PACIFICO ABAD ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. JUAN N. EVANGELISTA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The
defendant, Juan N. Evangelista, appeals to this court from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, the dispositive
part of which reads as follows:

“Wherefore,
the court is of the opinion and so holds that the preliminary
injunction issued in this case should be declared permanent, and
furthermore orders the defendant herein to indemnify the plaintiffs in
the sum of one hundred pesos (P100) for every day of the ordinary
cockpit days, and five hundred pesos (P500) for every day of
extraordinary ones permitted by the law, during which the operation of
the cockpit in question was suspended by order of the said defendant,
with the costs against him. So ordered.”

In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court a quo in its decision, to wit:

“1.
The lower court erred in declaring that the plaintiff-appellee Antonio
Abad had obtained due permit from the defendant to transfer to,
establish and operate his cockpit at the barrio of San Nicolas,
municipality of Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija.

“2. The
lower court erred in holding that ordinance No. 8, series of 1932, duly
passed and approved by the municipal council of Gapan, Province of
Nueva Ecija, is null and void because it is partial.

“3.
The lower court erred in sentencing the defendant. a public officer,
being the municipal president of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, to indemnify the
plaintiffs in the sum of P100 for every day of the ordinary cockpit
days and P500 for every day of the extraordinary ones during the days
the plaintiffs’ cockpit was suspended from operation by the defendant.”

The pertinent facts necessary for the resolution of the questions raised in the present appeal are as follows:

Desiring to transfer his cockfighting business together with the
cockpit from the barrio of San Lorenzo to that of San Nicolas, both in
the municipality of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Antonio Abad, one of the
plaintiff-appellees herein, sought an interview with the president of
the aforesaid municipality, the herein defendant-appellant Juan N.
Evangelista, regarding the matter. Acting upon the latter’s suggestion,
Antonio Abad addressed him the following communication (Exhibit A) on
February 9, 1932:

“The undersigned hereby applies for a permit to transfer to and to reconstruct his camarin
of wood with iron roof, measuring 30 x 15 meters, on the land belonging
to Mr. Agustin Garcia in the barrio of San Nicolas in this
municipality. This camarin will be used as a cockpit, and is
already assessed for tax purposes under Tax Declaration No. 20522 in
the name of the herein applicant.

“Trusting that you will give this application prompt attention and due consideration, I remain.

	“Very respectfully yours,
	“(Sgd.) ANTONIO ABAD”

On
the same date, February 9, 1932, the aforesaid defendant-appellant Juan
N. Evangelista, in his official capacity as municipal president of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, sent the plaintiff-appellee, Antonio Abad the
following reply (Exhibit C):

“In reply to
your favor of even date, I have the honor to inform you that the
undersigned has no objection to granting the permit which you request
for the transfer and reconstruction of your camarin.

“You are, therefore, granted the permit to transfer the camarin
in question now located in San Lorenzo and assessed in your name under
Tax Declaration No. 20522, to the land of Mr. Agustin Garcia in San
Nicolas, subject, however, to the provisions of the ordinances now in
force and of those which the municipal council may later enact and
approve, regarding the matter.

	“Very respectfully,
		“(Sgd.) JUAN N. EVANGELISTA
	“Municipal President”

Pursuant
to the above reply, Antonio Abad transferred his cockpit from the
barrio of San Lorenzo to that of San Nicolas at an expense of P1,500.
The plaintiffs’ cockpit was reconstructed at a distance of 200 meters
from that of Tangkeko, situated in the same barrio.

On March
17, 1932, the municipal council of Gapan enacted and approved municipal
ordinance No. 6 (Exhibit 1) entitled: “Regulating the establishment of
cockpits in the municipality of Gapan, Province of Nueva Ecija.”

On April 4, 1932, the provincial board of Nueva Ecija disapproved the
aforesaid municipal ordinance No. 6, on the ground that it was
ambiguous, inasmuch as it did not state to whom payment of the license
should be made.

On the same day, April 4, 1932, the
plaintiff Pacifico Abad paid to the municipal treasurer of Gapan, the
privilege tax corresponding to the second quarter, that is from April
to June, 1932, for which receipt No. 23158 (Exhibit D) was issued, in
accordance with the ordinances then in force.

For the
purpose of remedying the defects of municipal ordinance No. 6 which was
disapproved by the provincial board of Nueva Ecija, the municipal
council of Gapan, presided over by the herein defendant-appellant, on
April 5, 1932, enacted and approved municipal ordinance No. 8, series
of 1932 (Exhibit 2) which reads as follows:

“[MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE NO. 8]

“REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COCKPITS IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF GAPAN, PROVINCE OF NUEVE ECIJA.

“Be it ordained by the Municipal Council of Gapan in session this day assembled:

“ARTICLE
1. Any person desiring to establish or who has already established a
cockpit shall secure in advance a permit therefor from the Municipal
President, and shall pay, besides, an annual license tax as provided in
Municipal Ordinance No. 19, s. 1980.

“ART. 2. The
construction of any building for cockpits within the barrios of San
Vicente, San Lorenzo and Poblacion is strictly prohibited.

“ART.
3. The Municipal President, upon application in writing by the
interested party, shall issue a permit, renewable annually, for the
construction of any building for cockpit purposes and for operating
same, upon payment by the applicant to the Municipal Treasurer of
Gapan, Nueva Ecija, of the amount of two pesos (P2): Provided, however, That no permit shall be issued for the establishment of more than one cockpit in the same barrio: And provided, further, That no two cockpits shall be less than two kilometers distant from one another.

“ART. 4. The Municipal Treasurer shall not issue a municipal license to
any person, corporation or entity unless provided with the permit
provided for in the preceding article.

“ART. 5. Any
person, entity or corporation violating any of the provisions of this
ordinance shall, upon conviction, be punished with imprisonment of not
less than ten (10) days nor more than thirty (30) days, or fine of not
less than twenty pesos (P20) nor more than two hundred pesos P200) or
both fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the Court, and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay a fine at the rate of
two pesos (P2) per day.

“ART. 6. Repealing clause.—All
municipal ordinances or part of ordinances that may be in conflict with
the provisions of this ordinance are hereby repealed.

“SEC. 7. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

“On motion by Councilor Dr. Agustin Y. Lotuaco, seconded by Councilor Attorney Lorenzo de Guzman: Approved.”

On April 7, 1932, the herein defendant-appellant addressed a
communication to the plaintiff-appellee Antonio Abad, inviting his
attention to the fact that his cockpit was being operated in violation
of municipal ordinance No. 8, copy of which was enclosed therewith.

On April 10, 1932, while the plaintiff-appellees’ cockpit was in full
swing, the herein defendant-appellant suspended the cockfighting
therein through his policemen, whereupon this action was instituted.

In view of the facts stated above, the first question which naturally
arises is whether or not the plaintiff-appellee Antonio Abad obtained a
permit to operate his cockpit.

In his letter mentioned above, the plaintiff-appellee applied for a permit to transfer his camarin
of wood to be used as a cockpit to the barrio of San Nicolas. The
defendant-appellant herein granted him the desired permit, that is, to
transfer the said camarin, subject to the provisions of the
ordinances then in force and of those that may later be enacted,
regarding the matter. In his aforesaid letter, the plaintiff-appellee
Antonio Abad did not request a permit to conduct cockfights in the camarin in question. Neither could he request such a permit, inasmuch as he did not then intend to use the camarin for cockfights, but in the future, for he stated in his letter: “This camarin
will be used for cockfights * * *.” The defendant-appellant must have
understood it that way when he granted him a permit for the sole
purpose of transferring his camarin.

This
understanding is corroborated by the testimony of the
plaintiff-appellee, Antonio Abad, relative to the conversation
regarding the matter in question, which he had with the
defendant-appellant before he filed his application. On that occasion
no other matter was discussed except the transfer of the camarin.

If the plaintiff-appellee Antonio Abad’s intention in addressing the
communication, Exhibit A, to the herein defendant-appellant had been to
apply for a permit not only to transfer his camarin but also
to conduct cockfights therein, he should have filed a second
application for the latter purpose upon receipt of the reply to his
application wherein he was granted the permit solely to transfer his camarin but not to conduct cockfights therein.

Therefore, the court a quo committed the error attributed to it in the first assignment of error.

With respect to the second assignment of error, that is, that the court a quo
erred in declaring municipal ordinance No. 8 null and void for being
partial, it appears that on March 17, 1932, the municipal council of
Gapan had already enacted municipal ordinance No. 6 containing the very
same provisions regulating the establishment of cockpits in the
municipality of Gapan, which was disapproved by the provincial board of
Nueva Ecija on April 4, 1932, on the ground that it did not specify to
whom payment of the license fee should be made. On the aforesaid date,
March 17 1932, the plaintiff-appellees had not yet begun operating
their cockpit, as they had only paid their privilege tax corresponding
to the second quarter, that is, from April to June, 1932, only on April
4, 1932, the date when municipal ordinance No. 6 was disapproved, as
hereinbefore stated, without having applied for nor obtained the
necessary permit therefor.

Therefore, it cannot be said that
municipal ordinance No. 8, which was enacted and approved the following
day, April 5, 1932, is partial and was passed to protect Tangkeko who
was already operating a cockpit in the same barrio, and to prejudice
the herein plaintiff-appellees, inasmuch as it authorizes the
establishment of two cockpits after securing the necessary permit and
paying the required license of two pesos, provided the two cockpits are
not less than two kilometers apart.

It is true that, with
the enactment of municipal ordinance No. 8, the plaintiff-appellees
cannot conduct cockfights in their camarin on the ground that
it is only 200 meters from Tangkeko’s cockpit, but this fact is not by
itself alone sufficient to render the ordinance unreasonable inasmuch
as the measure is within the scope of the delegated police power of the
municipal council of Gapan and it is not incumbent upon the courts of
justice to inquire into the reasons or motives which prompted said
municipal legislative body to regulate the distance in question. (Secs.
2238 and 2243 [i], Administrative Code; Case vs. “Junta de Sanidad” and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1; Vinco vs. Municipality of Hinigaran, 41 Phil., 790; Cariño vs. Jamoralne, 56 Phil., 188.)

Inasmuch as municipal ordinance No. 8 was enacted pursuant to the
police power of the municipality, the fact that it fixes a distance of
not less than two kilometers between one cockpit and another is not
sufficient to render it partial, and therefore, null and void, even
though it is prejudicial to the plaintiff-appellees’ cockpit, being the
last to be established. Furthermore, the license granted for the
establishment and operation of a cockpit is a privilege which can be
suspended any time by competent authority. (Pedro vs. Provincial Board of Rizal, 56 Phil., 123.)

With respect to the damages which the trial court has ordered the
defendant-appellant to pay, the records show that on April 7, 1932, the
defendant-appellant herein notified the plaintiff-appellees that their
cockpit was being operated in violation of municipal ordinance No. 8
then in force, copy of which was enclosed therewith. Instead of taking
the matter to the courts of justice for the purpose of testing the
validity of the ordinance in question, and of preventing the herein
defendant-appellant from enforcing it by means of a preliminary
injunction, they challenged the authority of the municipal chief
executive and persisted in violating municipal ordinance No. 8, thus
compelling the said municipal chief executive, the defendant-appellant
herein, to make use of the municipal police force for the purpose of
enforcing the law. When the defendant-appellant made use of the
municipal police force in order to prevent the violation of the law, as
he was in duty bound to do, the plaintiff-appellees were operating
their cockpit without having first secured the necessary permit or
license either before or after municipal ordinance No. 8 went into
effect—the receipt of payment of the privilege tax not being the
license or permit therefore—and their cockpit was not two kilometers
distant, as required, from Tangkeko’s cockpit, in violation of the
provisions of the ordinance in question, in spite of their having been
notified thereof by the herein defendant-appellant. The permit to
transfer a cockpit is not a license or permit to conduct cockfights.
(Company “Bighani” vs. Pablo, 53 Phil., 886.)

Therefore, inasmuch as the defendant-appellant herein has acted in
compliance with his executive duty, he is neither civilly nor
criminally liable for damages resulting from a proper exercise of his
executive power.

In view of the foregoing consideration, we
are of the opinion and so hold: (1) That a municipal council which
enacts and approves an ordinance regulating the distance between one
cockpit and another acts within its delegated police power and it is
not incumbent upon the courts of justice to inquire into the reasons
and motives which prompted the said municipal legislative body to fix
the distance in question; (2) that inasmuch as the license granted for
the establishment of a cockpit is a mere privilege which can be
suspended at any time by competent authority, the fixing in a municipal
ordinance of a distance of not less than two kilometers between one
cockpit and another is not sufficient to justify the annulment of such
ordinance on the ground that it is partial, even though it is
prejudicial to an already established cockpit; and (3) that a municipal
president who acts in compliance with his duties pursuant to a proper
exercise of his executive power, is neither civilly nor criminally
liable for damages resulting therefrom.

Wherefore, the
judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant
herein is absolved from the complaint, which is dismissed, with the
costs against the appellees. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Hull, and Imperial, JJ., concur.