SIXTO CASIN, PETITIONERS, VS. HERMOGENES CALUAG, JUDGE OF COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ALBAY, AND TEODORO REGALADO, RESPONDENTS.

This action entitled a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus is, in
fact and in law, an action of mandamus by the petitioner against the respondent
judge because the latter has refused to take cognizance of, and dismissed, The
action of quo warranto instituted by the petitioner against the
respondent Teodoro Regalado, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction as prayed for
by the latter in his motion to dismiss said action.

The petition for quo warranto alleges that the respondent Teodoro
Regalado is not eligible to the office of Mayor of Malinao, Albay, because of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, under the provisions of section
172 of the Revised Election Code.

The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the petitioner’s action on the
ground that the Court of First Instance of Albay has no jurisdiction to try and
decide the said action, because the People’s Court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the criminal action of treason instituted against the
respondent Teodoro Regalado, constituted by substantially the same acts of
disloyalty alleged in the petition of quo warranto, and the respondent
judge dismissed the petitioner’s claim as prayed for by the respondent
defendant.

It is our considered opinion that the Court of First Instance of Albay has
jurisdiction to try and decide the special civil action of quo warranto
independently from the criminal action for treason pending before the People’s
Court, and therefore the respondent judge failed to perform an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office as judge, that is, that
of taking cognizance of a case over which the court which he presides has
jurisdiction, and appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy in the present
case.

A person may be declared in a special civil action of quo warranto
to be disloyal to the Republic of the Philippines, which was denominated or
called the Commonwealth of the Philippines before the complete withdrawal of the
sovereignty of the United States from these Islands, and ineligible to hold
public office under section 172 of the Revised Election Code, if the
preponderance of evidence so shows, although said person has been or will be
acquitted of the crime of treason. Because the law provides as a ground of
disqualification, not the conviction of the candidate of the crime of treason or
any other act constituting disloyalty, but the mere fact of being disloyal.
Undoubtedly, the object of the law is to disqualify a person, who is shown to be
disloyal to the Government of the Philippines by a preponderance of evidence in
a quo warranto proceedings, to hold a public office in said government.
Of course, a person convicted of the crime of treason or any other offense
constituting disloyalty to the government is, a fortiori, disqualified to hold a
public office. Had the lawmakers intended to require conviction of disloyalty as
a ground for disqualification, it would have so expressly provided. For
instance, in a civil action for absolute divorce, the law requires conviction of
one of the spouses of the crime of adultery, and the mere fact that the husband
or wife has committed said crime is not sufficient for granting a divorce; while
under article 1433 in connection with article 105 of the Civil Code, the mere
commission of adultery, without necessity of conviction for the commission
thereof, is a sufficient ground for granting a petition for separation of
properties of husband and wife.

Under the Penal Code, conviction for treason requires the testimony of at
least two witnesses to an overt act or to each and every part or bit thereof;
while in a special civil action of quo warranto, as in all civil cases, a mere
preponderance of evidence is sufficient for granting the relief demanded. The
parties to the criminal action for treason against the respondent are the People
of the Philippines as prosecutor and Teodoro Regalado as defendant, while in the
case of quo warranto at bar the parties are the petitioner and the
respondent.

To construe section 172 of the Revised Election Law as requiring a previous
conviction of a crime constituting disloyalty to the government, would be to
thwart, partially or in toto, the purpose of the law. The law requires that a
quo warranto proceeding against a provincial or municipal officer on
the ground of ineligibility be decided within thirty days from the filing of the
complaint. It is of judicial notice that it would require quite a long period of
time before final conviction of a defendant in a criminal case may be secured;
and in the meantime such defendant, although disqualified for reason of
disloyalty, may continue holding possession of the office to which he has been
elected during the whole term or a greater portion thereof.

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the fact that there was pending
before the People’s Court a criminal action for treason against Teodoro Regalado
did not preclude the court presided by the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the quo warranto action against said Teodoro
Regalado.

Therefore, the respondent judge should and is ordered to proceed with the
trial of the case, with costs against the other respondent. So
ordered.

Pablo, Perfecto, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

FERIA, J.:

I certify that Justice Pedro Tuason concurs in this decision, but he does not
sign it because he went down to Manila.

Petition granted.