THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. REMEDIOS AVELINO DE LINAO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

As
this is the second appeal of this case, a brief review of the
proceedings leading up to the first appeal and the decision thereof
will be pertinent.

On March 26, 1930, an information was
filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, charging
that Antonio Ubaldo, Felix Tuazon, Agapito Toreno, Elpidio Gaspay and
Remedios Avelino de Linao conspired together to murder Joaquin Linao,
the husband of Remedios Avelino, and feloniously assaulted and wounded
him about midnight on the 24th day of March, 1930. As Joaquin Linao
survived, the information charged Remedios de Linao with frustrated
parricide as follows:

“That at about
midnight of the 24th day of March, 1930, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the accused Remedios Avelino de Linao, then being
the lawful wife of one Joaquin Linao, conspiring and confederating with
her four coaccused persons who were fully aware of the existence of
said marital relation, and all of said accused helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, and with intent to
kill, taking advantage of the cover of darkness which they purposely
sought therefor, with evident premeditation and for a price or promise
of reward, treacherously assault, beat, and wound the said Joaquin
Linao at his dwelling at No. 145 Jesus Street, in said city, by then
and there strangling him and stabbing him on a vital part of the chest
and other parts of the body while he Was asleep in his said dwelling,
thereby performing all acts of execution which would produce the death
of said Joaquin Linao as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of said accused
persons, to wit, the timely and effective intervention of medical
assistance.

“Contrary to law.”

Ubaldo and Tuazon pleaded guilty and were sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal
for frustrated murder. The judgment was affirmed by this court (55
Phil., 94). Toreno, on a separate trial, was also found guilty of
attempted murder and sentenced to ten years of presidio mayor. This judgment was also affirmed by this court (G. R. No. 33909).^[1] Gaspay was acquitted.

On her plea of not guilty, Remedios de Linao was separately tried and
found guilty of the crime of attempted parricide. She was sentenced to
twelve years of prision mayor. The judgment was affirmed by this court on March 10, 1931 (G. R. No. 33909).^[2]

On December 26, 1931, this court granted the motion of the appellant Remedios de Linao for a new trial as follows:

“The
court having regularly acquired jurisdiction for new trial of the
above-entitled cause submitted by both parties for decision, after
consideration thereof by the court upon the record, its decision and
order for judgment having been filed on the 16th day of December, A. D.
nineteen hundred and thirty-one;

“By virtue thereof it is
hereby adjudged and decreed that the motion for reconsideration and the
motion for rehearing are denied, and the motion for a new trial
granted; and the record remanded to the court below, with instructions
to reopen the case to take the evidence of the affiant Felix Tuazon in
support of the motion for a new trial, and such other and additional
evidence as the defense and prosecution may care to offer which in the
opinion of the court may be relevant.”

As a
result of the new trial, the same judge again found the appellant
guilty as charged, and she now appeals making the following additional
assignments of error:

“I. The lower court
erred in giving credit to the testimony of Bonifacio Abad, chauffeur of
garage car No. G-1017, to the effect that he saw an unidentified woman
standing on the second flight from the top of the stairway leading to
the ‘azotea’ of the house of the defendant waving her hand,
notwithstanding the physical impossibility for Bonifacio Abad to have
seen that place at that time of the night, and the report of the
government Weather Bureau (Exhibit 100) to the effect that the night of
March 24, 1930, was moonless and dark.

“II. The lower
court erred in disregarding entirely the unbiased testimony of Gavino
San Juan who was the first person in the neighborhood who responded to
the call for aid of the offended party, Joaquin Linao.

“III.
The lower court erred in not giving credit to the expert opinion of
Professor Jose del Rosario, chemist and handwriting expert, to the
effect that Exhibit J is not a part of Exhibit J-1 and by substituting
therefor its opinion and personal appreciation.

“IV. The
lower court erred in not finding that the intention and real motive of
Antonio Ubaldo,” Felix Tuazon and Agapito Toreno in entering the house
of the offended party, Joaquin Linao, was robbery.

“V. The
lower court erred in rejecting the testimony of Carmen de Luna,
Ildefonsa Amor de Santuico and Angel Linao on the ground that their
testimony did not constitute newly discovered evidence.

“VI. The lower court erred in not giving any credit to the testimony of
the defendant and appellant, Remedios Avelino de Linao, and in
considering her testimony as a last minute attempt to escape criminal
responsibility.

“VII. The lower court erred in not
allowing the offended party, Joaquin Linao, to testify as witness in
the new trial on the ground that his testimony would not constitute
newly discovered evidence.

“VIII. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant and appellant of the crime charged.”

Referring to the fifth and seventh errors assigned above, it appears
that the lower court, upon objection of the prosecution, refused to
admit the testimony of Joaquin Linao, Carmen de Luna, Ildefonsa Amor de
Santuico and Angel Linao, on the ground that their testimony would not
constitute newly discovered evidence (pp. 134, 154, 155, t. s. n.). It
appears also that other evidence, which counsel for the accused thought
important, was excluded by the court on the same ground (e. g. page
116, t. s. n.).

The court below misconstrued the order of
this court granting new trial and the above-mentioned exclusions were
erroneous. When this court remands a criminal case for new trial
without restriction, the previous adjudication is wiped out and the
case should proceed de novo and be conducted, as far as practicable, as if there had been no previous trial. (U. S. vs.
Dacir, 26 Phil., 503, 517.) But the order granting the new trial may
restrict the same to particular issues or particular parties, or permit
both the prosecution and the defense to offer such further and
additional evidence as they may desire to submit without the necessity
of retaking the evidence already in the record. (U. S. vs. Singuimuto, 3 Phil., 176, 183.) The order of this court of December 16, 1931,^[1]
granting the motion for new trial and remanding the record to the court
below with instructions to take the evidence of Felix Tuazon and “such
other and additional evidence as the defense and the prosecution may
care to offer which in the opinion of the court may be relevant,” was
not intended to restrict the evidence on the new trial to such as in
the opinion of the lower court may be newly discovered, evidence. In
other words, the court below was not warranted in substituting for the
word “relevant” the words “newly discovered”. This is the more apparent
because the case was reopened for the prosecution as well as the
defense. Such a restriction as the court below read into our order
might render rebuttal evidence impossible for either side. The evidence
thus erroneously rejected—specially the evidence of the appellant’s
husband, Joaquin Linao—was doubtless material and important to the
defense. But it is not necessary to sustain the errors assigned by the
appellant in this respect in view of the other conclusions we have
reached on this appeal.

The evidence presented to us on this
appeal makes out a very different case from that presented to us on the
first appeal as relates to the accused Remedios de Linao. At the first
trial the appellant was not called and did not testify as a witness. In
our decision promulgated on March 10, 1931, we indicated a number of
circumstances which were not denied or explained by the accused, and we
said:

“It must be conceded that no one of
the foregoing links in the chain of circumstantial evidence, standing
alone and within itself, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Even so
when all of these respective links of sworn testimony of eyewitnesses
are forged into one chain, no one of which are denied, except by
inference or presumption, a strong case of circumstantial evidence is
made out against the appellant.”

At the new
trial which is now under review on this appeal, the defense introduced
nine witnesses (including the appellant) and the prosecution, one in
rebuttal. The evidence offered by the defense on the new trial, besides
supplementing that given at the first trial, was intended to explain
the circumstantial evidence which this court, in its previous opinion,
had mentioned as pointing to the guilt of the appellant; and this
testimony may be summarized as follows:

Joaquin Gallego, an
employee of the Weather Bureau, testified that at the time the crime in
question was perpetrated on the night of March 24, 1930, there was no
moon; that the moon did not rise until 2.41 a. m. The object of this
testimony was doubtless to impeach the Government’s witness, Abad, who
had testified at the original trial as follows:

“P.
¿Estaba ella cerca de alguna luz?—R. Frente a su casa habia un poste de
luz electrica encendida cuya claridad le daba hacia ella, y ademas era
noche de luna.”

Gavino San Juan, (who was
subpoenaed as a witness for the prosecution at the first trial but not
used), testified that he is a close neighbor of the Linaos; on the
night of March 24, 1930, he saw the chauffeur of the Linaos, whom he
recognized, and two other men, whom he did not know, enter the Linao
house. Shortly afterwards, he heard cries and shouts coming from the
Linao house indicating a fight, and following that, Angel Linao came
running out. He met Angel and, while inquiring of him what had
happened, one of the men ran past them and they pursued him. There was
no automobile parked in front of the Linao house, but a garage car was
standing near the church. He turned back and went up into the Linao
house. On seeing him, Joaquin Linao started to strike him, saying: “Is
this another one?”, but Mrs. Linao told him that Ihe was a neighbor.
Remedios de Linao was supporting her husband with her right arm and
told him to take her husband to the hospital and gave him a sheet to
wrap about her husband. She brought the sheet herself. He, the witness,
helped Joaquin Linao down to the automobile. Remedios de Linao
accompanied them to the car. The witness helped Mr. Linao into the car;
Paulita, Angel and the chauffeur were in the car. Mrs. Linao told them
to wait for her because she wished to go with them. She ran back to get
her child who was crying. Angel suggested they should hurry to the
hospital which they did. After they left Mr. Linao at the hospital, he
and the garage chauffeur went directly to the Luneta Station to report
what occurred. A detective returned to the hospital with them and when
they arrived there, they saw Mrs. Linao at the hospital. After that, he
and the detectives went in the same car to Pandacan.

On the night in question it was dark. The witness admitted signing a statement at the police investigation.

In response to questions of the court, he stated that it was about half
past eleven at night when he saw the three men enter the Linao house.
The night was cloudy and dark. From the fence (verja), one could see to
the “azotea”. At the time he saw the three men enter the fence gate, he
saw no one on the “azotea”. The three men came walking from Calle
Beata. The man he and Angel pursued was one of the three. When they
reached the automobile, the men jumped from the car. When he went up
and met Joaquin Linao, he was standing, Mrs. Linao supporting him. He
observed spots on his undershirt. Mrs. Linao came down with them to the
car. She asked him to wait for her as she desired to go with them. She
said that after the child cried. To the best of his recollection, Mrs.
Linao was wearing a nightgown. He did not remember the color because he
paid no attention to it. He could not say if Mrs. Linao was holding a
child while supporting her husband. He was much excited and there was a
big crowd at that time. He is a native of Pandacan. The first statement
he made to the police was very brief because he was dead sleepy and
tired (mareado).

The testimony of Felix Tuazon at the new trial is summarized in the Attorney-General’s brief as follows:

“The
testimony of Felix Tuazon, one of the accused who plead guilty and who
is now serving his sentence in Bilibid Prison, tends to show that on
the night of March 24, 1930, he met his co-defendants Antonio Ubaldo,
Agapito Toreno and Elpidio Gaspay in a restaurant in M. H. del Pilar
Street, Manila, where they took supper that night; that Ubaldo told
them that his master, Joaquin Linao, had plenty of money and he
proposed to them to rob him that night; that they agreed to commit the
robbery and the four of them took a garage automobile and then
proceeded to the house of the Linaos in Pandacan; that once upstairs
Ubaldo indicated to Tuazon where Joaquin Linao was sleeping, whereupon,
Tuazon and Toreno went to the sola and there found Joaquin Linao’s coat
hanging on a chair; that from one of the pockets of the coat Tuazon
took a big envelope containing paper money; that Tuazon then went near
Joaquin Linao in search of his pocket-book, because according to Ubaldo
most of Linao’s money was in the pocketbook; that while Tuazon was
looking for the pocketbook Linao woke up, whereupon Tuazon got hold of
Linao’s neck; that immediately thereafter a struggle between the two
followed, with Toreno helping Tuazon; that Linao was wounded; that
afterwards Tuazon and Toreno ran away downstairs towards an automobile
that was waiting for them out in the street; that no sooner had they
got into the automobile or had gone a short distance than many people
went after them; that they later left the automobile and ran towards a
grass field; that while on the grass field Toreno threw away the
envelope containing money; and that soon afterwards Toreno and Tuazon
were apprehended by the people. Tuazon’s testimony further tends to
show that that was the first time that he went up the house of the
Linaos; that Mrs. Linao never went to the house of Tuazon or Toreno,
nor did she ever offer to give them P200 if they would kill her
husband; that when Tuazon and his companions went up the house the
night in question, he did not see Mrs. Linao there; that in going up
the house, their intention was to rob and not to kill Mr. Linao; that
Tuazon saw Mrs. Linao for the first time at the Luneta Police Station
that same night after he was arrested; and that it was Detective
Pescante who indicated to him at the police station who Mrs. Linao was
(pp. 78-119, t. s. n., new trial).”

The
testimony of Dr. Jose del Rosario tends to show that the piece of paper
Exhibit J had not been torn off and was no part of the piece of paper
Exhibit J-1 which was found in the drawer of a bureau in the house of
the accused. The testimony of Carmen de Luna and of Ildefonsa Amor de
Santuico corroborates the statement of the appellant that she and her
husband were with her sick sister at the Centro Escolar de Senoritas
from about 5:30 on the afternoon of March 24, 1930, until 10 o’clock
the same night.

Joaquin Linao, the husband of the appellant
and the person who was robbed and assaulted on the night of March 24,
1930, wished to take the stand as a witness for his wife but, as
stated, the trial court declined to receive his testimony on the ground
that the same was not newly discovered evidence. The defense offered in
evidence a petition which Joaquin Linao had intended to file in this
court on behalf of his wife before we granted the motion for new trial,
in which petition he sets out certain facts within his personal
knowledge. The court below admitted the petition presumably for the
purpose of showing the facts to which this witness would have testified
had the court so permitted. Said petition is as follows:

“Comparece el infrascrito ante esta Hon. Corte y, respetuosamente, solicita permiso para exponer:

“1.°
Que habiendo tenido ocasion de revisar la mocion de nueva vista
presentada por los abogados de la acusada, con todos los documentos y affidavits
anexos, demostrativos de haberse descubierto nuevas pruebas, el que
subscribe concurre plenamente con todas y cada una de las alegaciones
de la acusada en la citada mocion, convencido de que reflejan fielmente
la verdad;

“2.° Que como parte ofendida en esta causa, el
infrascrito se permite manifestar a este alto Tribunal que se halla
intimamente convencido de la inocencia de la acusada, no so1o por los
fundamentos, razones y circunstancias expuestas en los escritos,
alegato y memorandums de la acusada y sus abogados, sino porque el que
subscribe tiene sus propios motivos para pensar en la ausencia de
culpabilidad de dicha acusada, entre ellos, los siguientes:

“(a)
Durante los muchos anos de su convivencia conyugal con la acusada,
despues de hacer un escrutinio minucioso, el que subscribe no recuerda
haber dado ocasion ni haber realizado algun acto que fuera causa
suficiente para que una persona normal e inteligente, como es su
esposa, haya abrigado por un instante siquiera el deseo de causar o
hacer que se cause la muerte del padre de sus hijos;

“(b)
A raiz del inicio de esta causa, el que subscribe se puso a recordar y
examinar la conducta de la acusada, en un esfuerzo para buscar algun
antecedente que tuviese relacion logica, de cualquier indole que sea,
con el proposito delictuoso que se le imputa por la acusacion, y no
obstante los muchos dias y muchas noches de concentrada y angustiosa
reflexion consagrados a la materia, el infrascrito no ha conseguido
hallar ni un solo indicio compatible con el deseo de privarle de la
vida;

“(c) En los muchos anos de convivencia con
la acusada, el declarante ha tenido completa oportunidad de conocer la
psicologia de su esposa, no solo por haber visto su manera de ser y de
conducirse en su vida de relacion con el que subscribe y sus hijos, con
otras personas, parientes, conocidos y extranos, sino tambien por las
conversaciones y discusiones de diversos asuntos y por las
manifestaciones de la intimidad familiar, pues el infrascrito cree que
su esposa exactamente se caracteriza por la personificacion del
caracter apacible, completamente incapaz de abrigar sordas rebeldias en
el corazon o de adoptar resoluciones violentas o extremas, siempre
predispuesta a considerar las contrariedades con espiritu conciliador o
animo dulcemente resignado, constantemente cauta para evitar que sus
actos o sus palabras pudieran causar daño, siendo excesivamente
indulgente hasta con las mayores travesuras de sus hijos y sin
atreverse a castigarlos nunca;

“(d) El que
subscribe no ha visto o notado en su esposa ningun acto ni le ha oido
pronunciar palabra alguna que denotara animadversion o aversion hacia
el infrascrito, ni nada que indique el deseo de alejarse o separarse o
de estar libre o de huir de la presencia del esposo, ni aun en los caos
de que entre ella y el que subscribe haya surgido la mayor divergencia
de criterio sobre. cualquier asunto;

“(e) Como
quiera que el declarante, siendo natural de la Provincia de Bataan,
tenia y tiene sus asuntos principalmente en dicha Provincia, en donde
tenia que permanecer mucho tiempo, aun mucho antes del suceso de autos,
la acusada le habia rogado que viese la manera de permanecer mas tiempo
en Manila, a su lado, y para conseguir este objeto, dicha acusada
estuvo haciendo gestiones para que el que subscribe pudiese ocupar
algun puesto en la Ciudad de Manila, y al infrascrito le consta que la
acusada hasta solicito la ayuda de su hermana, Doña Librada Avelino,
Directora del Centro Escolar, para que pudiese ocupar un puesto en
Manila, y permaneciese aqui al lado de su esposa y de sus hijos, y
estas gestiones de la acusada revelan no so1o el proposito de estar mas
cerca del que subscribe sino tambien su vivo interes por la carrera y
el porvenir de su marido, cosas incompatibles con lo que se le imputa
en la querella;

“3.° Que uno de los hechos en que la acusacion ha insistido, consiste en el siguiente testimonio del Sargento Vicente Antonio:

”
‘Toreno dijo que aquella mujer que se fue a su casa en la tarde del 24
de marzo, le habia demostrado un sobre diciendole que contenia P200 y
que si ellos conseguian matar a Mr. Linao o al marido de aquella mujer,
el dinero que contenia aquel sobre seria para el y para su compañero.’

* * * * * * *

‘Que en aquella tarde, aquella mujer iba acompañada de Ubaldo, el
chofer de la familia.’ (F. 381-382, traduccion de las N. T.) Pero esta
es una falsedad, porque fue fisicamente imposible que en la noche del
24 de marzo de 1930, pudiese la acusada ir, acompañada por el chauffeur
Ubaldo, a la casa de Toreno para ofrecerle la referida cantidad de
P200, porque cuando el infrascrito llego a su casa, situada en la Calle
Jesus, Pandacan, Manila, a las 12.30 de la tarde de aquella fecha,
encontro en la casa a su esposa con quien el quo subscribe permanecio
en la casa hasta las 3 de la tarde, en que bajo de casa y se embarco en
el automovil, guiado este por el chauffeur Antonio Ubaldo, y
estuvo haciendo uso de dicho automovil continuamente hasta las 5 de la
tarde poco mas o menos, hora en que volvio a su casa. Durante el tiempo
en que el infrascrito estuvo usando el automovil, este estuvo guiado
por Ubaldo. Cuando el declarante llego a su casa a las 5 de la tarde su
esposa le informo que la Directora del Centro Escolar se hallaba
enferma y, para visitarla, la acusada y el que subscribe se dirigieron
en aquellos mismos momentos al Centro Escolar, en donde la acusada y el
que subscribe permanecieron hasta las 9.30 de la noche proximamente, y
durante todo el tiempo en que estuvieron en el Centro Escolar la
acusada estuvo junto a su esposo y no tuvo la menor oportunidad de
salir del edificio del Centro Escolar sin conocimiento y sin que le
pudiese ver el infrascrito. Este y la acusada partieron del Centro
Escolar a las 9.30 de la noche proximamente y se retiraron a su casa,
tambien juntos, en donde estuvieron conversando hasta ya pasadas las 11
proximamente, cuando ambos se retiraron para dormir. Y fue a eso de las
11.30 de la noche cuando el que subscribe fue despertado por la
agresion perpetrada en su persona;

“4.°
Que el que subscribe esta convencido de que el movil del crimen que se
perpetro en su persona debio ser el robo, pues efectivamente en aquella
noche de autos se le ha perdido la suma de P800, sin que hasta ahora se
hubiese recuperado;

“5.° Que la experiencia humana ha
demostrado que hay inocentes que sufren penas en la carcel y hay
culpables que gozan de libertad, y para evitar que se cometa injusticia
a la acusada, siendo inocente, que sufra alguna penalidad, y teniendo
en cuenta los affidavits prestados por personas
desinteresadas en apoyo de la nueva vista de la causa, el infrascrito
ha tenido a bien someter a la consideracion de esta Hon. Corte esta
peticion para que la misma la tome en cuenta en la resolucion de la
mocion de nueva vista presentada por los abogados de la defensa.

“Por
tanto, a esta Hon. Corte respetuosamente pide se sirva ordenar la nueva
vista de la causa para la practica y presentacion de las pruebas
nuevamente descubiertas para cumplir mejor con los fines de la justicia
y de la ley.

“Orion, Bataan, para Manila, diciembre 15, 1931.

	“Muy respetuosamente sometida,
			(Fdo.) “JOAQUIN LINAO
			“Esposo de la uqui acusada y
				parte ofendida en esta causa”

The proffered testimony of the accused’s husband, as set out in the
foregoing document, would have fully corroborated her own testimony and
completely and satisfactorily accounted for the acts and whereabouts of
the accused during the entire afternoon and evening of March 24, 1930,
thus refuting the imputation of the convicted aggressors that she
visited the house of Toreno in Ermita that afternoon and then and there
hired them to assassinate her husband that night.

Angel Linao, the son of Joaquin Linao and Remedios de Linao, 17 years
of age and a student, was not permitted to testify. The court sustained
the objection of the fiscal to the effect that this witness, having
testified at the first trial, nothing he could testify to now would be
newly discovered evidence (p. 212, t. s. n.). Without repeating what we
have already said as to the error of the court in excluding this
witness, it cannot be doubted that his corroboration of the testimony
of Gavino San Juan would have added to its convincing effect.

Remedios de Linao. The testimony of the defendant-appellant Remedios de
Linao on her own behalf is summarized by the Attorney-General as
follows:

“She is married to Joaquin Linao,
the offended party herein. She never conspired against his life. She is
a member of the Philippine Bar. She has five children. Her husband was
practicing law in Bataan Province and was planning to be a candidate
for the governorship of that province. Shortly after noon on March 24,
1930, he came home at Pandacan, Manila. They conversed until 3 p. m. of
that day when he left in the family automobile driven then by Antonio
Ubaldo, the chauffeur of the Linao family. When Mr. Linao returned home
at 5.30 p. m. on the same day, she told him that her sister, Miss
Librada Avelino, was sick in the Centro Escolar de Senoritas. Upon his
suggestion, they called on her that same afternoon. From the time they
arrived at the Centro Escolar de Senoritas until 10 o’clock the
following night, she never left the place. From the Centro Escolar de
Senoritas, they went home direct. Upon coming home, they chatted for
some time about politics until she went to bed. She slept with her
small children in one of the rooms, while her husband slept in the sala.
Before going to bed, she was telling her husband that she did not like
politics. She was trying to help him secure an employment in Manila
(pp. 217-225, t. s. n., new trial). In the night in question, she was
awakened by her husband’s outcries; he was calling her name. She
immediately got up and carrying in her arms her son Pedring, who had
also been awakened, rushed to her husband and found him in the antesala.
Mr. Linao had been wounded and was bleeding. With small Pedring in her
arms, she immediately embraced her husband. Mr. Linao told her that
certain individuals wanted to kill him, to which she replied that they
might be his political enemies. He rejoined that the matter had nothing
to do with politics. She then told her son Angeling to look for an
automobile to take her wounded husband to the hospital. Not long
afterwards, Angeling returned with one of the neighbors named Gavino
San Juan, saying that he had already found an automobile. She requested
San Juan to carry her wounded husband to the automobile, which he did
after she had put a flannel sheet around Mr. Linao. She followed her
husband downstairs, but when she was getting into the automobile she
heard her son Pedring crying and so she went back upstairs to get him,
telling them to wait for her. But while she was upstairs, the
automobile left. Her husband, their son Angeling, their daughter
Paulita, and their neighbor Gavino San Juan went together to the
Philippine General Hospital. She then changed her son’s clothing and
her own nightgown, on both of which there were blood stains (pp.
225-229, t. s. n., new trial). Within an hour later, the automobile
returned with a policeman. In the same automobile, she went to the
Philippine General Hospital with her son Pedring. For a short time, she
was with her husband at the hospital until 1 o’clock in the night in
question when she was put under arrest. While there, Mr. Linao asked
her if she had seen the envelope containing P800, and she replied that
she had not. He asked her to go back home to look for the envelope, and
so she left the hospital in the same automobile with Gavino San Juan
and a policeman. But instead of taking her home, they took her to the
Luneta Police Station together with her son Pedring. She came to know
that she was under arrest, because, when she wanted to go home to look
for the missing money, they would not allow her to leave. She remained
in the police station until 5 a. m. of the following day, March 25,
1930, when, accompanied by a patrolman, she was allowed to go home in
order to change her dress. While at home, she looked for the envelope
containing P800, but did not find it. After changing her dress and
after taking breakfast, she was taken back to the Bagumbayan or Luneta
Police Station. At 4 o’clock on the afternoon of the same day, she was
released on bail (pp. 229-234, t. s. n., new trial). While in the
Bagumbayan Police Station, she was questioned by the police
authorities, but she did not give any answer. She was made to line up
with four women prisoners, and made to stay in the middle of them. Then
she noticed that a policeman went to a dark place which she later
learned to be a cell. Afterwards, she saw the policeman talking to an
individual and afterwards the two of them proceeded to a dark corner.
While they were talking together, she saw the policeman pointing out to
her. She did not hear what the two were talking about. The individual
was then taken near her and in her presence he pointed her out (pp.
234-237, t. s. n., new trial). She did not offer the sum of P200 to the
said individual. Before her husband was attacked in the night in
question, she had not seen or known his assailants; she saw them for
the first time at the Luneta Police Station in the same night, because
there was a detective who stated that it was they who attacked her
husband. She had had no communication with them before. She never had
any motive whatever for wishing to destroy the life of her husband; she
has always been in need of him. Before her husband was attacked in the
night in question, she had not seen his assailants, nor had she been at
the azotea of her house before the crime was committed that
same night. She was then sleeping (pp. 237-239, t. s. n., new trial).
She had not seen Exhibit J before it was presented in evidence by the
prosecution. She did not write the words appearing on said Exhibit J,
nor had she seen Exhibit J-1. In the night in question, she did not
write any note reading, ‘Tulog, pero hindi naghihilik.’ Neither had she
delivered such note to anybody that night. She had not seen Exhibit U
before the same was offered in evidence by the prosecution, nor had she
had anything to do with it (pp. 239-241, t. s. n., new trial). The
handkerchiefs, Exhibits M, M-1, and M-2, are hers, but she has not
given them to any person. She had not seen the ring, Exhibit N, nor the
pin, Exhibit N-1, before they were presented in evidence by the
prosecution (pp. 241-242, t. s. n., new trial). Her husband, Joaquin
Linao, does not snore while sleeping. She denied having offered P500 to
any person on condition that the latter would destroy Exhibit J. She
denied having offered any sum of money to detective Pescante. She
denied having talked with anybody in connection with Exhibit J-1. She
also denied having made any sign to Antonio Ubaldo or having instructed
him to say nothing about the affair (pp. 242-244, t. s. n., new trial).
She did not go to the house of the defendant Toreno on Arquiza Street,
Ermita. She denied having waved her hand to the assailants of her
husband before he was attacked by them. She did not know that Exhibit U
had been found within her house, nor did she have any conversation with
any policeman regarding it. She denied having had a talk at the police
station with Sergeant Vicente Antonio and having told him that she and
her children were hiding in the bath room of her house while her
husband was being attacked and was asking for help. She did not make
such statement to any policeman; she and her children were not in the
bath room at the time. When she was awakened and when she heard that
her husband was calling her, she was in bed and she got up to go to the
place where he was, but as she could not open the main door to the room
because she was carrying her child, she went out of the room through
the toilet adjoining the same room. She denied having been identified
at the police station in the night in question by Toreno as the woman
who had gone to his house and had shown him P200 (pp. 244-247, t. 8.
n., new trial). She knows Dr. Eduque and Dr. Rustia, both of whom
having been for some time family physicians of the Linaos, but she
never solicited their services for unlawful purposes. She studied
pharmacy (p. 249-250, t. s. n., new trial).

“On
cross-examination, Mrs. Linao testified that she had five children with
her husband, Mr. Joaquin Linao, the eldest and youngest being Angel
Linao and Eduardo Linao, respectively; that Eduardo was born on August
17, 1930, in the Centro Hospital, Manila, the attending physician being
Dr. Rustia; that she did not know whether Eduardo’s birth had been
registered in the corresponding office of the Government; that her
husband knew when she gave birth to Eduardo; that he was in Bataan
Province at the time; that she believed and she knew that her husband
had seen Eduardo but that she did not know when; that she stayed in the
hospital for a week, but her husband did not call at the hospital while
she was there; that from the hospital, she and her child Eduardo went
to her house at No. 145 Calle Jesus, Pandacan, Manila; that when her
husband left the hospital after he had been wounded in the night in
question, he was taken to Bataan and there he had remained up to the
time Mrs. Linao testified at the new trial (April 22, 1932) (pp.
134-140, t. s. n., new trial); that when Mr. Linao came home at noon on
March 24, 1930, she was eating with her children; that she did not know
whether Antonio Ubaldo, the family chauffeur, who was at the Linaos’
conjugal home at the time, was also taking his meal; that Ubaldo had
been employed by the Linaos as chauffeur without board and lodging and
so he neither lived nor took his meals in the Linao’s home (p. 143, t.
s. n., new trial); that Ubaldo began to work as chauffeur for the Linao
since the year 1929; that he left for sometime but afterwards he
returned; that on March 24, 1930, she was already a lawyer, she having
been admitted to the Bar in September, 1918; that it was in the
Bagumbayan Police Station in the night in question when she learned for
the first time that she was under arrest; that she did not inquire for
what crime she had been arrested; that it did not occur to her to find
out why the individual referred to hereinbefore was pointing out to her
or why she was made to line up with other women at the police station
(pp. 144-154, t. s. n., new trial); that in December, 1929, she became
aware that she was pregnant; and that she consulted Doctor Rustia about
her pregnancy (pp. 176 et seq., t. s. n., new trial.)”

In the light of the new evidence before us, we have come to the
conclusion that robbery was the motive for the assault on Joaquin
Linao, and that the Government’s hypothesis, that this appellant hired
thugs to assassinate her husband simultaneously with the robbery, has
not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. That robbery was the motive
stands out clear as day from the fact that robbery was committed. Res ipsa loquitur.
The new evidence convinces us that Remedios de Linao was not present at
the time and place where her codefendants, in their alleged
confessions, stated that she hired them for P200 to kill her husband.
Moreover, the said confessions, competent as they are against the
confessors, are inadmissible against the appellant. They are no part of
the res gestæ. This appellant was not present when they were
made and had no part therein and knew nothing of them when they were
made. We said in the case of People vs. Orenciada and Cenita (47 Phil., 970):

“It
is well established in this jurisdiction that a confession made by one
or two or more accused persons, without the intervention of the others,
is competent only against the declarant (U. S. vs. Castillo, 2 Phil., 17; U. S. vs. Paete, 6 Phil., 105; People vs. Tabuche, 46 Phil., 28).” See also People vs. Rodriguez, G. R. No. 37122, promulgated December 5, 1932.^[1] Applying
this doctrine to the instant case, in view of the evidence of the new
trial, the hypothesis of the prosecution that the motive for the crime
was the desire of this appellant to conceal her shame from her husband,
rests entirely upon imputations contained in the confession of the
chauffeur Ubaldo. If we were to admit that sort of evidence, no.
honorable maid or matron’s reputation, no home, in the Philippines
would be safe against the foulest slanders of low-minded criminals.

At the first trial of this cause, perhaps the most damaging evidence
against the appellant was the testimony of Detective Clemente Pescante
that the appellant offered him P500 if he would destroy Exhibit J. This
was not denied by the accused who did not take the stand at the first
trial. On the new trial, she denounced Pescante’s testimony as false (una falsedad). We have encountered considerable difficulty in attempting to reconcile this contradictory testimony.

The Attorney-General, in his summary of the evidence adduced at the
original trial in so far as it concerns Remedios de Linao, refers to
said Exhibit J as follows:

“When they
(Tuazon, Toreno and Ubaldo) got close to the stairs, she came out and
said to Ubaldo: ‘I have been long waiting for you; your master has been
sleeping soundly for some time already.’ She then left them and went up
into the house. On coming back, she waved her hand for Ubaldo to go
upstairs. Meanwhile, Tuazon and Toreno remained downstairs, waiting for
signal or orders from her to carry out the agreement to kill her
husband (Exhibit Q, pp. 152 and 74, roll of exhibits, pp. 165-173, t.
s. n., original trial).

“Ubaldo went upstairs, and she
whispered to him that his master (her husband) was still sleeping, and
so the plan to kill him (her husband) must then be carried out. She
also handed to Ubaldo the note Exhibit J, which reads as follows:
‘Tulog, pero hindi naghihilik. Tulog’ (Asleep, but not snoring. Asleep)
(p. 61, roll of exhibits), telling him to tear it afterwards so that
nobody would see it (Exhibit Q, pp. 150 and 70, roll of exhibits, pp.
165-173, t. s. n. original trial).”

It is
inconceivable to the writer that any sane woman, after having told
Ubaldo twice by word of mouth that her husband is sleeping, should then
reduce the same statement to writing and hand it to Ubaldo. Exhibit J,
under the circumstances stated, borders on the ludicrous. It is,
therefore, difficult for us to understand why the appellant, an
intelligent woman and a member of the Bar, would offer Detective
Pescante such a large sum of money (if she had it) without any reason
to believe that he is the kind of officer that could be bribed, and
well knowing, as any lawyer must know, that the destruction of that
exhibit would not prevent secondary evidence of its contents, if it had
any importance at all in the case. These considerations occur to us
quite apart from the question whether Exhibit J was in the handwriting
of the appellant, which was denied by her and a handwriting expert.

Excluding the confession of Ubaldo which incriminated and made the
foulest charges of infidelity against her, and considering the
statements of her husband as well as her own, we can find no rational
motive established by the evidence which would have actuated a woman of
the intelligence and character of Remedios de Linao to commit the grave
crime of which she is charged. At the original trial, the husband
himself, as a Government witness, testified that they had never had any
misunderstandings (disgustos). He intended to appeal on her
behalf in this court, and at the new trial he aided his wife and tried
to take the stand to testify on her behalf. All these circumstances
indicate a relationship of conjugal harmony in the home which is
incompatible with the prosecution’s theory that assassination and not
robbery was the motive of the assault on Joaquin Linao.

Out
of the mass of trivial details and the many apparent or real
contradictions in the testimony, we have endeavored to sift the salient
facts in arriving at the conclusion that the evidence at the original
trial, read in the light of the evidence at the new trial, leaves in
our minds a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. The
evidence at the new trial breaks the chain of circumstantial evidence
which we could not ignore when we rendered our decision on the former
appeal.

The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Street, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Villamor, J.,
concurring: In view of the result of the evidence presented during the
new trial of this case, I am compelled to concur with the majority
opinion.

---

^[1] Promulgated March 10, 1931, not reported.

^[2] Not reported.

[1] 56 Phil., 360, 866.

[1] 57 Phil., 1001.