THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GABRIEL HERNANDEZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The
appellant herein was charged with alleged violation of section 2659 of
the Administrative Code of 1917, as amended by Act No. 3387, in a
complaint filed by a private individual in the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Norte, on April 4, 1932. Later an information for the same
offense was filed against him by the provincial fiscal thereof and he
was sentenced by the said court to imprisonment for one month, to pay a
fine in the sum of one hundred pesos (P100) or to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, to suffer deprivation of the right
of suffrage and disqualification from public office for a period of one
year, and to pay the costs.

The defendant appealed from the aforesaid judgment alleging as his grounds that the court a quo erred as follows:

“I.
In holding that section 407 of the Administrative Code (Election Law)
disqualifies the defendant from assuming the office of provincial
governor of Camarines Norte on October 16, 1931.

“II. In
holding that the penalty prescribed in section 2659 of the
Administrative Code, qualifying him as a violator of section 407
thereof, is the one applicable to the defendant herein.

“III. In holding that Exhibit 1 was not sufficient to show the
defendant’s good faith in assuming the office of provincial governor of
Camarines Norte on October 16, 1931, without first having paid his
delinquent land taxes.

“IV. In sentencing the defendant
to suffer imprisonment for one month, to pay a fine of one hundred
pesos (P100) or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
in the payment of the said fine, and in depriving said defendant of his
right of suffrage with disqualification from public office for the
period of one year.

“V. In not absolving the defendant from the alleged offense as charged, and

“VI. In denying his motion for a new trial.”

The appellant admits that he was a candidate for governor of the
Province of Camarines Norte in the general elections held on June 2,
1931, and that he was eligible for the said office; that he obtained a
majority vote in the said election; that he assumed the office of
governor of the aforesaid province on October 16, 1931, at which time
he was delinquent in the payment of the sum of two thousand pesos
(P2,000) for land taxes to the Government. It also appears from the
evidence presented by the prosecution, and uncontradicted by that of
the defense, that two or three days before the appellant assumed said
office, the municipal treasurer of Daet, Camarines Norte, acting under
instructions received by him in a communication from the provincial
treasurer of said province, demanded, through his representative, that
the appellant pay the land taxes then due and that, notwithstanding his
demand, said appellant failed to pay not only the whole but even a part
of the tax in question.

Exhibit 3 of the defense shows that
upon petition of the appellant dated October 17, 1931, the Insular
Auditor, in a communication of the 26th of the said month and year,
permitted him to receive his salary as such provincial governor of
Camarines Norte on condition that he would apply whatever he received
as such salary to the payment of his delinquent taxes.

Exhibits 1, 7 and 2 and the appellant’s testimony prove that prior to
his assumption of office he came to Manila to obtain information from
the Chief of the Executive Bureau whether or not he could assume the
office to which he had been elected, notwithstanding his delinquency in
the payment of his land taxes. In answer to his query, he was then
informed that although his failure to pay the land taxes in question
did not incapacitate him from so doing, however, it was his duty to pay
them beforehand for the sake of order and public interest. Said
Exhibits 1, 7 and 2 are copies of communications exchanged between the
outgoing governor of Camarines Norte,—who had discussed the matter
generally—and the aforesaid Chief of the Executive Bureau. It may be
said that in resolving the appellant’s question as hereinbefore stated,
the aforesaid office further provided him with the above-mentioned
documents for his information.

Exhibit 8 is a telegram of
the then Attorney-General, Delfin Jaranilla, instructing the provincial
fiscal of Camarines Norte to refrain from filing any charges for
violation of section 2659 of the Administrative Code, unless such
alleged violation was the result of a voluntary act.

The
evidence shows that in August or September, 1932, the appellant had
already paid everything due from him by way of land taxes with his
salary as provincial governor of Camarines Norte, and that at present
he owes absolutely nothing under such concept.

Upon
consideration of the foregoing statements, it will be seen that, before
the appellant assumed the office to which he had been elected, he
sought information as to whether or not he could do so from the
authorities who were in a position to solve his situation. The Chief of
the Executive Bureau gave him the same information as that given in
Exhibit 1 to Governor Balce, whom the appellant succeeded in office,
which information was to the effect that although the latter was at
that time delinquent in the payment of his land taxes it did not
incapacitate him from assuming office. However, he was advised to try
his best to pay them.

It may be said that far from violating
the law voluntarily, the appellant assumed office under the absolute
conviction that he was not violating it. The truth of this statement
becomes the more apparent when we consider the fact that in deciding
similar questions, the Executive Bureau, as well as the Department of
the Interior and the Attorney-General, interpreting section 2659 of the
Administrative Code, held that delinquency in the payment of taxes did
not bar an officer-elect from entering upon the performance of his
duties.

“Section 2659 of the Election Law,
in our opinion, refers and applies only to those persons who are
ineligible or disqualified to hold office for not possessing the
necessary qualifications provided for by law. In other words, said
section 2659 should be interpreted not in connection with section 407
but With sections 113 or 120 of the Election Law, depending as to
whether the person in question is a senator-elect or
representative-elect, and section 404 seq. and 431 and 432 of said law.
Said section 2659, as its very words indicate, refers to a person who
assumes the office to which he had been elected without possessing the
necessary qualifications to hold public office as provided by law. * *
*.” (Op. Department of the Interior, Sept. 5, 1928; see Exhibit D.)

“An
elected municipal councillor who assumed office without having paid his
cedula tax for two years is not liable to criminal prosecution under
section 2659 of the Administrative Code. Delinquency in the payment of
taxes will not deprive him from being a qualified voter and entitled to
assume office. Act No. 3030 has impliedly repealed section 407, because
disqualification incident to the nonpayment of taxes is not specified
therein.” (Op. Atty.-General, Dec. 13, 1922.)

“A municipal
councillor who is delinquent in the payment of his taxes and assumes
office before having paid said taxes is not liable to prosecution under
this section (section 2659). Delinquency in the payment of taxes is no
longer a disqualification for assuming a public office. Section 407 has
been impliedly repealed.” (Op. Atty. General, March 28, 1923.)

Being undoubtedly of the same opinion, the Insular Auditor, in his
afore-cited communication to the appellant, dated October 26, 1931
(Exhibit 3), authorized the latter to collect his salary on condition
that he would faithfully apply it to the payment of his delinquent
taxes.

Under these circumstances, we should follow the doctrine laid down in the cases of Molina vs.
Rafferty (37 Phil., 545, and 38 Phil., 167), among others, to the
effect that long continued administrative interpretation of a tax law,
while not conclusive, should be followed unless clearly erroneous, and
we are of the opinion that it is not so in this case.

Having
arrived at this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass upon the
question whether or not the penalty provided in section 2659 of the
Administrative Code is applicable to an officer-elect who violates the
provisions of section 407 of the said Code.

The fact that
the information was filed in court on a complaint by a private
individual is of no consequence for the reason that, as has been held
in the case of United States vs. Yu Tuico (34 Phil., 209),
except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint
that a public crime has been committed can be laid by any competent
person. Furthermore, in the case of United States vs. Narvas (14 Phil., 410), this court, among other things, said the following:

“*
* * Such complaint is the process which begins the action and gives the
court or magistrate jurisdiction of the person of the defendant and the
subject matter of the action. Where such complaint has been presented
no other or further pleading on the part of the government is
necessary. The prosecution proceeds upon the complaint alone. In the
second place the action may be commenced by the promoter fiscal by
presenting to the court and filing with the clerk thereof the
information defined and set forth in the section above-quoted (section
5, General Orders, No. 58). In that case such information is the
process which institutes the action and the prosecution proceeds upon
it as the people’s pleading. It is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute
the action, whether commenced by complaint or information. This enables
him to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons.”

There is really nothing in the record to show the reason why some
private attorneys took charge of presenting Government evidence and of
cross-examining the witnesses for the defense. However, it shows that
the fiscal was present and that he further testified in the case as one
of the witnesses for the defense. It may therefore be reasonable to
suppose that the trial was conducted with the acquiescence and under
the supervision of the said officer. This, of course, cured whatever
defect there might have been in the procedure followed therein. There
is no question that the court a quo had original jurisdiction
to try the case inasmuch as the crime charged carries with it a penalty
the maximum degree of which exceeds one year and a fine of two hundred
pesos.

We are of the opinion, and so hold that the appellant
herein should be absolved from the complaint. Wherefore, reversing the
judgment appealed from, the appellant is hereby absolved from the
alleged violation of the law with which he was charged, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Street, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.