G.R. No. 37590. December 21, 1933
JOSE FERNANDO RODRIGO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. CONCEPCION CABIGAO AND LUIS IZQUIERDO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
IMPERIAL, J.:
action brought by the plaintiff arose from the relation of attorney and
client between the parties and the deceased Tomas Cabigao.
After the trial and upon consideration of the voluminous evidence
presented, the court rendered judgment ordering the defendants to pay
the sum of P2,500 to the plaintiff and dismissing the numerous
counterclaims and cross-complaints filed by the said defendants,
without costs. Both parties to the suit were not satisfied with the
judgment thus rendered and appealed therefrom.
The facts in
controversy are varied but all of them hinge upon the fees claimed, the
reasonable value of the services rendered, the nature of such services
and the accuracy and feasibility of the counterclaims and
cross-complaints. As they are interesting and because they clearly
summarize all the questions involved in the case we are reproducing the
conclusions of fact and of law arrived at by the trial court, to wit:
“The amount claimed by the plaintiff as presented under different items is as follows:
representing the unpaid balance of the promissory note, Exhibit M, the translation of which reads as follows: ” ‘We, the spouses Luis Izquierdo and Concepcion
Cabigao, hereby acknowledge being indebted in the sum of twenty seven
thousand pesos (P27,000) to Mr. Jose Fernando Rodrigo, for professional
services rendered in connection with all our cases from the year 1917
up to * * * together with those pending both in the Supreme Court and
in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The amount which will result
from our liquidation of the different sums he had received during the
lifetime of our father Tomas Cabigao, as well as during the time he had
been acting as judicial administrator of his testamentary estate, will
be deducted therefrom. This debt shall be paid upon the termination of
the testamentary proceedings as well as the pending litigations.” ‘In witness whereof, we hereunto affix our signatures this 7th day of August, 1926, at Bulacan, Bulacan, P. I.
CONCEPCION CABIGAO “ ” ‘LUIS IZQUIERDO’
for
services rendered and for money advanced in civil case No. 6788 of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, entitled Jose Zulueta, plaintiff, vs. Luis Izquierdo and Concepcion Cabigao, defendants.for fees in civil case No. 64206 of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila, entitled Maria Magtunao, plaintiff, vs. Concepcion Cabigao, defendant. deposited with him to be applied to the unpaid balance of the promissory note quoted above. “The
defendants Cabigao and Izquierdo, in turn, allege by way of special
defense, that the above-quoted promissory note was null and void on the
alleged ground that it was executed during the time the relation of
attorney and client still subsisted between them and the plaintiff;
that the amount thereof was excessive and unjust and that it had been
obtained by the plaintiff under the pretext of needing it to pacify
impatient creditors and for the purpose of ‘showing off’ as being among
those who earn fat fees; that the alleged services rendered by the
plaintiff were worth only P3,000; that part of the alleged fees
relative to the testamentary proceedings of Tomas Cabigao has already
prescribed on the ground that it had not been presented to the
committee on claims and appraisal; that the promissory note has not yet
become due on the alleged ground that civil cases Nos. 2039 and 3397
are still pending on appeal in the Supreme Court. In their
cross-complaint and by way of counterclaim they seek to recover the
following:
for
fees already collected and loans contracted by the plaintiff since the
year 1916, in excess of the sum of P3,000 which is the actual value of
his services.as indemnity for the poor defense he set up in case No. 2029, entitled Petrona Lim vs. Tomas Cabigao, which resulted in their being ordered to pay P12,200 instead of collecting said amount. for
damages suffered (by the defendants) through the negligence of the
plaintiff in the discharge of his duties as attorney in civil case No.
3590, entitled Eugenio Lim Pineda vs. The defendants.for
having been ordered to pay the total amount of P2,400 in the case of
Jose C. Zulueta in consequence of the plaintiff’s inexperience and
negligence as attorney. “P5,000, which they had to pay to Andres
Pascual because the plaintiff leased two fish-ponds belonging to the
intestate estate of Tomas Cabigao for P3,000, without permission of the
court.“FACTS
“It
is a proven fact that three years after he had been qualified by the
Supreme Court to practice his law profession, in or about the year
1918, the plaintiff herein met Tomas Cabigao, father of the defendant
Concepcion Cabigao, during one of said Tomas Cabigao’s trips from
Bulacan to Manila. Having introduced himself as a relative of said
Tomas’ wife who is Concepcion Cabigao’s mother, he offered his services
as attorney in the cases they might then have. In consequence, he was
entrusted with the study of a contract they had executed in connection
with some nipa land to be converted into a fish-pond for the reason
that the nipa land, in the state it was then, had very little value.
This instrument gave rise to case No. 2029 and to several other cases
which will be discussed later. The plaintiff had won the confidence of
the Cabigaos and thenceforth they entrusted him with other cases, among
which were those designated as Nos. 3397, 2039, 3111, 3590, 255 and
2067. In all the above cases, the plaintiff intervened either alone or
with the aid of other attorneys and until the year 1926 he did not have
any definite understanding with the Cabigaos regarding the amount of
his fees. In September, 1922, while many of the above cases were still
pending, Tomas Cabigao died and the plaintiff instituted proceedings in
case No. 2710 .for the probate of the will left by him. The plaintiff
was appointed administrator and although he did not actually manage the
testamentary estate for the reason that it was under Cabigao’s charge,
he had been receiving collections from lands under litigation or from
those under lease, which had to be paid to the legal representative of
the testamentary estate.“The plaintiff discharged his
duties as such administrator for four years. He never kept account of
his administration during that period of time and, although he used to
deposit the amounts he received as such in the bank, he did not do so
in the name of the estate he represented but in his own name. Neither
did he render any accounting thereof.“Although she did not
require the keeping of an account, the defendant Concepcion Cabigao,
who was instituted universal heir of the estate left by the deceased
Tomas Cabigao under his will, was continuously and constantly receiving
money from the plaintiff on account of her participation, issuing
receipts therefor when asked to do so, and relying upon the former’s
notes when otherwise. Neither did she keep an account of what she
received. The result was that neither one (plaintiff and defendant)
could balance his or her accounts and this led to constant disputes
which took place when, for one reason or another, the plaintiff could
not attend to the defendant’s demands or when he charged sums, which
she claimed not to have received, to her account. To obviate such
inconvenience both agreed to terminate the testamentary proceedings and
to straighten out their transactions. This opportunity was taken
advantage of to determine the amount of the plaintiff’s fees. As a
result the promissory note, Exhibit M, was executed, reserving the
balancing of the accounts of the administration for a later date. How
this balance was arrived at cannot be ascertained but it is assumed
that steps had been taken to that effect inasmuch as two days after the
promissory note was signed, the defendant Cabigao signed Exhibit O
which terminated the testamentary proceedings as she had requested,
stating therein that she had no objection to the acts of the plaintiff
as administrator and relieving him of all responsibility, not only
relative to the inventory but also to the accounts of the
administration. This document itself shows that Exhibit M was executed
on August 7, 1926, and the instrument Exhibit O was signed two days
later, that is, on August 9, 1926.“Sometime later,
Concepcion Cabigao had several cases for which she retained the
services of the herein plaintiff. Among the said cases were those
designated as No. 6703 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, No.
64206 of the Municipal Court of the City of Manila, and No. 3390 of the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan. She never had any litigation
regarding fees with him until the institution of the present action. On
the other hand, her other attorneys Messrs. Feria and Zulueta were
compelled to file complaints against her the former for the recovery of
an unpaid balance of his fees, in the sum of P500, and the latter, the
total amount of his fees, which were first appraised at more than
P6,000, but which were reduced to approximately one half that amount
under a judgment based upon an agreement of the parties.“The
relations between the plaintiff and the defendants, which began in the
year 1918, had been pleasant and did not become disagreeable until
after the year 1927 when their last suits were terminated and the
plaintiff claimed the right to retain some credits payable to the
defendants. which were deposited with the Court of First Instance. Such
relations, however, were not entirely severed until the occurrence of
the following incident: The defendants had delivered to the plaintiff
herein a certain amount of money with which to settle amicably a case
against one Eugenio Lim Pineda. The plaintiff, who had received the
money in question under promise to settle the case, did not do so, for
some reason or other, yet he did not return the money turned over to
him for that purpose, on time. The defendants, therefore, became
disgusted with his conduct. The intervention of an attorney who fanned
the flame of discord, precipitated the formal break. The defendants
filed charges for malpractice against the plaintiff and the latter, in
retaliation, filed the present complaint which gave rise to the
proceedings now under consideration.“Before the filing of
the complaint, the defendants never questioned the validity of the
promissory note, Exhibit M. Although they did not pay regularly and
were only forced to do so because the plaintiff took advantage of every
opportunity to collect on account, they had to conform thereto but not
without reluctance (see document 1-Q), and were able to pay
around ten thousand pesos (P10,000) on account of the promissory note
in question. By reason of their displeasure in the Lim Pineda case,
they felt that they had already paid him enough and demanded the return
of the promissory note to them. Neither did they bring an action for
nullity in order to be relieved from the effects of said promissory
note.“The case was called for trial after many
postponements. Collation was1 made of former transactions and accounts
carried before the termination of the testamentary proceedings of Tomas
Cabigao, that is, in or about the year 1926, before the execution of
Exhibit M and the filing of the document Exhibit O which terminated the
said testamentary proceedings.“The undersigned, who penned
this decision, had heard the oral testimony of both parties and duly
considered all vouchers attached to the records of the case, and had
not found any possibility of balancing said accounts, even
approximately, on the ground that each party has tried his best to
augment each item in his favor, even against his positive knowledge
that it was duplicated, and attempted to distort and alter the facts
thereof in order to justify his alleged credits, particularly those the
genuineness of which were not attested by the signature of the adverse
party. After the lapse of 5 or 6 years from the termination of a
testamentary proceeding (1926 to 1931), it becomes impossible to
ascertain what took place before it. To claim to have gathered all
vouchers therein when there are strong reasons to believe that many of
them have been lost, if not destroyed, is too much pretension which may
result in nothing more than mere gossip and malicious insinuations, and
countenance the much abused practice of ‘laying the whole blame upon
the other fellow.’“Under such circumstances, the
undersigned confesses that he is not in a position to administer strict
justice in the present case, and that, inasmuch as he is compelled to
render judgment herein, he has no other alternative except to resort to
equity and take advantage of presumptions inferable from acts as
admitted by each party.“No question relative to accounts
previous to the termination of the testamentary proceedings of Tomas
Cabigao can be raised in this case. All that had been done in
connection with debts and collections in favor of or against each
party, prior to that date, was settled with the termination of the
testamentary proceedings of Tomas Cabigao, case No. 2710, on the ground
that the document Exhibit O had relieved the plaintiff of all
responsibility relative to inventory and accounts of the testamentary
proceedings in question.“The said testamentary proceedings
having been terminated, the defendant Cabigao is now estopped from
reviving the question of accounts on the ground that, by affixing her
signature to Exhibit O, she induced the court to terminate it and she
has to abide by the consequences of her act.“It is true
that she defended herself by alleging that she had been induced to do
so by the plaintiff Rodrigo, but the court which saw her testify and
observed her attitude during the trial, which, far from being shy, was
aggressive and intelligent, cannot believe that she could have been
influenced to sign the aforesaid Exhibit O by means of nicely coined
phrases. Furthermore, if we were to take into account the fact that she
was already married at the time she signed the said document and that
her husband, an intelligent man, who speaks Spanish fluently, had acted
as her adviser, there would be less reason to believe that she had been
tricked by the plaintiff into signing the document in question. She had
allowed five years (1926 to 1931) to elapse without complaining of the
alleged fraud and she did not complain in her own motion but merely
took advantage of the opportunity afforded her by a counterclaim. Under
this circumstance, there is every reason to believe that her defense is
unfounded and that such allegations were made in view of her advantage
as a client in a suit against her attorney.“Let us now
discuss the question raised relative to the validity of Exhibit M. This
is a promissory note for the payment of fees, which was undoubtedly
signed while the relation of attorney and client still subsisted
between the plaintiff and the defendants. The undersigned entertains no
doubt regarding his authority to pass upon the question of whether the
credit, the payment of which is claimed thereunder, is adequate or
excessive. In order to do so in the present case, it is necessary to
determine how much has already been paid on account of the said
promissory note and whether or not the defendants, who signed it may
still be bound to pay the unpaid balance thereof.“The
evidence presented by one as well as the other party, that is, by the
plaintiff with respect to the amount he had received, and by the
defendants to the amount paid, is absolutely inadequate to reach an
approximate balance thereof. This is due to the same reason as above
stated in connection with the balancing of the accounts of the
administration. However, considering the fact that the plaintiff first
admitted having received P1,000, although he later made an unjustified
attempt to reduce it very materially in his amended complaint; that
although the defendants allege having paid the sum of P17,000, they
were unable to prove it by means of the documents presented, some of
which did not bear the plaintiff’s signature, while others were signed
by other persons who were not proven to have been authorized to collect
in his name; that many of the items contained in the account presented
by the defendants constitute expenses incurred in the proceedings and
therefore cannot be considered as fees in the absence of an express
agreement to the contrary; the undersigned, without claiming absolute
correctness in his estimate, is of the opinion that he is not far from
the truth in holding: that the money received by the plaintiff may
amount to P12,500, more or less, including the sum of P2,500 which he
admits having retained against the accounts of the defendants; that
this amount is adequate to compensate the services he had rendered from
1918 to the date of the filing of his complaint, February 2, 1931,
making sufficient allowance for all carelessness or negligence incurred
in good or bad faith for which the defendants may hold him accountable.
The plaintiff might have made mistakes, who does not make them?
However, his mistakes are not so gross as claimed and refer to rather
disputable questions or, at most, to those which require clearness of
perception, as assumed by his critics, or very accurate analysis
expected only of a learned attorney with vast experience, of whom there
are very few, and for whom the amount appraised herein, for the
plaintiff’s services, is ridiculously low.“No mention is
made herein of the opinion rendered by the attorneys who appeared as
experts, one to point out the mistakes committed by the plaintiff, and
another to appraise the amount of the plaintiff’s fees, on the ground
that the opinion of the former is likened to that of a critic who, from
his comfortable armchair, points out the defects of a well known
theatrical play by merely repeating the criticisms already launched by
another (he dwelt mainly on already decided cases), which opinion is
absolutely different from that to be rendered in the deliberation of a
scheme the result of which, whether good or bad, depends upon various
contingencies; while that of the latter is based merely on papers and
documents which he had on hand or which were shown him by the
defendants, not by the plaintiff, which opinion may be rendered
incomplete or lacking inasmuch as it is evidently founded on deficient
data, and because the services of an attorney is not confined only to
that which appears in the record of the case.“The defense
of prescription as set up by the herein defendants, in connection with
the plaintiff’s services as administrator, cannot be entertained on the
ground that the circumstances under which the promissory note Exhibit M
had been executed, and even the terms thereof, show beyond the shadow
of a doubt that the fees in question were included in determining the
amount stated therein.“That the sum of P2,500 credited in
his decision as part of the plaintiff’s fees, which were appraised
therein at P12,500, is the sum retained by the said plaintiff with
which to settle the transaction with Eugenio Lim Pineda, and the same
P2,500 which he placed at the disposal of said Eugenio Lim Pineda in
payment of the latter’s credit against the defendants (document
appearing on pp. 16-18 of the record), and that the P2,500 in question
is the same sum ordered by Judge Lesaca to be delivered to Eugenio Lim
Pineda’s attorney (p. 24 of the record) on February 25, 1931, and which
Attorney Nicolas Santiago, in the name of Attorney Francisco, who
represented said Eugenio Lim Pineda, collected under check No. 142008,
as shown on the same page 24 of the record.”
As may be seen, the court held that the plaintiff was well compensated
with what he had already received from the defendants and the deceased
Tomas Cabigao, amounting to P12,500 more or less, including the sum of
P2,500 granted him in the decision, as amended. In his brief the
plaintiff assigns four alleged errors and attempts to show by his
arguments in support thereof that he is entitled to the additional
amount claimed in his complaint. We deem correct the conclusion arrived
at by the trial court to the effect that under the evidence presented,
the time that has elapsed, and the death of Tomas Cabigao, it is
difficult, if not practically impossible, to determine the true figures
as well as the exact amount of money actually advanced to the
plaintiff. However, taking into consideration all the evidence we have
on hand, we cannot help but declare that the preponderance thereof
supports the conclusion that the plaintiff has already been compensated
adequately and reasonably with the amount which he has already received
together with the sum of P2,500 still to be paid to him.
The
same thing is true with respect to the claims of the defendants. They
assign no less than eighteen alleged errors in the decision in an
attempt to justify their contention that the court should have
sentenced the plaintiff in accordance with their counterclaims and
cross-complaints. Inasmuch as the considerations stated in the decision
already decide the merits of the contentions of the defendants, suffice
it to say for the sake of brevity, that the evidence, which we have
carefully examined, supports the judgment rendered by the trial court
and does not justify the claims of the defendants.
Wherefore, not finding any substantial error susceptible of reversal or
modification in the decision appealed from, it is hereby affirmed,
without special pronouncement as to the costs of this instance. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, and Hull, JJ., concur.