G.R. No. L-6855. April 23, 1954

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Albay declaring respondent Pedro Beraquit ineligible to the office of
mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, Province of Albay, on the
ground that he was not a resident of said municipality one year prior
to the elections held on November 13, 1951.

A petition for quo warranto was filed by Lazara R. Bien to
test the eligibility of Pedro Beraquit to be a candidate for the office
of mayor of the municipality of Malilipot, Province of Albay. It is
alleged that the respondent was ineligible for that position because he
was a resident of Baras, Catanduanes, and has not resided for at least
six months in Malilipot, Albay, prior to the elections held on November
13, 1951, and that, notwithstanding his ineligibility, he registered
his candidacy for that office and was proclaimed duly elected by the
municipal board of canvassers on November 17, 1951. It is prayed that
his election be declared null and void and the office be declared
vacant.

The record shows that upon the filing of the petition for quo warranto
on November 19, 1951, the court issued an order directing that summons
be made immediately upon respondent giving the latter three days within
which to answer from service thereof. The hearing was set for December
4, 1951. In compliance with said order, the clerk of court, on November
23, 1951, required the deputy sheriff of Catanduanes to serve the
summons at respondent’s residence in Baras, Catanduanes, and directed
that another summons be served upon him at his residence in Malilipot,
Albay. Neither of the summons was served either because of respondent’s
absence or because of the refusal of the persons found in his residence
to accept the service. As a result, substituted service was resorted to
as allowed by the rules by leaving a copy of the summons at the
residence of respondent.

When the date set for hearing came, neither the respondent, nor his
counsel appeared. He did not also file an answer as required by the
court. Petitioner asked to be allowed to adduce evidence in the absence
of respondent, but the court decided to transfer the hearing to
December 7, 1951 in order to give respondent ample opportunity to
appear and defend himself. In the same order, the court directed that
another summons be served upon respondent. Again, the summons failed
for the same reasons. And when the case came up for hearing for the
second time, and respondent again failed to appear, the court decided
to allow petitioner to present her evidence. Thereafter, a decision was
rendered granting the petition. Copy of this decision was received by
respondent on December 15, 1951 and on December 18, he filed a motion
praying that the decision be set aside and the case be heard on the
merits. This motion was granted and the court set the hearing on
February 22, 23, and 25, 1952.

On February 22, 1952, petitioner presented four witnesses. On
February 23, 1952, she presented one witness, and on February 25, 1952,
she presented two more witnesses, plus eleven pieces of documentary
evidence. Then she rested her case.

When the turn of respondent came to present his evidence, counsel
for petitioner made a manifestation whereby he made of record his
objection to any and all evidence that respondent intends to present on
the ground that it would be immaterial and irrelevant for the reason
that he has failed to file an answer to the petition. At this juncture,
counsel for respondent asked for an opportunity to file an answer, and
instead of ruling on this request, the court allowed counsel to present
evidence without prejudice on its part to disregard it if it should
find later that the question raised is well taken. But after the
presentation of one witness, and while the second witness was in the
course of his testimony, the court suspended the hearing and required
the parties to present memoranda to determine whether or not respondent
may be allowed to file his answer and continue presenting his evidence.
This was done, and on March 14, 1952, the court issued an order denying
the request to file an answer and declaring the case submitted for
decision. And on the same date, it rendered decision declaring
respondent ineligible as prayed for in the petition. The case is now
before Us upon the plea that the question involved in this appeal is
purely one of law.

The question posed in this appeal is whether the lower court erred
in denying the request of respondent to be given an opportunity to file
an answer to the petition and, in default thereof, in denying him the
right to continue presenting his evidence notwithstanding the action of
the court in setting aside its previous decision in order to give him
an opportunity to appear and defend himself.

The reasons which the lower court has considered in denying the
request of respondent to be given an opportunity to file an answer and
to be allowed to present evidence in support of his defense are clearly
stated in the decision. Said reasons are: “As above stated, respondent
failed to file his answer and when his turn came, and he attempted to
present his evidence, counsel for petitioner vehemently objected on the
ground that he has not raised any issue. The court, after a careful
consideration of all the facts and circumstances surrounding the case,
was constrained to sustain the objection of petitioner, and barred
respondent from presenting his evidence. For evidently, he is guilty of
gross and inexcusable negligence. From the time he voluntarily appeared
in court on December 18, 1951 when he filed the motion for
reconsideration above adverted to, he submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. His voluntary appearance is equivalent to
service. Consequently, he should have filed then his answer within the
reglementary period fixed by law, it being his legal duty to do so. At
least, he should have filed his answer from the time he received the
order setting aside the judgment—that is, on January 21, 1952, and
before the 15 days period expired. When he entered trial on February
22, 1952, without filing his answer, there was no issue raised, and a
summary judgment for petitioner may be rendered. Indeed, Section 8,
Rule 9 of the Rules of Court provides, among others, that material
averments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of damage,
shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied; and Section 10
states that defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.”

We can hardly add to the foregoing reasons of the lower court which
we find fully supported by the record. We can only state in passing
that the granting of a motion to file an answer after the period
originally fixed in the summons, or in the rules of court for that
purpose had expired, is a matter that is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, and under the circumstances obtaining in the
case, we find that this discretion has been properly exercised. The
court has been most liberal to respondent such that it even went to the
extent of setting aside its previous decision. And we don’t believe
that the interest of Justice will be jeopardized if the decision of the
lower court is maintained for, while on one hand the evidence adduced
by the petitioner appears to be strong, on the other, it does not
appear that respondent has made any offer of the evidence he intended
to introduce that might give an inkling that, if presented, it may have
the effect of offsetting the evidence of petitioner. There is,
therefore, no legal basis for concluding that the result of the
decision would be ‘changed had respondent been able to complete his
evidence. And in the absence of this basis, respondent’s plea for
equity can deserve but scant consideration.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Parss, C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ., concur. .