FELIX MEDIRAN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MAXIMIANO VILLANUEVA ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Upon December 22, 1915, the plaintiff, Felix Mediran, instituted an action of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer in the court of the justice of the peace of
the municipality of Amadeo, Cavite, against the defendants Maximiano Villanueva,
Jacinto Villanueva, and Pedro Villanueva, to recover the possession of a parcel
of land situated in said municipality, alleging that he had been in possession
thereof until on or about December 15, 1915, when the defendants unlawfully
entered thereon and thereafter forcibly detained the same from him. The prayer
was that judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the possession
of said premises and that the defendants be adjudged to pay damages for the
unlawful detention, together with costs.

Upon January 11, 1916, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff was entered in
the court of the justice of the peace against Jacinto Villanueva and Pedro
Villanueva, and the two latter thereupon appealed to the Court of First Instance
of the Province of Cavite. In said court the plaintiff substantially reproduced
his original complaint, omitting the name of Maximiano Villanueva therefrom, as
this party had been shown to have had no part in the act which was the subject
of the complaint. The two defendants Jacinto Villanueva and Pedro Villanueva
answered the complaint with a general denial and by way of special defense
asserted that they were the owners of the property in question, claiming to have
inherited the same from their father who died nearly 20 years before. At the
hearing in the Court of First Instance judgment was.rendered in favor of the
defendants, and the plaintiff in earn has appealed to this court.

It appears, by what we consider to be a clear preponderance of the evidence,
that the plaintiff, Felix Mediran, for many years prior to the occurrence which
led to the institution of the present action, had been in lawful and undisturbed
possession of the premises in question and during a large part of this time had
cultivated portions thereof either in person or by means of a laborer whom he
placed in charge of the premises to cultivate the same on shares. The property,
it appears, is located some distance away from the poblacion of Amadeo
and in comparatively unfrequented parts. During the years 1913 and 1914 no crops
of any importance were grown on the land, owing to the excessive drought then
prevailing, though maize may have been planted during these years in certain
portions of the property.

About the middle of December 1915, while laborers employed by the plaintiff
were engaged at work preparatory to planting, the defendants appeared on the
scene and ordered them to depart, which they did. Upon being notified of this
incident the plaintiff repaired to the land and there found the defendants busy
in the fields. The plaintiff thereupon ordered the defendants to desist, but
they replied with a threat to the effect that if he bothered them something ill
would befall him.

There is evidence in the record tending to show that the defendants had
previously appeared on these premises in October of the same year, or before,
and had then done acts which indicated an intention to exercise dominion over
the property. This incursion, however, was not known to the plaintiff at that
time, and the first intimation which he received of the fact that the defendants
were upon the property was in December, as already stated.

Upon the foregoing statement of facts we are of the opinion that the
plaintiff should be restored to possession and that the Court of First Instance
was in error in giving judgment for the defendants. The action of the lower
court seems to have been bas(,d in part upon the idea that the defendants had
not used force in Sufficient degree to give rise to a right of action under
section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended, and in part upon the idea
that inasmuch as the defendants asserted that they were owners of the property,
a question of ownership was raised, with the result that the jurisdiction of the
court was thereby defeated.

Upon the first point, it will be noted that the statute defining the
conditions under which the action of forcible entry and detainer will lie, in so
far as it relates to the situation where a trespasser unlawfully seizes and
withholds possession, is in the following words:

“Anyone deprived of the possession of any land, or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, * * * shall at any time within one
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession be entitled, *
* * to restitution of the land, building, and premises possession of which is
unlawfully withheld, together with damages and costs.” (Sec. 80, Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended.)

In order to constitute the use of “force,” as contemplated in this provision,
the trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. Nor is it even
necessary that he should use violence against the person of the party in
possession. The act of going on the property and excluding the lawful possessor
therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this
is all that is necessary. Under the statute entering upon the premises by
strategy or stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by force. The foundation
of the action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a
person who has entered without right. The words “by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth” include every situation or condition under which one person
can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior
possession, therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under
the very eyes of the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without
the consent of the latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior
possessor from the property, the action of forcible entry and detainer can
unquestionably be maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser
other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself
on the ground and excluding the other party.

Juridically speaking, possession is distinct from ownership, and from this
distinction are derived legal consequences of much importance. In giving
recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law
is to protect the person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of
controverted right, it requires the parties to preserve the status quo
until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that
the person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending
this decision; and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in a
petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of
dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual” security and
disturbing to social order. Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the
owner of a piece of property and desires to vindicate his ownership against the
party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an action to
this end in a cotort of competent jurisdiction ; and he can not be permitted, by
invading the property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the
latter the burden of instituting an action to try the property right.

Upon the second point it is clear that under the law now in force it is
beyond the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace to adjudicate in any case upon
the question of the title of real property, or to declare that one person rather
than another is the owner. But it does not result from this that when an action
of forcible entry and detainer is instituted to recover possession the defendant
can defeat the proceeding merely by asserting ownership in himself. Though the
jurisdiction to determine the question of ownership is vested exclusively in the
superior court, the inferior court of the justice of the peace possesses full
power to determine the right of possession and assess the damages incident to
the unlawful detention. To this end it may consider the evidence of
ownership.

Section 68 of Act No. 136, as amended by section 3 of Act No. 1627, reads as
follows:

“A justice of the peace shall have no jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of
title to real estate or any interest therein, and whenever a case requiring
such adjudication is brought before him it shall be his duty, upon discovering
the same, to suspend further proceedings therein, and certify the cause
forthwith to the Court of First Instance.” (This was superseded by the
amendatory provisions contained in section 3 of Act No. 2041, and section 1 of
Act No. 2131; but as the latter provisions were held to be invalid in Barrameda
vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep.f 44, the provision above quoted remains in
force.)

The introduction into the statute of the words which we have printed in
italics was most unfortunate. What should have been stated, if it was necessary
to state anything, in place of these words was a rule to the effect merely that
no judgment entered in a case originating in the court of a justice of the peace
should affect the title of real property or operate as res adjudicata
with respect thereto. The result of the words actually employed in this statute
is to place upon the justice of the peace in all these cases the duty of
deciding, as a preliminary question affecting his jurisdiction, whether the
action involves possession only or ownership as well. The determination of this
question has often been a source of great perplexity to both courts and
litigants; and when a mistake is made it is followed by very inconvenient
results. For instance, if the justice of the peace erroneously decides that the
action involves a question of ownership, and certifies the case into the Court
of First Instance, and the latter court discovers that the only question is one
relating to possession, no judgment can there be entered upon the merits, and
the cause must be returned, so it is decided, to the court of the justice of the
peace in order that he may proceed to hear the cause.

Now, how are we to determine whether a particular action is a purely
possessory action, ,and as such within the jurisdiction of the court of the
justice of the peace, or an action founded on property right, and therefore
beyond the jurisdiction of such court? In considering this problem the averments
of the complaint and character of the relief sought are primarily to be
consulted; but it would be a mistake to suppose that an action involves a
question of title merely because the plaintiff may allege in his complaint that
he is the owner of the land. Just as the plaintiff may introduce proof of his
title in order to show the character of his prior possession, so he may allege
ownership in himself as a material and relevant fact in the case, and the
insertion of such an allegation in the complaint cannot by any possibility place
the cause beyond the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court, provided it
otherwise sufficiently appears that what the plaintiff really seeks is the
restoration of possession as against an intruder who has seized the property
within the period of one year. Much less can the defendant in such an action
defeat the jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court by setting up title in
himself. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the factor which
defeats the jurisdiction of the court of the justice of the peace is the
necessity to adjudicate the question of title. The circumstance that proof of
title is introduced at the hearing or that a claim of ownership is made by
either or both of the parties is not material. The simple rule to be applied in
all such cases is therefore this:! If the complaint shows that the plaintiff had
prior possession of the premises and that within the period of one year he has
been deprived thereof by a trespasser, who excludes him and withholds possession
without right, the action must be considered to be within the jurisdiction of
the justice of the peace, for the purpose of restoring: the plaintiff to
possession, regardless of any claims of ownership put forth by either party,
provided the prayer of the complaint is limited to such relief.

It will be here observed that the plaintiff must prove a prior possession in
himself. The question arises, what sort of possession is here intended? The
answer evidently is that the plaintiff merely” has to show actual possession,
possession in fact, or as it is expressed in article 430 of the Civil Code,
“natural possession,” supposing this term capable of being properly used with
respect to the possession of such a thing as land. As between a person who has
possession of this kind and a mere intruder who enters by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy, or stealth the presumption of law favors the former and to him
accordingly the protection of the law is extended. Possession of a piece of
property may be wholly precarious or unrighteous, yet if the possessor has in
his favor priority of time, he has this security, that he is entitled to stay
upon the property until he is put off lawfully by a person having a better
right. Of course, if one person merely holds for another, as in the case of a
servant for a master, the actual possession must be conceded to be in the
latter, since possession, as a fact, cannot be recognized in two different
personalities (art. 445, Civ. Code.)

There is one point at which section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure
undoubtedly jars upon the mind of a person imbued with the conceptions of the
Civil Code relative to possession. That section, it will be observed supposes
that a person who has possession may be deprived of such possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. As a corollary it results that the
intruder, by the same token, acquires possession in himself. But under the
doctrine of possession which informs the Civil Code, this is an impossibility,
since, in article 444 of the Civil Code, it is said that acts which are merely
tolerated and those clandestinely executed, without knowledge of the possessor
of a thing, or by force, do not affect the possession. It is thus apparent that
in a situation where the civil law says a change of possession is impossible,
the Code of Civil Procedure supposes a change of possession to take place.
Evidently the word “possession,” as used in section 80 means nothing more than
the physical possession, not legal possession in the sense contemplated in
article 444 of the Civil Code.

A few words upon one additional point. Can the fact of possession be
established by the plaintiff in an action of forcible entry and detainer by
proof of ownership? The answer is that, under certain conditions, it can. Of
course, if a party can prove external acts of dominion over a particular piece
of ground, as continuous cultivation or the uninterrupted taking of produce from
the fields, he has no need to resort to proof of ownership. The proof of actual
possession, based upon these acts of dominion, is sufficient. But the case may
be that of a man who owns a tract of land in a remote or unfrequented part of
the country. He has, we may suppose, acquired title by composition with the
State, and he has not been exercising acts indicative of actual possession over
the whole tract at all times. An obtruder enters secretly upon the land and
proceeds to occupy a portion thereof to the exclusion of the owner. It can not
be open to question [that] that owner may here prove, in an action of forcible
entry and detainer, that the patch of ground in dispute is part of the larger
part of which he is owner and of which he has had possession. In this case the
document of title would be admissible in evidence as defining the limits of his
holding and the character of the possession asserted by him.

From what has been said it results that the judgment of the Court of First
Instance entered in this case in favor of the defendants should be reversed; and
judgment will be here rendered condemning the defendants, Pedro Villanueva and
Jacinto Villanueva, to restore the possession of the land in question to the
plaintiff Felix Mediran. It is further adjudged that the plaintiff recover of
said defendants the sum of P30 as damages, together with the costs of this
proceeding in the three instances. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Araullo, and Fisher, JJ.,
concur.