FLORENCIA ANURAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ANA AQUINO AND RUFINA ORTIZ, ADMINISTRATRICES OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF QUITERIA ORTIZ, DEFENDANTS. ANA AQUINO, APPELLANT.

The evidence of record in this case clearly discloses that the plaintiff,
Florencia Anuran, is the widow of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, to whose estate the
property described in the complaint belongs; that the defendant, Ana Aquino, is
the natural child of a sister of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased ; that on the death
of Ambrosio Aquino, one Norberto Capiña was appointed administrator of his
intestate estate, at the instance of Ana Aquino, the natural child of his
sister; that in the course of the administration proceedings Ana Aquino, acting
in collusion with the administrator, fraudulently represented to the court that
Ambrosio Aquino had died intestate, leaving no heirs other than Ana Aquino, a
daughter of his deceased sister; that at the time when these representations
were made, both Ana Aquino and the administrator well knew that the plaintiff,
Florencia Anuran, was the surviving spouse of Ambrosio Aquino, deceased, and
that Ana Aquino was not a legitimate but a natural daughter of the deceased
sister of Ambrosio Aquino; that, without notice to the widow, Ana Aquino, acting
in collusion with the administrator appointed at her instance, fraudulently
procured the entry of an order in the administration proceedings dated March 12,
1912, authorizing and approving the delivery by the administrator of all
property of the estate to the alleged sole heir, Ana Aquino, the defendant in
this suit, and that the motion of the administrator on which this order was
based was supported by the affidavit of Ana Aquino, setting forth the false and
misleading statement of the alleged facts as hereinbefore indicated.

The widow, who was not a party of record in the administration proceedings,
did not discover that this order had been entered until about the 14th day of
February, 1914, when she promptly entered her appearance in the administration
proceedings and moved that the order be set aside, and that she be declared the
sole heir of the deceased, who, as she alleged, had died without leaving either
ascendants, or descendants, or collateral relatives entitled to share in the
estate. The court declined to entertain this motion on the ground that the
alleged fraudulent order had been entered more than six months prior to the date
of the motion, so that under the provisions of section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, he had no jurisdiction to entertain the motion to set it aside.

Thereafter the widow promptly instituted this separate action, wherein the
trial court after declaring the order null and void, in that it had been
procured by fraudulent collusion between the defendant and the administrator,
gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Ana Aquino for
the possession of the lands and other property turned over to the latter by the
administrator, and for damages for their detention.

The facts upon which the trial judge based his judgment are fully sustained
by the evidence of record, and clearly entitle the plaintiff to the relief
granted her.

The only ruling upon the facts by the trial judge as to which there is any
real question at this time is his finding that the defendant, Ana Aquino, is a
natural and not a legitimate daughter of a deceased sister of Ambrosio Aquino.
This fact was supported by oral evidence, corroborated by certified copies of
the entries in the records made at the time of the issuance of her birth and
marriage certificate, both of which disclose that she is the natural daughter of
her mother by an unknown father. In the absence of any showing to the contrary
this evidence is amply sufficient to sustain the finding that she is a natural
and not a legitimate daughter of her mother.

In the light of these facts, there is not and cannot be any substantial
question as to the right of the widow to take the estate of her deceased husband
as his sole heir under the provisions of articles 943 and 952 of the Civil Code.
These articles are as follows:

“A natural or legitimized child has no right to succeed ab intestate
the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother who has
acknowledged it; nor shall such children or relatives inherit from the natural
or legitimated child.”

“In the absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children, whether of
the whole blood or not, of the same surviving spouse, if not separated by a
final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased.”

We are not much impressed by the various formal and procedural objections
urged by the appellant to the proceedings had in the court below.

There can be no question as to the right of any person adversely affected by
a judgment to maintain an action to enjoin its enforcement and to have it
declared a nullity on the ground of fraud and collusion practiced in the very
matter of obtaining the judgment when such fraud is extrinsic or collateral to
the matters involved in the issues raised at the trial which resulted in such
judgment; and fraudulent collusion between an administrator and a third person
resulting in an order or judgment whereby an interested person is unjustly
deprived of his rights in or to the estate under administration, has always been
recognized as a sufficient ground for the grant of relief from the order or
judgment thus fraudulently procured. (23 Cyc, 1022, 1025, 1027, and numerous
cases there cited.)

As to the claim that the question of title to a part of the property
described in the complaint is res adjudicata, it is only necessary to
indicate that in the present case the plaintiff bases her right to this property
upon her statutory right to inherit the estate of her husband (article 952,
Civil Code), whereas the judgment relied upon in support of the plea of res
adjudicata, was merely a judicial declaration that a part of this property
belonged to the estate of the deceased husband of the plaintiff, and that this
part of the estate was not, as plaintiff then contended, her separate property.
In the present action plaintiff wholly abandons her contentions in the former
proceedings, and claims title by inheritance from her husband, accepting and
relying upon the former ruling whereby the land then in question was judicially
declared to be a part of his estate.

As to the contention of the appellant touching the prescription of this
action, it is a suffcient answer to say that the evidence clearly discloses that
it was instituted promptly and without unreasonable delay after the discovery of
the fraud perpetrated by the defendant, acting in collusion with the
administrator, and within less than three years from the date of the entry of
the order. Section 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “An action
for relief on the ground of fraud” must be brought within four years after the
right of action accrues, “but the right of action in such cases shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud.”

Appellant contends that the legality and validity of the order entered in the
administration proceedings is res adjudicata, plaintiff’s motion to
have it vacated on the ground of fraud having been denied and no appeal having
been taken from the order denying the motion. It appears, however, that the
motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that under the provisions of section
113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court had no jurisdiction to grant
relief from the order upon a motion in the original preceedings, submitted more
than “six months after the order was taken.” If that application for relief was
properly denied on the grounds indicated, the dismissal of the motion cannot be
relied upon to sustain a contention that the question of the validity and
legality of the original order is res adjudicata. It becomes important,
therefore, to determine the question as to the power of the courts in this
jurisdiction to grant relief from the effect of judgments and orders upon motion
entered in the proceedings wherein such judgments or orders are entered when the
ground of the motion is alleged fraud in their procurement.

In the case of Arnedo vs. Llorente and Liongsen (18 Phil. Rep.,
257), we held that in this jurisdiction, wherein there is no term system of
court sessions as that system is understood in England and the United States,
the courts have inherent plenary power over their own judgments until they
become final in the sense that they are unappealable and subject to execution as
of right at the instance of the prevailing party; but that thereafter no court
has inherent power to alter, amend or vacate such a judgment in order to correct
errors of law or fact, other than mere clerical errors or defects as a result of
which the judgment as entered fails to set forth the judgment which was actually
rendered.

This ruling is substantially identical with the prevailing rule in most
English and American jurisdictions, except only as to the duration of the period
within which the courts retain their plenary control in the premises, which in
those jurisdictions closes with the end of the term at which the judgment is
rendered.

At the comon law there were some apparent exceptions to the universality of
this rule and more or less modified by statute, these apparent exceptions have
been carried into most American jurisdictions, and in part, at least, have been
incorporated into our own judiciary system, which was substantially modelled
upon English and American prototypes. Speaking broadly, these apparent
exceptions were limited to cases wherein judgments were vacated on the ground
that they were void because of lack of jurisdiction or irregularity in their
entry apparent on the face of the record, or because vitiated by fraud. In
addition to the apparent exceptions of this kind limited to cases wherein the
court exercised its inherent power to vacate void judgments, the authority of
the courts over regular judgments has been extended in a number of specified
cases by statutory provisions such as those contained in section 113 of our Code
of Civil Procedure, which was borrowed directly from the California Code
(section 473.)

That article is as follows:

“Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect:
Provided, That application therefor be made within a reasonable time,
but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding
was taken.”

As a result of these statutory innovations in the common law rule a great
variety of practice has arisen in the various states in the matter of the
vacation of judgments.

As is said by Freeman in his work on judgments: “The practice in the
different states is, in many respects, so conflicting that few rules can be laid
down as universally applicable.”

A somewhat extended examination of the text book Authorities and of the cases
cited by them in support of the discussion of the varying practice in different
American jurisdictions, under varying provisions of procedural statutes,
satisfies us that American precedents furnish an uncertain guide, and should be
deemed to be merely persuasive authority at best.

In California, from whose procedural code section 113 of our Code was
adopted, the courts have gone farther, perhaps, than elsewhere, in holding that,
except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, their jurisdiction to set
aside alleged void judgments on motion is exhausted at the close of the term;
(Black on Judgments, par. 306; Freeman on Judgments, pars. 86, 93 and 98 and
cases there cited, including People vs. Harrison, 84 Cal., 607) so
that, while the process continues to be subject to the control of the court, a
judgment cannot be vacated on any account, unless it appears on the face of the
judgment roll to be a nullity for lack of jurisdiction, such a judgment being
held to be “a dead limb on the judicial tree, which should be lopped of” or
wholly disregarded as the circumstances require.

We are of opinion that the reasons which led the California courts to its
conclusions in this regard apply with equal, if not greater, force in this
jurisdiction.

Our Code, in addition to the relief by motion from judgments, orders or other
proceedings taken against a party through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect when application is made therefor within six months from the
taking of such judgments or orders, which is provided in section 113, furnishes
a special summary remedy by original petition to the Supreme Court (section 513)
whereby a party aggrieved by a default judgment who has been deprived of a
hearing by frauds accident, mistake or excusable negligence, may have such
default judgment summarily set aside if application is made within sixty days
after he first learns of the rendition of such judgment.

The remedies thus provided were evidently intended to include and do in fact
include every case wherein the courts should be permitted to open up cases after
judgments have been entered and become final, other than the exceptional case of
a judgment which appears on the face of the record (or more accurately speaking
the “Book of Final Records” or Judgment Roll, sec. 387, Code of Civil Procedure)
to, have been entered without jurisdiction, and is therefore a nullity which may
be “stricken down or wholly disregarded” as the circumstances require, and
vacated or ser aside by the court wherein it was entered upon the attention of
the court being directed by motion or otherwise to the fact that it is void for
lack of jurisdiction in the court to enter it. Every consideration of expediency
and justice, is opposed to the uncontrolled exercise of discretion by the courts
in opening up cases after judgments entered therein have become final, and our
statutes having undertaken to regulate the practice and having furnished
adequate remedies whereby the courts can grant relief of this kind in
appropriate cases, no attempt to extend the authority of the courts beyond the
prescribed limits should be tolerated. Strict adherence to the code provisions
in this regard will avoid much of the confusion and embarrassment to which both
the litigants and the courts have been exposed as a result of the laxity and
uncertainty which appears to have prevailed in some jurisdictions in this
regard. The interests of the individual, as well as of the community, demand
there should be a definite end of every litigation; and nothing could be more
impolitic than to leave it to the discretion of every court to revise and review
and reconsider its judgments without limit. (Arnedo vs. Llorente and
Liongson, supra.)

Of course what has been said must be understood as directed to the practice
of reopening cases and vacating and setting aside judgments on motion, or by the
courts themselves of their own volition, after such judgments have become final.
This form of relief is wholly distinct from the relief which may and should be
granted in separate proceedings instituted to enjoin a party from enforcing a
judgment which he has obtained when it would be “against conscience to permit
him to do so.” and for such other further and additional relief as may be just
under all the circumstances

The enjoining of a judgment at law is a purely equitable remedy, but as has
been well said:

” * * * It is not necessary for its exercise that the tribunal should be
distinctively and individually organized as a chancery court. This power is
habitually brought into play in those states where, for want of separate equity
courts, the law courts apply equitable remedies. And even under the codes, where
law and equity are fused, equitable jurisdiction, equitable proceedings and
equitable remedies are not abolished, although metamorphosed as to their
external appearance. * * *” (Black on Judgments, par. 360.)

And further:

* * * Judgments are not reversed or vacated in equity. Adjudications at law
are not overhauled or re-examined. It is to the party himself that the energies
of the court of equity are directed, and its remedial power is exercised by
putting restraint upon his usual liberty of following up his judgment by the
appropriate process for its collection. Equity therefore acts on the
person, not the proceeding; and while it will enjoin the enforcement of
a judgment, in proper cases, it will not interfere with the judgment itself. * *
*” (Par. 357, supra.)

And again:

“Fraud has always been reckoned among the special abhorrences of equity, and
fraud is one of the grounds upon which application is most frequently made to
equity for relief or redress. It is well settled that equity will enjoin a party
from enforcing a judgment which he has obtained by means of fraud. ‘Fraud will
vitiate a judgment, and a court of equity may declare it a nullity. Equity has
so great an abhorrence of fraud that it will set aside its own decrees if
founded thereupon.’ * * *” (Par. 368, supra.)

This form of relief is expressly recognized in the Code of Civil Procedure in
section 43, which provides for a prescription period of four years for actions
“for relief on the ground of fraud,” the right of action in such cases “not to
be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of ‘the fraud.”

From what has been said it follows that the probate court properly declined
to assume jurisdiction to vacate or set aside its final order turning over the
property to the defendant in this case, on the ground of fraud in its
procurement, the motion therefor not having been submitted during the six
months’ period prescribed in article 113 of the Code within which judgment or
orders may be vacated or set aside on motion; and it further follows, that the
court having no jurisdiction to entertain such a motion, its dismissal is no bar
to a separate action for relief on the ground of fraud, and defendant’s plea of
res adjudicata was properly overruled.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, Street, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.