G.R. No. L-1663. March 31, 1948
FLORENTINA VILLAHERMOSA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
BENGZON, J.:
Manila Court of First Instance, denying the writ of habeas corpus requested by
Florentina Villahermosa on behalf of her son Delfin Co, who is under detention
by the immigration authorities for purposes of deportation.
In the night of March 24, 1947, a party of sixty-nine Chinese landed
clandestinely on the shores of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur, in an attempt to evade
our immigration laws. Leading them was Delfin Co, a young man, 18 years old,
born in Paniqui, Tarlac, of a Chinese father named Co Suy, alias Yu Kui, and
Florentina Villahermosa his wife. Co Suy died in July, 1940, and in February,
1946, Delfin left the Philippines for China on board the S/S Cushman as
a Chinese repatriate, in company with his relative Co Chi Pe. However, due to
financial difficulties in China he took steps to return; but having met a
Chinese (Co Soon Tiong), who informed him of a plan to smuggle their compatriots
into this country, he agreed to lead the party to Ilocos Sur where his mother
had relatives who could render valuable assistance. The voyage was undertaken;
but unfortunately, the immigrants were discovered and apprehended immediately
after arrival, and on the 27th day of March, Delfin Co was examined by the
Commissioner of Immigration. Formal investigation of the case began on April 10,
1947. Four days later, the corresponding board recommended that said Delfin Co
be deported to China as a Chinese citizen. The Commissioner of Immigration
agreed with the board, and, acting on this recommendation, rendered a decision
ordering deportation of Delfin Co.
It appears that on April 29, 1947, Florentine Villahermosa, after knowing the
apprehension of her son Delfin, filed in the civil registry of Tarlac under
Commonwealth Act No. 63 an oath of allegiance for the purpose of resuming her
Philippine citizenship which she had lost upon her marriage to Co Suy. On the
strength of such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by Florentina, it was
contended before the immigration authorities that Delfin, being a minor,
followed the citizenship of his mother, and was a national not subject to
deportation. These contentions were overruled. They were repeated before the
court of first instance in this habeas corpus proceeding and were likewise
rejected. Appellant stresses the same defense.
There are two reasons why Delfin Co must be returned to China. First, he is
not now a Philippine citizen; and second, granting that he is, at the time he
entered this country from China he was a Chinese subject to deportation, and any
subsequent change in his status can not erase the taint of his unlawful,
surreptitious entry.
Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution enumerates those who are citizens
of the Philippines, as follows:
“(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.“(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.“(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
“(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.“(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.”
Delfin Co’s claim to citizenship can only be predicated, if at all, on
paragraph 4 of the above section. But,being a minor, he has not had the
opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship, and therefore he is as yet an
alien, his father being a Chinese.
We have heretofore held [1] that, after
the Constitution, mere birth in the Philippines of a Chinese father and Filipino
mother does not ipso facto confer Philippine citizenship and that
jus sanguinis instead of jus soli is the predominating factor
on questions of citizenship, thereby rendering obsolete the decision in Roa
vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil., and U. S. vs. Lim Bin, 36
Phil., and similar cases on which petitioner’s counsel relies.
Nevertheless, it is contended that Florentina Villahermosa being a Filipina,
Delfin Co should likewise be.a Filipino. Commonwealth Act No. 63 does not
provide that upon repatriation of a Filipina her children acquire Philippine
citizenship. It would be illogical to consider Delfin as repatriated like his
mother, because he never was a Filipino citizen and could not have
reacquired such citizenship.
While his Chinese father lived, Delfin was not a Filipino. His mother was not
a Filipina: she was Chinese. After the death of such father, Villahermosa
continued to be a Chinese, until she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in
April, 1947. After that reacquisition Delfin could claim that his mother was a
Filipina within the meaning of paragraph 4, section 1 of Article IV of the
Constitution; but, according to that same Organic Act, he had to elect
Philippine citizenship upon attaining his majority. Until he becomes of age and
makes the election, he is the Chinese citizen that he was at the time of his
father’s demise [2].
It does not help petitioner’s case to assert that as a mother she has a right
to retain custody of her minor son and to keep him here. Where such son has
violated the immigration laws and rendered himself liable to deportation no rule
or principle should frustrate the Government’s action by the interposition of
the mother’s right to custody. This consideration becomes stronger where, as in
this case, the re-assumption of Philippine citizenship by Villahermosa has all
the earmarks of an attempt to impede the banishment of Delfin Co, who by the
way, besides being guilty of violating our laws, has not shown any signs of
eagerness to adopt our ways of life.
This petition is moreover to be denied on the strength of precedents
heretofore established, because Delfin was a Chinese when he arrived here; and
any posterior change of status can not affect the legality of his detention for
purposes of deportation.
In Juan Co vs. Rafferty, 14 Phil. 235, a Chinaman claimed the right
to enter the Islands, and being refused by the customs officials, gave bond that
he would present himself for deportation if the claim were disallowed. While
under bond, he was adopted as a son by another Chinaman domiciled herein, in
legal form. Held: He is subject to deportation, because such adoption had no
effect upon his right to enter or to remain in the Islands. This Court said that
the status of an immigrant and his right to stay here is to be determined as of
the time of his entry (U. S. vs. Ju-Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 263) and that
he could not do afterwards anything to render valid what was originally an
illegal entry.
“A Chinese person, not a merchant at the time he applies to enter the
Islands, will not be permitted to remain here upon the theory that he became a
merchant during the time he was waiting for the decision of the proper
authorities”. (Tan Guam Sien vs. Collector of Customs, 31.Phil. 56.)
(See also U. S. vs. Chan Sam, 17 Phil. 448)
that the child born of a Filipino mother married to a foreigner “is not yet a
Filipino” and “will be one if he prefers to be so upon reaching the age of
majority”. (Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p. 209).
We declare that Delfin Co is not now a Filipino. We also declare that he
having entered this country surreptitiously is subject to deportation.
The decision of the lower court denying his petition for habeas corpus is
affirmed. With costs.
Parás, Pablo, Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.
Paras,
J., I hereby certify that the Chief Justice voted to affirm the decision.
[¹] Tan Chong Hung v. Secretary of Labor, No. 47616,
September 16, 1947; 45 Off. Gaz., 1269.
[²] The debates of the Constitutional Convention
show that the child born of a Filipino mother married to a foreigner “is not yet
a Filipino” and “will be one if he prefers to be so upon reaching the age of
majority”. (Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p.
209.)
CONCURRING
HILADO, J.:
I concur in the foregoing decision. Besides, I will only point out that
petitioner, by the very purpose for which she filed the oath of allegiance
mentioned therein, made herself unworthy and disqualified to be repatriated
under Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Section 4 of said Act provides that repatriation sh shall be effected by
merely taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of the
Philippines (now Republic of the Philippines) and registration in the proper
civil registry. Allegiance requires the person pledging it, among other things,
to respect and obey the laws of the country to which the pledge is made. But
here the person taking the oath of allegiance did so for the express purpose of
legalizing, so to say, a most serious violation of the immigration laws of the
Philippines by her son. An oath of allegiance taken for that end is, if
anything, an affront to the sovereign, besides the criminal responsibilities it
entails.
DISSENTING
PERFECTO, J.:
The majority decision fails to abide by one of the elemental rules of law,
enunciated by human wisdom.
That rule is stated in Article 18 of the Civil Code as follows:
“Children, while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality
of their parents.”
That rule is reaffirmed by the Naturalization Law, No. 2927, as amended by
Act No. 3448. It provides that children under 20 years of age and residing in
the Philippines shall become citizens upon naturalization of their parents.
The rule is founded on human nature. Because minor children depend on their
parents for their sustenance, support and protection, it stands to reason that
they should follow the nationality of said parents. They have to live under the
same roof with their parents and as near enough to them t o enjoy patental care
and protection. Minor children have to follow their parents wherewer the latter,
by political, moral, mental and economic exigencies, have to establish their
abode.
To accept the majority’s position is to justify its inevitable consequences,
one of them being the possibility of a fratricidal battle, should the nation of
one happen to be at war with that of the other. One shudders at the mere thought
that parents, as soldiers of one belligerent nation, should fire in murderous
battle against their own children fighting in the enemy trenches, while the
children aim their guns at the very authors of their lives.
There is unanimity of opinion that petitioner Florentina Villahermosa is a
Filipino citizen. There is no question that she was born of Filipino parents in
Lapog, Ilocos Sur, in March, 1905. She is living in Paniqui, Tarlac, the
province of Ambassador Romulo. Since her birth she has resided in the
Philippines. She never went to China. She is a widow. She is the mother of
Delfin Co, a minor of 18 years. She is the mother of another minor named
Benjamin Co, who is living with her. There should not be any question that under
the above mentioned elemental rule of law and under express statutory
provisions, Delfin Co follows the nationality of his mother, His mother is a
Filipino citizen. Delfin Co is a Filipino citizen.
When on July 18, 1940, her Chinese husband died, Florentina Villahermosa must
have felt that she regained her Filipino citizenship. She was ignorant of the
provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 63, so she failed to file the oath of
allegiance required by it. Because her son came into trouble,she happened to
learn about the legal requirement and on March 25, 1947, ahel took the oath
which was filed:on the 29th of the same month with the Civil Registrar of
Paniqui, Tarlac.
That the purpose of said oath of allegiance is, by her repatriation, to keep
her son at her side and within the folds of this country, appears to have
provoked some indignation, as if petitioner has committed a crime or, at least,
a reprehensible act. There is absolutely no ground for taking such an attitude.
Petitioner had only exercised a right expressly granted to her by law. The
statutory provision does not deal with motives or purposes. It is as impersonal
as the constitutional provisions guaranteeing fundamental rights without taking
into consideration the purposes and motives for the exercise of said rights.
That petitioner had exercised a right expressly granted to her by law for the
benefit of her son or for the purpose of protecting him against an action
harmful to him, is only logical. There is nothing objectionable in her taking
advantage of the law to give tangible expression to her maternal love, which is,
without any doubt, universally considered the most sublime feeling nature has
infused on human heart. The feeling is so elemental that it is not unknown even
to the lowest phila of the animal kingdom. That even the fiercest wild animals
are not devoid of such feeling is a wonder that cannot fail to move the most
indifferent person. Many perceive in that fact the operation of an infinite
intelligence taking care of all living things.
That petitioner had only obeyed the mandates of nature, that she yielded to
an unconquerable feeling, the one most oraised by moralists, deified by
spiritual and religious leaders, the subject of glowing eulogium in eloquent
prose and inspired poetry, whenever and wherever literature has flourished,
instead of causing criticism, should only merit panegyric and be acclaimed, she
having followed the noblest impulses of her nature.
Since his birth on May 31, 1928, Delfin Co has been a resident of the
Philippines until February 2, 1946, when, probably yielding to the youthful lust
for adventure, without the consent or knowledge of her mother, he stealthily
went to China. Having returned on March 24, 1947, to the Philippines, his place
of residence, it is only natural that he should want to remain here and that his
mother should exert all efforts so that he should not go away again. By the
repatriation of Florentina Villahermosa, Delfin Co became ipso facto a
Filipino citizen. As a resident of the Philippines and as a Filipino citizen, he
is entitled to stay.
The unfortunate fact that a character by the name of Co Soon Tiong was able
to persuade him to help smuggle a bunch of Chinese into this country, by landing
them in Lapog, Ilocos Sur, in consideration of a free passage to the
Philippines, is no reason to deprive him of the right to remain in the country
of which he is a resident and a citizen.
There are indications that he is entitled to more pity than blame, by his
failure to resist the wiles of a scheming person, who took undue advantage of
his immaturity. His anxiousness to return to his country and be at his mother’s’
side must have been too strong for him to refuse a free passage, a mere pittance
when, as amply publicized, to secure entrance of Chinese immigrants, middlemen
or procurators earn thousands of pesos per person.
Did Delfin Co commit any crime or offense punishable by law? If he did, let
him be prosecuted and sentenced through due process of law, and if deportation
is the punishment provided by law by competent courts of justice, let the
judgment be rendered and enforced. But it is admitted on all sides that there is
no law punishing the act of Delfin of rendering help to the smuggling of a bunch
of Chinese in question. If he did not commit any crime or offense, only a
subverted sense of justice may justify punishing him with deportation.
We vote, with the revocation of the appealed order of the lower court, to
declare null and void the order of the Commission on Immigration deporting
Delfin Co to Amoy, China.
DISSENTING
TUASON, J.:
With regret I am constrained to disagree with the views of the majority. I
shall briefly state the reasons for my dissent.
- Article 18 of the Civil Code is explicit in its provision that “Children,
while they remain under parental authority, have the nationality of their
parents,” Delfin Co has become, in my opinion, a Filipino citizen by reason of
his mother’s reacquisition of Philippine citizenship after her husband’s death,
I see no difference, and no valid reason for differentiating, between a
legitimate child of a Filipino mother by a deceased foreign father and a
Filipino mother’s illegitimate child. The latter under the rules of
international law as well as the Civil Code takes the citizenship of its
mother.The intention of the framers of the Constitution to withhold
Philippine citizenship from the child of a Filipino mother and an alien father
until the child reaches the age of majority, does not create an exception to the
general rule. It is ny humble and considered opinion that the deferment of
conferring Filipino citizenship on such a child extends only to those cases in
which both parents are alive and retain their foreign nationality, or where the
father having died, the mother has not chosen to regain her original
citizenship.It is not good law which prevents the minor child of a
citizen of the country, a child to whom by law and by nature she owes
protection, from joining its parent. I do not believe that the Constitutional
Convention could ever have contemplated such an inadmissible and irrational
situation.I do not share the apprehension of some members of the Court
that if a child like Delfin Co should follow the citizenship of her mother his
citizenship would be at the mercy of being changed as often as its mother
changes her citizenship by marriage or otherwise. If that should happen, there
is nothing wrong or ridiculous about it. On the contrary, I think it is more in
accordance with natural law. That is what happens in the case of an illegitlmate
child of a Filipino mother marrying a foreigner or obtaining another
citizenship; and there is in this connection no perceptible difference between
an illegitimate child and a legitimate child whose father is dead. If a mother
can and wants to change her citizenship daily, certainly it is natural rather
than queer that her minor child, which depends upon her for care and support,
should not be left stranded.- The decision says: “This petition is moreover to be denied on the strength
of precedence heretofore established, because Delfin was a Chinese when he
arrived here; and any posterior change of status can not affect the legality of
his detention for the purposes of deportation.” I do not think this doctrine is
applicable to the present case. The principle established by the decisions cited
on this point is that an immigrant can not take advantage of his unlawful entry
to acquire the conditions imposed by the immigration laws. In the language of
this Court, (U. S. vs. Chan Sam, 17 Phil. 448-456), “to say to him
(immigrant) that if by any means he can gain an unlawful entry in the Islands he
will be relieved of the consequences flowing from his unlawful act if at any
time after he gains his unlawful entrance he changes his status and assumes the
occupation of one of the privileged classes, would be to set a premium on the
unlawful but successful evasion by Chinese laborers of the laws prohibiting
their entrance into the Islands.” And in Tan Guan Sien vs. Collector of
Customs, 31 Phil., 56, the Court had the same idea when it said, “The law does
not contemplate that Chinese persons may, by one method or another, gain en
entrance into the territory of the United States without the fsection six
certificate’, and after such entrance become such a merchant, and then as such,
insist upon his right to remain.” In these two cases, and in the case of Juan Co
vs. Rafferty, 14 Phil. 235, in which the immigrant was adopted by a
resident while the immigrants right to enter was under investigation, the
changes in the immigrant’s status were effected by him or with his intervention
and could not have been accomplished in his absence.In the case at hand the conversion of the immigrant to Philippine citizenship
was entirely independent of his will and of his presence in the Philippines. The
bond that binds the petitioner and her child existed before the latter entered
the Philippine territory and not from the date of her repatriation only. It is
the legal and absolute right of the immigrant’s mother to reclaim her Philippine
citizenship regardless of any mental reservation, her motives or her attitude
toward her country. The legality of her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
is nowhere challenged. Assuming then that Delfin Co’s nationality follows that
of his mother, as we believe it does, has Co forfeited his right to be with her
as a result of his entering the Philippines unlawfully? I know of no law which
sanctions such punishment for an immigrants fault. If, on the otherhand, the
theory is that the immigrant must first be purged of his sin by deportation
after which he may be allowed to come back and settle here, the Court would be
adopting an empty ceremony that would lead to no useful purpose nor enhance the
prestige of the administration of law.FERIA, J.:
I concur in this dissenting opinion.
Jugdement affirmed.