G.R. No. L-5917. January 28, 1955

This case was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente, represented by its Supreme Bishop Gerardo M.
Bayaca, against Bishop Santiago A. Fonacier seeking to require the latter to
render an accounting of his administration of all the temporal properties he has
in his possession belonging to said church and to recover the same from him on
the ground that he had ceased to be the Supreme Bishop of said religious
organization. Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., having been elected as Supreme
Bishop after the filing of the original complaint, was later made a co-plaintiff
in a supplementary complaint.

Mons. Fonacier claims as a defense that he has not been properly removed as
Supreme Bishop; that his legal successor was Juan Jamias who had been elected in
accordance with the constitution of the church; that he has already rendered an
accounting of his administration to Bishop Jamias and turned over all the
properties to the latter; that Bishop Isabelo de los Reyes Jr. formally joined
the Protestant Episcopal Church of America and for this reason he has ceased to
be a member of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente; and that Bishops De los Reyes
and Bayaca having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices of
the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, they ceased to be members thereof and.
consequently, have no personality to maintain tlie present action.

On May 17, 1950, the court rendered judgment declaring Mons. Isabelo de los
Reyes, Jr. as the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, and ordering Mons. Fonacier to render an accounting of his
administration of tlie properties and funds of the church “from the time he
began occupying the position of Secretario de Economia Temporal thereof until
the present time.”

When the case was taken to the Court of Appeals, the latter found the
decision of the Court of origin in accordance with law and the evidence and
affirmed the same in toto, and the case is now before us by virtue of a
petition for review interposed by defendant Mons. Fonacier.

Petitioner assigns in this instance twelve errors as allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals which, in his opinion, merely involve or raise legal
questions which can be looked into in the present petition for review, but this
assertion is disputed by respondent who claims that the issues herein involved
call for factual conclusions inasmuch as they require an examination of the oral
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. As to which of these
contentions is correct, we are not in a position to determine at the moment, the
only thing clear being that in a petition for review, “The judgment of the Court
of Appeals is conclusive as to the facts, and cannot be reviewed by the Supreme
Court. The entry of such judgment is the end of all questions of fact.” (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 1952, ed., p. 952), or, as section 2,
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court provides, “only questions of law may be raised in
the petition and must be distinctly set forth”, and conformably with this
provision this Court has constantly ruled that it would not disturb the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals in an appeal by certiorari (De Vera vs.
Fernandez, 88 Phil, 668; Velasco vs. The Court of Appeals, 90 Phil.,
689; Monfort vs. Aguinaldo, L-4104, May 2, 1952.) Considering the
nature of the present appeal, we would therefore proceed to restate the facts as
found by the Court of Appeals, limiting our function to ascertaining or
determining if the conclusions drawn from said facts are in accordance with law
or the constitution of the Iglisia Filipina Independiente which, in our opinion,
is the key to the solution of the present controversy, and in our discussion of
the issues as reflected in the various assignments of error, we will follow the
same arrangement made in petitioner’s brief without prejudice of discussing
together or in a group those which we believe are interrelated and can be better
elucidated than by discussing them separately.

The main facts which led to the present controversy as found by the Court of
Appeals are: “It is not disputed that upon the death of Mons. Aglipay, the
Supreme Head of the IF! since 1902, Mons. Fonacier was elected Obispo Maximo, on
October 14, 1940, in accordance witji the constitution of the church. The
latter’s successor should have been elected by the Asamblea Magna of the Church
on September 1, 1943. However, due to the circumstances brought about by the
Pacific War, it was agreed, on December 16, 1941, by the Bishops stationed in
Manila and neighboring provinces that Mons. Fonacier should hold over as Obispo
Maximo of the IFI, for the duration of the emergency created by the war. After
the liberation of the Philippines, and on September 1, 1945, an attempt was made
to convene the Asamblea Magna for the purpose of electing the Obispo Maximo, but
owing to lack of quorum, the Bishops present agreed that Mons. Fonacier would
continue for another year, or until September 1, 1946.

“On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council of
Bishops) of the IFI convened and approved the designation of bishops to their
respective . bishoprics. Here began the conflict which culminated in the
division of the church into two groups. In that meeting Mons. Alejandro
Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of Cavite. Upon learning that
the latter notified the priests of his bishopric regarding his assignment, Mons.
Fonacier wrote him a letter dated September 18, 1945 enjoining him from assuming
the duties of his office and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite
until he (Fonacier) had approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council as
provided for in the constitution. To this letter Bishop Remollino replied
explaining his side and adding that he was ready to defend.his stand on the
matter before the courts of justice. In view of this attitude, Mons. Fonacier
ordered the expulsion of Bishop Remollino from the church and also of Bishop
Manuel Aguilar (Exhibits 3 and 4) whom Mons. Fonacier suspected to be the
instigator of certain acts of insubordination and defamation against him.

“On December 1, 1945, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges (Exhibit B) against
Mons. Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the
Supreme Council of Bishops, held on January 21, 1946, which decreed the forced
resignation of appellant, and to the Asamblea Magna or Asamblea General of the
church, held on January 22, 1946. This body approved the forced resignation of
appellant (petitioner Fonacier) and elected Bishop Gerardo M. Bayaca as Supreme
Bishop to succeed Mons. Fonacier.

“When notified of his removal as Obispo Maximo and required to turn over all
the funds, documents and other properties of the church to his successor,
appellant refused. Hence, the commencement of the instant action in the Court of
First Instance of Manila.

On September 1, 1946 the Asamblea Magna convened and elected Mons. Isabelo de
los Reyes, Jr. as Obispo Maximo (respondent herein). On the same date Mons.
Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and elected Mons.
Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop. Thus two factions of the IFI were
created.

“The faction under Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. according to the statement
(Exhibit EE) of the Director of National Library, issued on May 22, 1947, had
nineteen bishops and 252 priests while the faction undeV Mons. Juan Jamias had
ten bishops and only 40 priests. Thus on June 23, 1947, the Secretary.of Public
Instruction promulgated an order to the effect that for administrative purposes,
Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., was recognized as sole head of the IFI and the
applications of priests of said church for permits to solemnize mariages would
be granted if it were shown thereon that they recognized Isabelo de los Reyes,
Jr., as the Obispo Maximo of said church. The Supreme Court, however, denied the
power of the Secretary to stop the Fonacier group from obtaining licenses to
solemnize marriages.

“On January 22, 1948, the bishop and priests under Mons. De los Reyes, Jr.,
had increased from 252 to 293 while those under Mons. Jamias were only 64
(Exhibit 25) and Mons. De los Reyes, Jr. was duly registered as ‘corporation
sole for the administration of the temporalities of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente, pursuant to the provisions of Articles 154-164 of the Corporation
Law.’”

I

The petitioner assigns as first error the following: The Court of Appeals
erred “in holding that the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar, Alejandro
Remollino, Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., Gerardo Bayaca, Juan Quijano and Pablo
Tablante decreed by the Supreme Council and the petitioner as Obispo Maximo was
illegal,” and the facts concerning the ouster of Bishops Remollino and Aguilar
as narrated by the Court of Appeals are:

“At the meeting of the Supreme Council of Bishops held on September 2, 1945,
Mons. Alejandro Remollino was appointed to the diocese of Cavite. He at once
advised the priests of his bishopric of such appointment. Upon learning of this,
appellant, Bishop Fonacier, wrote Bishop Remolino a letter, dated September 18,
1945 (Exhibit T) calling his attention to the fact that the latter had been
quite hasty in returning to the diocese of Cavite without waiting for the
approval by the Obispo Maximo of the Supreme Council’s resolution of September
2, 1945 as provided for in the constitution of the church, which requires the
approval of the Obispo Maximo to all resolutions of the Supreme Council before
becoming effective and enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office and
from taking possession of said diocese. Mons. Remollino answered appellant with
a letter (Exhibit U) dated September 19, 1945, stating that he had been
appointed Bishop of the diocese of Cavite by the late Mons. Aglipay; that said
appointment was subsequently confirmed by the Supreme Council of Bishops; that
he had ever since been the Bishop of said diocese; and that, therefore, he was
ready to defend his stand on the matter before the courts of justice. Resenting
such attitude of Bishop Remollino, taking it as a defiance and an insult,
considering it as a direct contempt of the Supreme Head of the church, and
suspecting Bishop Manuel Aguilar as the one who drafted said letter and as the
instigator, among the priests and followers of the church, of what he considered
as acts of insubordination, defamation and vilification against him, appellant
prepared and signed a document, dated October 8, 1945, purporting to be a decree
of expulsion, whereby he decreed the expulsion of Msgrs. Aguilar and Remollino
from the church (Exhibit 3). This document was signed by appellant,
countersigned by the Secretary General Bishop Isabelo de Io9 Reyes, Jr. and
agreed to by Bishops Juan Jainias, Martin Jamias, Gregorio Gaerlan, Leopoldo
Ruiz, Gerardo Bayaca and Pablo Tablante. On October 16, 1945 the last-named six
bishops approved a resolution decreeing the expulsion of Aguilar and Remollino
from the church (Exhibit 4), which they signed and appears to have been
countersigned by the Secretary General and approved by appellant as Obispo
Maximo. It is claimed by appellant that due to the intervention of persons
interested in settling the controversy within the church, said decree of
expulsion (Exhibit 4) was not put into effect immediately and that he,
appellant, agreed to consider the matter closed after receiving from Aguilar and
Remollino a letter of apology which the latter promised to write. In other
words, there was an understanding that if no letter of apology was written by
Bishops Aguilar and Remollino. Exhibits 3 and 4 will become operative. Appellant
also contends that having been’ informed by Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. that
Bishops, Aguilar and Remollino refused to sign a letter of apology, appellant
issued the communication (Exhibit BB) on November 20, 1945, whereby he declared
the effectivity of the decree of ouster of the aforesaid two bishops, dated
October 8, 1945. (Exhibit 3).”

The issue now to be determined is: Was the ouster of Bishops Manuel Aguilar
and Alejandro Remollino legal and valid?

Petitioner contends that such ouster was legal and valid because it was
decreed by him as Supreme Bishop and the act was sanctioned by the Supreme
Council in accordance with the constitution of the church as a punishment for
the action of said bishops in defying and slandering the Supreme Head of the
church and in campaigning to destroy the unity of the church. Furthermore,
petitioner contends that, under the constitution of the church Bishops Aguilar
and Remollino had the right to appeal from the decree of expulsion to the Curia
de Apelaciones which had jurisdiction to review and render final judgment
thereon, but that they did not avail themselves of this remedy and, hence, his
decree became final and executory and cannot now be attacked collaterally
outside of the church, for the civil courts have no jurisdiction to review or
revise it.

We find that this claim is but a reiteration of what petitioner has advanced
when this case was brought before the Court of Appeals and the latter has
already passed upon it after making a careful discussion of the evidence, oral
and documentary, in connection with the pertinent provisions of the constitution
of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente touching upon the powers of the Supreme
Bishop concerning removal of bishops of the church, and in connection with
pertinent authorities relative to the doctrine of interference which civil
courts might have regarding ecclesiastical matters. And we find that the
discussion made by the Court of Appeals on the points raised by petitioner is
correct.

Take for instance the question relative to the authority of the civil courts
to review or revise an action or decree of the ecclesiastical courts or
authorities concerning which the Court of Appeals upheld the power of the civil
courts to look into the propriety of the decree of ouster because of the plea of
respondent that it was not issued in accordance with the procedure laid down in
the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. The Court of Appeals
entertained the view that since it is claimed that the ouster was made by an
unauthorized person, or in a manner contrary to the constitution of the church,
and that the ousted bishops were not given notice of the charges against them
nor were they afforded an opportunity to be heard, the civil courts, have
jurisdiction to review the action regarding said ouster citing in support of its
view some authorities from Vol. 45 of the American Jurisprudence which we
believe to be pertinent and decisive of the issue under consideration (45 Am.
Jur. pp. 751-754). And, for the purposes of this decision, it is enough for us
to quote the following as a representative authority: “Where, however, a decison
of an ecclesiastical court plainly violates the law it professes to administer,
or is in conflict with the laws of the land, it will not be followed by the
civil courts. * * * In some instances, not only have the civil courts assumed
the right to inquire into the jurisdiction of religious tribunals and the
regularity of their procedure, but they have subjected their decisions to the
test of fairness or to the test furnished by the constitution and laws of the
church. Thus, it has been held that expulsion of a member without notice or an
opportunity to be heard is not conclusive upon the civil courts when a property
right is involved.” (45 Am. Jur., p. 77.)

The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because petitioner,
as Supreme Bishop, could act alone pursuant to the constitution of the church
wherein it is provided that the Supreme Bishop is the supreme head of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have full powers to impose the
penalties of dismissal, confinement in the seminary, suspension, fine, transfer,
etc, which, without contravening the penal laws of the constituted civil
government, can be imposed upon the bishops, and that said power can be
exercised even without the intervention of the Supreme Council, cannot be
entertained in the light of the very provisions of the constitution of the
church, it appearing that the alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the
constitution is not all-embracing but limited and, in any event, the final
action shall be taken by the Supreme Council. Thus, the pertinent provisions of
the constitution of the church are quoted hereunder for ready reference:

“Tendra omnimodas facultades para imponer las penas de separation, reclusion
en el Seminario, suspension, multa, traslado y otras, que, sin contravenir las
leyes penales del Gobierno civil establecido, se puedan imponer a los Apostoles
* * *.

“Sin embargo el Obispo Maximo no podra castigar a nadie, sin oir al acusado y
sin darle medios para justificarse, y aun asi, tendra que oir la opinion del
Juez de la Curia de Apelaciones, y, en caso gravisimo, al Consejo Supremo de
Obispos (Sec. VI, Cap. Ill, Parte II, p. 39, Reglas Constitucionales, Exhibit
K).

“Los Obispos, en caso de delinquir, seran juzgados por el Consejo Supremo,
bajo la sancion del Obispo Maximo (Sec. VII, id., p. 40).

“Los que se crean condenados injustamente podran apelar a la Curia de
Apelaciones, la cual fallara inapelablemente.

“La Curia de Apelaciones dirimira las competencias y conocera en primera
instancia de las condenas que dictare el Obispo Maximo, pudiendose apelar al
Consejo Supremo de Obispos, en los casos en que se impongan exageradas penas.”
(Sec. VIII, Ibid., p. 40).

It can be plainly seen from a cursory reading of the foregoing provisions
that the Supreme Bishop cannot punish an erring member without first giving him
an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself, and, in any event, without
first securing the opinion of the Judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, and in
serious cases, the case needs to be referred to the Supreme Council of Bishops.
With regard to a case where a bishop is involved, the action shall be submitted
to the Supreme Bishop for approval. And in case of guilt, the accused may appeal
to the Curia de Apelaciones, whose decision shall be final. Such is the
procedure laid down by the constitution of the church when disciplinary action
needs to be taken. against a delinquent member. It is not, therefore, correct to
say that the Supreme Bishop can take action alone in connection with an erring
bishop, even in disregard of the Supreme Council, in view of the over-all powers
he claims to possess under the circumstances.

That the procedure above outlined is correct and apparently is in line with
the practice consistently followed by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente against
its erring officials, finds reaffirmation in the alleged ouster of Bishops De
los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, Quijano, and Tablante wherein it appears that, in
effecting said ouster, the group headed by petitioner followed a procedure
.which apparently is in accordance with the above quoted provisions of the
constitution and which, as found by the Court of Appeal is as follows: “Formal
charges were filed with the Supreme Council. This body convened on January 29,
1946, for the purpose of considering said charges. A President of the Supreme
Council was elected. A bishop was appointed as judge of the Curia de
Apelaciones. The charges were referred to the President of the Curia de
Apelaciones for action, who reported that the same being so serious should be
taken cognizance of by the Supreme Council. The Supreme Council resolved to
notify the respondents of the charges requiring them to answer within 24 hours
should they wish to plead any defense. Two bishops were commissioned to serve
notices upon the respondents. Since propositions of an amicable settlement
failed, the Supreme Council constituted itself into a tribunal to hear the
charges. A hearing was held at which the respondents failed to appear or to
present any defense. At said hearing the Supreme Council received evidence and,
after hearing the opinion of the judge of the Curia de Apelaciones, approved and
promulgated a decision ordering the ouster of the respondents.”

Since, according to the Court of Appeals, no procedure similar to the one
followed by the faction of petitioner in connection with the case of Bishop De
los Reyes, Bayaca and others, was ever adopted as far as Bishops Aguilar and
Remollino are concerned, or no formal charges were filed against the latter, nor
an investigation or hearing ever held, it follows that the ouster of said two
bishops was null and void, it being in violation of the constitution of the
church.

Let us now take up the alleged ouster of Bishops De los Reyes, Bayaca,
Quijano and Tablante which, according to petitioner, has been validly decreed by
him as Supreme Bishop, and, as usual, let us refer to the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals:

“After having been notified of his removal as Supreme Bishop of the IFI and
required to turn over all the funds, documents and other properties of the
Church he had in hia possession to his successor by letter, Exhibit I, dated
January 23, 1946, the appellant organized a group of rebels of the church which,
on January 29, 1946, formed a Supreme Council composed of appellant himself,
Bishops Jamias (J.) Jamias (M), Gaerlan and Ruiz and the bishops he illegally
consecrated, namely, Evangelista, Elegado, Bergonia, Pasetes and Mondala. Said
Supreme Council met in Pasay; elected Juan Jamias as’ President of the Supreme
Council, who, in turn, appointed Gaerlan and Ruiz, as Juez de la Curia de
Apelaciones and Secretary General, respectively; and took cognizance of the
charges of Rev. Flaviano Lorenzo against Mons. Isabelo de las Reyes, Jr.,
Gerardo Bayaca, Juan Kijano and Pablo Tablante for alleged high treason to the
IFI (Exh. 30). On January 30, 1946 the same Supreme Council met, constituted
itself as a tribunal and rendered decision decreeing the separation of the above
mentioned Bishops Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. et al., from the
IFI.”

It should be noted that the action against the above mentioned bishops was
taken after petitioner had been notified of his removal as Supreme Bishop of the
Iglesia Filipina Independiente and required to turn over all the funds,
documents, and properties of the Church to his successor by the Supreme Council
of Bishops which decreed his forced resignation on January 21, 1946. If
petitioner has ceased to be the Supreme Bishop when he took that action against
the four bishops, then it would seem that he had no further authority to convoke
a Supreme Council of Bishops or a meeting of the Asamblea Magna te sit in
judgment of them in accordance with the constitution of the church and,
therefore, whatever action his group might have taken leading to their ouster
would necessarily be void and without effect. While apparently the ouster of
said bishops was made in accordance with the procedure laid down by the
constitution of the church wherein the four bishops were given an opportunity to
be heard and defend themselves, the validity of the action taken will
necessarily have to be premised on the legality of the forced resignation
decreed against petitioner which is also one of the issues raised by petitioner
in this appeal. This will be taken up in the latter part of this decision. In
the meantime, suffice it to state that the Court of Appeals has found the ouster
of Bishop De los Reyes and his companions to be without justification in view of
the conclusion it has reached that petitioner has been validly removed as
Supreme Bishop since January 22, 1946 and the Supreme Council of Bishops he had
convened was illegal it being composed merely of himself and the bishops he had
consecrated without the sanction of the legitimate members of the Supreme
Council of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. If this premise is correct, as
will be discussed elsewhere in this decision, then the ouster of Bishop De los
Reyes and his companions is unjustified and illegal.

II

In this second assignment of. error, petitioner claims that it was a mistake
for the Court of Appeals to consider Irineo C. de Vega as bishop and as member
of the Supreme Council, the Asamblea Magna, and the Asamblea General of the
church and this claim is predicated upon the fact that Bishop Vega has already
severed his connection with the church by voluntary resignation because of his
desire to engage in the practice of law.

We are afraid that this assignment of error raises a question of fact which
was already resolved by the Court of Appeals against the petitioner. The only
purpose of this assignment is to show that petitioner was not properly ousted as
Supreme Bishop and that Monsignors Bayaca and De los Reyes were not duly elected
as Supreme Bishops because Bishop Vega had no right to participate in the
proceeding affecting them, but in justifying his stand, petitioner brings into
play his own assumption of facts which have already been rejected by the Court
of Appeals. Thus, in discussing the evidence submitted by both parties relative
to the alleged resignation of Vega as bishop of the Iglesia Filipina
Indcpendiente, the Court of Appeals made the following findings:

“Testifying, appellant averred that it was the Secretary General Mons. De los
Reyes, Jr., who informed him that Vega did not want to continue as Bishop of the
IFI and that he preferred to engage in the practice of law (p. 188, tsn, First
Trial), but Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., testified that Bishop Vega did not actually
resign but only asked for a vacation which the Supreme Council granted, the
reason for such vacation being that his parish church in Paco had been burned
during the war. And Bishop Vega himself testified that he never resigned as
Bishop and that, in spite of the letter Exhibit 45 canseiLng his permit to
solemnize marriages, he continued to exercise the other powers and privileges of
his position; and that the appellant wrote a letter to the National Library for
the cancellation of Vega’s permit to solemnize marriages because of the
differences between the two or the grudge of appellant since the election in
1940 when the former was the campaign manager of Bishop Castro who ran against
the appellant for the position of Supreme Bishop.

“On the other hand, it appears that at the meeting on September 2, 1945 Vega
was assigned or appointed by the Consejo Supremo to the diocese of Tayabas,
Marinduque, Batangas and Mindoro (Exhibit M) and on October 18, 1945 the minutes
of said meeting were duly approved by the Supreme Council (Exhibit A A) and
appellant, although present in both meetings, never protested to such
appointment of Bishop Vega.

“We hold, therefore, that the alleged res:gnation of Vega or the voluntary
relinquishment of hia position as Bishop, has not been established by clear and
convincing evidence, and Error No. III assigned was not committed by the trial
court”

Note that, after discussing the evidence in the manner above stated, the
Court of Appeals held “that the alleged resignation of Vega or the voluntary
relinquishment of his position as Bishop, has not been established by clear and
convincing evidence”, and this finding we cannot now disturb.

III

The third assignment of error refers to the finding of the Court of Appeals
that Monsignors Apostol, Evangelista, Mondala, Pasetas, Bergonia, Ramos and
Elegado have not been validly consecrated as bishops and therefore cannot be
considered members of the Supreme Council, Asamblea Magna, and Asamblea General
of the church.

In this connection, the Court of Appeals found that the aforementioned seven
individuals were consecrated by petitioner without the approval of the Supreme
Council and in violation of the constitution of the church for, according to
said court, “In fact one of the charges filed against the (petitioner) which
culminated in his forced resignation was the latter’s having consecrated said
bishops not only without the consent or approval of the Consejo Supremo but also
ovtir its express objection as in the case of P. Evangelista.” And, in assailing
this finding, petitioner merely makes the comment that the appointments of these
bishops is an ecclesiastical matter which cannot be revised by the civil courts.
We have already stated that while the civil courts will ordinarily leave
ecclesiastical matters to church authorities, they may however intervene when it
is shown, as in this case, that they have acted outside the scope of their
authority or in a manner con- trary to their organic law and rules (45 Am. Jur.,
751, 754). This assignment, therefore, is without merit

IV and V

The fourth and fifth assignments of error read:

“IV. The Court of Appeals erred in not declaring that the bo called Supreme
Council and Asamblea General that met on January 21 and 22, 1946, respectively,
upon the call of Aguilar, were illegally constituted, and that, therefore, their
actuations were null and void, more particularly, the ouster of the petitioner
as Obispo Maximo decreed by them.

“V. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Asamblea General and the
Asamblea Magna referred to and defined in the Church’s constitution is one and
the same body.”

The fourth assignment of error is important because it calls for a
determination of the validity of the ouster of petitioner as Supreme Bishop of
the Iglesia Filipina Independiente. It involves an inquiry into the propriety of
the meeting held by the Supreme Council of Bishops and Asamblea General on
January 21, and January 22, 1946, respectively, upon the call of Bishop Aguilar.
For the determination of the pertinent issues, it is necessary to make a review
of the facts leading to the forced re signation of petitioner as Supreme Bishop
as found by the Court of Appeals.

It appears that on December 1, 1945, Bishop Aguilar filed charges against
petitioner as Supreme Bishop which he outlined in detail in a letter he
addressed to him on said date and which appears copied verbatim in the decision
of the Court of Appeals (Exhibit B). On December 4, 1945, Bishop Aguilar issued
a call for a meeting of the Asamblea General to be held on January 22, 1946
(Exhibit D), and on January 2, 1946, he issued another call for a meeting of the
Supreme Council to be held on January 21, 1946 for the purpose of hearing and
considering the charges contained in the aforesaid letter. Petitioner answered
the charges, through a counsel, in a written statement dated January 18, 1946
(Exhibit N) wherein he challenged the authority of Bishop Aguilar to summon the
council of bishops for the purpose of hearing the charges and the authority of
Bishop Remollino to attend the same on the ground that the two bishops had
already been expelled by him from the church. The Supreme Council of Bishops
convened on January 21, 1946 as scheduled and proceeded to deliberate on the
charges against petitioner, and after finding them proven and substantiated, it
approved a decree ordering the forced resignation of petitioner as Supreme
Bishop of the church. The decree was submitted to the Asamblea Magna or Asamblea
General which convened on January 22, 1946. Petitioner did not attend this
meeting but sent a printed answer to the charges (Exhibit 0). The assembly,
after deliberating on the merits of the decree as well as the reasons and
explanations advanced in petitioner’s answer, unanimously approved said decree
and immediately thereafter elected Bishop Gerardo Bayaca as Supreme Bishop in
place of petitioner.

Petitioner claims that the meeting of the Supreme Council held on January 21,
1946 was illegal because (1) .it was called by Bishop Aguilar, an unauthorized
person, who already ceased to be a bishop and president of the Supreme Council
by reason of his previous ouster, and (2) the bishops who were present did not
constitute a quorum. Likewise, petitioner assails the legality of the meeting of
the Asamblea General or Asamblea Magna held on January 22, 194G for the reasons
that (1) it was called by Bishop Aguilar alone and not by the Supreme Council as
provided for in the constitution, and (2) the persons who attended said meeting
did not constitute a quorum. Petitioner further contends that the Asamblea
General and the Asamblea Magna are two different bodies, their differences
being, to wit: the Asamblea General is called by the Supreme Council while the
Asamblea Magna is called by the Obispo Maximo; the Asamblea Magna is composed of
all bishopS, one priest from each diocese elected by the parish priests of the
same, and one layman from eacn diocese elected by the presidents of the
parochial committee, while the Asamblea General is composed of all bishops,
parish priests, and presidents of the parochial committees; and that the sole
function of the Asamblea General is to try the Supreme Bishop, while the
Asamblea Magna is called upon to elect the Supreme Bishop and to amend the
constitution of the church.

The claim that Bishop Aguilar had no authority to convene the Supreme Council
by reason of his previous ouster cannot now be sustained in view of our finding
that said ouster was made in violation of the constitution of the church. The
same thing may be said with regard to the claim that Bishop Vega had no right to
participate in the meeting because of his voluntary separation from the church.
It is only important to note in this connection that in the session of the
Supreme Council held on September 2, 1945, (Exhibit M), Bishop Aguilar was
elected president of said council and his designation has not been disputed by
petitioner. It was in this capacity that he issued the call for a meeting of the
Asamblea General on January 22,1946 and the call for a meeting of the Supreme
Council on January 21, 1946.

As regards the existence of a quorum in the meeting held by the Supreme
Council of January 21, 1946, the following is the finding of the Court of
Appeals: “After examining the whole record, we believe, and so hold, that on
January 21 and 22, 1946 there were only thirteen legitimate bishops of the IFI,
namely: Fonacier, Jamias (J.), Jamias (M.)f Gaerlan, Ruiz, De los Reyes, Jr.
Bayaca, Kijano, Tablante, Felipe, Aguilar, Remollino and Vega. Buyser is not
included because he was ill and never heard of. Seven out of these 13 attended
the meeting of the Consejo Supremo held on January 21 1946, namely: De los
Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, Kijano, Tablante, Aguilar, Remollino and Vega. It is,
therefore, beyond question that there was a quorum present in that session.”
This finding we cannot now disturb.

On the question whether or not the Asamblea General and the Asamblea Magna
are one and the same body, the Court of Appeals, after examining all the
provisions of the constitution of the church (Exhibits K and L), found that the
finding of the trial court in the affirmative sense was correct making its own
the reasons advanced by the said trial court in support of said conclusion. This
is now assailed by petitioner as erroneous because it ignored the amendment
introduced in the original provision of the constitution as regards the
composition of the Asamblea Magna.

While apparently the trial court overlooked the amendment pointed out by
petitioner regarding the composition of the Asemblea Magna, we do not however
consider material the nature of the change made as to affect the substance of
the finding of the trial court it appearing that the change is merely nominal
and does not make any reference to the composition of the Asamblea General. The
ambiguity in the composition of the latter body is still there for it nowhere
appears in the constitution any definition or explanation as regards its
composition in the same manner as it does with regard to the Asamblea Magna. It
is perhaps for this reason that the authorities of the church have involved
themselves in a confusion as to the real body that should be called upon to act
on the different problems of the church which accounts for their differences of
opinion as to whether said two bodies are really one and the same. As the
situation now stands, we do not feel justified in nullifying the actuation of
the assembly called by Bishop Aguilar in his capacity as President of the
Supreme Council of Bishops simply because it was called Asamblea Magna and not
Asamblea General as now pretended by petitioner.

The legality of the meeting of the Asamblea Magna held on January 22, 1946 is
also assailed because it was called by Bishop Aguilar alone and not by the
Supreme Council of Bishops as a body as provided for in the constitution. While
there is some merit in this contention, it cannot, however, have the effect of
nullifying the actuation of said body for this reason alone considering the
other factors that had intervened, namely: that the meeting was called by Bishop
Aguilar in his capacity as President of the Supreme Council; that this body
actually met in pursuance of that call and took action on the charges referred
to it by Bishop Aguilar, and that the action taken by the council was submitted
to the Asamblea General which the council well knew was to convene on January
22, 1946. All these acts of the council have the effect of ratifying the call
made by Bishop Aguilar.

Petitioner also argues that there was no quorum in the meeting of the
Asamblea General held on January 22, 1946 because of the thirty-one (31) persons
present thereat, only nineteen (19) were qualified to attend it because the
other twelve (12) were neither bishops nor parish priests, nor presidents of
local committees. This issue was also resolved by the Court of Appeals in the
affirmative sense, “the finding of the court on this matter is as follows:

“Pursuant to the Reglas Constitucionales the Asamblea Magna is composed of
all the bishops, and one parish priest delegate and one layman delegate from
each diocese. Accordingly, the total number of the members allowed to attend the
Asamblea Magna is equal to the number of the dioceses multiplied by three. To
find out how many delegates should be present in the session of the Asamblea
Magna on January 22, 1946, the number of dioceses into which the IFI was then
divided should be ascertained. According to the minutes of the meeting of
September 2, 1945 (Exhibit M) there were sixteen dioceses, two of which were
vacant. In the minutes (Exhibit 12) of the meeting of the Asamblea Magna, formed
by the faction of the appellant, on September 1, 1946 only fifteen dioceses were
listed. The total number of members or delegates allowed to attend the Asamblea
Magna on January 22, 1946, was, therefore, (48.) Only 25 of them were needed to
constitute a quorum. Since there were thirty-one members or delegates present in
that meeting, it is beyond question that a quorum was present.”

As a corollary to the above findings, the Court of Appeals held that the
Supreme Council and the Asamblea Magna that met on January 21, and January 22,
1946, respectively, were legally constituted and that the forced resignation and
ouster of petitioner taken therein and the designation of Bishop Bayaca as
Supreme Bishop, conducted on January 22, 1946, are valid. These findings, which
involve questions of fact, cannot now be looked into, and, therefore, should be
affirmed.

VI and VII

The next error assigned by petitioner refers to the legality of the election
of Bishop De los Reyes, Jr., as Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina
Independiente.

It appears that on September 1, 1946, upon the call made by Mons. Bayaca as
incumbent Supreme Bishop, the Asamblea Magna held a meeting and elected Bishop
Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. as his successor. This election is now assailed on the
ground that Mons. Bayaca had no authority to issue the call as he was not
legally elected Supreme Bishop and had been ousted as member of the church by
the Fonacier faction, and bcause there was no quorum present in that
meeting.

With regard to the first ground, we have already seen that the election of
Mons. Bayaca was found to be valid and his ouster by the Fonacier faction null
and void so that it cannot be said that he acted outside the scope of his
authority in calling the meeting in question. And with regard to the question of
quorum, the Court of Appeals found that there was, and this finding cannot now
be looked into.

Petitioner next takes up the legality of the election of Bishop Jamias as
Supreme Bishop of the church contending that the Court of Appeals committed an
error in declaring said election invalid and without effect.

On this point, the evidence shows that petitioner Fonacier, calling himself
as Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente, issued a call to all
those bishops and rebels belonging to his faction for a meeting to be held by
the Asamblea Magna on September 1, 1946 for the election of his successor, and
it was in that meeting where Bishop Jamias was elected to take his place as
Supreme Bishop; but such election was found by the Court of Appeals to be
illegal because, “It has been conducted not by a quorum of qualified and
legitimate members of the IFI but by rebels thereof who were not authorized to
organize the so-called Asamblea Magna”, anfl so it concluded that Mons. Juan
Jamias was not legally elected as Supreme Bishop of said church. This finding
also involves a question of fact which we cannot now look into.

IX, X, XI and XII

Finally, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred:

“IX. In holding that the abandonment of the constitution, restatement of
articles of .religion and abandonement of faith or abjuration alleged by
petitioner are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts.

“X. In holding that the new declaration of faith and the abandonment of the
constitution of the church were legally and validly adopted by the duly
constituted Consejo Supremo and Asamblea Magna composed of legitimate members of
the IFI headed by respondent Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., and duly empowered by
the reglas constitucionales (Exhibits K, and L,) to take such actions.

“XI. In holding that the consecration of Reyes, Bayaca, and Aguilar as
bishops by the American Protestant Episcopal Church was merely for the purpose
of conferring upon them apostolic succession and there is no factual basis for
their alleged abjuration or separation from the IFI.

“XII. In not holding that the respondent Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr., and
Gerardo M. Bayaca, having abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and
practices, as well as the constitution of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente,
and having adhered to those of others, have automatically ceased to belong to
said church, and consequently, have no personality to maintain the present
action.” (9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th assignments of error.)

The issues raised in the foregoing assignments of error were squarely met by
the Court of Appeals whose decision on the matter, because of its lucidity and
the interesting discussion made therein concerning the importance of the alleged
abandonment of the Constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and
abandonment of faith or abjuration on the part of Bishop De los Reyes, Bayaca
and Aguilar in relation to the tenets of the original constitution of the church
and the conclusions it has drawn in line with the authorities cited in support
thereof, we can do no better than to quote in toto hereunder:

“Sometime in April 1947, Bishops De los Reyes, Jr., Gerardo Bayaca and Manuel
Aguilar, upon their petition, were consecrated as bishops of the Protestant
Episcopal Church of the United States. On August 5, 1947, the Obispo Maximo, the
Supreme Council, the Asamblea Magna of appellee’s faction amended the
constitution of the IFI (Exhibit 55) and restated its articles of religion
(Exhibit 54).

“On January 10, 1948, the appellant amended his answer by further alleging
that: ‘in or about the month of August, 1947, plaintiff Isabelo de los Keyes,
Jr. as alleged Obispo Maximo of the plaintiff’s Iglesia Filipina Independiente,
formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America, a duly existing
religious corporation, and therefore, has ceased to be a member of the Iglesia
Filipina Independiente, and has no legal capacity to sue, allegedly as Obispo
Maximo of the last mentioned church.’

“On this point the court below took the view that the alleged doctrinal
changes, abandonment of faith and acts of abjuration complained of are purely
ecclesiastical matters and that since Bishop De los Reyes, Jr. allowed himself
to be consecrated bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church under the conviction
that he was so authorized by the Supreme Council of the IFI and with the
condition that he would not be bound by any obligation to the Episcopal Church,
his consecration will not , affect his affiliation as member of the IFI unless
the latter takes action against him and expels him, if found guilty.

“Appellant now claims that the trial court committed the first error assigned
because it should have held that appellees De loa Reyes, Jr. and Bayaca, having
abandoned the faith, fundamental doctrines and practices, as well as the
Constitution of the IFI, and having adhered to those of others, have
automatically ceased to belong1 to said church, and consequently, have no
personality to maintain the present action.

“The arguments of appellant may be summarized as follows:

(1) that the civil courts have jurisdiction to revise decisions on
ecclesiastical matters where it is necessary to do so for the purpose of
settling question of civil and property rights or when property rights are
aflected; (2) that the amendment of the constitution of the IFI approved in
August, 1947, were illegal and ineffective, inasmuch as they were not approved
by the duly constituted authorities of the church; (3) that said amendments
introduced radical and substantial changes in the profession of faith and
fundamental doctrines and practices of the church; and (4) that in view of said
amendments and of subsequent consecration of plaintiffs-appellees as bishops by
the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States they have lost their rights
to claim any participation in the properties and to use the name of the IFI.

“The position of appellant is that appellees having taken part in adopting
and sanctioning amendments to the church’s constitution which radically and
substantially changed the profession of faith and fundamental doctrines and
practices of the church, his faction cannot now be compelled to deliver to the
appellees whatever property of the church are in its hands particularly because
said faction continues to be loyal and faithful to the original doctrines and
practices of said church. In support of this stand appellant cites several
authorities (Watson vs. Jones, 20 L-ed. 666; 45 Am. Jur., 764, 765;
Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ, L. D. S. vs. Church of Christ, 60
Fed. 937; Paranaque Methodist Episcopal Church, et al. vs. Methodist
Episcopal Church, et- al., 33 0. G. 534, and 54 C. J. 71) holding that in case
of schism within a church its properties should remain with the faction that
continues adhering to the original doctrines and practices of the church
irrespective of whether it constitutes a majority or a minority of the members
thereof.

“It is to be recalled that the forced resignation of appellant as Obispo
Maximo of the IFI was ordered on January 22, 1946 and on the same day, appellee,
Mons. Gerardo Bayaca was elected as Obispo Maximo to replace him. On January 23,
1946, appellant was notified of his removal and required to surrender and
deliver all personal properties of the church still in his possession or under
his control. Instead of doing so, he with a few members of the Consejo Supremo,
with the help of some members of the laity, because of dissatisfaction with the
action of the majority in removing the appellant as Supreme Bishop, erected
themselves into a new organization formed a rump Consejo Supremo and a rump
Asamblea Magna and claiming to speak for the church, decreed the ouster of Mons,
Bayaca, De los Keyes, Jr., Kijano and Tablante on January 30, 1946. On February
9, 1946 this action was commenced by Mons. Bayaca and the IFI seeking to compel
appellant to render an accounting of his management of the properties of the
church and deliver the same to the plaintiffs. The alleged doctrinal changes
took place in August, 1947. It is thus clear that the present action sprang out
of a mere division not a schism in the church. Schism is ‘a division or
separation in a church or denomination of Christians, occasioned by diversity of
opinions, breach of unity among people of the same religious faith (45 Am. Jur.,
775), a division occasioned by diversity of opinion on religious subjects (38
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed. 303), while division means ‘no more than a
separation of the society into two parts, without any change of faith or
ulterior relations’ (45 Am. Jur., p. 775). Such being the case, the doctrinal
changes and abandonment of faith are irrelevant and immaterial in the case at
bar and the invoked rule of doctrinal adherence does not apply.

“But assuming that there was a real schism in the IFI, the situation, under
the facts of record, would not help appellant’s contention because pursuant to
the ruling in the case of Watson vs. Jones, 20 Law Ed., pp. 674-676,
cited by both parties, the use of properties of a ‘religious congregation’ in
case of schism, ‘is controlled by the numerical majority of the members, such
ruling admitting of no inquiry into the existing religious opinions of those who
comprise the legal and regular organization.’

“The law is stated in that case as follows:

‘The questions which have come before the civil courts con- cerning the
rights to property held by ecclesiastical bodies, may as far as we have been
able to examine them, be profitably classified under three general heads, which
of course do not include cases governed by considerations applicable to a church
established and supported by law as the religion, of the state.

‘1. That first of these is when the property which is the subject of
controversy has been, by the deed of will of the donor, or other instrument by
which the property is held, by the express terms of the instrument devoted to
the teaching, support or spread of some specific form of religious doctrine or
belief.

‘2. The second is when the property is held by a religious congregation
which, by the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other
ecclesiastical associations, and so far as church government is concerned owns
no fealty or obligation to any higher authority.

‘3. The third is where the religious congregation or ecclesiastical body
holding the property is but a subordinate member of some general church
organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general
and ultimate power of control more or less complete in some supreme judicatory
over the whole membership of that general organization.

‘The second class of cases which we have described has reference to the case
of a church of a strictly congregational or independent organization, governed
solely within itself, either by a majority of its members or by such other local
organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical government;
and to property held by such a church, either by way of purchase or donation,
with no other specific trust attached to it in the hands of the church than that
it is for the use of that congregation as a religious society.

‘In such cases, where there is a schism which leads to a separation into
distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of such bodies to the use of the
property must be determined by ordinary principles which govern voluntary
associations. If the principle of government in such cases is that the majority
rules, then the numerical majority of members must control the right to the use
of the property. If there be within the congregation officers in whom are vested
the powers of such control, then those who adhere in the acknowledged organism
by which the body is governed are entitled to the use of the property. The
minority in choosing to separate themselves into a distinct body, and refusing
to recognize the authority of the government body, can claim no rights in the
property from the fact that they had once been members of the church oi
congregation. This ruling admits of no inquiry into the existing religious
opinions of those who comprise the legal at regular organization; for, if such
was permitted, a very small minority, without any officers of the church among
them, might be found to be the only faithful supporters of the religious dogmas
of the founders of the church. There being no such trust imposed upon the
property when purchased or given, the court will, not imply one for the purpose
of expelling from its use those who by regular succession and order constitute
the church, because they may have changed in some respect their views of
religious truth.

‘Of the cases in which this doctrine is applied no better representative can
be found than that of Shannon vs. Nelson, 18 Vt. 511, which asserts
this doctrine in case where a legacy was left to the Associate congregation of
Ryegate, the interest whereof was to be annually paid to their minister forever.
In that case, though the Ryegate congregation was one of a number of
Presbyterian churches connected with the general Presbyterian body at large, the
court held that the only inquiry was whether the society still exists, and
whether they have a minister chosen and appointed by the majority and regularly
ordained over the society, agreeably to the usage of that denomination. And
though we may be of opinion that the doctrine of that case needs modification,
so far as it discussed the relation of the Ryegate congregation to the other
judicatures of the body to which it belongs, it certainly lays down the
principle correctly if that congregation was to be treated as an independent
one.’ (Watson vs. Jones, 20 Law Ed., pp. 674-676).

“It goes without saying that the properties of the IFI are held by a
religious congregation; that said church comes under the second class described
in the above-quoted decision; and. that the numerical majority is on the side of
the faction of the appellees, because 7 out of the 13 bishops of the church went
to them and according to the statement of the Director of National Library,
issued on May 22, 1947, appellee’s faction was composed of 19 bishops and 252
priests whereas appellant’s faction had only 10 bisheps and 40 priests, and on
January 22, 1948 its bishops and priests were 293 as against 64 of appelant’s
group (Exhibit 25).

“The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with
faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule
of a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church those
allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil courts (45 Am. Jur. 748-752.
755).

“It appears that the main complaint of the appellant is that the appellees
upon adopting their new declaration of faith and the amendments of the
constitution of the church, as appears in Exhibits 54 and 55, they have
repudiated the Oficio Divino which is the definite statement of the doctrines
and rites of the IFI and the official book of the church. But appellant admits
that said Oficio Divino ‘does not pretend to close the way for any change which
the progress of religious science may in the course of time show to be true and
acceptable/ (Appellant’s Memorandum, pp. 28-29). Indeed, the Oficio Divino
itself says that it was an ‘ensayo’ and that its purpose was merely to give
definite forms to the then accepted doctrines of the church without however
closing the doors to, or making impossible any future changes that the progress
of religious science might demand. Thus the note on page 221 of the Oficio
Divino (Exhibit 57) reads as follows:

‘Con la publicacion del presente libro, damos formas definitivas a nuestras
doctrinas, pero sin cerrar jamas el camino del progreso de la ciencia religiosa
como si pretendieramos pasar por dogmas el resultado de nuestras
investigaciones.’

“It cannot be gainsaid that since the establishment of the IFI in 1902 there
have been some changes and revisions of some of its tenets and articles of
faith. This is quite understandable in a church like the Aglipayan Church which
is not an ancient one and has not had the opportunity to make any of its
doctrines and tenets clear and dogmatic. And it is but natural and fitting that
new doctrines in religious matters be subjected to investigation and revision or
even rejection in harmony with the advancement of religious science.

“Appellant contends however, that any such changes should be adopted by the
church (Memorandum supra). Without resolving whether the amendments in question
(Exhibits 54 and 55) constitute repudiation of faith or involve wide departure
from the fundamental and characteristic beliefs or policy of the IFI, we
believe, and so hold, that the same were legally and validly adopted by the duly
constituted Consejo Supremo and Asamblea Magna composed of legitimate members of
the IFI, headed by Mons. Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. and duly empowered by the
Reglas Constitucionales, as amended (Exhibits K and L), to take such action.
Appellant’s insistence that Bishops Aguilar, Remollino, De los Reyes, Jr.,
Bayaca, Kijano and Tablante who took part in the adoption of said amendments
having been ousted by appellant’s faction were not authorized to act for the
IFI, is untenable. We have already discussed and held somewhere in this opinion
that the alleged ouster of the aforementioned bishops was null and void and the
election of Bishop De los Reyes, Jr., as Obispo Maximo was valid and we did
recognize him as the sole and legitimate head of the IFI.

“Anent the consecrations of Mons. De los Reyes, Jr., Bayaca, and Aguilar as
bishops of the American Protestant Episcopal Church, we find that the
preponderating weight of evidence reveals, as questions of fact, that the
purpose of said consecrations was merely the conferring of apostolic succession
upon said bishops; that the American Episcopal Church did not acquire any
authority, ecclesiastical or otherwise over the IFI or over the bishops thus
consecrated; and that the latter were not required to take oath nor were they
accepted as bishops of the aforesaid episcopal church by virtue of their
consecrations, according to the uncontradicted testimony of Bishop Norman
Spencer Binstead, of the American Episcopal Church, who consecrated them and of
Bishops Bayaca, Aguilar and De los Reyes themselves. Hence, there is no factual
basis for the alleged abjuration or separation from the IFI of said bishops and,
consequently, appellees Isabelo de los Reyes, Jr. and Gerardo M. Bayaca are
still members of the IFI, and do not lack personality to maintain the present
action.”

We can hardly add to the above findings to which we agree. We wish only to
make the following observations. The complaint in this case was filed on
February 9, 1946 raising as the main issue whether petitioner should still be
regarded as legitimate Supreme Bishop of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente or
whether he has been properly replaced by Bishop Gerardo Bayaca. This has been
recognized by petitioner himself who, in the brief he sub- mitted to the Court
of Appeals, maintained that the only issue was, “Who is the true and legitimate
Obispo Maximo of the IFI?” The alleged abjuration of respondent De los Reyes and
Bishops Bayaca and Aguilar and the alleged restatement of articles of religion
and doctrinal differences between the new and original constitutions of the
church were never alleged directly or indirectly in the pleadings of the
parties. These questions were raised for the first time on January 10, 1948 when
petitioner filed a supplementary answer alleging that on August, 1947, the re-
spondent “formally joined the Protestant Episcopal Church of America.” The
alleged doctrinal changes and abjura- tion took place therefore after this case
was filed in court, and after the division of the church into two groups had
occurred, and, consequently, they could not have been the cause of the division.
Under these circumstances, it would seem clear that the allegation regarding the
alleged changes in doctrinal matters or in matters of faith incorporated in the
constitutions of the church are entirely irrelevant in the present case. And, on
this matter, this observation of the Court of Appeals conies in very fittingly:
“The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion, and
abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with
faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule
of a church having reference to the power of excluding from the church those
allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters
which are outside the province of the civil courts.” (45 Am. Jur., 748-752,
755.) To this we agree.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as
to costs.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., and Reyes, J.B.L.,
JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed.