THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LORENZO DE LA CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This
is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, convicting the defendant-appellant of the crime of frustrated
murder upon the following information:

“That
on or about the 23rd day of November, 1932, in the municipality of
Aliaga, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the abovenamed accused Lorenzo de la Cruz
with treachery and evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did
then and there, voluntarily, illegally, maliciously and criminally,
attack, assault and stab with a knife in the municipal building of
Aliaga Raymundo Calderon, then chief of police of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija,
causing upon the latter serious wound which needed medical attendance
to heal for a period of more than 30 days but less than 90, and
incapacitated said Raymundo Calderon for labor for a like period of
time, the accused performed all the acts of execution which should have
produced the death of said Raymundo Calderon, as a consequence, but
which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent
of the will of the mentioned accused, to wit, because of the timely
medical attendance rendered to the mentioned Raymundo Calderon.”

Upon arraignment, the accused plead not guilty. At the trial he waived
his right to present evidence in his behalf. The lower court found the
following as the established facts of the case:

“The
evidence for the prosecution shows that at 8:30 a. m. of November 23,
1932, while Raymundo Calderon, chief of police of the municipality of
Aliaga, Province of Nueva Ecija, was in the municipal building, and
when he was going down the stairway, the defendant with a knife marked
Exhibit A stabbed him on the back. As a result thereof, he rolled down
from the first step to the last of the stairway. The aggression was
unexpected, because there was no exchange of words between the
defendant and the offended party. He was taken by corporal of police
Meliton Facundo to the dispensary. Raymundo Calderon felt weak and
dizzy on account of the wound. He was treated by Dr. Marcelo Medina,
but Raymundo Calderon did not know exactly what the doctor did to him.
He only knew that he vomited the food he had taken at breakfast and
spit blood. The wound that was found by Dr. Marcelo Medina in the body
of Raymundo Calderon, when the latter was lying on bed in the municipal
building of Aliaga, was more than one-half inch in length and less than
two inches in depth. The right lung was affected, because thirty
minutes after partially suturing the wound the patient vomited blood.
On that date, Raymundo Calderon was taken to the Cabanatuan Hospital,
and stayed there until December 8, 1932. He could not stand up, nor lie
down sideways. He was very weak and had fever and difficulty in
breathing. On December 8, 1932, Dr. Restituto Yuson saw Raymundo
Calderon in the Cabanatuan Hospital, and, after examining him, he found
that he had effusion in the pleural cavity, and was in a serious
condition. He had a wound in the upper part of the thorax between the
scapula and the spine. The wound was the cause of the effusion in the
pleural cavity. The patient could not stand up, so he decided to take
him to Manila by train. On December 9, 1932, Raymundo Calderon was
taken to Saint Paul’s Hospital in Manila. After taking a radiograph of
the wound, he decided to operate on him immediately. He took from the
pleural cavity a bloody serum. Raymundo Calderon stayed in Saint Paul’s
Hospital from December 9, to December 24, 1932. When Raymundo Calderon
left the hospital, the wound was healed but he was still weak. There
was no need of further treatment, but the doctor advised him not to
work. So, only on February 1, 1933, Raymundo Calderon resumed his work
as chief of police in the municipality of Aliaga. His salary was P40
monthly, which he failed to earn from November 23, 1932, to February 1,
1933. He spent P800 for the treatment of his wound. On November 23,
1932, the defendant made a sworn statement before the justice of the
peace of the municipality of Aliaga, Province of Nueva Ecija, which is
marked Exhibit B.

“The defendant waived his right to present evidence in his behalf.”

The defendant was sentenced to suffer twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and required to indemnify Raymundo Calderon in the sum of P890.64.

Upon this appeal, the appellant submits the following single assignment of error:

“The
lower court erred in convicting the accused of the crime of frustrated
murder when he should be convicted only of the crime of serious
physical injuries, penalized under the first paragraph of subdivision
4, article 263, Revised Penal Code, with the mitigating circumstance
under subdivision 7, article 13, of the same Code.”

The only question submitted, therefore, is whether the evidence makes out a case of frustrated murder.

The chief argument of the appellant is that the defendant should be
convicted only of the crime of serious physical injuries because there
is no sufficient evidence of intention to kill on the part of the
accused. In the absence of any formal or express declaration of such
intention, the same must be inferred from the evidence like any other
fact in the case. The defendant presented the same argument in the
court below as he presents here. In commenting upon this argument, the
court below said:

“The only question to be
decided is whether the crime committed by the defendant is as charged
in the information, or merely serious physical injuries, as claimed by
counsel for the defendant.

“Taking into consideration the
fact that the defendant was under the belief that Raymundo Calderon won
over the love and affection of Pastora Acebron, the concubine of the
defendant, to the extent that the defendant then believed that Pastora
Acebron was already a concubine of Raymundo Calderon, there is
sufficient basis for the conclusion that on November 23, 1932, when the
defendant stabbed the offended party with a knife of the size of
Exhibit A from behind, the former was determined to do away with the
latter. Moreover, the wound inflicted by the defendant upon the
offended party warrants the conclusion that the defendant had the
intention to kill the offended party performing all the acts of
execution which would have deprived the offended party of his life as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not deprive him of it by
reason of causes independent of the will of the defendant.

“In
the commission of the crime, the qualifying circumstance of treachery
was present, because when the defendant stabbed the offended party from
behind, the latter was caught unaware, so the defendant employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly
and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might have made.”

The evidence shows that when Calderon was stabbed in the back by the
accused, Calderon collapsed and rolled down from the head to the foot
of the stairway of the municipal building. That fact might reasonably
have produced in the mind of the accused the impression that he had
killed Calderon or at least had inflicted a mortal wound. This would
explain his desistance from pursuit and further attack. He may have
been prevented from further pursuit by the officers who arrested him
but the evidence upon that point is not clear. In any event, in the
absence of any evidence to the contrary, we think the court below was
warranted in inferring from the facts that it was the intention of the
accused to inflict a mortal wound upon Raymundo Calderon. A variety of
pertinent facts may furnish the basis for a reasonable inference of
intention to kill. In the case at bar, the motive for the crime,
namely, the desire of the accused to keep his concubine for himself and
not to Jose her to Raymundo Calderon, is important. The use of a deadly
weapon; the infliction of the wound in a vital spot which the accused
might reasonably suppose would be mortal; making the attack with
treachery from behind, which might reasonably influence the accused to
believe that he could inflict a mortal wound because of the absence of
opposition; the fact that the accused knew that Calderon, being chief
of police, had a revolver might reasonably raise in his mind the belief
that he must inflict a fatal wound so as to disable Calderon at once
otherwise his own life would be in jeopardy—all these circumstances
warrant the inference that it was the intention of the accused to kill
Calderon.

The crime was correctly found by the lower court to be frustrated murder. (U. S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil., 209; People vs. Reyes, 47 Phil., 635; People vs. Dagman, 47 Phil., 768; People vs. Borinaga, 55 Phil., 433.)

The judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Avanceña, C. J.,
dissenting: In my opinion, the intention to kill has not been
established beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the appellant
should only be sentenced for the crime of physical injuries.