G.R. No. L-6207. February 21, 1955

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing the complaint for the recovery of a piece of jewelry or its value in
the sum of P1,500. The facts involved as may be gathered from the record, are
simple, clear, and without dispute. Since the year 1931 plaintiffs Esteban de
Guzman and his wife Maxima Laperal were engaged in the sale of jewelry and
sustained business relations with the defendants Roman Alvia and his wife
Magdalena de Alvia who, especially Magdalena, used to receive pieces of jewelry
from them for sale on commission or rather that the compensation received by
Magdalena was the over price she could secure over and above that fixed by
plaintiffs. On October 31, 1946, Magdalena through her husband Roman Alvia
received from plaintiffs for sale, several pieces of jewelry, among them the
jewelry in question described as “medio terno, rositas with 25 brillantes”
valued at P1,500. Said jewelry was later entrusted by Magdalena to one Eugenia
Villarin, for sale. Eugenia is said to have absconded with said jewelry and
failed to account for it to Magdalena.

On several occasions, plaintiffs demanded of Magdalena and her husband Roman,
the return of the jewelry or its value but defendants were unable to comply with
the demands. Thereafter, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the Court
of First Instance of Manila (Criminal Case No. 5549) against Roman Alvia because
it was he who actually received the jewelry from plaintiffs and signed the
receipt Exhibit A. Roman was acquitted of the charges on the ground that he
merely acted as agent of his wife Magdalena who was the person who had business
dealings with the plaintiffs. Then a second complaint also for estafa (Criminal
Case No. 8776) was filed against Magdalena. She was also acquitted on the ground
that there was no misappropriation or conversion under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Said trial judge Conrado Sanchez in his decision Exhibit
1:

“Ever since about the year 1931 defendant and complainant sustained business
relations. Defendant used to get jewels—for sale— from the spouses Esteban de
Guzman and Maxima Laperal de Guzman. The jewels not sold were returned to
complainant. It was also the practice known to complainant and his wife that
said jewels were being entrusted by defendant to other persons for sale. It
seems that the compensation of the accused consists of the overprice that she
could secure over and above the price set forth by the complainant.

* * * * * * *

“Defendant does not deny that she received the jewels obtained by
her husband from complainant under the receipt Exhibit A.

* * * * * * *

“But as to this piece of jewelry, “medio terno
rositas”, worth P1,500, defendant did not profit therefrom; she did not sell
them to said Eugenia Villarin. The fact is that that piece of jewelry (with
others) was delivered by defendant to Eugenia Villarin for purposes of sale.
There is absolutely no evidence or indication of collusion between defendant and
Eugenia Villarin.

“Whether or not defendant was authorized by complainant to sell the jewelry
is another point of inquiry. It is true that under the terms of the receipt
Exhibit A signed by defendant’s husband the latter, that is, Roman M. Alvia, was
not allowed to sell the jewelry thru an agent. But this Exhibit A was not signed
by defendant. And defendant testified in court that the standing practice known
to complainant and his wife during their business relations was that she
(defendant) could entrust jewels to others for purposes of sale. That explains
why in November of 1946 defendant sent her daughter Clara Alvia to ask from Dona
Maxima Laperal de Guzman, wife of complainant, whether they would agree to a
reduction of the price of the jewelry in question to P1,350; for then, Eugenia
Villarin told defendant that she had a purchaser for that amount.

“The record shows that defendant was actuated with good faith. When
she could no longer locate Eugenia Villarin she went to Mrs. De Guzman and asked
for time to get back the jewelry. But again she failed to get Eugenia Villarin.
She was candid enough to own her own fault in having entrusted the jewelry to
that person (referring to Eugenia Villarin). She offered that she be allowed to
pay in installments the said piece of jewelry as she did not want to lose her
credit with complainant and his wife. She went to the extent of offering two
Torrens titles covering five and one-half hectares of rice land in Calauan,
Laguna, for complainant and his wife to dispose of the way they wanted to, just
to make good her obligation. They did not accept any of her offers. But instead,
they threatened criminal action which they did, first against the husband Roman
M. Alvia who was acquitted (Criminal Case No. 5549 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Exh. E), and now against the wife Magdalena de Alvia, both
covering the same jewelry.

“The facts heretofore related impress upon the mind of the court the fact
that the element of misappropriation or conversion so essential to this type
of estafa is conspicuous by its absence in the present case. Therefore, the
crime of estafa does ruot exist.

“* * *. In the present case, good faith and lack of intent to appropriate are
present. Defendant’s liability, therefore, if any, is purely civil.”

Because of the acquittal of defendants spouses in the two criminal cases, the
present civil action to recover the jewelry or its value, was brought in the
Municipal Court. resulting in a decision in favor of plaintiffs. On appeal to
the Court.of First Instance of Manila, as already stated, the complaint was
dismissed on the basis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of
Wise & Co. vs. Larion 45 Phil., 314 to the effect that acquittal in
a criminal prosecution is an insuperable obstacle to the civil proceedings. The
appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals but it was later certified to us by
said appellate tribunal.

Without attempting to analyze the decision of this Court in the case of Wise
& Co. vs. Larion, supra, as to its absolute correctness and its
scope, particularly its implications, we are satisfied that said case is not
applicable here. It will be noticed that there Justice Street would appear not
to have entirely accepted without qualification the doctrine laid down in the
case of Almeida vs. Abaroa, 40 Phil., 1056, and he seems to have made a
distinction as when he said:

“* * *. It is enough for our present purposes to say that where, as here,
the facts on which civil liability is based are of such nature as inevitably
to constitute a crime, if anything, acquittal in a criminal prosecution is
,an insuperable obstacle to the civil proceeding.”

In that case of Wise & Co. although defendant did not make use of or
appropriate to himself the amount of which Wise & Co., was swindled, because
said amount went to the manager, still, Larion as assistant manager helped, and
made himself an accomplice in the misappropriation. For that he was charged with
estafa but was acquitted. Under those circumstances his acquittal was an
obstacle to his being held liable in civil action. In the present case, however,
the facts alleged in the complaint and on which civil liability is based, are
not of such nature as to constitute a crime. As held by Judge Sanchez in the
Criminal Case No. 8776 against Magdalena, there was no misappropriation or
conversion of the jewelry placed in her custody. Neither was there bad faith.
Her failure to return the same to its owner was due to the fact that following
the practice of which said owner was aware, the jewelry was given for sale to a
third party, Eugenia Villarin and the latter was the one who misappropriated it,
for which reason she was prosecuted for estafa. It was even intimated by Judge
Sanchez in his judgment of acquittal that the responsibility of Magdalena was
civil, not criminal.

Counsel for appellants contend that the present case comes under the
provisions of Article 29 of the new Civil Code which provides as follows:

“When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such, action requires
only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a j bond to answer for damages in cases the
complaint should be found to be malicious.

“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable
doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.”

Although the above-quoted legal provision, under Article 2267 of the same
Code is made applicable not only to future cases, but also to those pending,
like the present, on the date when the new Civil Code went into effect, said
Article 29 however, is hardly applicable because it plainly refers to an
acquittal on the ground that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The acquittal of Magdalena in Criminal Case No. 8776 was not
due to her guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt but because
there being no misappropriation or conversion or bad faith, the crime charged
was not committed. What in our opinion is applicable is Rule 107, section 1,
paragraph (d) of the Rules of Court which reads thus:

“Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the
civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In the other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the
jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the.person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damages
suffered;

Inasmuch as the final judgment in Criminal Case No. 8776 against Magdalena
does not contain any declaration that the fact from which civil liability might
arise did not exist but on the contrary, it found that she received the jewelry
and it intimated that her responsibility was civil rather than criminal, then
the civil action was not extinguished. The rule above reproduced comes from the
Spanish Law of Criminal Procedure (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), article 116
thereof, cited and applied in the case of Oro vs. Pajarillo, 23 Phil.,
484.

It is therefore clear that the acquittal of Magdalena of the charge of estafa
in the criminal case did not extinguish her civil liability. It is equally clear
that the acquittal of her husband Roman Alvia in the estafa case against him
extinguished his civil liability because the decision acquitting him expressly
said that he merely acted as a mandatario or agent of Magdalena and
consequently, was in no way responsible.

In view of the foregoing, in so far as the decision appealed from dismisses
the complaint against Magdalena de Alvia, the same is hereby reversed, with
costs. Case remanded for further proceedings.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Judgment reversed.