LUIS QUIANZON, PETITIONER, VS. PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF ILOCOS NORTE ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This
is an original petition for writs of prohibition (inhibition) and
mandamus filed by Luis Quianzon against the provincial fiscal of Ilocos
Norte, the justice of the peace of Currimao, and others. The cause is
now heard upon the answers of the various defendants.

It
appears that in the port of Currimao there has been formed an
association consisting of twelve groups of laborers, to which
association is confided the business of transferring freight and
passengers to and fro between the shore and ships touching at the port.
The association has a president, vice-president, secretary, and board
of directors. The charges for transportation are collected by
designated collectors and the proceeds kept by the cashier-treasurer.
The collectors and the cashier-treasurer discharge their duties without
bond. The money collected, after deduction of expenses, is supposed to
be divided into two parts, one for the laborers, the other for the
owners of the boats used in the work of transfer. The share of each
boat is determined by the number of trips made and the length of time
consumed in the service. The portion of the laborers is divided among
the twelve groups, and the share of each group is placed in the hands
of its boss (cabecilla) for distribution to the laborers
according to the service rendered by each. Some of the laborers, in
view of offices discharged by them in the association, receive an
additional share.

One Roque Ponce has for some time been discharging the duties of the office of temporary
cashier-treasurer and Tomas Quianzon those of bookkeeper. In July,
1933, the board of directors adopted a resolution appointing one
Domingo Albino as permanent cashier-treasurer. Ponce
questioned the validity of this appointment and refused to make
voluntary surrender of the books and documents in his possession. In
due time there followed a split in the membership of the association.
Charges of malversation were made against Ponce, and while the
provincial fiscal and his deputy were working into the situation trying
to discover the facts as to this charge, Ponce made counter-charges
against his predecessor and other officials in the association. If the
insinuations and charges of malversation are true, many thousands of
pesos are involved. Both sides have made charges. The case with which
we are here more immediately concerned has relation to the charges made
by the Ponce faction, evidently as a counter-maneuver to the charges
against that dignitary.

In this connection it appears that on August 9, 1933, Luis Quianzon presented a written accusation (denuncia) before the justice of the peace of Currimao accusing Dionisio Quinto and others of the offense of estafa.
The list of the accused in this accusation contains the names of scores
of persons. The justice of the peace entered upon the investigation, as
preliminary to the arrest of the accused, and about the time he was
ready to take action, the deputy provincial fiscal, who was then
investigating the charges against Ponce, appeared before the justice
and objected to the contemplated action upon the accusation laid before
him by Luis Quianzon, with the result that the justice of the peace
abstained from issuing the warrants of arrest.

The purpose
of the present proceeding, therefore, is to prohibit the fiscal from
meddling in the action which the justice of the peace ought,
supposedly, to take upon the accusation referred to, and to compel the
justice of the peace to issue warrants of arrest against the
individuals denounced by Quianzon, as already stated.

We are
of the opinion that the mandamus sought against the justice of the
peace of Currimao should not be granted. The writ of mandamus is only
available where there is a clear legal duty, unqualified by the
exercise of official discretion. But in this matter the justice of the
peace is not subject to the absolute duty of issuing the desired
warrants. He has a discretionary power; and while in the exercise of
his duties he is subject to the administrative supervision of the Judge
of First Instance (Adm. Code, sec. 228), he is not subject to mandamus
from this court. Nor is the writ of prohibition against the provincial
fiscal appropriate in this case. It may be that the views of that
official with respect to his functions in cases of this sort may be
incorrect in point of law. But his participation in this, matter does
not appear to us to have been officious or unjustifiable. The case
against the other respondents necessarily fails with the collapse of
the case against the justice of the peace and the fiscal.

The petition is denied, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Abad Santos, Vickers, and Butte, JJ., concur.