THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PASCUAL ACUÑA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This
action was instituted by the Bank of the Philippine Islands in the
character of receiver of the Tuason Entail, for the purpose, among
others, of recovering from Pascual Acuña and others certain land
contained in the Santa Mesa and Diliman hacienda located in the barrios
of Bagobantay and Diliman, of the municipalities of Caloocan and San
Juan del Monte, Province of Rizal, with declaration that the defendants
have no dominical rights over any portion of said hacienda, and to
recover damages and costs. The defendants, who are numerous, answered
with general denials, various special defenses, and cross-complaints,
asking that they be absolved and that judgment be given to them in
various amounts for the value of improvements alleged to have been made
by them upon the portions of said estate respectively held by them,
with costs. Upon hearing the cause the Court of First Instance of Rizal
disallowed each and all the cross-complaints, declared that none of the
defendants own any part of the land in controversy, and required them
to surrender possession to the plaintiff. To the Diliman defendants the
court allowed their appropriate share in the fees of the assessors. All
without, pronouncement as to costs. From this judgment two classes of
the defendants appealed, namely, the Bagobantay group and the Diliman
group, the first consisting of about 57 appellants, and the second
consisting of about 36.

The character in which the plaintiff
sues is not open to question, and the material facts are as follows:
The heirs of the Tuason estate, herein referred to as the Tuason
Entail, hold a Torrens title to a tract of land containing three
parcels with an area of about 1,600 hectares located in the Province of
Rizal. This property is now covered by Torrens certificate of title No.
3792 issued in lieu of an older certificate dating from July 8, 1914.
The land, for the most part, is not productive, having a light covering
of soil. It is not very useful for agricultural purposes, but it is
valuable because of its great extent and its proximity to a populous
city. In October, 1929, and prior thereto, the defendants entered upon
portions of the property mentioned and fixed themselves thereon. To
dislodge them this action was brought.

The fundamental facts
above stated supply all that is really necessary to this decision, and
said facts are fully borne out by the report of the two assessors, who
were nominated by the appellants, and by the findings of the trial
court. Nevertheless the attorneys representing the appellants have
exhausted the resources of legal ingenuity to make it appear that this
usurpation had some sort of legal justification. The appeal is
manifestly a mere fight for time and a contention for damages or
compensation for improvements, without basis in fact. The first error
assigned by the Diliman group is to the effect that the trial court
made no special findings upon the counterclaims of the defendants. But
such special findings were unnecessary, for it is manifest that, when
the facts found in connection with the principal cause of action supply
a complete refutation of the cause of action stated in a counterclaim,
no special findings upon the counterclaim are needed. It is obvious
that the decree of the court in the land registration proceeding put a
quietus upon any rights which the appellants may be supposed to have
had, originating anterior to the decree, and since that decree was
entered and title issued, the appellants could have no rights other
than such as are derived from and under the Torrens title. But no scrap
of paper was introduced in evidence showing any such right, and since
the rights acquired by the decree are imprescriptible (section 46, Act
No. 496), it results that the occupation of this land by the appellants
is a mere usurpation against which no valid legal defense can be
alleged.

Some of the defendants have attempted to prove that
they have occupied the parcels held by them from a period long anterior
to the decree in the land registration case, and some that the parcels
held by them are not within the confines covered by the title relied
upon by the plaintiff. All such contentions are evidently baseless.
Some of the appellants, it is true, had been on portions of this land
anterior to the present usurpation, but having been ousted, they
returned upon the occasion of the invasion now referred to, planting
themselves upon different parcels from what they had occupied before.
All of them are without color of right or title, and their number and
concerted action supply the main reasons why the course of this action
should have been prolonged until now.

With respect to the
claim of all of these appellants for reimbursement for the value of
improvements supposed to have been made by them upon the usurped
property, it is enough to say that such improvements, if they existed,
were evidently made in notorious bad faith; and they could not be
entitled to compensation; but as demonstrated in the report of the
assessors and opinion of the trial court, the improvements claimed, for
the most part, have not been made.

Among the arguments made
by the appellants of the Bagobantay group, it is alleged that the
Torrens title relied upon by the plaintiff is void, and in support of
this contention it is stated that, during the course of the
registration proceedings, an order was made by the court for the
amendment of the original plan of the applicants and that this order
was not followed by new publication, wherefore, it is supposed, the
court was without jurisdiction to decree the title to the applicants.
In this connection reliance is placed upon the doctrine stated in
Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial (49 Phil., 122). But
the brief for the appellants fails to call attention to the fact that
the rule stated in the case cited has reference to an amendment of the
plan by which additional land, different from that included in the
original survey, is intended to be brought within the process of
registration. In the case before us, the order referred to was for the
exclusion of certain portions of the land covered by the original
survey, and the doctrine of the case cited cannot apply. Apart from
this it does not appear that the portion intended to be excluded
comprehended any part of the land which has been usurped.

The appeal is without merit, and the judgment will be in all respects
affirmed. So ordered, with costs against the appellants.

Abad Santos, Vickers, Butte, and Diaz, JJ., concur.