THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SIMEON CAÑETE ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Leyte, whereby the appellants were found guilty of the crime of
libel.

Two informations were filed in the trial court charging the fifty persons
named in each information with the crime of libel. In the information in case
No. 4138 of the trial court, the publication complained of is averred to be a
libel upon the Rev. Nicanor Acebedo, and in case No. 4139, it is charged that
the same publication is a libel upon one Timotea Camposano. By stipulation the
two cases were consolidated and tried together in the court below. The trial
judge acquitted all of the defendants in case No. 4138, except Simeon Canete,
Hermogenes Camposano, Margarito Nolasco, Balbino Alminario, and Eulogio
Villablanca, who were found guilty and sentenced to short terms of imprisonment.
In case No. 4139, in which Timotea Camposano is the complaining: witness, the
court below acquitted all of the defendants, except Simeon Canete and Hermogenes
Camposano, each of whom was sentenced to pay a fine of P500, and Eulogio
Villablanca whom he sentenced to pay a fine of P100. From the consolidated
judgment thus rendered in the two cases, the convicted defendants have appealed
to this court.

The publication upon which the informations are based consists of a charge in
writing signed by appellants and their codefendants in the trial court, and
addressed to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, in which Father Acebedo,
at that time a parish priest of Dagami, Leyte, of which the defendants are
residents, is accused of maladministration, and misappropriation of the funds
and property of the church of Dagami under his charge, drunkenness, taking
indecent liberties of the women of his congregation, illicit relations with the
complainant, Timotea Camposano, and general immoral and indecent behavior. The
charges are in such a character that we do not believe they should be given
further publicity by reproducing them in this decision.

The publication is unquestionably defamatory in character, and this is
admitted by the appellants. They based their defense upon an attempt to prove
that the charges were true and the contention that the communication was
privileged, having been made only to Father Acebedo’s superior, in order that
the charges might be investigated. The court below held that the defendants had
failed in their effort to prove the truth of the charges, and in this conclusion
we concur. Whatever ground for doubt or suspicion there may have been, the
evidence falls short of proof that the complaining witnesses were in fact guilty
of any of the charges made against them in the publication upon which this
prosecution is based.

Before considering the other defense upon which appellants rely, namely that
the communication was privileged, it will be necessary to state the facts
disclosed by the record regarding the circumstances under which the offensive
publication was written, the conduct of the defendants, and their efforts to
persuade the church authorities to make and investigation into the charges.

The evidence shows that for a long time prior to the preparation of the
complaint against Father Acebedo, which led to this prosecution, his conduct had
been the subject of general dissatisfaction in his parish. The culmination of
this feeling was a meeting held by a number of the accused at the house of Gil
Camposano at which the conduct and character of Father Acebedo were discussed.
The result of the discussion was a decision to request the church authorities to
hold an investigation, and the appellant, Simeon Cañete was designated to
formulate the complaint in writing. For this purpose Canete availed himself of
the services of one Pastor, who wrote out the charges in the form of a complaint
addressed to the Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

Thereupon a number of the accused met again at the house of Gil Camposano,
signed the document, and designated the accused, Simeon Canete, to take it to
Manila and present it to the Archbishop. The document was then taken to a number
of prominent residents of Dagami, for the purpose of obtaining their signatures,
if possible, and several additional signatures were added to it by this means.
The subscribers include the presidente and vice-presidente of
Dagami, the auxiliary justice of the peace, several concejales and
ex-concejales, the chief of police, an ex-presidente of the
municipality, and many other prominent members of the community, including a
number of municipal teachers. The names subscribed to the charges against Father
Acebedo include, as stated by the trial judge, “a very large proportion of the
intelligent and educated men of the municipality, so that in a sense the present
prosecution is an indictment against the whole municipality.”

The statement of the charges ended with a petition as follows:

“For the reasons cited we pray His Grace, the Archbishop of Manila, to be
pleased to order an investigation of the charges made against the parish priest
of Dagami, Rev. Nicanor Acebedo, of the acts committed in the exercise of his
office, as a representative of the Apostolic Roman Catholic Religion, and that
upon proof of the charges by conclusive and satisfactory evidence, to direct
that this priest be removed from the parish of this municipality, and sent to
some other place, and that, if found guilty, he be made to suffer a punishment
adequate to the acts committed by him.”

The charges and petition for the removal of Father Acebedo were taken by the
appellant, Canete, to Manila, and by him turned over to the Catholic Archbishop
of Manila, by whom the papers were referred to the Bishop of Calbayog, Leyte. He
in turn referred the matter to his vicar general residing at Tanauan, Leyte,
with instructions to conduct a judicial investigation before the ecclesiastical
tribunal, if the complainants were disposed to make a deposit of P300 to cover
the costs, or to institute an administrative inquiry, at which the complainants
and accused should be heard, if they were not willing to make such deposit. The
vicar general thereupon addressed a communication to the complainants under the
general designation, “the signers of the libel against Father Acebedo,”
asking them to state whether they desired an administrative or a judicial
investigation, and in the latter event to make the required deposit. To this a
reply was made on behalf of the defendants that they were unable to make the
deposit required of them, but would like to have the investigation conducted
administratively or by an ex offlcio judicial proceeding in the
ecclesiastical courts. The vicar general answered under date of February 9,
1915, that even were the inquiry to be conducted ex officio it would
entail “not only work but also disbursements and expenses which will have to be
paid by whomever it may concern.” The communication ended with this
statement:

“When the Bishop receives a complete and faithful reproduction of your
written charges against your parish priest he will proceed in accordance with
the canon law and the Instruction of 1880, and take such action as may seem
proper.”

Evidently discouraged by these requirements, and the apparent reluctance of
the church authorities to take any action in the matter, the defendants made no
effort to comply with the conditions imposed upon them and in July, 1915, these
prosecutions were commenced.

The prosecution relied upon proof of the publication of the defamatory
writing, and made no attempt to prove actual malice. Defendants made some effort
to prove the truth of the allegations, but in this they were unsuccessful. We
are of the opinion, however, that the record, as a whole, justifies the
conclusion that at the time of the preparation and presentation of the charges
against Father Acebedo the belief prevailed very generally in Dagami that he had
been guilty of the misconduct imputed to him, that the appellants and their
codefendants below were actuated by no actual malice, and that their purpose
was, in good faith, to bring about an investigation of the charges by Father
Acebedo’s ecclesiastical superiors. That being the case, are they guilty of
libel, notwithstanding the fact that the proof fails to establish the truth of
the charges? Is the petition addressed by them to the Arcbishop a privileged
communication?

In the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil. Rep., 731), in
which the defendants were charged with libel of a public official for statements
made in a petition for his removal addressed to his administrative superior, Mr.
Justice Malcolm, writing the opinion of the court, said:

“Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government, have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and
incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of
privilege.

” ‘The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, “which
looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an
incidental result, it may in some instances afford an immunity to the
evil-disposed and malignant slander.”‘ (Abbott vs. National Bank of
Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)

“Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we
are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a
prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. The rule is
thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.

” ‘A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.’ (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1
Jur. [N. S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)

“A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a
complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or
conduct of a public official when addressed to an officer or a board having some
interest or duty in the matter. Even when the statements are found to be false,
if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is
made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a
self-seeking motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All
persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and
of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if
it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is
acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is
not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate
terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the
complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong
person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of
various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the
privilege.

“In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege
destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the
plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable
cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845], 3
How. 266.)

“A privileged communication should not be subject to microscopic examination
to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat
the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate
test is that of bona fides.”

It is true that the communication in the Bustos case (supra) was
addressed to a government official, but the American and British courts have
extended the qualified privilege by analogy to include cases like the present,
in which a member of a church makes a complaint regarding his minister to their
common ecclesiastical superior.

It is the established doctrine of the American courts that in matters purely
ecclesiastical the decisions of the proper church tribunals are conclusive upon
the civil tribunals. A church member who is expelled from membership by the
church authorities, or a priest or minister who is by them deprived of his
sacred office, is without remedy in the civil courts, which will not inquire
into the correctness of the decisions of the ecclesiastical tribunals. (Landis
vs. Campbell, 79 Mo., 433; Watson vs. Garvin, 54 Mo., 364;
Stack vs. O’Hara, 98 Penn., 213.) The right of such ecclesiastical
tribunals to. try members offending against the canons of conduct established by
the church being thus recognized it is reasonable that their decisions should be
privileged, however derogatory they may be to the reputation of the persons
affected.

“Persons who join churches * * * voluntarily submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of these bodies, and in matters of faith and individual conduct
affecting their relations as members thereof subject themselves to the tribunals
established by those bodies to pass upon such questions, and, if aggrieved by a
decision against them, made in good faith by such judicatories they must seek
their redress within the organization, as provided by its laws or regulations.”
(Landis vs. Campbell, supra.)

In the case of Farnsworth vs. Storrs (59 Mass., 412), the defendant,
the pastor of a church, was sued for libel for having published, by reading from
his pulpit, a sentence of excommunication in which it was stated in plain terms
that plaintiff had violated the Seventh Commandment. The defendants’s plea of
qualified privilege was sustained. Chief Justice Shaw, writing the opinion of
the court, said:

“The rights of churches to use, exercise, and enjoy all their accustomed
privileges and liberties, respecting divine worship, church order and
discipline, etc., are declared and secured by statutes passed at various times,
and in force to the present day. * * * Amongst these powers and privileges,
established by long and immemorial usage, churches have authority to deal with
their members, for immoral and scandalous conduct; and for that purpose, to hear
complaints, to take evidence and to decide; and, upon conviction, to administer
proper punishment by way of rebuke, censure, suspension and excommunication. To
this jurisdiction, every member, by entering into the church covenant, submits,
and is bound by his consent. (Remington vs. Congdon, 2 Pick., 310,
315.)

“The proceedings of the church are quasi judicial and therefore
those who complain, or give testimony, or act and vote, or pronounce the result,
orally or in writing, acting in good faith, and within the scope of the
authority conferred by this limited jurisdiction, and not falsely or colorably,
making such proceedings a pretense for coveringj’ an intended scandal, are
protected by law. It appears to us, that the defendant, as pastor of the church,
and minister of the congregation, was acting within the scope of his authority,
in reading a paper, which, it was proved had been adopted in a separate meeting
of the church, and directed thus to be read.”

The right of ecclesiastical tribunals to hear and decide cases involving the
conduct of their officers and members /being recognized, and this of necessity
involving immunity from charges of libel and slander based upon statements made
in good faith by the members of such tribunals and by parties or witnesses
giving evidence before them (York vs. Pease, 68 Mass., 282), a like
immunity must be extended to persons who, in good faith, make charges, written
or oral, to thjB church authorities, intended to provoke an investigation
concerning the conduct or character of a member, officer, or minister of the
institution. That such charges are privileged communications, if made without
actual malice, is the settled doctrine of the courts of the United States and of
Great Britain.

In the case of Shurtleff vs. Stevens (51 Vermont, 501), it appeared
that the defendant, a member of a religious organization, had made charges
against the plaintiff, a minister of the church, which led to his expulsion from
membership by the tribunals of the organization. The lower court held that the
charge was defamatory and that its publication implied malice. The Supreme Court
of Vermont reversed this decision, ruling that the communication was one of
qualified privilege and that in the absence of proof of express malice,
did not constitute libel. The court said:

“The plaintiff became a member of the Windham County Association voluntarily.
He entered into its covenant and subscribed to its rules. Under its covenant and
rules it had rightful jurisdiction to investigate charges of unministerial
conduct affecting its members, and on conviction to administer proper
punishment. The good name and good standing of every member of the association
was a matter of common interest to all the rest. The members were all
representative men, largely responsible for the growth and prosperity of the
churches under their charge. This association was an instrumentality whereby
they could advance the common interest of denominational work in Windham County;
and by virtue of its relationship to like organizations elsewhere, it was a
factor in the prosperity of the denomination throughout the land. Not only this,
but the general public not immediately related to these clergymen by the ties of
church covenant or society relationship, are more or less directly, within the
range of that moral influence which they are charged to exert. Thus the general
cause of public morality which underlies all good government, and which every
good citizen, be he priest or layman, is bound to promote, is affected by the
fidelity with which ministers of the gospel discharge the high trust of their
appointment In order to be successful public teachers of morality, they must be
unspotted public exemplars of it. Hence, if it be suspected that a wolf in
sheep’s clothing has invaded their ranks, and sits at their council board, it is
not only for the interest of all the members of the association to know the
fact, but it is their imperative duty, to make inquiry and ascertain the fact.
They owe such duty to the plaintiff as a brother member, if he is charged with
scandalous conduct, to the end that his innocence may be established. They owe
it to themselves, lest by indifference they give apparent approval to his
conduct. Their intimate official relation to the plaintiff in the cause of their
common work leaves them no other alternative; and if, in making such inquiry and
in acting upon the subject matter of it, they proceed with honesty of purpose
and act from a sense of duty, the law protects them.”

Public policy is the foundation of the doctrine of privileged communications.
It is based upon the recognition of the fact that the right of the individual to
enjoy immunity from the publication of untruthful charges derogatory to his
character is not absolute and must at times yield to the superior necessity of
subjecting to investigation the conduct of persons charged with wrongdoing. In
order to accomplish this purpose and to permit private persons having, or in
good faith believing themselves to have, knowledge of such wrongdoing, to
perform the legal, moral, social duty resulting from such knowledge of belief,
without restraining them by the fear that an error, no matter how innocently or
honestly made, may subject them to punishment for defamation, the doctrine of
qualified privilege has been evolved, under which, “the occasion on which the
communication was made rebuts the inference of malice prima facie
arising from a statement prejudicial to the character of the plaintiff, and puts
upon him the burden of proving * * * that the defendant was actuated by motives
of personal spite or ill-will, independent of the occasion on which the
communication was made.” (Newell, Slander & Libel [3d ed.] pp. 477,
478.)

When the publication complained of is such that, in the absence of express
malice, it is privileged, the burden of proving malice rests with the
plaintiff.

* * * ‘malice’ a term used to indicate the fact that the defamer is prompted
by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed. * * * The term ‘malice’ implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. * * * the existence of actual
malice in any given case can be proved either by extrinsic, internal, or
circumstantial evidence, like any other fact necessary to make out the
plaintiff’s case.” (Street, Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, p. 313.)

It has been suggested that the fact that the communication was addressed and
delivered to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, instead of the bishop to
whom Father Acebedo was directly subordinate, deprives it of its privileged
character. We are of the opinion that this view cannot be accepted. (U. S.
vs. Bustos, supra.) There is nothing to show that this
mistake, if such it was, was not honestly made, or that the purpose of
appellants was to give undue publicity to their charges.

It must be admitted that the Libel Law (Act No. 277) contains no express
recognition of the doctrine of qualified privilege in such a case as this. The
only section dealing expressly with the subject of privilege is the ninth, which
by its terms is limited to private communications made for the sole
purpose of protecting the interests of the person making the communication or
the interests of the person to whom such communications are made. The
communication here in question was in no proper sense a private communication as
it was clearly made with the intention and in the hope that it would be followed
by a public investigation. We are of the opinion, however, that it is an error
to assume that the right to freedom of speech as now enjoyed in these Islands is
conferred by Act No. 277, or that the scope and limit of its exercise
must be found in that statute. On the contrary, the principle which guarantees
to the people of these Islands the privileges of freedom of speech and of the
press is firmly embedded in the fundamental few of the land, to which all
statutes are subordinate. (Philippine Bill, sec. 5; Jones Law, sec 3.) The right
to petition the Government for the redress of grievances rests upon an equally
solid foundation. Nevertheless, these rights would be of no practical value were
their exercise, in the utmost of good faith, subjected to the condition that
failure to establish the truth of all statements made with a view to inciting
official action is to be punished as constituting the crime of defamation. With
the fear of such consequences constantly before him, the citizen might well
refrain from exercising his perilous privilege of petition or of free
speech.

The provisions relating to freedom of speech and the right of petition
contained in the Philippine Bill and the Tones Law are taken from the
Constitution of the United States. Judge Cooley, in his well-known work on
Constitutional Limitations (6th ed., p. 523), expresses the opinion that
publications which are privileged for some reason of public policy are within
the constitutional protection. Assuming that this view is correct it is obvious
that the constitutional right cannot be impaired, or abolished by implication,
by the failure to make provision for it in the statute concerning libels. The
Supreme Court of the United States, construing the provision in section 5 of the
Philippine Bill securing to accused persons the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, said that if that provision of the paramount law makes the presence of
the accused indispensable at every stage of the trial, “it is of no moment that
the Philippine laws do not go so far, for they cannot lessen its force or
effect. * * * It is the right which these constitutional provisions secure to
persons accused of crime in this country that was carried to the Philippines by
the congressional enactment, and, therefore, according to a familiar rule, the
prevailing course of decision here may and should be accepted as determinative
of the nature and measure of the right there.” (Diaz vs. United States,
223 U. S., 442.)

The plainest principles of natural right and sound public policy require that
the utmost possible freedom should be accorded every citizen to complain to the
supervising, removing and appointing authorities of the misconduct of the public
officials with whom he comes into contact, and like considerations make it
equally proper that members of a religious organization should enjoy equal
freedom in bringing to the attention of the church authorities the misbehavior
of their spiritual leaders or of fellow-members. Manifestly, the right must be
exercised in good faith, and may not with impunity be made the occasion for the
venting of private spite. It is subject to the limitation and restriction that
such complaints must be made to a functionary having authority to redress the
evils complained of; that they must be made in good faith and that they must not
be actuated by malice.

As we are convinced that the conduct of defendants in making the complaint
which has led to these prosecutions has conformed to the conditions upon which
the qualified privilege they claim may be enjoyed, the judgment of the trial
court in both cases is reversed and the appellants are acquitted, with the costs
of both instances de officio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, Street, and
Malcolm, JJ., concur.