G.R. No. 39224. October 24, 1933
SIMPLICIO SERAFIN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JUSTO C. CRUZ, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
“Wherefore,
it is but just and equitable that judgment be rendered in this case in
favor of the plaintiff Simplicio Serafin, declaring that he is entitled
to hold the office of chief of police of the municipality of Quingua,
and it is hereby ordered that he be reinstated therein with all the
privileges and emoluments appurtenant thereto in conformity with the
law, from the date of this decision.“The defendant herein
cannot be sentenced to pay the costs on the ground that the municipal
president who is liable therefor, was not included as a party defendant
herein. Neither can the defendant be deprived of the emoluments already
collected by him on the ground that he rendered services and collected
such emoluments on the strength of the appointment issued in his favor
by the municipal president himself.”
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors in the decision of the trial court, to wit:
“I.
The lower court erred in not declaring that the decision rendered by
the former provincial board of Bulacan, dated October 3, 1931, being
final and conclusive, the plaintiff is not entitled to any other remedy
except to invoke the authority of intervention of the Governor-General
of the Philippine Islands in case of manifest abuse of discretion on
the part of said provincial board.“II. The lower court
erred in not declaring that the actual provincial board of the Province
of Bulacan has no jurisdiction over the case.“III. The
lower court erred in not declaring that the decision of the actual
provincial board of the Province of Bulacan, dated January 21, 1932,
decreeing the reinstatement of the plaintiff in the position of chief
of police of the municipality of Quingua, Bulacan, is null and void.“IV.
The lower court erred in not finding that by virtue of the final
decision of the former provincial board of Bulacan, dated October 3,
1931, ousting the herein plaintiff from the position of chief of police
of the municipality of Quingua, Bulacan, said municipality had, in
accordance with law, the right to declare said position vacant and to
appoint another one in lieu of said plaintiff.“V. The
lower court erred in declaring that the former provincial board of
Bulacan had committed errors in decreeing the complete separation of
the plaintiff from the service as chief of police of the municipality
of Quingua, Bulacan.“VI. The lower court erred in
ordering the reinstatement of the plaintiff Simplicio Serafin in the
position of chief of police of the municipality of Quingua, Bulacan,
with all the privileges and emoluments from the date of the decision of
the court, December 20, 1932, and in not declaring that herein
defendant Justo C. Cruz is the rightful chief of police of said
municipality, entitled to all privileges and emoluments corresponding
to his position from his appointment until he be legally ousted from
said position.”
The following pertinent facts are necessary for the solution of the questions raised in this appeal, to wit:
On January 12, 1931, Father Victorino Lopez, Parish Priest of Quingua,
Bulacan, filed with .the provincial board of Bulacan, administrative
charges against the appellee herein, Simplicio Serafin, in his capacity
as chief of police of the aforesaid municipality of Quingua, Bulacan,
for negligence in the performance of his duties. Inasmuch as said
charges were endorsed to the municipal council of Quingua for
appropriate investigation and decision, said municipal council, after
conducting the necessary investigation of the case, issued on February
13, 1931, resolution No. 9 (Exhibit 1) exonerating the said complainant
herein.
From this resolution, the complainant therein,
Father Victorino Lopez, appealed to the provincial board then composed
of Jose Padilla, provincial governor, and Aniceto Crisostomo and
Teofilo Sauco, members, which, after due hearing, rendered judgment
therein on October 3, 1931, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows.
“Wherefore, the board is of the
opinion that due to his inefficiency, misconduct, and record, the
herein respondent should be separated from the service, particularly
during this time when there are so many eligibles, and government
institutions are entitled to select the officials who have a keen sense
of responsibility.“Therefore, it is hereby ordered that the respondent chief of police of the municipality of Quingua be dismissed.
“It is so resolved.”
Teofilo Sauco, member of the aforesaid provincial board, dissented from
the resolution in question in the belief that dismissal was too severe
a penalty therefor and that suspension for six months would be
sufficient.
In view of the foregoing, on October 14, 1931,
the municipal president of Quingua, Anselmo D. Garcia, issued executive
order No. 1, series of 1931, dismissing the said appellee
chief of police of the municipality of Quingua, Simplicio Serafin, from
the service and appointed the herein respondent-appellant, Justo C.
Cruz, permanent chief of police of the municipality of Quingua (Exhibit
F). After having been submitted to the new council of Quingua for
approval during its session of October 16, 1931, said appointment was
definitely confirmed by a vote of four to three.
The records
do not show the exact date on which the herein plaintiff-appellee
received notice of the decision of the provincial board, dated October
3, 1931, and of the order of his dismissal dated October 14, 1931, but
the postmaster of the municipality of Quingua certified (Exhibit 2)
that a registered letter, No. 979, addressed to the plaintiff-appellee
was delivered to the latter on October 14, 1931.
The term of
office of the members of the provincial board which issued order of
dismissal dated October 3, 1931, expired on October 15, 1931, and they
were substituted by Cirilo B. Santos, provincial governor, and Juan
Suerte Felipe and Jose G. de Jesus, members, who were elected on June
5, 1931.
Fifteen days after October 14, 1931, that is on
October 29, 1931, the plaintiff-appellee filed with the new provincial
board a motion for reconsideration of the decision ordering his
dismissal rendered by the former provincial board on October 3, 1931,
and of which he was notified on October 14, 1931.
The new
provincial board granted the said motion for reconsideration, and after
conducting a new hearing of the case, rendered judgment on January 21,
1931, exonerating the plaintiff-appellee of the charge of “negligence
in the performance of his duties”, and by an executive order dated May
3, 1932, addressed to the president of the municipality of Quingua,
ordered the immediate reinstatement of the said appellee in the office
of chief of police of the municipality of Quingua. In a communication
dated May 7, 1932, addressed to the aforesaid provincial board, the
said municipal president informed the latter that he had already
permanently appointed another in place of the dismissed chief of police.
The purpose of the present appeal is to have the respondent herein
expelled from the office of chief of police of the municipality of
Quingua and the herein appellee reinstated therein.
The
principal question to decide in the present appeal is not whether or
not a provincial board may reconsider a decision rendered by a former
board but whether or not a duly appointed and qualified chief of
municipal police who has entered upon the performance of his duties as
such, may be dismissed therefrom in order to reinstate another who had
been dismissed from such office pursuant to a legal, valid and
conclusive decision.
Section 2272 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3206, provides the following:
“Sec. 2272. Suspension and removal of members of municipal police.—Members
of the municipal police shall not be removed and, except in cases of
resignation, shall not be discharged except for misconduct or
incompetency, dishonesty, disloyalty to the United States or Philippine
Government, serious irregularities in the performance of their duties,
and violation of law or duty, and in such cases charges shall be
preferred under oath by the municipal president or by any other person
and investigated by the municipal council, or a committee of three
councilors designated for said purpose by a majority of the council, in
public hearing, and the accused shall be given opportunity to make
their defense. * * *”
Mechem in “Law of Public Offices and Officers”, page 294, paragraph 461, states:
“*
* * When the appointing power has once acted and the appointee has
accepted the office and done what is required of him upon its
acceptance, his title to the office becomes complete, and he can then
be removed only in the regular way.” (Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137.)
In the case at bar, the herein defendant-appellant, Justo C. Cruz, was
permanently appointed chief of police of Quingua by the president of
the said municipality, to fill the vacancy created by the dismissal
from said office of the herein plaintiff-appellee, as ordered by the
provincial board of Bulacan after the necessary proceedings provided by
law. The appointment in question was confirmed by the municipal council
of Quingua after the appointee had qualified and entered upon the
performance of his duties as chief of police. In accordance with the
authority cited above, the defendant-appellant has acquired a vested
right in the office and cannot be removed nor dismissed therefrom
except for any of the causes designated and in accordance with the
proceedings established by law. The legal provision quoted above
expressly states that members of the municipal police shall not be
removed and, except in cases of resignation, shall not be discharged
from the service, except for misconduct or incompetency, dishonesty,
disloyalty to the United States or Philippine Government, serious
irregularities in the performance of their duties, and violation of law
or duty. The reinstatement of the dismissed official is not one of the
causes designated by the law for the removal therefrom of one who has
been permanently appointed to substitute the former.
In view
of the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that
the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto does not lie against a
duly and legally appointed chief of municipal police who has duly
qualified for and has entered upon the performance of his duties, in
order to reinstate another who has been legally dismissed from the
office in question.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and the quo warranto proceedings dismissed, with the
costs against the appellee. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.