G.R. No. 12900. March 27, 1918
JULIAN SIMAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SATURNINO LEUS AND SIMEON LEUS, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
MALCOLM, J.:
Leus, father and son, defendants, to have the marriage between plaintiff’s
daughter, Simeona Siman, 18 years of age, and Simeon Leus annulled, and to
recover damages. The grounds set forth in the complaint are “fraud, force,
threats, and intimidation.” Although not assigned as error these statements
disclose on their face why we must hold with defendants.
The father is not the legal representative of the child before the courts.
(Code of Civil Procedure, sees. 116, 117, 553, and 558; Palet vs.
Aldecoa & Co. [1910], 15 Phil., 232; Pobre vs. Blanco [1910], 17
Phil., 156.) The right of a parent to maintain an action for the annullment of
the marriage of an infant son or daughter is permitted only when the party in
whose behalf it is sought was under the age of legal consent and such marriage
was contracted without the consent of his or her parents. (Marriage Law, secs.
10 [1]; 11 [1].) The consent of the parents to the marriage was not necessary
since the girl was not under the age of 18 years. (Marriage Law, sec. 7 [3].) In
other words, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege a cause of action in
favor of someone; he must show that it exists in favor of himself. It would
certainly be a startling proposition to announce that a judgment can be procured
dissolving a marriage contract without it being disclosed in the complaint that
the alleged injured party is desirous of being released from the bonds of
matrimony. Such a rule would permit a parent to invalidate a marriage without
the consent or knowledge of a party thereto. If it were to obtain, it would
prove subversive to social order, sound policy, and good morals. (See Fero
vs. Fero [1901], 70 N. Y. Supp., 742; Coddington vs. Lamer
[1902], 78 N. Y. Supp., 276; Wood vs. Baker [1904], 88 N. Y. Supp.,
854.)
The causes assigned for annulling this marriage are those enumerated in
paragraphs 4 and 5, section 10, of the Marriage Law. In the succeeding section
of the same law, it is provided that the action to obtain a decree of nullity of
marriage for either of these two causes must be brought “by the injured party.”
But here the supposed injured party, the girl, does not institute action nor is
it instituted in her behalf by the father. Yet, the real party in interest is
the girl. She must be regarded as a married woman until nullity is ascertained
and declared by a competent court. By marriage, although under the age of
majority, she has become emancipated. (Civil Code, Book I, Title XI, chapter 1.)
The last sentence of article 317 of this chapter of the Civil Code relative to
appearance in court by the minor has been repealed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 116, 558; Willard’s Notes to the
Spanish Civil Code, page 35.) Nor does the girl need a guardian ad
litem in order to bring suit. (Code of Civil Procedure sec. 115; Marriage
Law, sec. 11.) It is only the infant wife who may maintain an action to annul
her marriage on the grounds alleged in the complaint. It is for her to elect as
to whether or not she desires the marriage to be declared void.
Considering, therefore, the purpose of the law and construing together the
appropriate provisions of the Civil Code, the Code of Civil Procedure, and the
Marriage Law, in order to give effect to them, it results that, where one of the
parties to a marriage is over the age of consent but yet an infant, the father
of this minor, emancipated by marriage, has no right of action, in himself, to
sue for the nullity of such marriage, and the minor daughter does not need his
aid in bringing the suit. Nor does the minor daughter emancipated by marriage
need a guardian ad litem in order to bring action. (Delpit vs. Young
[1899], 51 La. Ann., 923.)
In consonance with the foregoing, judgment is reversed, without special
finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Araullo, Street, Avanceña, and
Fisher, JJ., concur.
Carson J., did not take part.