G.R. No. 9116. September 19, 1914

ROSENDO PALAD ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. MARIANO CUI, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE PROVINCE OF TAYABAS, AND BALDOMERO CALATRAVA, RESPONDENTS.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions September 19, 1914 MORELAND, J.:


MORELAND, J.:


In this proceeding it is prayed that a writ of mandamus issue directing the
respondent Mariano Cui, as judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province
of Tayabas, to approve a proposed bill of exceptions in civil case No. 600 of
that court, and thereby allow an appeal to the Supreme Court for a review of the
judgment, orders, and decrees of the court in that action.

The complaint also prays, that this court, if it find an appeal from the
judgment, orders, and decrees aforesaid will, not lie, issue a writ of
certiorari, directed to the judge aforesaid to certify to this court a complete
transcript of the record of the court in the cause, so that the acts of the
court may be reviewed and their legality determined as provided by law; and that
the orders and decrees specified therein be declared null and void as having
been made without or in excess of jurisdiction.

It appears undisputed that on the 10th of January, 1911, Baldomero Calatrava
began an action against the plaintiffs in this case for the summary possession
of real estate in the justice’s court of Sariaya, Tayabas, of which lands, it
was alleged, defendants in that case had deprived the plaintiff by one of the
means described in section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The action was
tried and decision rendered by the justice’s court in favor of the plaintiff and
possession of the lands was duly awarded. The defendants appealed to the Court
of First Instance.

After the perfection of the appeal the plaintiff Calatrava reproduced in the
Court of First Instance the complaint which he had filed in the justice’s court,
which, after having been amended in some particulars unimportant here, was
received by that court as the complaint in the case.

On the 16th day of October, 1911, Calatrava, the plaintiff, was notified by
the clerk of the court that the case had been put on the calendar for trial on
the 2d day of November, 1911. There appears in the record a certificate of such
service signed by the clerk in the following form:

“This 16th day of October, 1911, notices were sent by mail to Baldomero
Calatrava and Rosendo Palad at Sariaya, notifying them that the present case was
set down on the calendar of the court for the 2d day of November,
1911.”

On the 28th day of October, 1911, the defendants filed a demurrer to the
complaint. It does not appear that a copy of this demurrer was served upon the
attorney for the plaintiff or upon the plaintiff himself.

On the 2d of November the case was duly called for a hearing upon the
demurrer and the latter having been considered by the court was sustained and
the complaint dismissed. On the same day notice of the decision was sent by the
clerk of the court to the plaintiff, Calatrava, service of which is certified by
the clerk by the following added to the bottom of the order sustaining the
demurrer and dismissing the complaint:

“This 2d day of November, 1911, a copy of the foregoing order was sent to
plaintiff at Sariaya.”

On the 30th of November, 1912, more than one year after the rendition of the
judgment and notice of the same as aforesaid, said Court of First Instance, but
with a different judge presiding, set aside the order sustaining the demurrer
and dismissing the complaint and reinstated the cause, basing its action upon
the ground that the order sustaining the demurrer had been made and the cause
dismissed without notice to the plaintiff. This order of the court seems to have
been notified to both parties in the case, for, later, we see the defendants in
pursuance thereof answering the complaint without objection and proceeding with
the preparation of the cause for trial. Issue was later duly joined and the
cause tried, the court rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants.

Portions of the judgment of the court material to the questions before us are
as follows:

“The court finds and decides that the plaintiff is the sole owner and
legitimate possessor of the lands in question, with a perfect right to the
possession of the same and that the defendants have been unjustly detaining the
said lands since the 3d day of January, 1911.

* * * * * * *

“That the defendants, their agents and servants, are for ever prohibited from
interfering in any manner whatever with the plaintiff in the possession of said
lands.

* * * * * * *

“The right is reserved to the plaintiff of bringing an action against the
defendants for the recovery of the value of the product of said lands and
damages resulting from the detention thereof.”

We are of the opinion that mandamus will not lie. The action in the justice’s
court was one merely for the summary recovery of the possession of land and had
nothing to do directly with the determination of the ownership thereof

The case was appealed to the Court of First Instance and was tried upon the
same theory. It has been held by this court, the writer of this opinion
dissenting, that a third instance, that is, an appeal to the Supreme Court, does
not lie in summary proceedings.

That being1 so, no appeal lies in this case from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance, and, accordingly, the petition for the writ ordering that an
appeal be allowed must be denied.

We are also of the opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to the writ
of certiorari as prayed for. We regard the action of the Court of First Instance
vacating the order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the action as within
its jurisdiction. If the notice of the hearing of the cause on the 2d of
November, 1911, had been given as required by law our judgment would have been
different. In such case the order would have become final long before the order
vacating it was made and the court would have been without jurisdiction in the
premises upon the showing made.

As will be observed, however, the notice was given by the clerk to the
plaintiff in the case and not to his attorney.

The plaintiff had appeared in the justice’s court by E. A. Gala, an attorney
and counselor at law of Lucena, Tayabas, and had also appeared in the Court of
First Instance on appeal by the same attorney, who signed the complaint. It is
the general rule that where a party appears by attorney in an action or
proceeding in a court of record, all notices thereafter required to be given in
the action or proceeding must be given to the attorney and not the client; and
that a notice given to the client and not to his attorney is not a notice in
law. (Rules 3 and 12, Courts of First Instance.) As a necessary consequence, the
demurrer was sustained and the action was dismissed without legal notice to the
party interested. This being the case, the plaintiff could apply within a
reasonable time after discovering the dismissal of his action for the vacation
of the dismissing order and the reinstatement of the cause. This was in fact
done soon after the discovery, and we are of the opinion that the court had
jurisdiction to make the order which it made.

There appear to be, however, certain references in the judgment of the court
which seem to decide the question of ownership and which seem also to have been
made upon the theory that the ownership of the property in question was
necessarily determined by that judgment. We have already quoted those parts of
the decision which seem to do this. In so far as they in any way affect the
title to the land in question, they are beyond the jurisdiction of the court to
make and must be held to be void.

It is a principle established by decisions of this court that, on an appeal
In summary proceedings, the Court of First Instance has no wider jurisdiction or
greater powers than had the justice’s court from which the appeal was taken. A
justice of the peace having in summary proceedings no jurisdiction to determine
the title to land, the Court of First Instance has no such power on an
appeal.

The petition for mandamus is, therefore, denied, as is also the petition for
a writ of certiorari except as herein above stated, with costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.