G.R. No. L-6784. March 12, 1954

94 Phil. 531

[ G.R. No. L-6784. March 12, 1954 ]

NATIVIDAD MIRANDA, LUIS MIRANDA, PEDRO MIRANDA, RAMON MIRANDA AND FAUSTINO MIRANDA, PETITIONERS, VS. DEPORTATION BOARD, RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to restrain
respondent from hearing the Deportation case filed against petitioners
and, incidentally, to have an order issued requiring respondent to show
cause why petitioners should not be released on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.

On November 17, 1952, petitioners were charged before the
Deportation Board with having entered the Philippines through fraud and
misrepresentation in that, being the children of Chinese parents, they
succeeded in showing through misrepresentation that they are the
legitimate children of Faustino Miranda, a Filipino citizen, had with a
woman named Puy Siok and that, by reason of such misrepresentation,
they were landed in this country as children of a Filipino citizen.
Because of these charges, petitioners were arrested and detained at the
detention station of the Bureau of Immigration although later they were
set at liberty upon posting a bond of P1,000 each.

On June 18, 1953, petitioners filed a motion to quash the case
alleging that they are Filipino citizens and, therefore, the
Deportation Board has no jurisdiction over them. The Deportation Board
not only denied this motion but set the case for hearing on July 7,
1953, whereupon petitioner filed the present petition seeking the
suspension of the hearing and their release.

The main contention of petitioners is predicated upon the theory
that the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is confined to persons
who are admittedly aliens and are found to be undesirable
and, having alleged that they are Filipino citizens, said Board has no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges filed against them.

While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of
the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the
person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does
not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners
should make “a showing that his claim is not frivolous” (Ng Fung Ho vs.
White, 259 U. S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they
are Filipino citizens. [Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U. S., 21,
35-36.] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the
Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence
that may be presented and determine in the first instance if
petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is inherent in, or
essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the Deportation
Board (Laurencio vs. Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37.) It is not
therefore correct to state that the question of citizenship should be
determined exclusively by the courts. As this Court ruled in a recent
case:

“Resuelto por la Junta que tiene jurisdiction, es
obvio que debe proseguir con el caso hasta su termination. Si la Junta
halla infundados loa cargos de indeseabilidad del recurrente, el caso
habra terminado totalmente, pero si la halla indeseable, puede apelar
contra el fallo, y si la apelacion fracasa, entonces sera el tiempo de
considerar si demostrando causa razonable debe haber un juicio ulterior
sobre la ciudadania filipina que alega mediante habeas corpus.” (Llanco
vs. The Deportation Board, G. R. No. L-3272, prom. February 22, 1954.)

The foregoing disposes of the claim relative to the illegality of
petitioners’ confinement. With regard to the contention that the
Deportation Board has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in allowing the taking of a blood test upon the
persons of petitioners to prove that they are not Filipino citizens,
the same need not now be considered, it being a matter that said Board
can look into in the exercise its incidental power to pass upon the
citizenship of petitioners.

Wherefore petition is denied, with costs against petitioners. The
writ of preliminary injunction issued against respondent is hereby
dissolved.

Paras, C. J., Reyes, Pablo, Jugo, Bengzon, Labrador, Padilla, Concepcion, and Montemayor, Diokno, JJ., concur.

[RESOLUTION, March 18, 1954]

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF
UNSUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES OF 1946 TO 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET AL.,
PETITIONERS.

DIOKNO, J.:

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the
“Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, “in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.” (Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of
the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree
of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent
in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower
than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in
1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective
since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on the
bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override
the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members
of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the
President allowed the bill to become a law on June 21,1953 without his
signature. The law, which incidentally was enacted in an election year,
reads in full as follows:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS
FROM NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.

Be it enacted by the Senate, and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
fourteen, Rule numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court,
any bar candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in
any bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six
up to the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations;
seventy-one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar
examinations; seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and
fifty-three bar examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen
hundred and fifty-four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the
nineteen hundred and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent in any
subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen hundred and
forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects
and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing
general average that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent
examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates
filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while
others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground
for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in
question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to
the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared
valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have
filed petitions or not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly
classified, affected by this decision, as well as a more detailed
account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this
decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects
of the law, the following statistical data are set forth:

(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be
benefited by section 1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified
as follows:

1946 (August)	206	121	18
1946 (November)	477	228	43
1947	749	340	0
1948	899	409	11
1949	1,218	532	164
1950	1,316	893	26
1951	2,068	879	196
1952	2,738	1,033	426
1953	2,555	986	284

Total	12,230	5,421	1,168

Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to
the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.

(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful
candidates are to be benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These
candidates had each taken from two to five different examinations, but
failed to obtain a passing average in any of them. Consolidating,
however, their highest grades in different subjects in previous
examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient to
reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.

(3)
The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts is
therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful
candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions,
which are still pending because they could be favorably affected by
Republic Act No. 972,—although as has been already stated, this
tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.

UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OP REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on
the practice of the legal profession arid the administration of
justice, and because some doubts have been expressed as to its
validity, the court set the hearing of the aforementioned petitions
for admission on the sole question of whether or not Republic Act No.
972 is constitutional.

We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the
brilliant assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued,
orally and in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may
be gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente
J. Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of
the validity of the law, and of the U. P. Women Lawyers’ Circle, the
Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando,
Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de
Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside
from the memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego,
M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly
helped us in this task. The legal researchers of the court have
exhausted almost all Philippine and American jurisprudence on the
matter. The question has been the object of intense deliberation for a
long time by the Tribunal, and finally, after the voting, the
preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a new member in
order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.

Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of
reading materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:

“The reason for relaxing1 the standard 75 per cent
passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the
years immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as
the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of the
preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.”

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
“insufficiency of reading materials” and of “inadequacy of preparation.”

By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem involved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
for the practice of law that should be developed constantly and
maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection
of property, life. honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such
a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger.

Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal
reading materials is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant
materials. Decisions of this court alone in mimeographed copies were
made available to the public during those years and private enterprises
had also published them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette
has been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad
have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some even
with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally during
those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be published
since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition of new
volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.

Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be enforced.

The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point
of view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question
would have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty
ideals by the Congress of the United States, and which we have
preserved and attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous juridical
history of more than half a century? From the citations of those
defending the law, we can not find a case in which the validity of a
similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity cite,
among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State
vs. Cannon7lT40 NW, 441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts in 1932 (81 ALR 1061), of Guarina (24 Phil., 37), aside
from the opinion of the President which is expressed in his vote of the
original bill and which the proponent of the contested law respects.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them
without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.

To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully
the case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the
law—that of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York
revoked the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the
petition of Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the
provisions of a statute concerning the school of law of Columbia
College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court
of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of the state of New
York.

It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:

“They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any
other office of public trust. All votes for either of them for any
elective office except that of the Court of Appeals, given by the
Legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any
power of appointment to public office. Any male citizen of the age of
twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the
requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall be entitled to
admission to practice in all the courts of this State.” (p. 93).

According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional precept is as follows:

“Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers;
the power of appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and
this was the principal appointing power which they possessed. The
convention was evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this
power had been exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges
had imposed upon admission to practice before them. The prohibitory
clause in the section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the
insertion of the provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in
this particular section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its
connection with the object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing
indicative of confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve
any portion of their power over this subject, unless the Supreme Court
is right in the inference it draws from the use of the word ‘admission’
in the action referred to. It is urged that the admission spoken of
must be by the court; that admit means to grant leave, and that the
power of granting necessarily implies’ the power of refusing, and of
course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses the
requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.

“These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of the act.” (p. 93.)

Now, with respect to the law of April 7, I860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the
school of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of
Laws was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution
required of applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not
however quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public
or accessible private library in the country.

In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:

“The motive for passing the act in question is
apparent. Columbia College being an institution of established
reputation, and having a law department under the charge of able
professors, the students in which department were not only subjected to
a formal examination by the law committee of the institution, but to a
certain definite period of study before being entitled to a diploma as
graduates, the Legislature evidently, and no doubt justly, considered
this examination, together with the preliminary study required by the
act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal requirements, to the
ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering the latter
examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study was
essential, unnecessary and burdensome.

“The act was obviously
passed with reference to the learning and ability of the applicant, and
for the mere purpose of substituting the examination by the law
committee of the college for that of the court. It could have had no
other object, and hence no greater scope should be given to its
provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed entirely to
dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the Constitution;
and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an intention that the
authorities of the college should inquire as to the, age, citizenship,
etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only rational
interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to make
the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments of
the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in
connection with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in
order to determine the present condition of the law on the subject.”
(p. 89)

* * * * * * * *

“The
Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question.” (P. 93)

From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of
Cooper with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the
following distinctions:

(1) The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar examinations be
admitted to the practice of law.

(2) The law of New York
according to the very decision of Cooper, has not taken from the court
its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney at law; in
effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.

(3)
The Constitution of New York at that time and that of the Philippines
are entirely different on the matter of admission to the practice of
law.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this
attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the
judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly “constitutes the most solid of titles.”

Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution
to repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court
regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment the
proposition that the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And
it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous
judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.

We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial. A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had
been undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of
this decision we quote the following paragraphs:

“This statute presents an assertion of legislative
power without parallel in the history of the English speaking people so
far as we have been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty
as to the extent of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the
ultimate qualifications of attorneys at law, but in England and in
every state of the Union the act of admitting an attorney at law has
been expressly committed to the courts, and the act of admission has
always been regarded as a judicial function. This act purports to
constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this respect it stands
alone as an assertion of legislative power, (p. 444)

“No
greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving in
form and substance the exact form of government set up by the people,
(p. 444)

“Under the Constitution all legislative power is
vested in a Senate and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the
prescribing of qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative
in character, the Legislature is acting within its constitutional
authority when it sets up and prescribes such qualifications, (p. 444)

“But
when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in its
judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude,
is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)

“Under our
Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are distinct,
independent, and coordinate branches of the government. Neither branch
enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, but each is supreme in that
branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department. Neither
department should so act as to embarrass the other in the discharge of
its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought of the people
setting upon the form of government under which we exist. State vs.
Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs. Barstow,
4 Wis., 57. (p. 445)

“The judicial department of government
is responsible for the plane upon which the administration of justice
is maintained. Its responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By
committing a portion of the powers of sovereignty to the judicial
department of our state government, under a scheme which it was
supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment or interference by any
other department of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility
for the manner in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the
judicial department are exercised, (p. 445)

“The relation of
the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate relationship. The bar
is an attach of the courts. The quality of justice dispensed by the
courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of its bar. An
unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the
administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute, (p. 445)

“Through all time courts have exercised a
direct and severe supervision over their bars, at least in the English
speaking countries.” (p. 445)

After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:

“Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For
more than six centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the
courts of England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the
Revolution of 1688, had exercised the right of determining who should
be admitted to the practice of law, which, as was said in, Matter of
the Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham’s New Cases 235, ‘constitutes the most
solid of all titles.” If the courts and the judicial power be regarded
as an entity, the power to determine who should be admitted to practice
law is a constituent element of that entity. It may be difficult to
isolate that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of
the inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the
judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging
to the judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from
England this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate
branch of the government. They took this institution along with the
power traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its
attorneys at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to
make the three great departments of government separate and independent
of one another. The idea that the Legislature might embarrass the
judicial department by prescribing inadequate qualifications for
attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant purpose of making
the judicial independent of the legislative department, and such a
purpose should not be inferred in the absence of express constitutional
provision. While the Legislature may legislate with respect to the
qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does not rest
upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the subject of
the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class
from which the court must make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not. constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed
necessary by the course for the proper administration of judicial
functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of
an attorney at law.” (p. 450)

“Furthermore it is an unlawful
attempt to exercise the power of appointment. It is quite likely true
that the Legislature may exercise the power of appointment when it is
in pursuance of a legislative functions. However, the authorities are
well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit attorneys to the practice
of law is a judicial function- In all of the states, except New Jersey
(In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our investigation
reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law by
their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 368; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed.
285; Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519;
Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021,, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030,
20 Ann. Cas. 413.

“The power of admitting an attorney to
practice having been perpetually exercised by the courts, it having
been so generally held that the act of a court in admitting an attorney
to practice is the judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on
the part of the Legislature to confer such right upon any one being
most exceedingly uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an
attorney is and always has been a purely judicial function, no matter
where the power to determine the qualifications may reside.” (p. 451)

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:

“It is indispensable to the administration of
justice and to interpretation of the laws that there be members of the
bar of sufficient ability, adequate learning and sound moral character.
This arises from the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and
restraining authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly
important, also that the public be protected from incompetent and
vicious practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief is wide. It
was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N.
Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. K. 851: ‘Membership in
the bar is a privilege burden with conditions.’ One is admitted to the
bar ‘for something more than private gain.’ He becomes ‘an officer of
the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the end^ of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
‘whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld.”
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is
filed in courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action.
Admission to the bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a
decision of the court entered upon its records. The establishment by
the Constitution of the judicial department conferred authority
necessary to the exercise of its powers as a coordinate department of
government. It is an inherent power of such a department of government
ultimately to determine the qualifications of those to be admitted to
practice in its courts, for assisting in its work, and to protect
itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in sufficient
learning, and those not possessing good moral character. Chief Justice
Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte Secombe, 19 How.
9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, ‘It has been well settled, by the rules and
practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court
to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as an
attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be removed.’”
(p. 727)

In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to
secure license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of
state (In re Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:

“In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L.
Ed. 366, the court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be
unconstitutional, explained the nature of the attorney’s office as
follows: “They are officers of the court, admitted as such by its
order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal learning and
fair private character. It has always been the general practice in this
country to obtain this evidence by an examination of the parties. In
this court the fact of the admission of such officers in the highest
court of the states to which they, respectively, belong, for three
years preceding their application, is regarded as sufficient evidence
of the possession of the requisite legal learning, and the statement of
counsel moving their admission sufficient evidence that their private
and professional character is fair. The order of admission is the
judgment of the court that the parties possess the requisite
qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are entitled to appear
as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become
officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional
misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only
be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded.
Ex parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal.
430. Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere
ministerial power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been
so held in numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of
New York in the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re
Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. ‘Attorneys and Counsellors,’ said that court, are
not only officers of the court, but officers whose duties relate almost
exclusively to proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their
appointment may, with propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the
latter, in performing his duty, may very justly considered as engaged
in the exercise of their appropriate judicial functions.” (pp. 650-653).

We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:

“Admission to practice of law is almost without
exception conceded everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial
function, and this opinion need not be burdened with citations in this
point. Admission to practice have also been held to be the exercise of
one of the inherent powers of the court.”—Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172
Pac. 906.

“Admission to the practice of law is the exercise
of a judicial function, and is an inherent power of the court.”—A. C.
Brydonjack, vs. State Bar of California, 281 Pac 1018; See Annotation
on Power of Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.

On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.

“The distinction between the functions of the
legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of
the legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in
matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the legislative action,
while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to
transactions that are past or conditions that exist at the time of the
exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not
subject to alteration or change either by legislative action or by
judicial decrees.

“The judiciary cannot consent that its
province shall be invaded by either of the other departments of the
government.”—16 C. J. S.T. Constitutional Law, p. 229.

“If the
legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts by
requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views,
it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge
of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry.”—Cooley’s Constitutional limitations,
192.

In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar
examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without
falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the
practice of law, the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a
judgment—a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the
aforecited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although
this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for
justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and
not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear
usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13,
article VIII of the Constitution provides:

“Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power
to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish
increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines.”—Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress
and this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to
the practice of law The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizes. continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this
Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise
of its primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor
mean that Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly
attorneys at law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice
of law. Its power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the
existing rules on the matter, if according to its judgment the need for
a better service of the legal profession requires it. But this power
does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend,
disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the
legal profession.

Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be
exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful
consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each department
requires. These powers have existed together for centuries without
diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in
that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on
the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and
responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or
supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the
judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice
of the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of
its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which,
exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant,
but rather complementary to each other in attaining the establishment
of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities
of the administration of justice.

The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guariña took the examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been
appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of
law without a previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña
and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This
Tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations. The
court said:

“Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No.
1597, the applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without
taking the prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the
office of provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes.

Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:

“SEC.
2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One Hundred and
ninety, entitled ‘An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil Actions
and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,’ is hereby amended
to read as follows:

“1. Those who have been duly licensed
under the laws and orders of the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain
or of the United States and are in good and regular standing as members
of the bar of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of
this code; Provided, That any person who, prior to the
passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter, shall have held, under
the authority of the United States, the position of justice of the
Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or judge or
associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the Philippine
Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila,
assistant prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of
Manila, assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney
for the Moro Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may
be licensed to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands
without an examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and
establishing such fact to the satisfaction of said court.”

“The
records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this appellant
took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report of the
examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received an
average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the
required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of
our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this
affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the
required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occasion, he now ‘possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability.”

“But it is contended
that under the provisions of the above-cited statute the applicant is
entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without taking the
prescribed examination ‘upon motion before the Supreme Court”
accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now holds the
office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought
to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute,
and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that
the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original
Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without any examination.’ It is
contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and
to the candidate’s claim de jure to have the power exercised.”

And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress
of the United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and
articles 13 to 16 of Act 190, the Court continued:

“Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon
this court by the commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress
would be limited and restricted, and in a case such as that under
consideration wholly destroyed, by giving the word ‘may,’ as used in
the above citation from Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a
permissive effect. But any act of the commission which has the effect
of setting at naught in whole or in part the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, or of any Act of Congress prescribing, defining or limiting the
power conferred upon the commission is to that extent invalid and void,
as transcending its rightful limits and authority.

Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed
to the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case
of Guarina, the Court held:

“In the various cases wherein applications for
admission to the bar under the provisions of this statute have been
considered heretofore, we have accepted the fact that such appointments
had been made as satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the
applicant. But in all of those cases we had reason to believe that the
applicants had been practicing attorneys prior to the date of their
appointment.

“In the case under consideration, however, it
affirmatively appears that the applicant was not and never had been
practicing attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the date
of his appointment as provincial fiscal, and it further affirmatively
appears that he was deficient in the required qualifications at the
time when he last applied for admission to the bar.

“In the
light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion, we
do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is
in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines,
should be denied.

“In view, however, of the fact that when he
took the examination he fell only four points short of the necessary
grade to entitle him to a license to practice; and in view also of the
fact that since that time he has held the responsible office of the
governor of the Province of Sorsogon and presumably gave evidence of
such marked ability in the performance of the duties of that office
that the Chief Executive, with the consent and approval of the
Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the Government service
by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we think we would
be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No. 1597 in
waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by general
rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in a
special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court
upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary
examinations prescribed by general rule.”—(In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law
passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the
license.

The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has
been found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class
legislation, and that if it has intended to make a classification, it
is arbitrary and unreasonable.

In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, J.899 required of
the Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for
the practice of law to those students who began studying before
November 4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma
issued by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office
and would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three
years if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date.
The Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:

“This is an application to this court for admission
to the bar of this state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued
to the applicants. The act of the general assembly passed in 1899.
under which the application is made, is entitled ‘An act to amend
section 1 of an act entitled “An act to revise the law in relation to
attorneys and counselors,’ approved March 28, 1894, in force July 1,
1874.’ The amendment, so far as it appears in the enacting clause,
consists in the addition to the section of the following: ‘And every
applicant for a license who shall comply with the rules of the supreme
court in regard to admission to the bar in force at the time such
applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office or a law
school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules’.”—In re Day et
al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.

* * * “After said provision there is a
double proviso, one branch of which is that up to December 31, 1899,
this court shall grant a license of admittance to the bar to the holder
of every diploma regularly issued by any law school regularly organized
under the laws of this state, whose regular course of law studies is
two years, and requiring an attendance by the student of at least 36
weeks in each of such years, and showing that the student began the
study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual
proofs of good moral character. The other branch of the proviso is that
any student who has studied law for two years in a law office, or part
of such time in a law office, ‘and part in the aforesaid law school,’
and whose course of study began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be
admitted upon a satisfactory examination l/y the examining board in the
branches now required by the rules of this court. If the right to
admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso, which, it is
claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the persons
named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for their
admission to the bar.” (p. 647.)

“Considering the proviso,
however, as an enactment, it is clearly a special legislation,
prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If the legislature
had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts and take
part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, and not by granting
special and exclusive privileges to certain persons or classes of
persons. Const, art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a
privilege, and a license for that purpose makes the holder an officer
of the court, and confers upon him the right to appear for litigants,
to argue causes, and to collect fees therefor, and creates certain
exemptions, such as from jury services and arrest on civil process
while attending court. The law conferring such privileges must be
general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in framing an
enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as the law
establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation to
the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different legislation as to the different classes,
and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the subject
of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 III. 66, 35 N.
E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs.
Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.

“The length of time a
physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by experience, may
furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II
N. E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided and
practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an arbitrary
discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State vs,
Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the
law, and plainly, any classification must have some reference to
learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso
is limited, first, to a class of persons who began the study of law
prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two
classes—First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of
this state before December. 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in
a law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this
court, and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of
time for making application for admission. As to both classes, the
conditions of the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two
different conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study
is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the
completion of any sort of course its managers may prescribe is made
all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the
mere date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of
classification. Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November
4th could qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those
who began on the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only
two years in study, while those who commenced the next day must spend
three years, although they would complete two years before the time
limit. The one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is
to be admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and
without any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the
prescribed course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless.
Such classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any
just relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso
is for the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined
persons, (pp. 647-648.)

In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of
being a class legislation:

“But the statute is invalid, for another reason. If
it be granted that the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately
and definitely the qualifications upon which courts must admit and
license those applying as attorneys at law, that power can not be
exercised in the manner here attempted. That power must be exercised
through general laws which will apply to all alike and accord equal
opportunity to all. Speaking of the right of the Legislature to exact
qualifications of those desiring to pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice
Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S.
Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: ‘It is undoubtedly the right of
every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions
as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This
right may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of
our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every
one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the ‘estate’
acquired in them—that is, the right to continue their prosecution—is
often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily taken
from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy
equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring examinations to establish the possession on the part of the
application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in the
state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general principle.
State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345; State
vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.

“This law singles
out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the right to practice law
and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a mere matter of
legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had once
established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that
right. That fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature to
select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it
would confer its favors.

“A statute of the state of Minnesota
(Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the
practice of law, without examination, all who had ‘serve in the
military or naval forces of the United States during the World War and
received an honorable discharge therefrom and who (were disabled
therein or thereby within the purview of the Act of Congress approved
June 7th, 1924, known as ‘World War Veteran’s Act, 1924 and whose
disability is rated at least ten per cent thereunder at the time of the
passage of this Act.” This Act was held unconstitutional on the ground
that it clearly violated the quality clauses of the constitution of
that state. In re Application of George W. Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227
N. W. 179.

A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:

“The general rule is well settled by unanimity of
the authorities that a classification to be valid must rest upon
material differences between the person included in it and those
excluded and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions.
As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must
be founded upon pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from
irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore, any law that is made
applicable to one class of citizens only must be based on some
substantial difference between the situation of that class and other
individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some reason on
which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such a
difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members
of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members
of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory
legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the difference
made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate
on that class only, and not generally on all.” (12 Am. Jur. pp.
151-153.)

Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per
cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71,5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which
has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the above-mentioned authorities, for this
classification? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years
before, with the general average indicated, were not included because
the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those
years. This fact does not justify the unexplained classification of
unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954,
1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years
under the same conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no
record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one
concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and
that in such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend
to cure? Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70
per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent
to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done—cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75
per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to
do so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal.
What Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient
to qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or
defect of judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete
the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is
being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each
year the general average by one per cent, with the order that said
candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said
law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct
are not the rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court,
by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly what the
Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment
of Congress. In other words, the power exercised was not to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done
was to stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the
Constitution has granted to Congress, because it falls within the power
to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which
such duty been confided.

Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of
examinations, at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system
is that it does not take into account that the laws and jurisprudence
are not stationary, and when a candidate finally receives his
certificate, it may happen that the existing laws and jurisprudence are
already different, seriously affecting in this manner his usefulness.
The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the
article is not expressed in the title of the Act. While this law
according to its title will have temporary effect only from 1946 to
1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system for an
indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and
because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its
nullity affects the entire law.

Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because
they are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or
Congress has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or
establish arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; and third, because their purposes or effects violate the
Constitution or its basic principles. As has already been seen, the
con- tested law suffers from these fatal defects.

Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic
Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit: u

Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates
who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits,
are certainly inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly
found by this Court in the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to
the Bar of these candidates, depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity
to determine if they are at present already prepared to become members
of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest encroachment on
the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.
Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined
their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that
this Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and alter
them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the
Constitution.
By the disputed law, Congress has
exceeded its legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the
rules on admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are,
as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the practice of
law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum norms
towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is
essential to a worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the
primary and inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue in the
practice of law according to existing rules.
The
reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates, which
the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly
a class legislation.
Article 2 of Republic Act No.
972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
Lacking in
eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1 referring
to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as
it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.

RESOLUTION

Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing
of the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the
Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and resolved, and have
decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:

That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article
1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the
law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue
to be in force, in conformity with section 10, article VII of the
Constitution.

Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the
candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are
denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained
a general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, are considered as having passed,
whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this
decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar on the
date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

ANNEX I

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:

August, 1946^[1]

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof.
Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez,
Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Jose Perez Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.

Number of candidates	206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised	12
73’s	6
72’s	6
Number of candidates who passed	85
Number of candidates who failed	121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	18
Percentage of success (per cent)	41.62
Percentage of failure (per cent)	58.74
Passing grade (per cent)	72

November, 1946

Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.

Number of candidates	481
Number of candidates whose grades were raised	19
(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent—
Minutes of March 31, 1947)
Number of candidates who passed	249
Number of candidates who failed	228
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	43
Percentage of success (per cent)	52.20
Percentage of failure (per cent)	47.80
Passing grade (per cent)	72

(By resolution of the Court).

October, 1947

Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon,
Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon
Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peiia,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.

Number of candidates	749
Number of candidates whose grades were raised	43
70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent	1
69 per cent	40
68 per cent	2
Number of candidates who passed	409
Number of candidates who failed	340
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972	972
Percentage of success (per cent)	54.59
Percentage of failure (per cent)	45.41
Passing grade (per cent)	69

(By resolution of the Court).

NOTE.—In
passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
respectively, the Court found out that they were not benefited at all
by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in Civil Law.

August, 1948

Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano E. Montemayor, Chairman
Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr.,
Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G.
Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.

Number of candidates	899
Number of candidates whose grades were raised	64
71’s	29
70’s	35
Number of candidates who passed	490
Number of candidates who failed	409
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972	11
Percentage of success (per cent)	62.40
Percentage of failure (per cent)	37.60
Passing grade (per cent)	70

(By resolution of the Court).

August, 1949

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon.
Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.

Number of candidates	1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74’s)	55
Number of candidates who passed	686
Number of candidates who failed	532
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	164
Percentage of success (per cent)	56.28
Percentage of failure (per cent)	43.72
Passing grades (per cent)	74

(By resolution of the Court).

August, 1950

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,^[1]
Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty.
Marcial P. Liehauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta,
Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio
Horrilleno, Members.

Number of candidates	1,316
Number of candidates whose grades were raised	38
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation
and authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty.
Francisco Delgado).
Number of candidates who passed	423
Number of candidates who failed	894
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	26
Percentage of success (per cent)	32.14
Percentage of failure (per cent)	67.86
Passing grade (per cent)	75

August, 1951

Board of Examiners; Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V.
Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.

Number of candidates	2,068
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74’s)	112
Number of candidates who passed	1,189
Number of candidates who failed	879
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	196
Percentage of success (per cent)	57.49
Percentage of failure (per cent)	42.51
Passing grade (per cent)	75

August, 1952

Board of Examiners; Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas,
Hon. Emilio Pena, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.

Number of candidates	2,738
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74’s)	163
Number of candidates who passed	1,705
Number of candidates who failed	1,033
Number of those affected by .Republic Act No. 972	426
Percentage of success (per cent)	62.27
Percentage of failure (per cent)	37.73
Passing grade (per cent)	75

August, 1953

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon.
Pastor M. Endencia, Atty, Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas,
Jr., Hon. Emilio Pena, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix,
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.

Number of candidates	2,555
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74’s)	100
Number of candidates who passed	1,570
Number of candidates who failed	986
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972	284
Percentage of success (per cent)	61.04
Percentage of failure (per cent)	38.96
Passing grade (per cent)	75

A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act
No. 972, grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations,
with annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration
without invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS’ LAW

		Civ.	Land	Merc.	Int.	Pol.	Crim.	Rem.	Leg.	Gen. Av.
MRD-	1. Agunod, Filemon L.	66	71	61	76	80	83	73	75	71.4
MRD-	2. Cunanan Albino	76	72	74	75	70	70	65	72	71.45
	3. Mejia, Flaviano V.	64	64	65	68	83	74	68	80	69.85

1948

MRD-	4. Orlina, Soledad R.	71	68	66	75	63	75	70	88	69.9
MRD-	5. Vivero. Antonio Lu.	75	73	73	65	63	66	65	80	69.95
MRD-	6. Gatchalian. Salud	72	66	71	75	78	68	65	50	69.65

1949

	7. Abaya. Jesus A.	69	76	75	75	71	89	55	75	70.8
MRD-	8. Advincula, David D.	76	80	62	86	81	72	60	65	70.5
	9. Agraviador, Alfredo L.	63	85	70	77	80	81	65	80	71.8
	10. Alacar, Pascual C	61	63	83	79	71	85	65	80	72.05
	11. Amog, Pedro M.	75	66	76	78	81	74	55	85	72.2
	12. Apolinario. Miguel S.	75	84	78	78	70	70	60	75	71.95
	13. Aquino, Maximo G.	82	77	71	77	76	77	60	75	73.15
	14. Asinas, Candido D.	75	83	69	80	81	83	55	85	72.65
	15, Baldivino, Jose B.	75	65	72	82	82	69	60	80	71.95
	16. Balintona, Bernardo	75	80	64	78	74	67	65	70	70
	17. Banawa, Angel L.	78	70	70	75	81	83	60	60	72.3
	18. Bandala, Anacleto A.	66	80	66	71	93	72	65	70	69.6
	19. Bandon, Alawadin K.	74	79	69	77	91	73	60	80	73.35
	20. Baquero, Benjamin	76	79	64	77	85	72	65	75	72.5
	21. Blanco, Jose	75	75	70	75	77	76	60	90	72.5
	22. Buenaluz, Victoriano T.	75	71	72	78	67	82	60	75	70.85
	23. Canda, Benjamin S.	75	72	75	82	76	77	65	75	73.55
	24. Canon, Guillermo	77	86	67	88	75	69	70	85	73.9
	25. Carlos, Estela S.	75	81	81	79	72	73	65	70	73.8
	26. Cerezo, Gregorio Q.	69	76	76	79	71	80	55	80	70.4
	27. Clarin, Manuel L.	75	82	76	81	73	69	70	75	73.95
	28. Claudio Conrado O.	76	62	78	77	73	72	60	70	71.4
	29. Condevillamar, Antonio V.	68	65	74	80	85	75	60	75	71.65
MRD-	30. Cornejo, Crisanto R.	72	75	69	82	83	79	65	80	73.4
	31. Corona, Olvido D.	68	76	73	81	81	72	60	75	71.15
	32. Dizon, Mareial C.	76	86	69	83	75	74	65	80	73.1
	33. Enriquez, Agustin P.	75	77	70	81	81	77	65	80	73.75
	34. Eapiritu, Irineo E.	80	88	69	75	76	77	65	75	73.8
	35. Fernandez, Macarlo J.	63	82	76	75	81	84	65	75	72.95
	36. Gallardo, Amando C.	78	79	67	77	76	75	60	65	70.95
	37. Garcia, Freidrich M.	76	80	66	75	72	70	60	75	69.7
	38. Garcia, Julian L.	64	77	68	82	89	77	65	75	72.15
	39. Garcia, Leon Mo.	77	86	71	80	60	82	65	75	71.85
	40. Garcia, Pedro V.	76	82	73	81	74	83	60	85	78.6
	41. Garcia, Santiago C.	62	91	79	75	72	75	65	80	71.8
	42. Genoves, Pedro	75	83	70	78	87	76	55	80	72.7
	43. Gonzales, Amado P.	75	71	71	75	86	75	60	75	72.65
	44. Guia, Odon R. de	77	76	66	81	74	76	60	75	70.9
	45. Fernandez, Simeon	62	68	71	80	74	90	65	75	70.85
	46. Jakosalem, Filoteo	82	83	73	82	61	87	65	70	73.6
	47. Jesus. Felipe D. de	75	83	67	79	78	85	60	76	72.45
	48. Jocom, Jacobo M.	77	77	74	77	74	64	55	75	70.65
	49. Juarea, Nicolas	77	84	56	76	73	82	60	85	70
	50. Kalalang, Remigio	65	75	74	80	70	70	65	85	70.3
	51. Layumas, Vicente L.	67	84	65	75	89	66	60	80	70.3
	52. Leyson, Amancid F.	69	83	75	76	81	75	65	76	73.15
	53. Libanan, Marcelino	71	83	61	77	80	81	65	75	71.75
	54. Um, Jose E.	77	77	72	76	72	64	65	70	71.15
	55. Lim, Jose F.	70	75	62	83	80	71	65	80	70.4
	56. Linao. Mariano M.	66	84	76	78	80	75	60	75	71.75
	57. Lopez. Angelo P.	67	81	75	72	79	81	65	80	71
	58. Lopez, Eliezar M.	77	75	60	75	77	85	60	76	70.7
	59. Lopez, Nicanor S.	72	71	70	78	77	84	60	75	71.55
	60. Manoleto, Proceso D.	72	70	65	78	81	90	60	80	71.95
	61. Mancao, Alfredo P.	67	64	71	83	76	76	65	80	70.95
	62. Manera. Mariano A.	75	78	75	75	68	79	60	65	71
	63. Mercado, Arsenio N.	67	64	71	83	76	76	65	80	70.95
	64. Miranda, Benjamin G.	76	81	67	82	74	77	65	80	72.55
	65. Manad, Andres B.	77	75	68	82	69	72	65	76	71.15

1949

66. Oroaco, Casimiro P.	72	84	69	81	70	82	65	75	71.9
67. Padua, Manuel C.	76	76	68	80	79	79	50	76	70.1
68. Palang, Basilio S.	71	75	82	71	55	87	65	75	69.6
69. Palma, Cuadrato	62	75	69	93	80	79	55	80	69.6
70. Panganiban, Jose V.	67	83	61	81	91	74	60	75	70.6
71. Pareja, Felipe	66	71	75	81	67	74	60	70	68.75
72. Patalinjug, Eriberto	73	77	78	73	78	71	55	75	71.25
73. Paulin, Jose C.	66	69	71	77	83	82	65	75	72.1
74. Pido, Serafin C.	72	78	63	80	71	85	70	80	72.05
75. Pimentel, Luis P.	77	75	76	81	76	68	66	80	71.6
76. Plantilla, Rodrigo C.	72	78	68	89	79	81	65	85	73.55
77. Regalario, Benito B.	72	80	64	80	75	81	65	80	69.55
78. Robis, Casto P.	62	77	74	73	68	80	70	80	70.9
79. Rodil, Francisco C.	68	69	70	81	76	75	65	75	70.75
80. Rodriguez, Mariano I.	80	75	69	80	72	80	65	80	73.35
81. Romero, Crispulo P.	78	75	66	77	76	83	65	75	72.85
82. Saez, Porfirio D.	75	75	72	81	69	77	60	75	71
83. Saliguma, Crisogono D.	79	79	74	78	69	65	65	70	71.8
84. Samano, Fortunate A.	76	84	72	77	70	82	60	75	71.9
85. Santos, Faustina C.	71	68	68	76	75	85	55	75	69.5
86. Santos, Josefina R.	68	69	76	71	77	82	65	75	72.3
87. Seludo Ananias G.	75	80	69	79	77	82	65	75	78.25
88. Semilia Rafael I.	68	85	55	83	89	79	65	80	71.25
89. Telan Gaudencio	77	79	70	75	70	75	60	75	70.86
90. Tesorero, Leocadio T.	75	71	63	75	82	62	65	63	69.65
91. Torre, Valentin S. de la	85	81	71	76	69	65	55	70	70.4
92. Torres, Ariston I.	78	71	72	81	61	84	55	85	70.4
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. de	70	75	71	79	65	80	65	80	70.65
94. Viado, Jose	67	70	74	75	75	90	55	80	70.7
95. Villacarlos, Delfin A.	73	87	71	82	69	70	75	85	73.85
96. Villarail, Leonor S.	73	81	76	86	86	73	55	85	73.6
97. Zabala, Amando A.	76	70	67	75	76	76	60	75	70.6

1950

MRD-	98. Cruz, Filomeno de la	70	71	78	81	76	72	64	96	73.4
	99. Eapanola, Pablo S.	71	78	55	76	85	69	65	93	70.2
	100. Foronda, Clareticio J.	60	78	68	79	84	88	62	93	71.9
	101. Bechanova, Vicente	69	76	75	75	69	68	75	96	71.3
MRD-	102. Penalosa, Osias R.	80	78	61	76	61	77	66	85	70.2
MRD-	103. Sarmiento. Flora A.	65	86	63	82	89	72	60	72	70.15
	104. Torre. Catalino P.	75	85	68	78	69	67	66	69	70.25
	105. Ungson, Fernando S.	61	87	75	70	57	85	83	82	72.8

1951

	106. Abasolo, Romulo	77	70	64	65	76	70	76	64	71.7
	107. Adeva, Daniel G.	75	59	74	65	69	51	78	67	70.4
	108. Aguilar, Vicente Z.	73	63	68	75	70	69	76	75	71.25
	109. Amodia, Juan T.	75	76	66	76	76	60	77	76	72.36
MRD-	110. Anosa, Pablo S.	76	78	68	76	74	61	75	79	71.6
	111. Antiola, Anastacio R.	68	76	75	70	71	70	81	66	73.05
	112. Aquino, S. Rey. A.	70	71	71	60	74	62	76	77	71.1
	113. Atienza, Manuel G.	71	78	68	80	86	61	82	15	73.85
	114. Avancena, Alfonso	71	71	65	75	70	72	78	80	71.8
MRD-	115. Balacuit, Camilo N	75	73	75	70	72	65	75	76	73.25
	116. Barinaga. Jeremias L.	68	69	73	70	74	60	80	79	71.2
MRD-	117. Barrientos, Ambrosio D.	76	60	67	55	74	63	77	62	70.26
MRD-	118. Benitez, Tomas P.	67	75	75	60	73	72	75	78	72.2
	119. Biason, Sixto F.	73	82	67	65	66	72	77	68	71.25
MRD-	120. Brinas, Isagani, A.	71	69	74	70	76	62	79	72	71.95
	121. Btaela, Arcadio P.	72	77	61	70	71	68	79	71	69.76
	122. Cabilao, Leonardo S.	73	50	75	75	75	60	71	79	71.25
	123. Cabrera, Ireneo M.	75	66	70	65	72	81	70	79	72.4
	124. Cacacho, Emilio V.
	125. Calilung, Soledad C.	64	73	73	80	73	67	75	59	69.65
MRD-	126. Calimlira, Jose B.	64	73	73	80	73	65	75	69	69.65
	127. Calimlim. Pedro B.	66	82	69	60	69	62	82	75	70
	128. Camello, Sotero H.	70	77	63	65	75	66	84	64	71.55
	129. Campos. Juan A.	71	88	70	75	64	69	71	62	70.15
	130. Castillo. Antonio del	78	78	70	60	79	67	69	76	72.66
MRD-	131. Castillo, Dominador Ad.	75	67	72	75	74	71	67	66	71.1
MRD-	132. Castro, Jesus B.	72	86	72	75	65	75	76	71	72.85
	133. Casuga, Bienvenido B.	75	72	72	70	69	61	75	60	70.95
	134. Cabangbang, Santiago B.	77	67	61	80	73	59	83	76	72.2
	135. Craz, Federico S.	69	74	75	75	68	65	76	70	71.65
	136. Dacanay, Eufemio P.	70	73	62	75	72	69	85	71	72.05
	137. Deysolong, Felisberto	66	62	72	75	70	62	83	62	70.85
MRD-	138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.	78	79	63	75	73	75	81	59	73.5
	139. Espinosa, Domingo L.	78	63	58	70	70	67	87	63	71.6
MRD-	140. Farol, Evencia C.	80	78	66	75	81	72	62	73	72.25
	141. Felix, Conrado S.	71	71	75	65	70	58	75	69	70.75
	142. Fernan, Pablo L.	67	88	66	85	73	68	78	75	72.35
	143. Gandioco, Salvador G.	64	58	66	65	76	70	89	75	72.1
	144. Gaatardo, Crispin B.	70	69	68	75	78	66	86	72	73.9
	145. Genson, Angelo B.	75	57	73	65	67	54	78	56	69.55
	146. Guiani, Guinaid M.	68	60	75	65	74	67	75	77	71.5
	147. Guina, Graciano P.	66	69	67	60	78	52	83	61	69.6
MRD-	148. Homeres, Praxedes P.	74	74	75	75	71	69	75	71	73.35
	149. Ibarra, Yenancio M.	60	75	74	70	74	70	80	75	71.9
	150. Imperial, Monieo L.	72	78	75	75	72	56	80	77	73.7
MRD-	151. Ibaaco, Jr., Emiliano M.	71	70	63	85	71	60	85	53	70.85
	152. Inandan, Fortunate C.	77	77	67	55	73	75	79	57	72.5
	153. Jimenez, Florencio C.	75	70	70	75	72	61	75	78	72.05
	154. Kintanar, Woodrow M.	70	83	72	65	76	73	75	69	72.95
	155. Languldo, Cesar V.	63	71	63	85	70	61	85	79	70.55
	156. Lavilles, Cesar L.	61	89	75	65	73	63	75	78	70.55
	157. Llenos. Francisco U.	64	70	65	60	72	65	92	75	71.75
	158. Leon, Marcelo D. de	63	73	60	85	75	75	90	70	72.75
	159. Llanto, Priscilla	72	68	60	65	76	67	84	68	71.35
	160. Machaehor, Oscar	68	59	78	70	67	57	75	75	70.15
MRD-	161. Magsino, Encarnacion	77	66	70	70	76	71	75	61	72.75
MRD-	162. Maligaya, Demetrio M.	70	61	75	65	75	50	91	51	72.3
	163. Manio, Cregorio J.	67	67	69	80	71	67	75	75	70.65
	164. Puzon, Eduardo S.	72	82	60	60	69	70	68	72	68.05
MRD-	165. Marcial, Meynardo R.	66	75	74	70	75	67	81	75	73.15
	166. Martin, Benjamin S.	68	72	63	75	69	63	84	62	70.1
MRD-	167. Monterroyo, Catalina S.	70	80	75	80	76	66	82	51	73.95
MRD-	168. Montero, Leodegario C.	73	67	66	80	81	65	81	75	73.75
	169. Monzon, Candido T.	70	72	74	75	67	70	77	69	72.05
	170. Natividad, Alberto M.	73	79	68	65	73	69	75	79	72.2
MRD-	171. Navallo, Capistrano C.	70	72	68	85	81	66	71	74	72.1
	172. Nisce, Camilo Z.	66	66	75	65	79	68	85	62	73.5
MRD-	173. Ocampo, Antonio F. de	75	81	76	65	74	67	75	69	73.75
	174. Olaviar, Jose O.	72	70	69	55	66	70	77	75	70.5
MRD-	175. Perez, Cesario Z.	75	76	66	80	72	63	82	69	72.95
	176. Pogado, Causin O.	70	66	65	70	75	64	75	70	69.95
	177. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela	75	73	62	65	78	59	75	66	70.2
	178. Recinto, Ireneo I.	73	76	68	75	74	68	80	63	72.3
MRD-	179. Redor, Francisco K.	62	77	73	75	69	64	76	69	70
MRD-	180. Regis, Deogracias A.	76	74	68	65	65	65	88	75	73.35
	181. Rigor, Estelita C.	67	78	61	80	71	77	79	65	70.9
MRD-	182. Rimorin-Gordo, Estela	70	72	62	60	88	66	67	79	70.15
	183. Rosario, Prisco del.	70	64	70	70	72	73	85	57	72.65
	184. Rosario, Vicente D. del	75	91	65	75	68	68	79	62	72.2
	185. Saavedra, Felipe	73	80	63	75	76	73	68	62	70.35
	186. Salazar, Alfredo N.	66	72	73	75	67	68	77	69	70.85
	187. Salem, Romulo R.	77	81	72	65	73	60	76	75	73
	188. Foz, Julita A.	75	72	75	75	65	70	76	64	72.5
	189. Santa Ana, Candido T.	77	69	65	75	81	75	70	75	73
	190. Santos, Aquilino	72	66	69	65	68	70	81	71	71.7
	191. Santos, Valeriano V.	76	72	75	75	68	62	76	79	73.1
	192. Suico, Samuel	73	79	72	75	71	59	84	65	73.3
	193. Suson, Teodorico	74	68	66	80	66	59	79	67	70.35
	194. Tado, Florentino P.	64	76	67	65	76	72	76	63	69.7
	195. Tapayan, Domingo A.	69	72	69	70	76	73	82	79	73.75
MRD-	196. Tiausas, Miguel V.	67	60	71	75	79	67	84	60	72.7
	197. Torres, Carlos P.	68	71	71	70	70	63	82	71	71.6
	198. Tria, Hipolito	69	72	75	60	69	64	78	66	70.05
	199. Velasco, Avelino A.	65	72	75	75	71	67	78	76	72.1
	200. Villa, Francisco C.	65	80	73	75	68	79	65	75	70.2
	201. Villagonzalo, Job R.	78	67	74	65	72	51	69	71	70.25
	202. Villarama, Jr., Pedro.	75	74	75	55	75	66	67	75	71.45

1958

	203. Abacon, Pablo	75	72	78	81	78	72	64	55	72.7
MRP-	204. Abad, Agapito	73	76	73	85	75	63	62	75	70.95
MRP-	205. Abella, Ludovico B.	70	81	76	81	70	66	77	58	72.7
MRP-	206. Abellera. Geronirao F.	75	79	79	87	76	61	63	70	71.7
MRP-	207. Abenojar, Agapito N.	71	72	78	54	70	75	69	70	72.9
	208. Alandy, Dproteo R.	64	83	93	91	69	59	60	60	71.2
	209. Alano, Fabian T.	70	83	61	83	72	87	72	70	71.9
MRP-	210. Alcantara, Pablo V.	71	79	80	81	73	70	72	62	73.65
	211. Arcangel, Agustin Ag.	75	85	71	73	76	65	68	65	71.85
	212. Acosta, Dionisio N.	76	81	78	87	56	65	77	70	72.8
MRP-	213. Abinguna, Agapito C.	66	85	80	84	75	58	76	75	7.65
	214. Adove, Nehemias C.	76	86	78	77	66	78	69	62	73.55
	215. Adrias, Inocencio C.	75	83	61	88	76	67	79	75	73.4
	216. Aglugub, Andres R.	75	83	73	88	72	62	72	62	72.65
	217. Andrada, Mariano L.	76	85	66	87	63	77	75	77	73.
MRP-	218. Almeda, Serafin V.	72	72	75	81	61	67	73	65	70.75
	219. Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad	73	71	72	91	75	67	65	53	70.7
MRP-	220. Amodia, Juan T.	75	79	68	85	62	64	75	78	71.4
MRP-	221. Antonio, Felino A.	71	76	81	83	79	52	72	70	73.3
MRP-	222. Antonio, Jose S.	75	92	90	68	65	64	68	80	73.75
	223. Anonuevo, Ramos B.	71	87	78	81	64	63	74	76	72.7
	224. Aquino, S. Rey A.	67	77	57	78	69	70	69	80	67.7
	226. Arteche, Filomeno D.	78	83	60	89	76	77	70	70	70.8
MRP-	226. Arribas, Isaac M.	75	78	70	81	73	70	67	78	72.2
MRP-	227. Azucena, Ceferino D.	72	67	78	89	72	67	77	65	73.95
	228. Atienza, Ricardo	72	87	70	79	66	65	75	75	70.85
	229. Balacuit, Camilo N.	75	78	89	75	70	65	66	75	73.3
MRP-	230. Baclig, Cayetano S	77	84	83	80	69	70	61	65	73
	231. Balcita, Oscar C.	75	77	79	90	64	60	67	50	70.65
	232. Barilea, Dominador Z.	71	67	82	77	64	61	65	80	70.5
MRP-	233. Banta, Jose Y.	75	80	77	81	75	63	71	75	73.95
MRP-	234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D.	76	70	67	80	67	66	70	81	70.7
	235. Batucan, Jose M.	66	76	78	88	62	76	67	78	71.2
	236. Bautista. Atilano C.	70	82	84	85	58	61	71	62	71.25
	237. Bautista Celso J.	71	68	63	87	80	67	80	70	72.75
	238. Belderon, Jose	76	81	76	92	70	66	67	62	72.65
MRP-	239. Belo, Victor B	76	77	64	73	75	71	76	76	72.85
MRP-	240. Bejec, Conceso D.	79	80	7	82	63	77	75	50	73.15
MRP-	241. Beltran, Gervasio M.	72	75	81	73	75	57	75	80	73.95
MRP-	242. Benaojan, Robustiano O.	74	84	77	84	75	63	68	62	72.85
MRP-	243. Berina, Roger C.	70	80	79	79	68	72	64	78	71.85
MRP-	244. Bihis, Marcelo M.	75	86	65	92	64	64	84	75	73.45
MRP-	245. Binaoro, Vicente M.	73	69	78	83	73	59	70	82	72.75
	246. Bobila, Rosalio B.	76	86	76	83	68	59	71	78	73.05
	247. Buenafe, Avelina R.	78	80	76	75	70	55	72	80	72.75
	248. Bueno, Anastacio F.	73	78	71	78	71	67	71	60	71.15
	249. Borres, Maximino L.	67	85	62	91	72	63	76	80	70.9
MRP-	250. Cabegin, Cesar V.	72	71	76	75	74	70	71	60	72.2
MRP-	251. Cabello, Melecio F.	72	78	78	89	58	70	67	71	70.5
MRP-	252. Cabrera. Irineo M.	79	88	53	91	71	85	75	76	73.3
	253. Cabreros. Paulino N.	71	79	83	84	60	62	71	60	70.85
	254. Calayag, Florentine R.	69	79	66	88	69	75	68	76	70.6
MRP-	255. Calzada, Cesar de la	76	72	80	67	62	71	66	62	70.85
	256. Canabal, Isabel	70	82	81	77	78	51	75	75	73.7
MRP-	257. Cabugao, Pablo N.	76	87	69	80	68	64	78	75	71.8
	258. Calangi, Mateo C.	78	93	71	87	70	66	69	62	71.8
	259. Canda, Benjamin S.	72	71	77	90	62	75	66	82	71.95
	260. Cantoria, Eulogio	71	80	71	89	70	55	72	75	71
	261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado	67	78	71	90	66	75	72	60	70.65
	262. Capitulo, Alejandro P.	75	70	53	87	75	63	76	91	71.2
MRP-	263. Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo	75	98	81	76	64	75	68	56	73.15
MRP-	264. Caluya, Arsenio V.	76	86	70	87	77	52	77	82	73.9
MRP-	265. Campanilla, Mariano B.	80	75	78	77	73	71	63	76	78.65
MRP-	266. Campos. Juan A.	66	86	83	84	67	61	80	57	71.25
	267. Cardoso, Angelita G.	78	71	73	76	79	56	69	60	71.8
	268. Cartagena, Herminio B.	71	72	65	89	64	73	80	70	70.65
MRP-	269. Castro, Daniel T.	65	75	77	76	85	60	75	69	78.16
	270. Cauntay, Gaudencio V.	70	78	72	73	77	69	64	80	71.2
	271. Castro, Pedro L. de	70	68	69	87	76	75	72	70	72.35
	272. Cerio, Juan A.	75	82	75	86	60	64	76	75	71.75
	273. Colorado, Alfonso R.	68	75	80	74	77	66	67	80	71.6
	274. Chavez, Doroteo M.	73	65	79	84	73	69	66	84	78.1
	275. Chavez, Honorato A.	77	76	79	86	74	53	74	75	78.65
MRP-	276. Cobangbang, Orlando B.	69	81	74	82	76	61	78	80	78.85
	277. Cortez, Armando R.	78	60	88	86	60	66	69	64	73.1
	278. Crisostomo, Jesus L.	76	87	74	76	62	65	76	66	71.45
MRP-	279. Cornejo, Crisanto R.	68	87	78	86	79	50	80	60	73.7
MRP-	280. Cruz, Raymundo	75	81	79	85	72	57	68	75	72.95
MRP-	281. Cunanan, Jose C.	78	92	63	83	76	72	68	65	72.4
	282. Cunanan, Salvador F.	70	82	64	92	67	75	73	76	71.45
	283. Cimafranea, Agustin B.	71	76	76	80	70	71	76	70	73.35
	284. Crisol, Getulio R.	70	91	78	85	68	55	71	60	70.8
MRP-	285. Dusi, Felicisimo R.	76	82	69	82	66	62	80	71	72.85
MRP-	286. Datu, Alfredo J.	70	75	72	86	80	55	68	79	71.5
	287. Dacuma, Luis B.	71	67	87	83	71	50	65	70	71.25
MRP-	288. Degamo, Pedro R.	73	80	82	74	80	67	67	67	73.65
	289. Delsado, Vicente N.	70	84	82	84	77	62	73	50	72.66
MRP-	290. Diolazo, Ernesto A.	75	83	86	73	54	54	75	75	72.25
	291. Dionisio, Jr., Guillenno	73	84	64	89	71	78	75	66	72.8
MRP-	292. Dichoso, Alberto M.	71	77	71	81	69	75	80	70	73.65
MRP-	293. Dipasupil, Claudio R.	70	76	82	73	79	70	72	56	73.9
MRP-	294. Selgado. Abner	75	84	63	67	64	60	70	72	68.35
MRP-	295. Domingo, Dotninador T.	70	69	81	82	68	63	71	75	72.2
	296. Ducusin, Agapito B.	70	78	58	88	75	77	62	76	68.05
MRP-	297. Duque, Antonio S.	75	77	78	86	76	72	64	75	73.9
	298. Duque, Castulo	75	80	73	83	66	67	65	66	70.65
	299. Ebbah, Percival B.	70	80	85	76	66	63	76	75	73.95
	300. Edisa, Sulpicio	65	77	75	89	75	62	75	65	72
	301. Edradan, Bosa C.	70	75	84	84	71	69	69	86	73.4
MRP-	302. Enage, Jacinto N.	66	70	88	93	72	67	65	76	73.2
MRP-	303. Encamacion, Alfonso B.	75	86	73	81	68	77	69	75	75.65
	304. Encarnacion, Cesar	65	78	58	68	66	64	75	72	67.1
	305. Estoista, Agustin A.	78	76	74	86	58	67	70	76	71.7
MRP-	306. Fabros, Jose B.	66	75	80	82	80	71	67	70	73.05
MRP-	307. Fajardo, Balbino P.	77	69	82	83	65	60	75	76	73.9
	308. Fajardo, Genaro P.	70	79	77	79	79	50	73	75	72.6
	309. Evansrelista, Felicidad P.	75	75	72	87	63	63	77	70	72.15
	310. Familara, Raymundo Z.	63	75	87	83	64	65	68	65	71.85
	311. Farinas, Dionisio	70	78	89	66	65	75	70	50	72.75
	312. Favila, Hilario B.	71	84	74	70	75	67	73	69	72.2
MRP-	313. Feliciano, Alberto I.	71	69	70	85	69	81	72	70	72.25
MRP-	314. Fernando, Lope F.	73	77	86	79	70	76	64	50	73
MRP-	315. Flores, Dionisio S.	78	72	77	83	57	50	58	73	72.05
MRP-	316. Fortich, Benjamin B.	70	82	70	70	78	65	64	75	70.86
MRP-	317. Fuente, Jose S. de la	76	88	72	74	60	71	79	79	73.55
	318. Fohmantes. Nazario S.	72	79	71	77	68	61	76	60	70.9
MRP-	319. Fuggan, Lorenzo B.	76	81	74	69	71	71	73	60	72.85
	320. Gabuya, Jesus S.	70	83	82	83	70	63	75	65	73.75
	321. Galang, Victor N.	69	83	84	76	70	57	71	60	71.95
	322. Gaerlan, Manuel L.	73	87	77	90	67	61	72	75	73.16
	323. Galem, Nestor R.	72	79	86	78	60	61	75	70	73.05
	324. Gallardo, Jose Pe B.	75	88	76	75	63	70	70	65	71.85
MRP-	325. Gallos, Cirilo B.	70	78	84	91	80	61	65	70	72.85
	326. Galindo, Eulalio D.	70	89	87	65	78	71	62	62	73.4
	327. Gahnan, Patrocinio G.	72	72	80	85	71	66	70	63	71.6
	328. Gamalinda, Carlos S.	76	79	81	86	67	63	69	65	72.55
	329. Gamboa, Antonio G.	71	67	70	72	76	60	75	68	70.95
	330. Gannod, Joae A.	69	82	75	81	68	62	73	68	71.25
MRP-	331. Garcia, Matias N.	67	78	74	90	79	69	76	65	72.8
MRP-	332. Ganete, Carmelo	76	87	77	82	74	67	68	81	73.8
	333. Gilbang, Gaudioso R.	75	67	80	82	67	67	64	70	70.5
	334. Gofredo, Claro C.	68	78	72	86	78	62	70	76	70.9
	335. Gomez, Jose S.	71	76	71	81	76	63	69	62	70.85
MRP-	336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.	68	93	85	78	64	69	70	64	72.35
MRP-	337. Gonzales, Rafael C.	77	75	71	89	65	70	70	60	70.05
MRP-	338. Gracia, Eulalia L. de	66	68	90	84	77	69	69	65	73.8
	339. Grageda, Jose M. A.	70	86	72	67	70	60	78	73	70.75
	340. Guzman, Juan de	76	86	69	84	64	79	76	76	73.6
MRP-	341. Guzman, Mateo de	76	79	79	73	72	69	68	80	73.9
	342. Guzman, Salvador B.	71	61	74	72	61	66	78	75	70.75
	343. Guzman, Salvador T. de	75	84	64	81	74	61	78	68	71.75
	344. Habelito, Geronimo E.	71	76	71	87	73	60	67	55	69.65
	345. Hedriana, Naterno G.	75	68	84	76	66	68	76	60	72.9
	346. Hernandez, Quintin B.	67	75	72	81	72	72	66	76	70.6

1952

	347. Homeres, Agustin R.	73	84	65	86	70	77	68	76	70.7
	348. Ines, Leonilo F.	65	88	71	88	77	73	61	70	70.55
	349. Jamer, Alipio S.	68	75	83	89	80	61	65	50	72
MRP-	350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.	75	65	68	85	76	70	83	54	73.8
MRP-	351. Jardinico, Jr., Emilio	73	86	72	78	82	67	67	64	72.8
MRP-	352. Jaen, Justiniano F.	76	75	78	84	71	66	70	77	73.85
	353. Jaring, Antonio S.	72	77	79	70	72	57	71	50	70.75
MRP-	354. Javier, Aquilino M.	75	84	79	78	77	61	66	66	73.05
	355 Jomuad, Francisco	75	75	72	88	78	58	76	43	72.4
MRP-	356. Jose, Nestor L.	78	61	64	73	68	76	64	80	69.7
	357. Lao, Jose M.	75	71	75	72	70	67	81	59	73.5
	358 Leon, Brigido C. de	67	75	78	92	78	61	72	80	72.55
	359. Leones, Constante B.	68	81	79	84	73	60	77	60	73
	360 Liboro, Horacio T.	72	69	80	87	73	62	70	61	72.4
	361. Llanera, Cesar L.	77	81	80	78	64	59	75	63	73
	362. Lomontod, Jose P.	75	76	69	70	73	76	74	75	73.2
	363. Luna, Lucito	70	75	69	83	59	53	74	75	68.4
MRP-	364. Luz, Lauro L.	76	90	78	88	64	58	75	77	73.95
MRP-	365. Macasaet, Tomaa S.	73	81	72	83	66	75	72	70	72.5
	366. Magbiray, Godofredo V.	80	67	84	76	70	62	65	68	73.05
	367. Majarais, Rodolfo P.	70	62	64	82	88	75	71	79	72.85
MRP-	368. Makabenta, Eduardo	75	90	77	83	59	71	72	78	73.3
MRP-	369. Malapit, Justiniano S.	74	83	74	89	58	60	72	76	71.1
	370. Maloles, Iluminado M.	70	87	73	76	77	50	76	76	72.3
	371. Maniquia, Daniel R.	75	80	73	91	69	71	65	70	72.1
	372 Marani Arsenio	65	79	60	72	73	51	75	86	67.9
	373 Marasigan, Napoleon	75	71	83	75	69	62	69	70	72.75
MRP-	374. Marco, Jaime P.	75	67	74	76	64	75	75	67	71.9
MRP-	375. Martir, Osmundo P.	70	86	76	78	72	71	75	63	72.95
MRP-	376. Masancay, Amando E.	73	87	75	77	72	60	78	80	73.2
MRP-	377. Mationg, Ignacio T.	62	87	72	79	73	76	69	77	71.3
	378. Mara, Guillermo L.	70	78	78	89	75	67	66	65	72.35
MRP-	379. Mercado, Felipe A.	73	77	82	82	78	52	69	85	73.9
MRP-	380. Miculob, Eugene P.	70	82	73	86	77	62	79	65	72.8
	381. Mison, Rafael M. Jr.	79	78	73	75	71	68	69	53	71.95
MRP-	382. Monponbanua, Antonio D.	79	79	68	88	64	78	69	83	73.1
MRP-	383. Montero. Leodegario C.	72	89	69	89	70	68	70	75	72.15
	384. Morada, Servillano S.	75	76	67	71	65	66	75	76	70.9
	385. Mocorro, Generoso	78	84	78	84	60	73	68	70	73
MRP-	386. Mosquera, Estanisiao L.	75	78	75	85	72	55	77	66	73.13
	387. Motus, Rodentor P.	80	78	70	94	72	75	70	57	73.75
	388. Macario, Pedro R.	70	67	74	86	78	63	72	66	72.15
MRP-	389. Nadela, Geredion T.	72	64	64	81	73	50	75	75	69.15
MRP-	390. Nazareno, Romeo P.	67	70	71	76	76	79	75	57	72.05
	391. Nieto, Benedicto S.	69	79	77	77	72	62	76	76	72.9
MRP-	392. Noguera, Raymundo	71	86	81	80	73	56	72	70	73.15
MRP-	393. Nodado, Domiciano E.	70	70	69	73	67	37	64	72	63.6
	394. Nono, Pacifico G.	67	77	78	67	75	59	71	76	71.35
MRP-	395. Nuval, Manuel R.	78	72	67	90	72	68	78	67	73.65
	396. Ocampo, Augusto	75	90	77	72	69	55	65	67	60.7
	397. Oliveros, Amado A.	72	75	68	72	84	50	75	73	71.9
	398. Opiiia, Jr., Pedro	76	77	74	67	73	66	68	70	71.85
MRP-	399. Olaviar, Jose O.	70	62	85	81	74	50	68	79	71.8
MRP-	400. Olandesca, Per O.	70	91	76	87	72	66	70	79	73.45
	401. Orden, Apolonio J.	72	65	84	86	66	50	72	68	71.45
	402. Ortiz, Melencio T.	71	75	78	81	66	67	7078	72.1
MRP-	403. Pablo, Fedelino S.	72	64	76	86	72	61	76	75	72.95
	404. Pacifico, Vicente V.	76	79	69	80	76	62	72	80	71.95
MRP-	405. Paderna, Perfecto D.	75	69	72	75	78	58	75	70	72.6
	406. Padlan, Crispin M.	71	66	76	79	68	67	74	66	71.65
	407. Padilla, Jose C.	70	65	67	82	78	75	78	75	73.3
	408. Padilla. Jr., Estanislao E.	71	88	78	86	59	75	78	50	72.95
MRP-	409. Palma, Bartolome	67	81	80	82	71	75	69	75	73.25
MRP-	410. Papa, Angel A.	75	72	65	65	77	59	63	71	73.45
MRP-	411. Parayno, Mario V.	71	88	74	89	69	66	76	73	73.65
	412. Parina, Santos L	70	87	85	77	64	67	63	76	71.85
MRP-	413. Pasion, Anastacio	63	80	68	81	82	79	76	58	72.55
	414. Pastrana, Rizal R.	69	76	71	76	68	63	77	83	71.65
MRP-	415. Paulin, Jose O.	70	66	80	87	75	50	65	80	70.9
MRP-	416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.	79	87	73	83	69	71	68	65	73.2
	417. Pena, Jesus	75	75	75	62	75	70	60	66	70.4
	418. Perez, Toribio R.	71	64	81	92	69	68	67	70	71.25
	419. Pestano, Melquiadea	77	81	74	87	59	68	76	75	73.2
MRP-	420. Pido, Serafin C.	77	81	72	82	69	71	60	75	71.15
	421. Pinlac, Filemon	67	76	74	86	65	79	65	72	70.55
	422. Poblete, Celso B.	72	79	82	76	66	64	74	50	72.15
MRP-	423. Piza, Luz	68	70	75	87	74	67	64	75	70.8
	424. Puzon, Eduardo S.	72	80	81	69	72	53	67	70	71.05
	425. Quetulio, Josefina D.	75	90	60	93	64	78	76	83	72.9
MRP-	426. Quipanes, Melchor V.	69	88	79	82	65	62	71	66	71.55
MRP-	427. Quietson, Bayani R.	73	75	76	77	70	81	71	53	72.85
	428. Racho, Macario D.	68	75	81	82	78	53	66	54	70.55
	429. Ramirez, Sabas P.	71	80	73	87	62	62	75	80	71.65
MRP-	430. Raffinan, Jose A.	80	83	79	79	62	72	68	65	73.25
MRP-	431. Ramos, Patricio S.	75	87	76	75	72	72	61	75	72.25
MRP-	432. Ramos-Balmori, Manuela	78	84	76	90	48	75	80	65	73.45
MRP-	433. Raro, Celso	75	81	76	67	75	77	55	77	71.4
MRP-	434. Rayos, Victor S.	75	86	79	91	71	67	67	70	73.9
	435. Revilla, Mariano S.	75	78	81	90	70	54	69	81	73.35
	436. Reyes, Abdon L.	72	64	81	78	76	73	69	54	72.85
	437. Reyes, Domingo B.	72	87	78	83	72	75	62	70	72.7
	438. Reyes, Francisco M.	75	85	84	68	75	71	68	50	73.9
	439. Reyes, Lozano M.	80	57	78	79	78	65	64	79	73.35
MRP-	440. Reyes, Oscar R.	75	75	82	82	76	64	68	60	73.65
	441. Rigonan, Cesar V.	71	85	65	86	75	70	76	70	72.7
	442. Rivera, Honorio	71	56	70	90	71	65	75	71	71.2
MRP-	443. Rivero, Buenaventura A.	72	88	72	94	68	73	66	80	72.6
MRP-	444. Robles, Enrique	75	77	75	77	82	64	69	70	73.7
	445. Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano	76	75	76	63	69	77	65	78	72.25
	446. Roldan, Jose V.	67	80	79	83	73	71	75	70	73.9
	447. Rosario, Adelaida R. del	80	75	65	70	68	72	80	70	73.18
	448. Rosario, Restitute F. del	75	75	79	90	68	66	66	63	72.1
MRP-	449. Sabelino, Conrado S.	71	81	69	75	77	71	75	70	72.98
	450, San Juan, Damaso	77	86	72	89	69	76	65	72	71.6
	451. Saniel, Felix L.	72	93	76	80	67	75	66	62	72.1
	452. Samaniego, Jesus B.	75	80	76	72	60	67	68	70	70.6
MRP-	453. Sandoval, Emmanuel M.	75	83	70	83	77	67	77	60	73.95
MRP-	454. Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.	71	75	81	90	62	64	76	68	72.95
	455. Santiago. Jr., Cristobal	75	76	54	93	63	65	59	70	71.8
	456. Santillan. Juanito LI.	76	89	83	83	63	58	65	62	71.26
MRP-	457. Santos, Rodolfo C.	75	75	78	82	73	76	66	70	73.7
MRP-	458. Santos, Ruperto M.	67	64	69	76	63	64	71	60	66.75
MRP-	459. Santos, Aquilino C.	72	71	73	79	73	79	71	85	73.8
MRP-	460. Santos, Rufino A.	75	81	79	85	74	72	66	54	73.3
	461. Suanding, Bantas	75	67	67	92	79	59	76	73	73.1
MRP-	462. Sulit, Fella M.	76	79	76	78	72	75	68	67	73.6
	463. Songco, Felicisimo G.	70	68	82	84	60	69	76	65	73.38
	464. Soriano, Aniceto S.	64	79	77	80	80	63	70	65	70.1
	465. Suarez, Pablo D.	73	85	70	87	76	70	64	70	71.9
MRP-	466. Sybico, Jesus L.	79	70	70	72	75	75	72	60	73.05
	467. TabaQue, Benjamin R.	69	68	77	79	74	68	72	60	71.85
MRP-	468. Tan Kiang, Clarita	81	79	72	80	62	75	73	80	73.96
MRP-	469. Tando, Amado T.	71	82	78	83	71	61	71	60	72
	470. Tasico, Severo E.	71	69	75	89	70	75	67	63	71.61
	471. Tiburcio, Ismael P.	73	82	72	93	76	67	68	54	71.16
MRP-	472. Tiongson, Federico T.	70	70	76	84	77	75	75	60	73.46
MRP-	473. Tolentino, Jesus C.	75	89	63	84	85	73	73	60	73.4
	474. Torrijas. Alfredo A.	77	66	67	83	68	75	71	63	71.3
MRP-	475. Tobias, Artemio M.	69	58	74	81	71	55	65	67	67.56
MRP-	476. Trillana, Jr., Apolonio	76	86	76	86	70	68	75	60	73.8
MRP-	477. Trinidad. Manuel. O.	66	91	83	75	63	66	67	65	70.8
	478. Trinidad, Pedro O.	66	78	78	58	78	51	64	76	70.8
MRP-	479. Udarbe, Flavio J.	80	82	77	82	67	66	68	75	72.6
	480. Umali, Osmundo C.	68	75	81	80	71	69	68	6	71.7
	481. Umayam, Juanito C.	77	75	87	85	66	66	66	60	71
MRP-	482. Usita, Gelacio U.	75	72	75	74	73	76	71	70	73.56
	483. Valino, Francisco M.	72	81	80	84	62	78	71	75	73.7
	484. Varela, Dominador M.	67	75	81	86	72	67	81	70	73.85
	485. Vega, Macairog L. de	78	62	79	87	70	70	71	65	73.8
MRP-	486. Velasco, Emmanuel D.	71	80	74	85	60	66	76	76	71.85
	487. Velez, Maria E.	73	70	89	80	56	50	72	67	71.05
MRP-	488. Venal, Artemio V.	78	91	58	67	76	55	75	73	73.65
	489. Venus. Conrado B.	69	81	74	85	62	66	72	77	77.05
MRP-	490. Versosa, Federico B.	75	79	72	88	76	68	74	59	73.7
MRP-	491. Villafuerte, Eduardo V.	75	83	70	76	64	64	76	65	71.2
MRP-	492. Villanueva, Cecilio C.	75	85	79	88	66	77	67	70	73.95
	493. Villar, Custodio R.	73	69	70	88	76	66	69	50	70.75
	494. Villasenor, Leonidas F.	80	85	67	77	62	75	76	73	73.15
	495. Viterbo, Jose H.	80	77	65	93	70	65	65	65	70.65
	496. Yaranon, Pedro	70	77	76	85	72	50	75	75	71.85
MRP-	497. Yasay, Mariano R.	75	75	72	76	63	77	70	60	71.1
MRP-	498. Ygay, Venancio M.	73	80	83	84	62	59	72	77	72.65
	499. Yulo, Jr., Teodoro	78	82	78	75	70	81	76	76	73.95
	500. Zamora, Alberto	70	65	76	79	62	77	69	52	71.3
	501. Rigonan, Felipe C.	70	79	69	89	76	62	71	64	71.2

A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades
in subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which
they took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and
those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied,
indicated by the initials MRD, follows:

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

	Civ.	Land	Merc.	Int.	Pol.	Crim.	Rem.	Leg.	Gen. Av.
1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
1946	68	67	76	76	73	73	49	50	66.5
1950	59	80	67	77	62	80	11	67	67.4
2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951	65	76	68	56	69	63	76	72	64.9
1952	65	68	75	84	72	59	73	67	69.75
1953	67	74	68	68	76	62	71	76	66.7
3. Blanco, Jose B.
MRD-1949	75	75	70	75	77	76	60	90	72.15
1951	64	71	68	65	68	70	78	71	66.96
4. Condeno, Mateo
1950	71	80	62	75	75	81	56	92	69.3
1951	70	60	61	65	77	64	67	1	67.86
5. Ducusin. Aigapito B.
MRD-1949	69	70	76	73	76	71	65	60	68.66
1960	60	71	65	67	67	75	66	89	68.1
6. Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949	60	70	82	79	70	69	60	80	69.25
1950	67	66	51	69	54	86	56	84	60.3
7. Luna. Lucito A.
1946	63	63	69	76	75	76	57	69	68.55
1952	70	75	69	83	69	63	74	75	68.4
8. Marana, Arsenio S.
1949	72	68	68	75	75	72	60	75	69.35
1952	65	79	60	72	73	61	75	86	67.9
9. Montano, Manuel M.
1951	61	60	58	60	70	63	75	64	64.8
1952	70	77	65	79	66	62	70	60	66.4
1953	78	64	66	68	71	50	71	78	70.65
10. Pena, Jesus S.
1950	25	75	46	75	45	52	46	71	46.2
1951	74	61	62	65	69	65	75	67	68.3
1952	75	75	75	62	75	70	60	68	70.4
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950	68	78	70	75	69	70	58	69	67.75
1951	65	62	75	60	73	57	75	71	66.8
12. Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949	65	75	72	75	60	75	56	85	66.65
1951	68	57	48	60	91	66	65	75	64.05
1952	68	53	68	67	58	56	75	64	65.7
13. Rivera, Eulogio J.
1952	67	80	51	69	69	77	73	53	66.35
1953	65	67	78	74	75	62	69	80	70.9
14. Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951	67	60	70	65	68	56	75	66	67.75
1962	70	71	67	78	67	75	71	70	70.1
15. Sanchez, Juan J.
1948	39	69	82	75	76	72	55	50	63.5
MRD-1949	67	56	69	75	72	77	60	75	68
1951	70	59	55	60	68	57	78	67	65.8
16. Santos, Constantino
1952	62	76	54	82	72	77	66	65	60.65
1953	73	71	70	65	78	64	65	78	70.4
17. Santos, Salvador H.
1951	60	64	55	70	68	52	70	75	62.85
1952	75	64	70	81	76	55	61	75	69.1
1953	70	71	79	65	72	54	66	80	70
18. Sevilla, Macario G.
MRD-1948	50	64	76	66	66	69	60	52	63.1
MRD-1949	47	66	78	64	71	86	65	85	68
1950	35	65	40	75	63	57	27	49	45
MRD-1951	68	59	72	55	69	65	75	75	60.3
1953	70	73	74	70	81	66	69	71	71.05

Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some
candidates—85 in all—presented motions for reconsideration of their
grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list
of those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic Act,
is as follows:

1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION

	Civ.	Land	Merc.	Int.	Pol.	Crim.	Rem.	Leg.	Gen. Av.
1. Acenas, Calixto R.	73	70	68	62	82	51	67	77	73.45
2. Alcantara, Pedro N.	67	70	75	85	87	54	71	80	72.8
3. Alejandro, Exequiel	62	72	71	75	80	76	75	77	73.4
4. Andres, Gregorio M.	70	76	86	58	79	50	71	78	72.7
5. Arnaiz, Antonio E.	66	80	76	58	79	68	77	81	73.4
6. Asis, Floriano U. de	66	78	75	81	77	55	73	69	71.25
7. Bacaiso, Celestino M.	71	65	76	68	76	50	75	70	70.95
8. Bala, Florencio F.	64	82	47	70	82	58	75	82	67
9. Baldo, Olegario A.	57	74	68	68	76	52	71	76	66.7
10. Barrios, Benjamin O.	65	71	76	75	80	62	83	73	73.95
11. Buhay, Eduardo L.	73	76	71	91	76	61	74	78	73.35
12. Burgos, Dominador C.	72	80	89	61	66	37	69	68	70.05
13. Carino, Eldo J.	79	81	60	75	74	74	76	74	73
14. Casar, Dimapuro	67	73	84	79	77	61	71	74	73.35
15. Castaneda, Gregorio	70	73	80	71	75	70	73	78	73.95
16. Estrellado, Benjamin R.	67	79	64	73	82	62	71	74	70.2
17. Fabunan, Edilberto C.	70	72	68	69	77	60	76	74	71.1
18. Feril, Domingo B.	75	71	84	65	70	60	65	70	71.6
19. Fernandez, Alejandro G.	65	75	87	80	81	63	61	80	72.8
20. Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss)	76	80	86	77	64	74	66	69	73.9
21. Garcia, Rafael B.	70	86	70	75	73	63	73	75	71.65
22. Gracia, Miguel L. de	73	68	75	59	80	51	72	71	71
23. Gungon, Armando G.	68	76	76	84	77	67	77	83	73.6
24. Gutierrez, Antonio S.	68	77	66	70	72	69	71	74	69.1
25. Ilejay, Abraham I.	77	70	76	77	81	62	70	68	73.7
26. Leon, Benjamin La. de	66	66	75	70	77	55	71	82	70.35
27. Lugtu, Felipe L.	62	70	78	65	78	56	69	81	69.9
28. Lukman, Abdul-Haraid	76	64	67	69	73	59	73	75	70.45
29. Maloles. Jr., Benjamin G.	77	76	68	68	71	51	75	78	70.85
30. Maloles, Julius G.	77	71	60	71	79	62	68	72	69.75
31. Mandi, Santiago P.	65	76	70	61	79	68	75	72	71.1
32. Margete, Rufino C.	70	76	66	75	85	73	71	75	72.75
33. Melocoton, Nestorio B.	70	81	73	78	83	52	72	75	72.35
34. Molina, Manuel C.	75	78	70	61	75	63	66	85	70.95
35. Munoz, Mariano A.	75	80	86	67	74	57	68	76	73.75
36. Navarro, Buenaventura M.	80	75	65	75	83	55	73	79	73
37. Nodado, Domieiano R.	60	67	67	50	70	50	56	75	61.7
38. Papas, Sisenando B.	65	62	71	61	70	56	66	67	66
39. Pagulayan-Sy. Fernando	63	75	71	62	83	67	70	72	70.4
40. Padula, Benjamin C.	70	77	54	62	74	78	75	68	69.05
41. Pasno, Enrique M.	78	72	66	54	71	58	72	78	69.86
42. Pena, Jr., Narciso	70	95	71	78	67	66	67	73	72.56
43. Perralta, Rodolfo V.	70	70	52	81	68	63	59	69	73.7
44. Pigar, Leopoldo R.	76	75	78	61	72	72	71	79	73.75
45. Publico, Paciano L.	68	69	76	76	70	59	74	67	70.6
46. Radaza, Leovigildo	75	78	76	61	77	50	71	86	72.2
47. Ramos, Bernardo M.	64	62	75	93	81	52	66	80	70.1
48. Rabaino, Andres D.	68	72	75	73	78	55	69	76	70.65
49. Kavanera, Oscar N.	70	77	80	71	82	62	69	78	73.6
50. Renoviila, Jose M.	65	75	80	68	79	52	62	78	69.5
51. Sabaot, Solomon B.	69	73	80	69	82	69	69	79	78.85
52. Sumaway, Ricardo S.	66	76	69	76	74	56	72	.68	69.1
53. Torrefiel, Sofronio O.	70	77	74	75	73	50	68	72	69.55
54. Vera, Federico V. de	60	61	47	77	69	60	67	77	60.9
55. Viray, Venancio Bustos	65	67	67	52	73	64	71	65	67.15
56. Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss)	63	70	56	75	68	54	70	77	64.5

PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972

	Civ.	Land	Merc.	Int.	Pol.	Crim.	Rem.	Leg.	Gen. Av.
1. Ala Narciso	70	71	73	59	73	74	81	77	73.5
2. Alcantara, Pedro N.	67	70	75	85	87	54	71	80	72.8
3. Arellano, Antonio L.	74	66	73	60	78	63	78	72	72.9
4. Buhay, Eduardo L.	73	76	71	91	76	61	74	78	73.35
5. Calautit, Celestino R.	71	78	84	75	75	61	68	72	78.2
6. Casuncad, Sulvio P.	61	73	82	69	81	68	71	84	78.05
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y Concepcion	84	69	76	75	82	50	58	73	72.05
8. Estonina, Severino	80	74	64	89	81	66	68	82	72.4
9. Fernandez, Alejandro Q.	65	75	87	80	81	63	61	80	72.8
10. Fernandez, Luia N.	70	75	77	75	78	67	72	73	73.35
11. Figoeroa, Alfredo A.	70	75	87	78	75	60	68	68	72.8
12. Formilleza, Pedro	65	75	89	68	83	51	70	75	73.25
13. Garcia, Manuel M.	69	68	93	93	73	62	62	70	71
14. Grospe, Vicente E.	68	65	78	66	79	61	69	82	71.6
15. Galema, Nestor R. (1952)	72	79	86	78	60	61	75	70	73.03
16. Jacobo, Rafael F.	76	76	75	74	76	50	72	76	72.3
17. Macalindong, Reinerio L.	67	77	79	79	74	72	68	77	72.75
18. Mangubat, Antonio M.	70	70	78	61	80	74	62	70	71.45
19. Montano, Manuel M.	78	64	66	68	81	60	71	78	70.65
20. Plomantes, Marcos	73	67	74	68	68	70	76	71	71.6
21. Ramos, Eugenio R.	70	80	76	67	72	69	72	79	72.6
22. Reyes, Juan R.	71	73	77	76	81	59	72	74	73.8
23. Reyes, Santiago R.	65	78	83	60	76	75	70	70	72.9
24, Rivera, Eulogio J.	65	67	78	74	75	62	69	80	70.9
26. Santos, Constantino P.	70	71	70	65	78	64	65	78	70.4
26. Santos, Salvador H.	70	71	79	65	72	64	66	80	70
27. Sevilla, Macario C.	70	73	74	70	81	56	69	71	71.06
28. Villavicencio, Jose A.	78	75	70	67	69	77	64	77	73.2
29. Viray, Ruperto G.	76	73	76	73	80	58	68	83	73.21

These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected
by this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any
petition, they reach a total of 1,094.

The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent
the passing general average in the bar examination of August and
November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent
in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising
to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused
the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No.
12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127
of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to
the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace many interesting
matters, but those referring to sections 14 and 16 immediately concern
us. The proposed amendment is as follows:

“SEC. 14. Passing average.—In order that a
candidate may be deemed to have passed the examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject. In determining the average, the
foregoing subjects shall be given the following relative weights Civil
Law, 20 per cent; Land Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent;
Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law,
10 per cent; International law, 5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent;
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5
per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent. Unsuccessful candidates shall not be
required to take another examination in any subject in which they have
obtained a rating of 70 per cent or higher and such rating shall be
taken into account in determining their general average in any
subsequent examinations: Provided, however, That if the
candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per cent in his third
examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already passed some
subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the subjects.

“SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.—Any
applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held
after the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be
entitled to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.
(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No. 12).

With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the matter before us being:

“It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates
at bar examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects
which they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended
in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he
has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher.”

Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951,
the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on
the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to
refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:

“The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127.
One part of this amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70
per cent or higher in any subject, although failing to pass the
examination, he need not be examined in said subject in his next
examination. This is a sort of passing the Bar Examination on the
installment plan, one or two or three subjects at a time. The trouble
with this proposed system is that although it makes it easier and more
convenient for the candidate because he may in an examination prepare
himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure passing1 them, by
the time that he has passed the last required subject, which may be
several years away from the time that he reviewed and passed the first
subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and theories contained
in those subjects and remembers only those of the one or two subjects
that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because
there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to continue
taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the
examination in no more than three installments; but there is no
limitation as to the time or number of years intervening between each
examination taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of
the law and the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When
a person is so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he
possesses the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of
all law subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be
able to practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal
service required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true
of the candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five
subjects eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and
the last two subjects the present year. We believe that the present
system of requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average
with no grade in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and
satisfactory. It requires one to be all around, and prepared in all
required legal subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.

* * * * * * *

“We now come to the last amendment, that of section
16 of Rule 127. This amendment provides that any applicant who has
obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without
failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office. In other words, Bar candidates who
obtained not less than 70 per cent in any examination since the year
1946 without failing below 50 per cent in any subject, despite their
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to
obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be
admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but
retroactive in its effects,

“We have already stated in our
comment on the next preceding amendment that we are not exactly in
favor of reducing the passing general average from 75 per cent to 70
per cent to govern even in the future. As to the validity of making
such reduction retroactive, we have serious legal doubts. We should not
lose sight of the fact that after every bar examinations, the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar
those who have obtained a passing general average grade, but also
rejecting and denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who
have failed. The present amendment would have the effect of
repudiating, reversing and revoking the Supreme Court’s resolution
denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may have obtained an
average of 70 per cent or more but less than the general passing
average fixed for that year. It is clear that this question involves
legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if finally enacted
into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member of the Court
remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a decision or
promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in accordance with
a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent amendment or even
repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final decision, order, or
resolution already promulgated, in the sense of revoking or rendering
it void and of no effect.

“Another aspect of this question to
be considered is the fact that members of the bar are officers of the
courts, including the Supreme Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted
to the Bar, the Supreme Court impliedly regards him as a person fit,
competent and qualified to be its officer. Conversely, when it refused
and denied admission to the Bar to a candidate who in any year since
1946 may have obtained a general average of 70 per cent but less than
that required for that year in order to pass, the Supreme Court equally
and impliedly considered and declared that he was not prepared, ready,
competent and qualified to be-its officer. The present amendment giving
retroactivity to the reduction of the passing general average runs
counter to all these acts and resolutions of the Supreme Court and
practically and in effect says that a candidate not accepted, and even
rejected by the Court to be its officer because he was unprepared,
undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless and in spite of all, must be
admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as its officer. We repeat,
that this is another important aspect of the question to be carefully
and seriously considered.”

The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:

“I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of
the bill, namely, to elevate the standard of the legal profession and
maintain it on a high level. This is not achieved, however, by
admitting to practice precisely a special class who have failed in the
bar examination. Moreover, the bill contains provisions to which I find
serious fundamental objections.

“Section 5 provides that any
applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without failing below 50 per cent in any subject in any
examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall be allowed to
take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This provision
constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one
group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946,
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.

“The same
provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions of the
Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It should
be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court passes the
corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have
obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The provision
under consideration would have the effect of revoking the Supreme
Court’s resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those who may
have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year. Said
provision also set3 a bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed
in the examinations for admission to other professions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy.”

Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the
Philippines, but it was not repassed by % vote of each House as
prescribed by section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill
No. 371 was presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4,
1946 up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952
bar examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent
in the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent
passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act,
any exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one
and included as part of the next whole number.

SEC. 2. Any
bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any
bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to have passed in
such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in
computing the passing general average that said candidate may obtain in
any subsequent examinations that he may take.

SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.

With the following explanatory note:

“This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections
of the President and to afford another opportunity to those who feel
themselves discriminated by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when
those who would otherwise have passed the bar examination but were
arbitrarily not so considered by altering its previous decisions of the
passing mark. The Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from
60 in 1947 to 74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary
fixing of passing grades and to give satisfaction to all parties
concerned, it is proposed in this bill a gradual increase in the
general averages for passing the bar examinations as follows; For 1946
to 1051 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per
cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination,
73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the
passing mark will be restored with the condition that the candidate
shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The
reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately after
the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of
reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students who
took up law soon after the liberation. U is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials
will be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years
preceding the last world war.

In this bill we eliminated
altogether the idea of having our Supreme Court assumed the supervision
as well as the administration of the study of law which was objected to
by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.

“The President in
vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his objections that the
bill would admit to the practice of law ‘a special class who failed in
the bar examination’. He considered the bill a class legislation. This
contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct because
Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court have already
established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent the passing
mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These bar
candidates for whom this bill should be enacted, considered themselves
as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the established
precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably
placed. We believe that suck precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet
altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being
inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.

“If
this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simpl curative
act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The
requirement of a ‘valid classification’ as against class legislation,
is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence : –

”
‘ A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the
class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or
classification, and there must be a “natural” and substantial
differentiation between those included in the class and those it leaves
untouched. When a class is accepted by the Court as “natural” it cannot
be again split and then have the diservered factions of the original
unit designated with different rules established for each.’” (Fountain
Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).

“Another
case penned by Justice Cardozo: “Time with its tides brings new
conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the new
conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting statute
must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few. If
so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It
permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws
are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the
special form. * * * The problem in the last analysis is one of
legislative policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the
lawmakers. Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by
the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U.
S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct. 431). (1932)

“This bill
has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always retroacts to
the extent of the care or correction only as in this case from 1946
when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent in
the Rules of Court.

“For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly recommended.

(Sgd.) “PABLO ANGELES DAVID
“Senator”

Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as
above transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this
Court, which endorsed the following:

Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting
Executive Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to
Senate Bill No. 371, the members of the Court are taking the same views
they expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5,
1951, to the Assistant Executive Secretary.

(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS

The President allowed the period within which the bill should be
signed to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law
on June 21, 1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many
times erroneously cited as No. 974).

It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and
that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for
re-election, together, however, they lost in the polls.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

LABRADOR, J.,:

The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the
exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the
Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers.
The power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion is used in
its exercise. This power should be distinguished from the power to
promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this power (to
promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the Constitution
to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or not to
admit. Thus the rules on the holding cf examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope of the
legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made
or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely
with this Court.

I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the
judicial function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional
prerogative of amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a
general average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per
cent in 1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is
to mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court.
It is a mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years
with grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to
show that it is an arrogation of the Court’s judicial authority and
discretion. It is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why
should those taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed
to have the privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking
earlier or later are not?

I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional,
because it is not embraced within the rule-making power of Congress,
because it is an undue interference with the power of this Court to
admit members thereof, and because it is discriminatory.

^[1] Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners vice Mr. Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned.

^[1] In 1946 and 1947. the
members of the Supreme Court were Hon. Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice,
Hon. Ricardo Paras, Hon. Felicisimo Feria, Hon. Guillenno F. Pablo,
Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Hon. Carlos Hilado, Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon.
Manuel C. Briones. Hon. Jose Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and Hon.
Pedro Tuason, Associate Justices. In 1948, Justices Marcelino R.
Montemayor and Alex. Reyes took the place of Justice Hilado, resigned,
and Hontiveros, retired. Justice itoman Ozaeta was returned to the
Court and Justice Sabino Padilla was appointed Secretary of Justice. In
June, 1949, Justice PadiUa was returned to the Tribunal, as Justice
Briones resigned. In October, 1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix
Bautista Angelo were appointed to the Court, as Justice Perfecto had
died, and Justice Ozeata had resigned. In 1951. Chief Justice Manuel V.
Moran resigned and Ricardo Paras was appointed Chief Justice. In 1958.
Justice Felicisimo Feria retired.

DISSENTING

PARAS, C. J.:

Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar
candidate “may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully,
he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject,” This passing mark
has always been adhered to, with certain exception presently to be
specified.

With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the
original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained
a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12 candidates with general averages ranging
from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of
December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list first
released containing the names of successful candidates covered only
those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but, upon
motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average of 72
per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31, 1947.
This would indicate that in the original list of successful candidates
those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but below 75 per
cent were included. After the original list of 1947 successful bar
candidates had been released, and on motion for reconsideration, all
candidates with a general average of 69 per cent were allowed to pass
by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the bar examinations
held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of successful
bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and irrespective
of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were allowed to
pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947 the Court
in effect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the year
1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed perhaps, to
an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.

Numerous flunkers in the bar examinatons held subsequent to 1948,
whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed
motions for reconsideration. invoking the precedents set by this Court
in 1947 and 1948, but said motions were uniformly denied.

In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law
deans and professors, practicing attorneys, presidents of bar
associations, and law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con,
approved a bill providing, among others, for the reduction of the
passing general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to
any bar examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by
the President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices
Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the
Congress passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the
President, with the important difference that in the later bill the
provisions in the first bill regarding (1) the supervision and
regulation by the Supreme Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion
of Social Legislation and Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the
publication of names of the bar examiners before the holding of the
examinations, and (4) the equal division among the examiners of all the
admission fees paid by bar applicants, were eliminated. This second
bill was allowed to become a law, Republic Act No. 972, by the
President by merely not signing it within the required period; and in
doing so the President gave due respect to the will of the Congress
which, speaking for the people, chose to repass the bill first vetoed
by him.

Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946
up to August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar
examinations; and 74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to
pass. Said Act also provides that any bar candidate who obtained a
grade of 75 per cent in any subject in any examination after July 4,
1946, shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and
such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any
subsequent examinations.

Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to
the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary
passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by
virtue of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the
general averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of
July 6, 1953, this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said
petitions, and members of the bar, especially authorized
representatives of bar associations, were invited to argue or submit
memoranda as amici curisæ, the reason alleged for said
hearing being that some doubt had “been expressed on the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so far as it affects past
bar examinations and the matter” involved “a new question of public
interest.”

All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial,
are immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:

“The Supreme Court shall have the power to
promulgate rules. concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive right. The existing laws on pleading,
practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are
declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to
alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal,
alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.”

Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the
power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, the Congress has the power to repeal, alter or supplement said
rules. Little intelligence is necessary to see that the power of the
Supreme Court and the Congress to regulate the admission to the
practice of law is concurrent.

The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far
as it covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is
unconstitutional, because it sets aside the final resolutions of the
Supreme Court refusing to admit to the practice of law the various
petitioners, thereby resulting in a legislative encroachment upon the
judicial power. In my opinion this view is erroneous. In the first
place, resolutions on the rejection of bar candidates do not have the
finality of decisions in justiciable cases where the Rules of Court
expressly fix certain periods after which they become executory and
unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters, specially on motions for
reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any given year, are subject to
revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the period within
which the motions were filed, and this has been the practice
heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and admission
to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function only
because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the Constitution and
our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no judicial function
involved, in the strict and constitutional sense of the word, because
bar examinations and the admission to the practice of law, unlike
justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no more than
the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only
when they would be ex post facto, would impair obligations
and contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal
protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post facto
enactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested
rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere curative statute
intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising from the
adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in certain
years.

Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946,
are being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record
of those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during
said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any
rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the
Congress held public hearings, and we can fairly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.

As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the
judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient
to state that, if there is any interference at all, it is one expressly
sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial
adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or
acquired in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty
purpose of creating appearances of separation and equality among the
three branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced
a case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one
and against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the
previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the
general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide
that those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose
general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice
law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired
under previous resolutions of this Court, namely, the bar admission of
those whose general averages were from 75 to 79 per cent.

Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may
pass a resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the
passing average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date
of the resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to
pass all candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or
more and on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70
per cent or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for
reconsideration, it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127
retroactively, because during the examinations held in August 1947 and
August 1948, said section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent)
was supposed to be in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit
that the Supreme Court and the Congress have concurrent power to
regulate the admission to the practice of law, that the latter may
validly pass a retroactive rule fixing the passing general average.

Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already
adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations
and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not
inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is
addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many
instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet
it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that
ground.

To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under
Republic Act 972 is against public- interest, is to assume that the
matter of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general
public was not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the
Congress held public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the
legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of
office, had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the
Act. On the question of public interest I may observe that the
Congress, representing the people who elected them, should be more
qualified to make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act
No. 972 as an expression of the will of the people through their duly
elected representatives.

I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the
Congress, in the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice
of law, may act in an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way
that this Court may not do so. We are thus left in the situation,
incidental to a democracy, where we can and should only hope that the
right men are put in the right places in our Government.

Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should therefore be given effect in its entirety.

Date created: October 08, 2014

G.R. No. L-6784. March 12, 1954