UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of an order of the Court of Industrial
Relations dated January 2, 1957 and its resolution dated March 5, 1957 declaring
that it has jurisdiction over the controversy and ordering that it be referred
to the Prosecution Division of said Court in order that the preliminary
investigation required by law may be conducted.

The petition stems from a complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the
Philippine Association of College and University Professors against the
University of San Agustin before the industrial court. Upon being required to
answer, respondent denied the charge of unfair labor practice and at the same
time disputed the jurisdiction of the court over the parties and over the
subject-matter. Trial was held before a hearing examiner without prejudice to
deciding the legal questions raised by respondent, and in the course of the
trial, respondent raised an additional legal point, to wit: that the court could
not go on with the trial because of lack of previous preliminary investigation
required by law. But the trial continued and thereafter the case was submitted
to the court for decision. On January 2, 1957, his honor, Judge Jose. S.
Bautista, issued an order holding that, while the court could not hold the trial
of the case without the requisite preliminary investigation, it has however
jurisdiction over the controversy because he “is of the opinion that industrial
employment is not a basic criterion in determining its jurisdiction in an unfair
labor practice charge.” He therefore ordered that the case be endorsed to the
Prosecution Division of the Court for such preliminary investigation. This order
was affirmed by the court en banc, with Judge Lanting taking no part and Judge
Martinez concurring in the result. Hence the present petition for review.

It appears that the University of San Agustin, petitioner herein, is an
educational institution conducted and managed by a “religious non-stock
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.” It
was organized not for profit or gain or division of the dividends among its
stockholders, but solely for religious and educational purposes. It likewise
appears that the Philippine Association of College and University Professors,
respondent herein, is a non-stock association composed of professors and
teachers in different colleges and universities and that since its organization
two years ago, the university has adopted a hostile attitude to its formation
and has tried to discriminate, harass and intimidate its members for which
reason the association and the members affected filed the unfair labor practice
complaint which initiated this proceeding. To the complaint of unfair labor
practice, petitioner filed an answer wherein it disputed the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations over the controversy on the following grounds:

“(a) That complainants therein being college and/or university professors
were not ‘industrial’ laborers or employees, and the Philippine Association of
College and University Professors being composed of persons engaged in the
teaching profession, is not and cannot be a legitimate labor organization within
the meaning of the laws creating the Court of Industrial Relations and defining
its powers and functions;

“(b) That the University of San Agustin, respondent therein, is not an
institution established for the purpose of gain or division of profits, and
consequently, it is not an ‘industrial’ enterprise and the members of its
teaching staff are not engaged in ‘industrial’ employment (U.S.T. Hospital
Employees Association vs. Sto Tomas University Hospital, 95 Phil. 40; and San
Beda College vs. Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, 97
Phil., 787, 29 October 1955; 51 Off. Gaz., (Nov. 1955) (5636-5640); and

“(c) That, as a necessary consequence, the alleged controversy between
therein complainants and respondent is not an ‘industrial’ dispute, and the
Court of Industrial Relations has no jurisdiction, not only on the parties but
also over the subject matter of the complaint.”

The issue now before us is: Since the University of San Agustin is not an
institution established for profit or gain, nor an industrial enterprise, but
one established exclusively for educational purposes, can it be said that its
relation with its professors is one of employer and employee that comes under
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations? In other words, do the
provisions of the Magna Carta on unfair labor practice apply to the relation
between petitioner and members of respondent association?

The issue is not new. Thus, in the case of Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs.
Juliana V. Araos, (102 Phil., 1080), promulgated on January 29, 1958, this
Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Montemayor, answered the query in the negative
in the following wise:

“The main issue involved in the present case is whether or not a charitable
institution or one organized not for profit but for more elevated purposes,
charitable humanitarian, etc., like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines is
included in the definition of ’employer’ contained in Republic Act 875, and
whether the employees of said institution fall under the definition of
’employee’ also contained in the same Republic Act. If they are included, then
any act which may be considered unfair labor practice, within the meaning of
said Republic Act, would come under the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations; but if they do not fall within the scope of said Republic Act,
particularly, its definitions of employer and employee, then the Industrial
Court would have no jurisdiction at all.

* * * * * * *

“On the basis of the foregoing considerations, there is every reason to
believe that our labor legislation from Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the
Court of Industrial Relation, down through the Eight Hour Labor Law, to the
Industrial Peace Act, was intended by the Legislature to apply only to
industrial employment and to govern the relations between employers engaged in
industry and occupations for purposes of profit and gain, and their industrial
employees, but not to organizations and entities which are organized, operated,
and maintained not for profit or gain, but for elevated and lofty purposes, such
as, charity, social service, education and instruction, hospital and medical
service, the encouragement and promotion of character, patriotism and kindred
virtues in the youth of the nation, etc.

“In conclusion, we find and hold that Republic Act No. 875, particularly,
that pontion thereof regarding labor disputes and unfair labor practice, does
not apply to the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, and consequently, the Court of
Industrial Relations had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the action or
petition filed by respondent Araos. Wherefore, the appealed decision and
resolution of the CIR are hereby set aside, with costs against
respondent.”

There being a close analogy between the relation and facts involved in the
two cases, we cannot but conclude that the Court of Industrial Relations has no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint for unfair labor practices lodged by
respondent association against petitioner and, therefore, we hereby set aside
the order and resolution subject of the present petition, with costs against
respondent association.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, and Felix,
JJ., concur.

 

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DISSENTING

 

REYES, J.B.L., J.,

I dissent for the reasons expressed in the dissenting opinion in Boy Scouts
of the Philippines vs. J. V. Araos,. 102 Phil., 1080.

Concepcion, J., concurs in the foregoing dissent.