G.R. No. 30992. September 17, 1929
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF, VS. UY TIAM SU (ALIAS UY CHIN CHI), OFFENDED PARTY AND APPELLANT. GO HONG, TAN TEANG, LIM TIAP, TAN HOT (ALIAS TANG SENG), HONG …
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
the dismissal thereof, ordered by the Court of First Instance of Laguna
on December 4, 1928.
The appellant is one of the defendants in another case (G. R. No. 30991)[1] also dismissed by virtue of the aforementioned order. He assigns the following errors as committed by the court below.
“1. In practically rendering the order of Judge
Paredes ineffective, which held that there were grounds for proceeding
against Go Hong and others in the case of frustrated murder, and the
order of the said judge decreeing the joint trial of both cases.“2.
In granting the motion filed by provincial fiscal Martinez praying for
the dismissal of both cases in order that he might make another
investigation and file such information as he may deem proper.”
In September 17, 1928, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Laguna ordered the joint trial of the two
aforesaid cases, setting it for the following October 15th.
These cases being later transferred to Judge Jugo, the provincial fiscal filed a motion which reads as follows:
“1. That the undersigned has always opposed the
dismissal of either of these two cases, and has given his tacit consent
to the date set for a joint hearing thereof by Judge Paredes, in the bona fide belief
that such procedure adopted by said judge is not anomalous and
irregular; and, furthermore, that all interested parties were agreeable
to said hearing;“2. That judging by the order issued yesterday, this honorable court
is not agreeable that these two cases be tried jointly, as ordered by
said Judge Paredes;“3. That according to the tenor of said order, it appears that this
honorable court is not disposed to designate which of the two cases is
to be tried first;“4.
That the undersigned is of the humble opinion that the setting of a
date for the hearing of the cases is incumbent upon the clerk of this
honorable court.“Wherefore, and in conformity with the
aforementioned order of this honorable court, the undersigned
respectfully prays for the dismissal of both cases in order to make a
reinvestigation thereof for the purpose of filing only one criminal
action for the crime resulting from said reinvestigation.” (Pp. 117 and
118, original record.)
The defendants in both cases opposed said motion of the fiscal in
separate pleadings; but the court below granted it an its order of
December 4, 1928, which reads as follows:
“Considering that the informations in these two
cases are nothing more than the result of two absolutely contradictory
and irreconcilable versions of one and the same incident;“Considering
that the provincial fiscal cannot conduct the prosecution of these two
cases, inasmuch as it is evident that he cannot maintain and try to
convince the court of his absolutely antagonistic theories in said two
cases; and“Considering that the People of the Philippine
Islands, plaintiff in both cases, cannot sustain two prosecutions
incompatible with each other;“Wherefore, the court hereby
grants the motion of the prosecuting officer, praying for the
provisional dismissal of these two cases, to enable him to institute a
single criminal action for the crime resulting from his
reinvestigation.” (Pp. 130 and 131, original record.)
It is this order which the herein offended party and appellant prays be revoked, on the grounds mentioned above.
With respect to the motion of the provincial fiscal granted by the
order appealed from, we quote herewith and make a part hereof, the
following paragraphs contained in the judgment rendered by this court
in the other case, G. R. No. 30991:
“We believe that the fiscal had sufficient grounds
to ask the court for the dismissal of the two cases for the purpose of
reinvestigating them and to take such action as may be prompted by the
result of the reinvestigation.“Our conclusion is not exactly
based upon the facts and opinions set forth in the fiscal’s motion, but
rather on his object in asking for the dismissal, namely, to
investigate the case again and thereafter take such action as the
interests of justice may require; such an attitude indicated his
uncertainty as to which of the two cases was to be prosecuted.“Although this court held in the case of People vs. Mediavilla (52 Phil., 94), that:
”
‘CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; FILING OF DIFFERENT COMPLAINTS AGAINST GUILTY AND
OFFENDED PARTIES.—The filing of an information against some defendants
for the murder of an individual, and then another information for
frustrated homicide and less serious physical injuries against said
individual and others, because said individual had fired three shots at
one of his assailants with his revolver, and because another of the
defendants, the accused in the instant case, had wounded said
assailant, does not disqualify the prosecuting attorney from sustaining
said charges, because the accused in the one may be the offended
parties in the other and vice versa, nor does it violate professional
ethics which forbids an attorney to represent adverse interests, since
in both cases the prosecuting attorney represents the public;’
nevertheless, when the provincial fiscal, in view of the facts of the
cases, apprehends that it would be an absurdity on his part to conduct
both prosecutions, said officer, being responsible for the prosecution
of criminal cases (section 1681, Administrative Code; U. S. vs. Reyes, 20 Phil., 510; and U. S. vs.
Despabiladeras and Laxamana, 32 Phil., 442), has a right to investigate
the cases more thoroughly in order the better to conform his action and
attitude therein to the real facts, and to the dictates and
requirements of justice and the public interest.
“And in granting said motion of the provincial fiscal, the court did
no more than recognize the great responsibility devolving on him and
the rights it had in helping him in the better, performance of his
duties.”
If, as we have seen and held, the provincial fiscal had sufficient
legal grounds to ask for the provisional dismissal of the two cases,
referred to, the court below did not err in upholding said grounds and
granting the dismissal prayed for.
Neither the former order holding that there were grounds to
prosecute the case for frustrated murder, nor the latter order setting
a date for the joint trial of both cases, was a legal bar to such
action on the part of the court below. With regard to the first order,
it was given by the court before the trial of the case, that is, before
the evidence was taken, and hence, could not refer to anything else
than the merits of the information itself, which was the only datum
adduced at that time upon the merits of the case; whereas the fiscal
filed his motion, not to amend the terms of the information, but to
ascertain whether or not he could and should uphold both cases, or if
he could not, which of the two actions he ought to prosecute.
Therefore, the order appealed from cannot be said to affect the former
in so far as to prosecute the case on its merits, that is, to continue
the trial under that information.
As to the other previous order, setting a joint trial for both
cases, such an order may be set aside by another one, though the latter
be made by another judge of the same court. It should be remembered
that this is not a case of a resolution on the merits of both cases, or
on any of the questions raised therein. We are simply concerned with
the powers inherent in all courts to regulate the dispatch of cases
pending before them, among which is the power to set a date for the
trial of those cases. And in the very nature of things, an order
setting a date for trial is subject to unavoidable delay and defeat by
reason of divers contingencies which do not exist at the time of the
order, but may well arise thereafter, such as the death of the parties
or of any of them, the compromise and adjustment of differences, etc.,
etc. Final or provisional abandonment may also necessitate the setting
aside of an order assigning a case to trial, as in the case before us,
and it does not appear that such abandonment was considered by the
court below when the former order setting a date for the joint trial of
the two cases was made.
The interests of justice demand that the same court, whether or not
presided over by the same judge, be empowered to amend or annul, as
circumstances may require, orders of this kind, given by it in the
exercise of its inherent powers, and having no relation to the merits
of the case, nor to any of the questions raised in the action, and
specially such orders as are dependent on facts and circumstances in
their nature contingent. And this is so, because, as held in the case
of Shioji vs. Harvey (43 Phil., 333), every court has
inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.
A similar case was that of Nunez vs. Low (19 Phil., 244),
where, after a Judge of First Instance had issued an order
disqualifying the provincial fiscal and his assistant to prosecute a
criminal case, another judge of the same court set aside that order and
directed said fiscal and his assistant to proceed with the case. This
court held:
“* * * That the court issuing the annulling order
was the same court which issued the original order; it is not a
question of one judge issuing an order and another annulling it; it is
merely a question of the power of a Court of First Instance to issue
and then to annul such order. The fact that different judges took part
cannot alter or diminish the power of the court, which was one and the
same.”
The grounds of this appeal being insufficient, the order appealed
from is affirmed in all its parts, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
[1] People vs. Ong Eng, p. 544, ante.