G.R. No. 30668. August 28, 1929
SABAS BUSTAMANTE ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JOSE M. RATO Y TUASON ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.
STREET, J.:
in which Sabas Bustamante et al., appeared in the role of petitioners
and appellees against Jose Maria Tuason and others, appellants. The
litigation was then already eighteen years old; and, at the beginning
of the opinion in said case, it was observed by Justice Johnson, the
author of the opinion, that it had been commenced so long ago .that
perhaps it had been forgotten by many of the original litigants. In the
decision at first promulgated in that case by the first division of the
court the judgment of the trial court was affirmed, with the result
that the appellee, Sabas Bustamante and others, were adjudged to have
established the claims therein made by them. However, upon motion for
reconsideration and rehearing, the full court, comprising all the
justices of the court, as its personnel now exists, with the exception
of the author of this opinion, set aside the judgment previously
entered, and the defendant-appellants were absolved from all liability,
“without prejudice to the right of the appellees, if they have in fact
a contract for the purchase of any parcel of land within the Hacienda
Maysilo, to commence another action, to compel a compliance therewith,”[1]
The present litigation was instituted in conformity with the
reservation thus made; and it is obvious that the present action cannot
be maintained unless the fundamental condition expressed in said
reservation shall be established.
The original complaint, then, was filed in this case in March, 1925,
by Sabas Bustamante and numerous other persons, sixty-one in all,
according to the final amended complaint, for the purpose of compelling
the defendants Jose M. Rato y Tuason and others, as owners of the
Hacienda Maysilo, to execute a deed conveying to the plaintiffs lots
indicated by the numbers 25-A, 25-B, 25-C, 25-D, 25-E, 25-F and 25-G.
The complaint was at various times amended, but the litigation now
stands upon the amended complaint of December 5, 1925. The defendants,
except Jose M. Rato y Tuason, have been succeeded by the Philippine
Land Improvement Co. as owner of part of the land which is the subject
of the action. It results that Jose M. Rato y Tuason and the Philippine
Land Improvement Co. are the immediate and effective defendants in the
suit. The plaintiffs are in possession of the land for the forced
purchase of which this action was instituted; and inasmuch as the
defendants deny the plaintiffs’ right, a cross-complaint was filed by
the defendants in connection with their answer asking for recovery of
possession and for judgment for the value of use and occupation during
the time the property has been held by the plaintiffs.
Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found that the condition laid
down by this court in the reservation contained in the dispositive part
of the decision in G. R, No. 22510 (supra) had not been
fulfilled, and that as a consequence the plaintiffs had not established
a right to specific performance of their alleged contract of purchase.
He therefore ordered that the defendants be absolved from the
complaint. Furthermore, in pursuance of the prayer contained in the
cross-complaint he ordered the plaintiffs to surrender to the defendants
the possession of the parcels of land held by them, within the subject
of controversy, and condemned the plaintiffs to pay to Jose M. Rato y
Tuason and to the Philippine Land Improvement Co., severally, the sums
of money indicated in the schedule annexed to the decision, and
required the plaintiffs further, from January 1, 1928, to pay, during
continuance of their occupation, to the said Jose M. Rato y Tuason and
Philippine Land Improvement Co. the sum of fourteen pesos, per annum,
per hectare for the land which they are occupying, in the character of
rent or for use and occupation. Finally the plaintiffs were adjudged to
pay the costs of the action.
It is worth observing that during the period of more than twenty
years covered in one way or another by this controversy there have been
two decisions made by the Court of First Instance and two decisions in
this court; and while the first pronouncements of the Court of First
Instance and of this court were favorable to the appellants, the last
words spoken by this court and by the Court of First Instance were
favorable to the present appellees, defendants in the action.
The opinion which is the subject of this appeal, comprised in pages
128-164, inclusive, of the bill of exceptions, contains a careful and
elaborate exposition of the facts and law of the case; and although
said opinion naturally does not meet with favor at the hands of the
attorneys for the appellants, we are nevertheless of the opinion that
the conclusions stated therein are sound and irrefutable. What is
briefly said in this opinion must therefore be considered to be merely
supplemental to the exposition contained in the appealed decision.
As already observed, the reservation contained in our decision of
February 6, 1925, by virtue of which reservation alone this action was
instituted, proceeded on the assumption that, in order to succeed, the
plaintiffs must show that they have an enforceable contract for the
purchase of the land concerned in this action. It is now notorious in
this record that there is no written contract in existence purporting
to give the plaintiffs the right to purchase any land. But by an
elaborate system of representation, the plaintiffs seek to insinuate
themselves into a right acquired by Apolinario Baltazar, successor of
Silverio Baltazar, by virtue of a receipt (Exhibit F) executed in
representation of the defendants by Tomas Arguelles on December 22,
1910. This receipt is of the following tenor:
“He recibido del Sr. Apolinario Baltazar la cantidad de ciento ochenta pesos a cuenta del importe de cinco parcelas dentro del municipio de Caloocan, provincia de Rizal.”
It is not questioned that Tomas Arguelles had authority to bind the
defendants and that the owners were bound, by virtue of that receipt,
to convey to him five (parcels of land. But two things appear
incontrovertibly in the case which are fatal to the plaintiffs’
contention. The first is that the representatives of the estate have
complied with the obligation which was assumed by virtue of said
receipt by conveying to Apolinario Baltazar certain parcels of land
which were accepted by him in complete satisfaction of the obligation
indicated in the receipt. Furthermore, the receipt shows on its face
that the obligation assumed was to Baltazar personally, and not to
Baltazar as representative of other persons. Nor is there any
satisfactory proof tending to show that, at any time before the
obligation was satisfied, the representatives of the defendants had any
reason to know, or suspect, that Baltazar was acting in a
representative capacity for the plaintiffs only. In this respect the
case resembles that of Dizon vs. Rivera (48 Phil., 996),
which was an action against the same estate based on similar grounds to
this, and in which this court refused to sustain the contention of the
plaintiffs. It is in our opinion likewise impossible to sustain the
contention of the appellants.
The voluminous record contains a number of collateral considerations
and questions, but we are of the opinion that at heart the case depends
upon lack of privity between the plaintiff-appellants and the contract
under which they seek to enforce their supposed rights. The action for
specific performance therefore fails.
In the twelfth assignment of error the appellants raise a question
as to the liability of the plaintiff-appellants for the several sums
for which the trial court gave judgment, under the crosscomplaint, in
favor of the defendants, in the character of rent or compensation for
use and occupation. In this connection it must be borne in mind that
this is an action for specific performance of a contract of sale. The
plaintiffs are not questioning, and have not questioned, the title of
the appellees to any of the property involved in this lawsuit; and
inasmuch as possession on the part of the appellants is admitted, it
results that, upon failure of the action for specific performance, the
defendants are entitled, under their cross-complaint, to obtain
compensation for use and occupation, without being able to take
advantage of their claim that they have had possession in good faith.
The judgment appealed from must be affirmed, and it is so ordered, with costs against the appellants.
Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
[1] Not reported.
[1]Bustamante vs. Tuason (47 Phil., 433).