G.R. No. L-6691. April 27, 1954

In Civil Case No. 4094 of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac,
Gaudencio Day and Lucia Manalese, plaintiffs, vs. Tomas Laxamana,
Gerardo Tioseco, Florentino Lising, and Register of Deeds of Tarlac,
defendants, said court rendered on April 24, 1940, a decision the
dispositive parts which read as follows:

“En vista de todo lo expuesto, se declaran nulos y
de ningun valor los documentor Exhlbitos D, E y F, y se ordena la
cancelacion por el registrador de titulos de Tarlac del Certificado de
Transferencia de Titulo No. 8780 (Exhibito E), y la expedicion de otro
en su lugar y a nombre de los demandantes, libre de toda carga y
gravamen, se condena a los demandantes a pagar al demandado Gerardo
Tioseco la suma de P2,609.14, mas los intereses acumulados a razdn de
-12 por ciento anual desde el 3 de mayo de 1935 hasta su complete pago;
se condena a Gerardo Tioseco y Tomas Laxamana a pagar mancomunada y
solidariamente a Florentino Lising la suma de P4,200 mas sus intereses
legates desde el 9 de mayo de 1934 hasta su complete pago; se sobreseen
todas las demas demandas, contrademandas y reconvenciones que no hayan
sido objeto de adjudication expresa en esta decision con las costas a
cargo de los demandados Laxamana y Tioseco.

“Se autoriza la
enmienda de los escrites en la causa que han menester ser enmendado
para ajustarlos a las pruebas y a la sentencia que aqui se dicta, para
evitar la incoacion de ulteriores demandas y la multiplicidad de
pleitos.”

From this judgment only the defendant Florentino Lising appealed to
the Supreme Court which, on September 23, 1943, rendered a decision the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“The judgment appealed from is hereby modified, and
the simulated sale in favor of Tomas Laxamana and the transfer
certificate of title issued in his favor as well as the deed of sale
executed by Laxamana in favor of Florentino Lising are hereby set
aside, and the Register of Deeds of Tarlac is ordered to issue another
certificate in the name of plaintiffs free from all encumbrances;
Gerardo to pay, jointly and solidarily, Florentino Lising the sum of
P4,200 with legal interest thereon from May 9, 1934, and, in case of
insolvency, the parcel of land in question may be sold, plaintiffs
having the right to suspend the sale by paying Florentino Lising the
said sum of P4,200 with legal interest from May 9, 1934, and with such
payment, the sum of P2,609.14 together with its interest which
plaintiffs owe Gerardo Tioseco is deemed paid. With costs against
Gerardo Tioseco and Tomas Laxamana alone.”

On December 20, 1945, the defendant Gerardo Tioseco, through
counsel, filed a motion for the execution of the decision in his favor
and against the plaintiffs Gaudencio Day and Lucia Manalese. This
motion was opposed by the latter and the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac denied the same in its order dated April 30, 1946, in view of
the Debt Moratorium, Executive Order No. 32. On May 29, 1948, the
defendant Gerardo Tioseco, likewise by counsel, moved for the execution
of the judgment in his favor and against the plaintiffs Gaudencio Day
and Lucia Manalese. This motion was denied by the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac in its order of June 21, 1948, again on account of
the Debt Moratorium, Executive Order No. 32. For the third time, or on
September 20, 1949, the defendant Gerardo Tioseco filed a petition,
through his counsel, reiterated on September 21, 1949, praying for the
execution of his judgment against plaintiffs Gaudencio Day and Lucia
Manalese. This petition was granted by the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac in. its order dated December 22, 1949, the judgment to be
executed being that portion of the decision which provides as follows:
“. . . se condena a los demandantes a pagar al demandado Gerardo
Tieseco la suma de P2,609.14 mas los intereses acumulados a razon de 12
por ciento anual desde el 3 de mayo de 1953 hasta su complete pago . .
.” Failing to get a reconsideration of this order, the plaintiffs
Gaudencio Day and Lucia Manalese have come to this Court by way of a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking the annulment of said
order and a directive against the Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Tarlac to desist from issuing any writ of execution.

The main issue raised herein involves a mere mathematical operation
to determine whether the third petition for execution filed by the
defendant (respondent herein) Gerardo Tioseco on September 20, 1949,
and granted by the Court of First Instance of Tarlac on December 22,
1949, is within the five-year period during which a judgment may be
executed on motion. In this connection, it is significant that the
respondent Court of First Instance of Tarlac, in the order now
complained of, expressly found that only the defendant Florentino
Lising had appealed from the decision of April 24, 1940, and that said
decision become final in May, 1940, in so far as it referred to the
judgment in favor of Gerardo Tioseco against the plaintiffs Gaudencio
Day and Lucia Manalese for the sum of P2,609.14. Indeed, said finding
was used by the court as the basis for holding that Gerardo Tioseco’s
credit against Gaudencio Day and Lucia Manalese was a pre-war credit
for purposes of the Debt Moratorium. We have, therefore, to accept May,
1940, as the starting point in computing the five-year period. From
said date up to March 10,1945, when Executive Order No. 32, otherwise
known as the Moratorium Law, took effect 4 years and 10 months had
elapsed, considering, in accordance with the liberal computation
adopted by the herein petitioner, May, 1940, and March, 1945, as whole
months. From July 26, 1948, when Republic Act No. 342 (lifting
partially the Debt Moratorium) took effect, up to September 20, 1949,
when the respondent Gerardo Tioseco filed his petition for execution, 1
year, 1 month and 24 days expired. Summing up, from May, 1940, when the
decision became final, up to September 20, 1949, when the third
petition for execution was filed, excluding the period when the Debt
Moratorium was effective, a total of 5 years, 11 months and 24 days had
transpired. It necessarily follows that the petition for execution
filed on September 20,1949, and granted by the respondent Court on
December 22, 1949, was very much out of the five-year period within
which a judgment may be executed on motion (section 6, Rule 39, of the
Rules of Court).

We are, therefore, constrained to hold, as it is our judgment, that
the herein petition for certiorari and prohibition be granted, and the
order of the respondent Judge of December 22, 1949, be as it is hereby
set aside. So ordered with costs against the respondent other than
respondent Judge.

Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, and Concepcion, JJ., concur.