MANILA YELLOW TAXICAB COMPANY, INC., AND ACRO TAXICAB COMPANY, INC., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. JULIO DANON, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

On
January 18, 1932, Julio Danon filed with the Public Service Commission
an application for a certificate of public convenience to operate a
taxicab service in the City of Manila and surrounding municipalities.
Opposition was filed by the two existing operators of taxicabs in the
City of Manila, namely the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co., Inc., then
operating about sixty-eight taxicabs, and the Acro Taxi-cab Co., Inc.,
then operating about twenty taxicabs. After hearing, in which it is
shown that Danon is now operating a number of so called garage cars
which he desired to convert into taxis, and after considerable evidence
was taken by the commission both for and against the then petitioner
the Public Service Commission, by a divided vote, granted Danon the
certificate prayed for and authorized him to operate thirty-one
taxicabs. Reconsideration being denied the existing operators, they
bring the case here for review.

After the major portion of
the testimony had been taken Associate Commissioner R. A. Cruz went on
vacation, and the Honorable Vicente de Vera, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Tayabas, replaced him as a member of the Public
Service Commission during that time pursuant to a valid assignment by
the Secretary of Justice. The two taxicab companies objected to Judge
De Vera taking part in the case in view of the provision of Act No.
3844, which provides:

“All contested
matters that may be presented before the Commission shall be heard and
decided upon by the Commission in full or at least by two
Commissioners, and before any Commissioner is assigned to write the
decision or any resolution which affects in some way the right of the
parties concerned, the matter shall be voted upon by the members of the
Commission who have taken part in the direction of the case.” This
objection was overruled by the commission and Judge De Vera sat in more
than two sessions of the commission and took an active part in the
direction and decision of the case. The action of the Public Service
Commission in this ruling is not contrary to the spirit of the
legislative mandate above quoted.

Appellants also urge that all public utilities must be subject to one
set of administrative principles and that no distinction can be made
between taxicab companies and any other service rendered by a public
utility. In this we can not concur, for example, experience has clearly
demonstrated that the telephone is of necessity a natural monopoly if
good service is to be rendered. A two-telephone service operating in
the same community, instead of being a public convenience might more
properly be termed a public annoyance.

This court in the case of Carmelo and Oriol vs.
Monserrat (55 Phil., 644), recognized a practical distinction between
taxicab companies in the City of Manila and autobus service on definite
routes. The latter decision, however, did not modify the basic
principle announced in the case of Batangas Transportation Co. vs.
Orlanes (52 Phil., 455), that unnecessary and ruinous competition
should not be permitted by public utilities, nor should new operators
be allowed to invade the definite field of old operators unless and
until the old operators had failed to comply with the orders of the
Public Service Commission to render adequate and proper service to the
public within their respective fields. The commission gave some weight
to the fact that, although oppositors had testified in their cases that
a very large number of taxicabs were necessary properly to serve the
public in the City of Manila, neither company had expanded its
operations by placing in service taxicabs in the number authorized by
their respective certificates. This, notwithstanding the number in
their certificates, is less than their testimony would indicate was
necessary for adequate service.

In the principal decision of
the Public Service Commission it is argued that the conversion of the
cars of the applicant from garage cars to taxis is to a great extent
one of form only so the transportation available to the public in the
City of Manila will not thereby be augmented. It was held that the
public convenience, however, will be served by the change in the nature
of the service rendered. There may be real merit in this contention,
but if all garage operators in the City of Manila should suddenly
desire to change the nature of the service rendered to the public very
clear evidence should be presented to show that ruinous competition
would not result before such applications should be granted.

Appellants urge upon this court their contention that the holding of
the Public Service Commission that applicant should be granted
permission to enter the taxicab field was contrary to the weight of the
evidence. Part of section 35 of Act No. 3108 provides:

“The
Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to review said order of the
Commission, and to modify or set aside such order when it clearly
appears that there was no evidence before the commission to support
reasonably such order, or that the same was without the jurisdiction of
the Commission.” This is a very different power than given the Supreme
Court in section 497 of the Code of Civil Procedure where the rule is
stated as follows:

“But the Supreme Court may review the
evidence taken in the court below and, after giving due weight to the
fact that the judge who tried the case saw the witnesses when they
testified, affirm or reverse by a preponderance of the evidence, or
modify by such preponderance, the judgment there rendered, as justice
may require, * * *.”

There are good reasons
why a different rule should apply to public service cases. In most
instances the cases are administrative not litigious in character. They
are questions involving business and transportation, not legal
questions, and the party entitled to preference, namely, the people of
the Philippine Islands, though always present is seldom represented.
Following the legislative mandate this court will refrain from
substituting their discretion on the weight of the evidence for the
discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and
will only reverse or modify such orders of the Public Service
Commission when it clearly appears that the evidence is insufficient to
support their conclusions.

The orders appealed from are therefore affirmed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Villamor, Villa-Real, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.