THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EUGENIO GACUTAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
convicting the accused of the crime of bribery, as defined in articles 385 and
389 of the Penal Code, and sentencing him to one year and one day of
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P160, together with the costs of the proceeding,
to suffer subsidiary imprisonment as prescribed by law, and to suffer temporary
special disqualification for a period of six years and one day, and declaring
the carabao forfeited to the Government of the Philippine Islands.

From the evidence in the case as introduced by the prosecution it appears
that Domingo Pascua, about July 20,1912, filed in appellant’s court, he being
the justice of the peace in and for the municipality of Solana in the Province
of Cagayan, a complaint against one Elias Pagulayan, for the theft of a horse;
that on or about July 31, 1912, and before said case was decided, Pascua, at the
request of appellant made several weeks before the trial of said case, gave to
appellant a female carabao worth about P80, in consideration of which appellant
agreed to decide said action adversely to Pagulayan; that the carabao was
delivered to appellant; and that thereafter, August 12, 1912, the accused
decided the case against Pagulayan, convicting him of larceny and sentencing him
to six months’ imprisonment, to pay the costs of the trial, and to indemnify
Pascua in the sum of P50.

On the other hand, the appellant claims to have proved by his witnesses and
by Pascua’s declarations that Pascua borrowed P20 from the appellant and
promised, in case of his failure to repay the sum loaned, that he would give the
appellant a carabao in settlement thereof, and that said carabao in question was
delivered to appellant in pursuance of said agreement.

Having examined the record with care, we do not hesitate in concluding that
from the evidence there remains no doubt of the guilt of the accused of the
crime of bribery.

From the judgment of conviction and sentence this court is unable to say
under what section of the Penal Code the accused was tried or convicted or what
was the character of punishment imposed. We have held in the case of United
States vs. Mariano (27 Phil. Rep., 132) that in every criminal case the court
should not only make a statement of the facts upon which the judgment of
conviction was founded, but should also refer to the section of the Penal Code
or of the statute under which the accused was convicted and sentenced and the
kind of punishment imposed. In other words, the sentence should specifically
show whether the defendant was sentenced to presidio correccional or
presidio mayor or arresto mayor and in what degree. A sentence
for one year and one day is not a complete sentence according to the practice of
the courts. It should be one year and one day of presidio correccional
and should state whether it is the minimum, medium, or maximum degree
thereof.

The Solicitor-General found himself in the difficulty to which we have just
referred when he attempted to sustain the judgment and sentence of the trial
court. He says:

“Having in mind the penalty imposed by the lower court upon the defendant and
appellant, ‘one year and one day of imprisonment, a fine of P160 or subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, payment of the costs, and disqualification
for a period of six years and one day under article 385 of the Penal Code, and
confiscation of the carabao in accordance with article 389 of the same code,’ it
seems that the court convicted the accused under article 382 of the Penal
Code.”

This discloses the manner in which the Solicitor-General, as well as this
court, has arrived at the article of the Penal Code on which the conviction is
founded.

Counsel for the accused was also uncertain as to the article under which the
accused was convicted, He says:

“The judgment appears to be based on articles 381 or 382 of the Penal
Code.”

We are of the opinion that the accused should have been convicted under
article 382 of the Penal Code, which provides that:

“Any public officer who shall agree to commit any act of injustice not
constituting a crime in connection with the exercise of the powers of his
office, in consideration of any offer or promise or of any gift or present
received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall,
if the act of injustice be committed, suffer the penalty of presidio
correccional in its medium and minimum degrees and pay a fine of not less
than the value of the gift and not more than three times such value; if the act
of injustice shall not have been committed, a penalty ranging from arresto mayor
in its maximum degree to presidio correccional in its minimum degree and a fine
of not less than the value of the gift and not more than double such value shall
be imposed.”

It certainly is an act of injustice to convict a person charged with a crime
without regard to what the evidence in the case may be. The accused promised
Pascua to convict Pagulayan regardless of the evidence in the case and
apparently carried out his promise. In consideration thereof he was to receive
and did receive a carabao worth P80. It is an act of injustice for a judicial
officer to decide a case pending before him regardless of what the evidence may
show. (U. S. vs. Alban, 4 Phil. Rep., 363.)

The act of injustice having been committed, the defendant should have been
punished with presidio correccional in its medium and minimum degrees
and sentenced to pay a fine of not less than the value of the gift and not more
than three times its value. The gift itself should also have been confiscated,
under article 389 of the Penal Code.

The case does not fall within article 381 of the Penal Code for the reason
that, in order to be within that article, the act which the accused agrees to
commit must be criminal. The act with he agreed to perform in the case before us
was to convict the accused* This was not a criminal act. Nor does the act fall
within the provisions of article 347 of the Penal Code, which provides that “any
judge who shall knowingly render an unjust decision against the defendant,
etc.,” shall be punished as therein provided. We do not know whether the
decision was a just one or an unjust one. There is nothing in the record to
determine that fact. We may say, therefore, without determining what effect, if
any, the decision “of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of
Alzua vs. Johnson (231 U. S., 106) has upon the provisions of Chapter I
of Title VII of the Penal Code, that there is no evidence upon which we may
determine that the judgment to be rendered was an unjust judgment.

There appearing in the case neither aggravating nor extenuating
circumstances, the penalty should be, imposed in the medium degree. The court
should have imposed a penalty of one year eight months and twenty-one days of
prision correccional, a fine of P 160, confiscation of the carabao, the
costs of the trial, and eight years and one day of temporary special
disqualification.

As so amended, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.