CLARO VILLAROSA ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. ULDARICO VILLAMOR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

The appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment appealed from,
absolving defendant Uldarico Villamor from the complaint, and
plaintiffs Claro Villarosa and Maria Capistrano, from the defendant’s
counterclaim, without special pronouncement of costs, alleging that the
trial court erred:

“1. In not permitting the introduction of evidence
on the fact that on July 26, 1924, Claro Villarosa was in the
municipality of Guinayangan, Tayabas, Philippine Islands.

“2.
In holding that the instrument marked Exhibit A in connection with the
instrument marked Exhibits B, C and E is a sale subject to repurchase.

“3.
In not holding that the instrument marked A is false and does not
express the true intention of the parties and that a condition for the
repurchase was an accounting by the appellee.

“4. In holding
that appellee Uldarico Villamor delivered to appellant Claro Villarosa
the sum of P1,000 including the amount of P140, after the execution of
the instruments marked Exhibits A and B.

“5. In holding that the sum of P2,000 mentioned in the promissory note Exhibit C has been paid.

“6. In holding that the second cause of action is groundless.

“7. In holding that the third cause of action is also groundless.

“8. In absolving the defendant from the complaint.

“9. In denying the motion for a new trial.”

On May 12, 1919, the plaintiffs sold the three parcels of land
described in the complaint to the defendant for the sum of P3,000, the
proper deed of sale, Exhibit A, being executed in favor of the vendee.
On the same date, Uldarico Villamor, the vendee, subscribed the
document Exhibit B before a notary public, stating that he had
purchased three parcels of land from Claro Villarosa for P3,000, and
binding himself, for friendship’s sake, to resell or bring about the
resale of said three parcels to said vendor, Claro Villarosa, for the
said price of P3,000 on or about May 12, 1921, that is, after two years
from the date of the contract Exhibit A.

The plaintiffs allege as the first cause of action that the
instrument Exhibit A is false and pray for the cancellation thereof and
damages in the amount of P5,000. As the second cause of action, they
allege that plaintiff Maria C. de Villarosa is the owner of the land
described in the complaint, whereon is built a house of strong
material, and that the defendant, pretending to be the owner of
one-half of said house, had said half demolished by means of violence,
and on this ground the plaintiffs ask for the payment of P2,000 plus
damages as suffered by the plaintiff on account of her illness brought
about by this act of the defendant, in the amount of P4,000. And as the
third cause of action, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant brought
suit against them in the justice of the peace court, for the purpose of
injuring and subjecting to a judicial pronouncement the honesty and
reputation of the plaintiffs, and for this act of defendant’s they pray
that he be sentenced to pay P6,000.

The defendant answered with a general and specific denial of the
facts alleged in the complaint, and in a counter-claim demanded the
payment of P1,716.76 for the products of the lands appropriated by the
plaintiffs, plus P1,500 damages.

After trial, the court below held:

“The following facts have been verified and are even
admitted by the plaintiffs in general, and particularly by plaintiff
Claro Villarosa, that by virtue of the sale evidenced by Exhibit A and
Exhibit B, defendant Villamor delivered, as part payment of the price,
P1,000 including the P140 payment by him in advance on May 9, 1919, and
in addition a promissory note in the amount of P2,000 for the balance
of the price of the lands sold. In connection with said P2,000, it has
been proven by the defendant’s evidence, including the instrument
Exhibit 1, whose genuineness is admitted by plaintiff Villarosa that
this amount was paid by the defendant with money borrowed in Manila.
There is, then, no doubt that defendant Villamor performed his part of
the obligation to pay the price of P3,000 of the realty sold, under
sales contracts Exhibits A and B.”

And with respect to plaintiff Claro Villarosa’s statement that the
sale was merely a contract of guaranty which he signed in the presence
of a notary public, believing Uldarico Villamor’s assurances that as a compadre
of his, he would not deceive him, and that he was induced to run for
municipal president of Lopez by said defendant, who offered to furnish
the money needed, and that a meeting was held to announce his candidacy
to the people of Lopez; that, while there, the defendant read to him a
document containing the description of his lands, and that he would
supply the expenses for his candidacy, and that Villarosa would only
execute in his favor a contract of guaranty, the trial court, after
observing how said witness testified, concluded that said testimony did
not deserve full credit, considering that plaintiff Claro Villarosa is a
man with a certain amount of culture, being acquainted with and able to
express himself in Spanish, and that he could not easily be deceived.
And the trial court rightly believed that the contract, as set forth in
Exhibit A and modified by Exhibit B, was duly entered into, and that it
is not a guaranty but a sale subject to repurchase.

We have studied the record before us and have found nothing to
warrant a reversal of the conclusion reached by the court below. The
plaintiff denied that he received the purchase price of the lands in
question, but his mere denial cannot weaken the affirmative evidence
adduced by the defendant in regard to the delivery of the P3,000. The
record shows, and the trial court has so held, that at the execution of
the contract Exhibit A, the defendant gave the plaintiff a part of the
price, that is, P1,000, including the P140 advanced by him; and
according to Exhibit 1, acknowledged by the plaintiff the latter
received P2,000 from the defendant to complete the payment of the lands
on May 21, 1919.

The plaintiff insists that the defendant prepared the list of the
expenses for his candidacy, Exhibit E, totaling P1,000, and that he
questions some of the items therein contained. The defendant explains
that this list was prepared by both of them for the sole purpose of
satisfying the plaintiff’s wife, who thought it strange that so much
should have been spent for her husband’s candidacy.

Be that as it may, we are of opinion, in view of the contradictory
testimony of plaintiff and defendant, that the latter did in fact ask
for some money from the former in order to meet the expenses of the
election campaign, but that although he was one of that candidate’s
leaders, there is no reason to believe that he undertook to defray the
expenses required to support the candidacy. We believe that the
plaintiff, being in need of money to meet the expenses of his candidacy
in 1919, entered into the contract evidenced by Exhibit A with the
defendant, selling him the three parcels of land described in said
instrument, and that as he failed to repurchase said lands within the
period of two years granted him by the defendant according to Exhibit
B, the sale was consolidated and the ownership of said lands vested in
the vendee, defendant herein. For those accustomed to deal with such
questions, there is nothing strange in what happened to the plaintiff.
It often happens that election candidates pledge their property in
order to be able to defray the expenses of a political campaign, and
unfortunately for the plaintiff, besides losing in that election, he
lost his property and the property of his wife, the other plaintiff.

In support of their contention that the contract between them and
the defendant upon the lands in question is only a mortgage or guaranty
and not a sale, the plaintiffs allege that said lands are worth more
than P10,000, one of the parcels being planted with 650 coconut trees
and the other with 200. The only evidence of this fact presented by the
plaintiffs is the testimony of plaintiff Claro Villarosa himself. But
against his testimony, we have that of the defendant, according to
which, one of the parcels of land contains only 190 coconut trees, and
the other 60, and that the value of the whole, including the land in
the town, is only P1,700. Neither party has presented a tax declaration
of real property. But allowing for the exaggeration in the declarations
of both parties, we incline to the belief that said lands are worth
more than what the defendant states but less than what the plaintiff
alleges. And, considering the straits in which the vendor found himself
at the time, there is nothing strange in his selling his property for
less than its full value.

Another point that it would be well to take up, is the fact that the
defendant did not take possession of the lands sold at the time the
contract of sale was entered into. The explanation for this is given
by the defendant, namely, that during the period for redemption he
permitted the plaintiffs to continue in possession of the land on
condition that he would share with them in its products. This is not
unusual in such contracts. At all events, we find in the record an
agreement of the parties to the effect that the lands in question have
been in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiffs until the end of
August, 1921, and that the defendant then entered into the possession
and enjoyment of said lands until the present date. It must be
remembered, in this connection, that the period for redemption expired
on May 21, 1921.

In regard to the second cause of action, that is, the defendant’s
destruction of one-half of the house built on the plaintiffs’ land, the
trial court also held that it was proved that said half of the house in
question belongs to the defendant and his wife, Alfonsa Santamaria,
having been purchased from the spouses Ramon Capusion and Nieves
Villamor who, in turn, acquired it from the original owners, Ines
Clarin and Rosario Capistrano. This conclusion of the trial court finds
ample support in the defendant’s Exhibits 3, 4 and 5.

And with respect to the third cause of action, the trial court held
that being a consequence of the first and second, it is groundless. We
find no argument in the appellants’ brief against this conclusion of
the court below. Considering the defendant’s counterclaim as not
proven, the trial court rendered judgment absolving defendant Uldarico
Villamor from the complaint, and plaintiffs Claro Villarosa and Maria
Capistrano from the counterclaim, without express pronouncement as to
costs.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from should be, as
it is hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Johnson, Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.