C. E. PIATT, CHIEF OF POLICE OF MANILA, COMPLAINANT, VS. PERFECTO ABORDO, RESPONDENT.

On
February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
accepted the offer of two individuals to sell him a quantity of opium,
a prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. On
the afternoon of the same day, Abordo was picked up at the corner of
Taft Avenue Extension and Vito Cruz in the City of Manila, by one of
the individuals who had made him the opium proposition, and was taken
to Rizal Avenue Extension outside of the city limits where they found a
number of persons awaiting them in an automobile. A can was disclosed
to Abordo as containing opium, and believing that it was opium, he
delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of the stuff.
The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene
of the delivery, but in returning to Manila another automobile overtook
them and the parties riding therein, pretending to be constabulary
soldiers, told Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his revolver and
commanding the driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz was able
to evade his pursuers and to arrive safely at his home in Pasay. Once
in his home Abordo examined the contents of the can and found it to
contain fake opium and sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta
Police Station of Manila that he had been robbed of P600. Two
individuals were later arrested, charged with the crime of estafa, and convicted.

Abordo admits that he entered into the transaction detailed above,
adding that “he is sincerely sorry for it and vows not to repeat”. His
defense is that “there being no evidence in the record establishing the
relationship of attorney and client between the respondent and the
malefactors”, and “the act complained of not having been committed in
the exercise of his profession of attorney-at-law”, the acts he
committed could not affect his status as attorney-at-law and could not,
therefore, constitute a ground for disciplinary action.

Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for
the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is well
settled that a member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his
office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. However, as a
general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of
its officers for misconduct alleged to be committed in his private
capacity. The exception to the rule is that an attorney will be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for
gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez [1923], 44 Phil., 567.)

The courts are not curators of the morals of the bar. At the same time
the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good
character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to
practice, when the attorney’s character is bad in such respects as to
show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an
attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him.

It
will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the
criminal law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious
plan from succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his
co-conspirators. The intention to flaunt the law was present even if
consummation of the overt act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the
canons of professional ethics which govern the conduct of attorneys,
the act was as reprehensible as if it had been brought to a successful
culmination. “Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most
sacredly bound to uphold the laws” said the United States Supreme Court
in the well known case of Ex Parte Wall ([1882], 107 U. S., 265), and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support.

The Solicitor-General submits that the respondent should be reprimanded
and warned that a repetition of similar conduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely. To our minds such leniency on the part of the
Supreme Court would serve merely to condone a pernicious example set by
a member of the bar, and would result in action entirely inadequate
considering the aggravated nature of the case. In this respect we are
not without judicial precedents to guide us. Thus, in the case of In re Terrel ([1903], 2 Phil., 266), although the respondent had been acquitted on the charge of estafa,
yet it was held that, since the promotion of an organization for the
purpose of violating or evading the penal laws amounted to such
malpractice oh the part of an attorney as will justify removal or
suspension, the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a
term of one year. Again, in In re Pelaez, supra,
where an attorney-at-law who, as a guardian, pledged the shares of
stock belonging to his ward to guarantee the payment of his personal
debt, although this was misconduct committed in his private capacity,
the court nevertheless suspended the respondent from the legal
profession for one year. We think the instant case equally grave, and
meriting as severe a sentence.

It is the order of the court
that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year to begin on September 1, 1933.

Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.