G.R. No. L-15560. December 31, 1960
INTERNATIONAL OIL FACTORY WORKERS UNION (FFW), PETITIONER VS. HON. ARSENIO MARTINEZ, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Court of Industrial Relations on May 11, 1951 and April 12, 1957, respectively,
the first prescribing a minimum wage of P5.50 a day for all regular male
employees of the International Oil Factory, and the second approving the
collective bargaining agreement entered into between said factory and the
International Oil Factory Workers Union (FFW), petitioner herein, dated April 6,
1957, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
“The Company agrees that all extra or temporary laborers who have rendered
efficient, faithful and satisfactory service shall be converted to regular
workers or laborers after one year from the signing of this Agreement * *
*.”
Pursuant to the aforementioned awards, the president of petitioning union in
behalf of eighteen laborers of the company wrote a letter to its superintendent
on April 14, 1958 asking the latter to raise their salaries from P4.00 to P5.50
a day. Cheng Guat, superintendent of the company, replied on April 16, 1958
stating, among others, that “the decision dated May 11, 1951 rendered in the
main case * * * which fixes the minimum of P5.50 for the male laborers * * *
could not be applied in the case of those newly converted regular laborers
from temporary laborers, inasmuch as those temporary laborers were not yet
employed in the factory at that time” and that the company has “not considered
whether their past services have been efficient, faithful and satisfactory.”
(Italics supplied)
Subsequently, petitioner filed before the industrial court a “Motion for
Compliance and for Contempt of Court” alleging that since the 18 laborers who
were classified as temporary on April 6, 1957 were already converted by the
company into regular workers on April 7, 1958 in view of the lapse of the one
year probationary period and the minimum wage of P5.50 a day awarded by the
court has not been paid to them, the company should be ordered to pay their
differential wages and the person or persons who have violated its order should
be declared in contempt of court.
After respondent company had filed its reply, hearing was held by the trial
judge, Hon. Jose S. Bautista, who from the evidence found the following facts:
“that Cheng Guat, superintendent of the respondent recognized the conversion of
the status of the above-named laborers in his letter to the petitioner’s
president on April 16, 1958; (Exh. D); that the payrolls of the above-named
laborers before April 7, 1958 contained the word ‘temporary’ while the pertinent
payrolls after April 7, 1958 did not contain the word “temporary”; (Exhs. G, G-1
to G-14) ; that the aforenamed laborers were also included in the list of the
regular workers in the payroll period after April 7, 1958; that the time book
indicates that the same laborers were classed together with the rest of the
regular workers; that when representation was made to the respondent towards the
use of time cards of the same laborers, the respondent superintendent promised
that time cards would be distributed the following day; (only regular workers
use time cards) (Exhs. E, E-1 to E-17); that the same group of laborers were
given sick leave with pay after April 7, 1958, which concession is granted only
to the regular employees; (Exhs. F, F-1 to F-37) that respondent explained that
the grant of sick leave with pay was due to the representation made in behalf of
the same laborers and not due to change of status from temporary to regular;
that the superintendent of respondent testified that the same group of laborers
violated certain rules and regulations of the respondent implying that the
condition of efficient, faithful and satisfactory service was not fulfilled;
that the respondent despite those alleged violations did not prosecute the same
laborers leading one to believe that such alleged infractions were not serious
enough as to warrant the conclusion of inefficiency, unfaithfulness and
unsatisfactory service and therefore, if ever true, were condoned; that it is
only now that the respondent is emphasizing those alleged violations, which is
very understandable; and that the same laborers executed individual contracts of
services with the respondent for certain periods of time.”
Hence, on January 17, 1959, the trial judge issued an order directing the
company to pay the salary differentials of the laborers in question but
absolving the officials involved from the prayer that they be declared in
contempt of court.
Dissatisfied with this order, respondent company elevated the case to the
court en banc, where the latter, by a vote of 3 to 1, Judge Bautista
dissenting, issued a resolution on April 3, 1959 reversing the order of the
trial judge, among others, on the following grounds: that inasmuch as 12 of the
18 laborers were not yet members of the union in 1956 and only became so after
the probationary period of one year, they are not entitled to the awards of the
court, and hence, their claim can be dismissed on this ground alone; that the
imputation of inefficiency, unfaithfulness and unsatisfactory service hurled
against said laborers by the superintendent of the company has not been
sufficiently rebutted; that the fact that said laborers were not dismissed does
not necessarily warrant the conclusion that they were efficient and faithful
because they may have been merely admonished not to commit the same faults in
the future; that the extension of the privileges of sick leave, vacation leave,
time cards, etc., to said laborers which were eajoyed by the regular employees
cannot amount to their conversion into regular employees because said privileges
were merely extended because of the earnest request of the president of the
union; and that the determination of whether the laborers are efficient,
faithful or competent rests upon the discretion of the company alone.
On July 9, 1959, petitioner came to this Court by way of certiorari seeking
to set aside the resolution of the industrial court en banc and the
affirmance of the trial judge’s order dated January 17, 1959.
The only question to be determined is whether the industrial court acted
correctly in issuing its resolution of April 3, 1959 declaring that the 18
laborers are not entitled to the wage differentials provided for in the
collective bargaining agreement on the ground that the condition precedent
relative to their efficient, faithful and satisfactory service has not been
complied with.
Respondents maintain the affirmative, and giving emphasis to the testimony of
Cheng Guat, superintendent of the company, contend that if there was ever a
conversion in the status of employment of the 18 laborers it was only partial in
the sense that the privileges accorded to them were merely extended because of
the earnest request of the president of the union and not because of the
company’s desire to give them a regular status. We find this pretense untenable,
not only because it was never set up as a defense by the company in its answer
and came out for the first time at the hearing when the superintendent of the
company testified on the matter over the vigorous objection of petitioner’s
counsel,[1] but also because, if such
were true, the company should have already explained that fact in its answer to
the letter of the union demanding that the minimum wage of P5.50 a day be
extended to the 18 laborers. No such thing was done, which shows that the
alleged defense is a last minute concoction made solely in an attempt to free
the company from liability.
Nor are we convinced that the condition precedent for the conversion of the
status of the laborers in question has not been complied with. Note that
practically all the privileges ordinarily given to the regular workers of the
company (minus the minimum wage of P5.50 a day) have also been accorded to the
laborers herein involved, only that the company now claims that they cannot be
given that increase because they were found to be inefficient, unfaithful and
incompetent, invoking in support of the charge the fact that they were found
guilty of certain violations of some of the company’s rules and regulations. But
it should be noted that the alleged violations, if any, were committed after
the one year probationary period and no evidence whatsoever was introduced
to prove their inefficiency during the probationary period. Since the agreement
entered into between the company and the union refers to seryices to be
performed during the period from April 6, 1957 to April 6, 1958 and the evidence
introduced refers to acts performed after April 6, 1958, the charge is
immaterial because, if during the probationary period they proved to be
efficient, they are entitled to be classified as regular laborers regardless of
the infractions they may commit thereafter. And even granting arguendo
that they committed some violations of the rules of the company, however, the
fact that they were condoned or disregarded by the company shows that they were
minor in nature which cannot substantially impair their efficiency as employees
of the company.
While it may be true that if one is not dismissed it does not follow that he
is efficient because he can be merely admonished, it is surprising that, in
spite of the company’s claim of inefficiency on the part of the 18 laborers,
still it continued them in its employ up to the present. If it were true, as
claimed, that said laborers were inefficient, why did it not dismiss them
knowing that it is its right to do so to protect its interest as already ruled
by this Court?[2] If we were to uphold
the theory entertained by the industrial court that the determination of the
efficiency of the 18 laborers rests upon the discretion alone of the
company, they may never acquire the status of regular employees, for then their
fate would be placed entirely at the whim and mercy of the employer. Such theory
is indeed detrimental to the interest of labor.
Anent the claim of respondent court that because the 12 laborers were not
members of petitioning union their case may be dismissed on this ground implying
that only union members are entitled to the benefits of the collective
bargaining contract, suffice it to state that such cannot be entertained because
to accord its benefits only to members of the union without any valid reason
would constitute undue discrimination against non-members.[3]
There is an insinuation that this appeal raises merely questions of fact and
so should be dismissed. This is not quite correct. The fact that this case was
given due course shows that the question raised is one of law, the facts being
undisputed. Indeed, the only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
industrial court acted correctly in issuing the resolution appealed from,[4] and this we find to be not warranted by
the evidence. This error we rectified in this decision.
Wherefore, the resolution appealed from is set aside. The order of the trial
judge dated January 17, 1959 is hereby revived, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Resolution set aside.
[1] While it is true that Com. Act 103
provides that the CIR shall not be bound by technical rule of legal evidence,
what is violated here is a cardinal rule of procedure to prevent surprises
especially in this case where the defendant changed its theory or defense after
plaintiff had closed its evidence.
[2] Manila Trading & Supply Co.
vs. The Honorable Francisco Zulueta, et al., 40 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p.
183; Indias vs. Philippine Iron Mines, 101 Phil., 297; 54 Off. Gaz.,
(6) 1817.
[3] Leyte Land Transportation Company,
Inc. vs. Leyte Farmers’ & Laborers’ Union, 80 Phil., 842; Land
Settlement & Development Corporation vs. Caledonia Pile Workers’
Union, 90 Phil., 817; Price Stabilization Corporation vs. PRISCO
Workers’ Union, et al., L-9288, December 29, 1958.
[4] Manila Railroad Go. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-4329, August 21, 1952.