CESAR ROBLES AND ELISA G. DE ROBLES, PETITIONERS, VS. DONATO TIMARIO, CONSUELO S. DE TIMARIO, AND THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAMARINES SUR, RESPONDENTS.

The records of this case disclose that on May 12, 1955, decision was
rendered by Hon. Jose T. Surtida, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur in Civil Case No. 2516, Consuelo J. Timario,
plaintiff, vs. Cesar Robles and Elisa G. de Robles,
defendants, declaring that the defendants are indebted to the plaintiff
in the. sum of P9,218.00, with interest at legal rate from the filing
of the action until the amount is fully paid. The judgment was not
appealed and so it became final. The decision had been rendered on a
complaint filed on November 9, 1953, but the extended period of
redemption of the land which had been sold with right to repurchase and
which was then subject of the suit did not expire until January 6,
1954. However, no objection was interposed on the ground that the cause
of action did not exist at the time of the filing of the complaint, so
the objection that the action was premature was waived.

On June 14, 1955, the plaintiff brought another civil action against
the same defendants in the same court (civil case No. 3015), alleging
the existence of the judgment above alluded to and praying that the
amount of the judgment (for the sum of P9,218.00, with legal interest
from November 9, 1953 until the full amount is paid) as well as the
costs, be paid by the defendants to the plaintiff. In this latter case,
the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on October 17, 1955,
ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff “the sum of P9,218.00 with
costs against them.” No order for the payment of interest was made in
the decision, although the court made reference to its own decision in
Civil Case No. 2516, declaring defendants indebted to the plaintiff in
the amount of P9,218.00, together with legal interest thereon from
November 9, 1953. This second case, Civil Case No. 3015, was appealed
from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court rendered judgment affirming the decision of the lower court in
the following terms:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, “with double costs against the appellants, the present appeal
being frivolous and manifestly intended for delay (Section 3, Rule 131,
Rules of Court).” (Annex “B”)

The case having been remanded to the Court of First Instance for
execution, the judge thereof on November 9, 1957, issued an order for
execution to issue, including double the amount of the costs, in
accordance with the confirmatory decision of the appellate court (Annex
C). On December 14, 1957, the order was amended to read as follows:

“The writ of execution is hereby amended by
including therein the legal interest in the sum of P9,218.00 from
November 9, 1953 until fully paid and by doubling only the costs in the
Court of Appeals.” (Annex “D”).

A motion to reconsider this amending order was denied, for the
alleged reason that in paragraph 1 of the decision, defendants were
ordered to pay interest. Hence the case was brought to this Court upon
petition for certiorari, petitioner alleging that the Court of First
Instance, acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in ordering
the amendment of the writ of execution, which amendment has altered or
changed the decision in Civil Case No. 3015, which had become final and
executory long before the amendment. On the filing of the petition, We
ordered that the petition be given due course and that a writ of
preliminary injunction issue to prevent the Sheriff of Camarines Sur
from continuing the sale of the properties of the petitioner under the
writ of execution.

The respondents herein have filed an answer to the petition for
certiorari, alleging that the inclusion of the legal interest in the
order sought to be set aside is in accordance With the decision of the
court in Civil Case No. 3516, and that the omission of the legal
interest in the dispositive part of the subsequent case was a mere
oversight which had made the decision ambiguous and subject to
clarification, such that an amendment is necessary in order to make the
judgment conform with the pleadings and the evidence as disclosed in
the record itself.

The authorities cited by the respondents are the cases of Locsin vs. Parades and Hodges, 63 Phil., 87, Velez vs. Martinez and Chacon, 63 Phil., 231, Beltran vs. Reyes, 55 Phil., 1004, and Ralla vs.
Director of Lands, 83 Phil., 491; 46 Off. Gaz. No. 11, 5487, and the
citations in 49 C. J. S. Sec. 436, pp. 863-864; 867-868. In the first
case of Locsin vs. Paredes and Hodges supra, it was found
that the word “severally” was omitted in the decision the amendment of
which was sought, and it was decided therein that the omission of the
word “severally” in the judgment created an ambiguity which may be
clarified even after the decision had become final. Note that the
omission of the word “severally” actually created an ambiguity in the
body of the decision. In the case of Velez vs. Martinez and Chacon, supra,
Velez was sued in his capacity as administrator of the estate, but in
the judgment he was personally made to pay for the amount of the
judgment. The judgment reads as follows:

” ‘In view of the foregoing, it is hereby ordered
that the herein defendant give to the herein plaintiff Ramon Chacon the
possession of the land described in the complaint heading this case and
to turn over, furthermore, to the said plaintiff the amount of
P1,326.54 with interest at 6 per cent per annum from March 30, 1930,
until fully paid; without coats. It is so ordered.”

A writ of execution was issued by virtue of the judgment. and
proceedings having been taken to prevent its enforcement, the court
held that inasmuch as the action was taken against Velez in his
capacity as administrator, the judgment is not against him personally
but in his capacity as administrator. We held in that case that the
order issued by the judge was rendered beyond his authority and that
the execution issued by virtue of the order was also null and void.

In the first case cited, Locsin vs. Paredes and Hodges, we
declared there was ambiguity in the judgment, which ambiguity could be
remedied by amendment, a situation which does not appear in the case at
bar, in which no ambiguity exists at all. The second case of Velez vs.
Martinez and Chacon is also no authority for the case at bar. The
action was to annul an order and a writ of execution issued in
pursuance thereto; it was not a mere amendment of a final judgment.
Neither can it therefore, be applicable to the case at bar. So also all
the cases of Beltran vs. Reyes, supra, and, Ralla vs. Director of Lands, supra,
wherein ambiguous statements in the decision needed interpretation, and
such ambiguities authorized inquiry into the body of the decision for
the purpose of clarification.

In the case at bar, no ambiguity of any kind exists in the
dispositive part of the judgment. The dispositive part of the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 3015, both by the Court of First Instance
and the Court of Appeals, absolutely makes no mention of any interest
on the amount of the judgment, hence there is no ambiguity to be
clarified from the statements made in the body of the decision. What
actually happened in the case at bar is an oversight on the part of the
judge and of the Court of Appeals, in not including an order for the
payment of interest, and a parallel neglect on the part of counsel for
the plaintiff-appellee in not seeking a modification of the judgment in
either court by the inclusion of the interest on the amount of the
judgment. There was a judicial oversight which counsel has neglected to
remedy both in the Court of First Instance and in the Court of Appeals.
The situation is one in which an oversight is sought to be remedied by
claiming an ambiguity not apparent in the dispositive part. While it
was within the power or within the duty of both the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeals to have rendered judgment for the
interest on the amount of the judgment, neither of said courts had
noted or remedied the omission. The general power, of courts to amend
their judgments or orders to make them conformable to justice, can not
be invoked to Correct an oversight or error as a judicial error, may
not be considered as a mere ambiguity, curable without a proper
proceeding filed before the judgment had become final. The situation in
the case at bar is covered by Freeman on Judgments, quoted by us in the
case of Marasigan vs. Ronquillo, 94 Phil., 237; 50 Off. Gaz., 606.

“The general power to correct clerical errors and
omissions does not authorize the court to repair its own inaction, to
make the record and judgment say what the court did not adjudge,
although it had a clear right to do so. The court cannot under the
guise of correcting its record put upon it an order or judgment it
never made or rendered, or add something to either which was not
originally included although it might and should have so ordered or
adjudged in the first instance. It cannot thus repair its own lapses
and omissions to do what it could legally and properly have done at the
right time. A court’s mistake in leaving out of its decision something
which it ought to have put in, and something in issue of which it
intended but failed to dispose, is a judicial error, not a mere
clerical misprision, and cannot be corrected by adding to the entered
judgment the omitted matter on the theory of making the entry conform
to the actual judgment entered.” (Freeman on Judgments, Sec. 141. Vol.
1, p. 273).

“But the failure of the court to render judgment
according to law must not be treated as a clerical misprision. Where
there is nothing to show that the judgment entered is not the judgment
ordered by the court, it cannot be amended. On the one hand, it is
certain that proceedings for the amendment of judgments ought never to
be permitted to become revisory or appellate in their nature; ought
never to be the means of modifying or enlarging the judgment or the
judgment record, so that it shall express something which the court did
not pronounce, even although the proposed amendment embraces matter
which ought clearly to have been so pronounced.” (Freeman on Judgments,
Vol. I, Sec. 142, pp. 274-275).

A case in point was decided by this Court in Jabon, et al. vs.
Alo, et al., 97 Phil., 751; 48 Off. Gaz., 8348. In this latter case,
the court declared plaintiff owner of the portions of the land in
question, but no directive was made in the said judgment to put
plaintiff in possession of the said portions adjudicated to him. After
lapse of more than one year since the decision had become final,
plaintiff moved for a modification of the dispositive part of the
decision by including therein an order directing defendants to vacate
the portions of the land in question.

We held that the dispositive part of the decision can no longer be
modified as prayed for. The authorities cited in the memorandum filed
by the petitioner seem to be in point. They are as follows:

“The only portion of the decision that becomes the
subject of execution is that ordained or decreed in the dispositive
part. Whatever may be found in the body of the decision can only be
considered as part of the reasons or conclusions of the Court and while
they may serve as Guide or enlightenment to determine the ratio decidendi, what is controlling is what appears in the dispositive part of the decision.” (Rosario Nery Edwards, et al., vs. Jose Arce et al., 98 Phil., 688; 62 Off. Gaz., 2487).

* * * * *

“The
Court should not require the collection of interest when the judgment
on which it is issued does not give it, and interest is not allowed by
statute. This has been held to be the rule even where interest on
judgment is allowed by statute, if the judgment does not include it.”
(33 C.J.S. No. 75b p. 216).

Considering that the dispositive part, of both of
the decisions of the Court of First Instance in Civil Case No. 3015,
and of the Court of Appeals in CA—G. R. No. 17320-R, contain no
provision on the interest to be paid on the judgment, we hold that it
is beyond the power of the respondent court to issue a writ of
execution for the payment of the principal obligation with the interest
thereon, because the amount of the interest was not included in both
judgments of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals.

Wherefore, the order sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside. The
injunction issued by Us is hereby declared permanent, with costs
against the respondents Donato Timario and Consuelo S. de Timario.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

 

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MONTEMAYOR, J.:

It is with deep regret that I feel myself constrained to dissent
from the learned majority opinion penned by Mr. Justice Labrador. It is
an opinion comprehensive and well written and states the facts of the
case correctly and fully. Only that, in my opinion, it suffers from a
flaw, in that it perhaps unwittingly permits a miscarriage of justice
by sticking too closely and strictly to the rules and to the
technicalities of the law, overlooking the justice and the relief that
respondents Donato Timario and Consuelo S. de Timario fully deserve.

Respondents obtained a judgment which has long become final, against petitioners on May 12, 1955 for the sum of P9,218.00 with interest at the legal rate from, the filing of the action, that is to say, from November 9, 1953. There is absolutely no question that the obligation was for P9,218.00 with legal interest.
Respondents brought the present action to enforce said judgment for the
payment of P9,218.00 with legal interest. The trial court in its
decision made reference to this former, final decision, calling for the
payment of P9,218.00 with legal interest and it approved and granted
the enforcement, only that in the dispositive part of the decision, it,
involuntarily omitted or forgot the payment of legal interest. It was a
clear oversight or involuntary omission. Even the majority opinion says
so when it stated, “what actually happened in the case at bar is an
oversight on the part of the judge and of the Court of Appeals, in not
including an order for the payment of interest”.

Shall we allow a party to suffer actual, real and substantial
injustice arid be deprived of the payment of interest even at the legal
rate, which interest has been declared, sanctioned and determined in a
final decision, just because in the enforcement of said final decision,
the courts have overlooked, omitted and forgotten to mention the
payment of said legal interest?

There is, in my opinion, nothing sacred or sacrosanct in the
dispositive part of a final decision which precludes its being touched,
amended, corrected and clarified, when it clearly appears that said
dispositive part does not reflect and embody as it should the decision
itself. The dispositive part merely consolidates and expresses briefly
the body of the decision and its conclusion, and gives it due course.
If it makes a mistake, clerical or otherwise, through oversight,
omission, etc., that mistake could and should, in the interest of
justice, be stricken down as an outlaw or intruder that has no reason
to be there, and the corresponding correction or clarification
immediately effected. Otherwise, courts of justice would fail in their
mission and the responsibility to administer real, substantial justice
or as near it, as is possible, to the parties on the merits of their
claims and defenses, if said courts place too much emphasis on and
adhere too closely to technicalities of the law.

Supposing that in the present case, although the final decision
sought to be enforced called only for the payment of P9,218.00, the
dispositive part of the present decision, although in its body it made
reference as it did to and correctly stated the said amount of
P9,218.00, through. oversight or clerical error, placed the comma
between the figures 2 and 1 and added one zero after 8, followed by the
decimal point, so as to make the sum of P92,180.00 instead, and the
trial court and the Court of Appeals and the parties, through
oversight, carelessness or overconfidence had allowed said decision
with the erroneous dispositive part to become final and conclusive.
Surely, that kind of error would not entitle the respondents to receive
P92,180.00 instead of P9,218.00, neither could it compel the
petitioners to pay the said clearly incorrect and erroneous amount. In
that case, this High Tribunal would intervene, examine the record of
the case, examine the body of the decision, strike down the error in
the dispositive part and make it conform to the body of the decision
and the merits of the case as found by the trial court. The noble
edifice of the administration of justice would not long stand and
endure if judicial errors unintentionally committed through oversight,
are allowed. to undermine it. And this danger could be effectively
avoided and prevented by a more liberal interpretation and application
of the law. The Rules of Court themselves provide for a liberal
construction of the same, saying that the rules shall be construed
liberally in order to promote their objective and to assist the parties
in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.

In the first case cited by the majority opinion, Locsin vs. Paredes
and Hodges, 63 Phil., 87, the decision of the trial court omitted the
word “severally”, and yet when this Tribunal found out even after said
decision had become final, that the obligation was not only joint but
several, we ignored the omission and allowed the trial court to cure it
by considering that the omitted word “severally” was actually contained
in the decision. Although the decision in that case was already final,
still we virtually modified it by practically allowing the insertion of
the word “severally”, which word was not there in the first place, in
order to make the decision conform to the merits of the case, although
we said that it was to clarify the ambiguity in the dispositive part.
Why could not we in the present case cure the error or omission
committed by inserting as it were the phrase, “with interest at the
legal rate from the filing of the action”, knowing that the respondents
are fully entitled to said legal interest and the petitioners liable to
pay it on the basis of the final decision being enforced. That would
clear the ambiguity. But the majority opinion says that there is no
ambiguity in the present case. I believe there is, because whereas the
dispositive part makes no mention of the payment of interest, the
decision sought to be enforced provides for said payment of interest,
and the very body of the present decision refers to said payment of
interest and in effect grants and approves its enforcement.

Again, in the case of Velez vs. Martinez and Chacon, 63
Phil., 231, cited and discussed in the majority opinion, the trial
court in its decision sought to hold the defendant personally
responsible for the payment of a certain amount with interest. In order
to correct the error and administer justice, we had to examine the
record of the case and when we found that the defendant was sued not in
his personal capacity but as administrator, we held that the trial
court could not hold him personally responsible but only as an
administrator. In other words, to administer justice in that case, we
went through and, beyond, even ignored the dispositive part of a trial
court’s final decision and after examining the record, we in effect
modified the dispositive. part of said final decision so as to conform
to the record and the merits of the case.

I agree with the majority that ordinarily, the judgment in a case
contained in the dispositive part should be respected and followed,
specially when it has become final, but when, as in the present case,
there is a manifest error or omission which substantially affects the
rights of one of the parties, and the trial court which had committed
that error itself is disposed and wants to correct its error or
omission, we should disregard technicalities and allow the trial court
to correct its own error. In trying to do so, the trial court in its
order of January 15, 1958, said:

“Although the dispositive part of the decision does
not order the defendants to pay interest on the sum of P9,218.00,
nevertheless, in paragraph 1 of the decision it clearly appears that
the defendants were ordered to pay legal interest on the said sum. For
this reason, the motion to set aside the order of this court of
December 14, 1957 ordering payment of said interest is denied.”

However, we, through the majority opinion, decline and refuse to
allow said trial court to make correction of its involuntary error. And
to my mind, there lies the whole trouble, nay, the tragedy of the whole
unfortunate situation.

Another point of view suggests itself. As already stated, the
present action was brought merely to enforce the first or final
decision which called for the payment of P9,218.00 and the payment of legal interest.
Since the present decision authorizes said enforcement, may it or can
it in the process of enforcement modify the final decision to be
enforced by increasing or diminishing the amount or omitting the payment of legal interest?
I do not believe so. It must enforce the final decision if at all,
faithfully, fully and in its entirety. It cannot enforce the payment of
the amount and leave the payment of legal interest for another action
for enforcement. In other words, a final decision may not be enforced
by means of or through a subsequent decision, piecemeal. Otherwise,
that would mean multiplicity of suits because the winning party would
have to bring another action to enforce that part of the decision
regarding payment of the interest which was involuntarily omitted in
the enforcing decision. This, in my opinion, is another reason why the
dispositive part of the present decision should be clarified and made
to conform to the body of the decision and the record of the case by
considering as included in said dispositive part, the payment of legal
interest.

The amount involved in the legal interest is quite substantial. It
is interest at the legal rate from November 9, 1953 on the rather
considerable amount of P9,218.00. The respondents who were adjudged by
final decision liable for said amount and interest have delayed the
said payment and even had taken the case on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, which court declared the appeal to be frivolous and condemned
them to pay double costs. By the time this decision becomes final,
almost seven years will have passed from November 9, 1953. The interest
on P9,218.00 for that period at the legal rate would be quite
substantial and with the majority opinion, we shall be depriving
respondents of that, in my opinion, unjustly, merely on technical
grounds.

In conclusion, I hold that an error committed through oversight in
the dispositive part of a decision may be corrected even if the latter
has become final, in order to conform to the body of the decision,
this, in order to serve the interests of justice; that where as in the
present case, the error was really unintentional because the body of
the decision as to the amount of the judgment and the payment of legal
interest, is clear, and the trial court that committed the error
realizes it and to make amends, wants to correct the error, it should
be allowed to do so by this Tribunal; that where as in the present
case, the decision in question and the dispositive part thereof merely
seek to enforce a prior, final judgment, said final decision must stand
in its entirety and integrity without any alteration, amendment,
increase or diminution of the amount involved, including the payment of
interest, and the decision enforcing the same must enforce it fully, in
its entirety, and it may not intentionally or otherwise, modify, alter,
diminish or increase the amount of the judgment. Neither may it enforce
the prior judgment only partially or piecemeal so as to leave the
enforcement of the rest of the judgment to a subsequent action for that
would mean multiplicity of suits.

For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.