SATURNINO D. VILLORIA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Direct appeal to this court from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, dismissing plaintiff’s complaint for injunction.

The essential facts of the case have been stipulated by the parties
and are briefly stated as follows: On June 26, 1923, a parcel of land
known as Lot No. 89 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Estate (Friar Lands) was
purchased by herein plaintiff Saturnino D. Villoria from the Government
of the Philippines for the sum of P1,042.00, payable in nine annual
installments. Plaintiff paid the first installment of P122.00 on May
14, 1923. For his failure to pay the succeeding installments, the
Director of Lands, on April 5, 1985, cancelled by unilateral
administrative action the sale certificate, in accordance with the
provisions of Lands Administrative Order No. 3, promulgated pursuant to
the provisions of Acts Nos. 1120, 2230 and 2360, as amended, and
Section 79 (B) of the Revised Administrative Code. More than two years
thereafter, or on August 10, 1937, the same Lot No. 89 was purchased by
one Susana Villoria from the Government pursuant to the provisions of
Com. Act No. 32.

On September 24, 1945, Nicanor, Edilberta, and Emiliana, all
surnamed Villoria, filed with the Bureau of Lands in Manila a joint
petition claiming preferential right to purchase the respective
portions of the lot in question actually occupied by each of them.
After an investigation duly conducted, the Director of Lands, on June
24, 1947, rendered a decision denying the joint petition. On appeal
however, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on January
2, 1948, reversed the decision of the Director of Lands and directed
the latter to order the subdivision of the lot in accordance with the
actual occupancy of the parties in 1937, and after such division, to
sell to them the portions claimed by them, in accordance with the
provisions of Com. Act 32, with refund to Susana Villoria of the
corresponding purchase price paid by her for the portions adjudicated
to the other Villorias. Her motion for reconsideration having been
denied, Susana Villoria, on April 19, 1948, elevated the case to the
Supreme Court on a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction to
compel the Director of Lands to execute a final deed of sale in her
favor for the whole of Lot No. 89. The petition, however, was
dismissed, this Court holding that petitioner’s remedy, if any, was an
ordinary action in the court of first instance. (G. R. No. L-2169.)
Susana Villoria then instituted in the court below Civil Case No. R-601
against the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Director of Lands. After said officials had filed their answer, the
court, Hon. Judge Edmundo S. Piccio, presiding, rendered a decision
dated January 25, 1949, dismissing the complaint. Susana appealed to
the Court of Appeals and as that court affirmed the decision, she
brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for certiorari (G.
R. No. L-6593). The petition, however, was denied.

On June 30, 1953, herein plaintiff Saturnino D. Villoria—upon
learning that the lot in dispute was about to be subdivided and the
corresponding deeds of sale issued in favor of Susana Villoria, Nicanor
Villoria, Edilberto Villoria and Emiliana Villoria—sent a telegram to
the Director of Lands, requesting for the suspension of the issuance of
the deeds of conveyance. The said telegram was followed by a letter of
plaintiff’s counsel, dated June 30, 1953 believing that Civil Case No.
R-601 was still pending appeal, the Director of Lands replied that he
could not take action on the request.

On July 27, 1953, plaintiff commenced the present action to restrain
the defendants Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
Director of Lands from subdividing the lot in question, from executing
the deeds of conveyance and from issuing certificates of title for the
said lot in favor of Susana, Nicanor, Emiliana and Edilberta, all
surnamed Villoria, on the grounds that the cancellation by the Director
of Lands of his contract for its purchase and the subsequent
adjudication thereof to the Villorias were illegal.

On the basis of the above facts as stipulated, the court below, on
November 9, 1954, rendered decision declaring the unilateral
cancellation of the deed of sale in plaintiff’s favor null and void,
the same being contrary to the Friar Lands Act (Act No. 1120), but it
dismissed the complaint just the same on the grounds of “prescription
and/or laches.” Motion for reconsideration of this decision having been
denied, plaintiff brought the case to this Court on appeal.

We agree with the trial court that under the Friar Lands Act, the
Director of Lands has no power to unilaterally cancel the sale
certificate or contract for failure of the purchaser to pay subsequent
installments. Section 17 of the said Act merely authorizes said
Director of Lands to “enforce payment of any past due installment and
interest by bringing suit to recover the same with interest thereon,
and also to enforce the lien of the Government against the land by
selling the same in the manner provided by Act No. 190 for the
foreclosure of mortgages.” (See Director of Lands vs. Rizal, 87 Phil., 806.)

But while the cancellation of the contract of sale was illegal, it
was, however, only on June 30, 1953, that plaintiff Saturnino D.
Villoria first asserted his claim by means of a telegram to the
Director of Lands and only on July 27, 1958 that he filed his complaint
in court. In the meantime, or two years following the cancellation of
the contract of sale, the lot in dispute had been sold to Susana
Villoria, his own sister. From then on, it became the subject of
controversy between said Susana and Nicanor, Emiliana and Edilberta,
also surnamed Villoria. Considering the lengthy controversy just
mentioned and plaintiff’s relation to Susana Villoria, he must have
known that the land was subject of the claim of other parties. He
should also have known of the apparent invalidity of the cancellation
of his contract of sale by the Director of Lands, because it is a
matter of law. See Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, 100
Phil., 277; 53 Off. Gaz., 677.) Yet it took him more than 18 years from
said cancellation (no less than 15 years from the sale of the land to
Susana Villoria) to protest against the sale and subdivision of the lot
in question in favor of Susana and the other Villorias. It has been
held that one having sufficient knowledge to lead him to a fact is
deemed to be conversant therewith and chargeable with laches in failing
to act thereon. (Kimbal vs. Director of Lands, 62 Phil., 296.)

In the case of Mejia de Lucas vs. Gamponia, supra,
this Court held that the equitable defense of laches require four
elements: “(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
the defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to
institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases
his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.” In the instant case, it is apparent that all the four elements
are present.

By his inaction, plaintiff had caused Susana and the three other
Villorias “the rigors and expenses of long protracted trial they
litigated administratively and judicially from the Bureau of Lands to
the Supreme Court.” For the same reason, he misled the authorities and
subsequent buyers of said lot into “believing he has acquiesced with
the cancellation.” Considering the changes of condition which had
arisen during the period in which there had been neglect, we do not
think the equitable power of the court can be invoked. To grant
plaintiff the relief sought for would undeniably cause injustice to the
parties aforementioned and their intervening rights destroyed or
seriously impaired. We, therefore, hold that plaintiff’s right to bring
the present action has been converted into a stale demand by his
inaction and neglect for more than 18 years.

It should here be stated that Susana Villoria has been in actual
occupation and possession of the portion of the lot awarded to her
since 1987, and the three other Villorias of the other portions even
long before that date. The record does not show that plaintiff
continued possession of the lot—if he ever was in possession
thereof—after its sale to him was cancelled. The lower court’s finding
that plaintiff abandoned the lot in question thus appears to be
supported by the record.

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia, and Barrera, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.