THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. FRANK TUPASI MOLINA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On the 6th day of February, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of
Ilocos Sur filed a complaint against the defendant charging him with the crime
of perjury, alleged to have been committed as follows:

“The said Frank Tupasi Molina, the above-named defendant, did on September
10,1912, in the municipality of Tayum of the Province of Ilocos Sur, P. I., for
the purpose of gaining admission, as in fact he did, owing to the deceit he
practiced, as will be hereinafter related, to the examinations for the municipal
police service in the Province of Ilocos Sur, which were held in the
municipality of Vigan, said province, on or about January 18, 1913, willfully,
unlawfully, and criminally take a false oath by affirming and asserting in an
oath that he knew to be false, in an examination application which he himself
filled out and signed, that prior to the said date, to wit, September 10, 1912,
he had never been indicted, tried, or sentenced for the violation of any law,
ordinance, or regulation in any court, when he knew at the time he took that
oath and signed his examination application, as he knows at the present time,
that he had been twice indicted for disturbing the public peace, and for
injurias graves, and sentenced to pay a fine and undergo imprisonment
therefor, by the justice of the peace court of Tayum and the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur.

“The defendant made the false declaration previously mentioned after he had
sworn before Lucas Magno, notary public, authorized by law to administer oaths,
that he would state the truth; and said false declaration made under the oath
taken by the defendant, as above stated, concerned a fact of such importance
that without it he would not have been admitted to said examinations prescribed
for the municipal police service. In violation of the law. (Sec. 3, Act No.
1697.)”

After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the
Honorable Francisco Santamaria, judge,found the defendant guilty of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to be imprisoned for a period of two months and to
pay a fine of P100, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
accordance with the provisions of the law, and to pay the costs. The defendant
was further sentenced to be disqualified from holding any public office or from
giving testimony in any court in the Philippine Islands until such time as the
sentence against him is reversed. From that sentence the defendant appealed to
this court and made the following assignments of error:

“1. The trial court erred in holding section 3 of Act No. 1697 to be
applicable in this case.

“2. The trial court manifestly erred in sentencing the appellant for
violation of section 3 of Act No. 1697, when the prosecution did not present any
evidence demonstrating that he had willfully and corruptly sworn or taken an
oath.

“3. The trial court erred in not sustaining the defense set up by the
appellant Tupasi with reference to the construction he placed upon the fifth
question of Exhibit A of the prosecution.

“4. The trial court erred also in holding that the words ‘which he does not
believe to be true,’ used in Act No. 1697, are equivalent to the term ‘knowingly
used in section 31 of Act No. 1761.

“5. The trial court erred in not acquitting the defendant.” It appears from
the record that on the 10th day of September, 1912, the defendant signed a
petition to be permitted to take the examination for the position of municipal
policeman. Said petition was signed by the defendant and sworn to by him before
a notary public. Said petition contained a number of questions which the
applicant was required to answer. Among other questions we find that No. 5 was
as follows:

“Have you ever been indicted, tried, or sentenced in any court for violation
of any law, ordinance, or regulations, or have you ever been tried or sentenced
for violation of regulations of the Army, Navy, or the Constabulary, in any
court martial of the Army or of the Constabulary, or in any other
court?”

To said question the defendant answered: “No, sir; I cannot remember
any.”

During the trial of the cause the prosecuting attorney presented Exhibits B,
C, and D.

Exhibit B shows that one Francisco Tupasi and others, on the 8th day of
February, 1911, had been arrested by an.order of the justice of the peace of the
municipality of Tayum, Province of Ilocos Sur, and charged with disturbing the
public peace, were found guilty, and sentenced, on the 20th day of February,
1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen days, and each to pay a fine of
25 pesetas, and to pay the costs.

Exhibit C shows that Francisco Tupasi, on the 18th day of May, 1911, had been
arrested and taken before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Tayum,
Province of Ilocos Sur, charged with the crime of “injurias graves,” and was
sentenced on the 22d day of May, 1911, to be imprisoned for a period of fifteen
days and to pay a fine of 75 pesetas and the costs.

Exhibit D is the certificate of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Ilocos Sur and shows that the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, on the
26th day of April, 1911, in an appealed case for disturbing the public peace,
sentenced the said Francisco Tupasi and others to pay a fine of 60
pesetas, in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, and
to pay the costs.

Exhibit A was the sworn petition presented by the defendant for permission to
take the examination. Said petition was signed by Frank Tupasi y Molina. It was
shown during the trial of the cause, by the admission of the defendant himself,
that he was the same person accused and sentenced in Exhibits B, C, and I). It
is argued that the defendant signed said application in the name of “Frank
Tupasi y Molina” when he had theretofore been known as “Francisco Tupasi,” for
the purpose of avoiding identity. The defendant said that “Francisco” was the
same as “Frank” and that he had adopted the name of “Frank” instead of
“Francisco.” The answers to the questions in said application were made in
English.

With reference to the first assignment of error, that the lower court
committed an error in applying section 3 of Act No. 1697 to the facts in the
present case, it may be said that said article provides that:

“Any person who, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer,
or person”, in any case in which a law of the Philippine Islands authorizes an
oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify
truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or certificate by
him subscribed is true, wilfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes
any -material matter which he does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury,
and shall be punished, etc.”

Act No. 2169 of the Philippine Legislature, which is an Act to provide for
the reorganization, government, and inspection of municipal police of the
municipalities or provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83,
provides for the reorganization of the municipal police of the municipalities or
provinces and subprovinces organized under Act No. 83.

Said Act further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Commerce and Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare general
regulations for the good government, discipline, and inspection of the municipal
police, “compliance wherewith shall be obligatory for all members of the
organization.”

Said Act further provides for an examining board for the municipal police. It
further provides that, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and
Police, the Director of Constabulary shall prepare an/examination manual,
prescribing, at the same time, suitable rules for the conduct of the
examination.

Said Act (No. 2169) also provides for the time and place for holding said
examinations.

Section 9 of said Act provides that: “To be eligible for examination, a
candidate shall have the following requirements: * * * (6) Have no criminal
record.”

In accordance with the requirements of said law, the Director of Constabulary
prepared an examination manual, prescribing at the same time rules for
conducting examinations, which examination manual was approved by the Secretary
of Commerce and Police, and thereby was given the force of law. Said manual
prescribed a form in blank, known as (Municipal Form No. 11,” which form each
applicant was required to fill, in order to be permitted to take said
examination. Said application required the applicant to swear to the facts
stated therein. We have, therefore, a law which authorizes the administration of
an oath in the present case.

Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for
the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as
the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law,
they are valid. A violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer
of the Government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such
regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment
in accordance with the provisions of law. (United States vs. Bailey, 9
Pet., 238, 252, 254, 256; Caha vs. United States, 152 U. S., 211, 218;
United States vs. Eaton, 144 U. S., 677.)

In the very nature of things in many cases it becomes impracticable for the
legislative department of the Government to provide general regulations for the
various and varying details for the management of a particular department of the
Government. It therefore becomes convenient for the legislative department of
the Government, by law, in a most general way, to provide for the conduct,
control, and management of the work of the particular department of the
Government; to authorize certain persons, in charge of the management, control,
and direction of the particular department, to adopt certain rules and
regulations providing for the detail of the management and control of such
department. Such regulations have uniformly been held to have the force of law,
whenever they are found to be in consonance and in harmony with the general
purposes and objects of the law. Many illustrations might be given. For
instance, the Civil Service Board is given authority to examine applicants for
various positions within the Government service. The law generally provides the
conditions in a most general way, authorizing the chief of such Bureau to
provide rules and regulations for the management of the conduct of examinations,
etc. The law provides that the Collector of Customs shall examine persons who
become applicants to act as captains of ships for the coastwise trade, providing
at the same time that the Collector of Customs shall establish rules and
regulations for such examinations. Such regulations, once established and found
to be in conformity with the general purposes of the law, are just as binding
upon all of the parties, as if the regulations had been written in the original
law itself. (United States vs. Grimaud, 220 U. S., 506; Williamson
vs. United States, 207 U. S., 425; United States vs. United
Verde Copper Co., 196U. S., 207.)

By reference to Exhibit A, the application made and sworn to by the
defendant, we find that the oath was taken before a notary public, a person
qualified to administer an oath, in accordance with the provisions of law.

The defendant, in support of his first assignment of error, argues that the
purpose of Act No. 1697 was not intended to cover cases like the present. He
argues that said Act was an Act only authorizing the appointment of
commissioners, to make official investigations, fixing their powers, for the
payment of witness fees, and for the punishment of perjury in official
investigations. The same question was presented to this court in the case of
“United States vs. Conception (13 Phil. Rep., 424). In that case the court
decided against the contention of the defendant in the present case. It is true
that the title of said Act (No. 1697) does not seem to indicate that said law
contained a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. Reading the
title alone, it would seem to be a law punishing the crime of perjury in
particular cases. The law (Act No. 1697) is a general law. It is not a private
or local law. In the United States the constitutions in the different States
generally provide that the title of a law shall indicate the general purpose of
the law. There seems to be no provision in the Philippine Islands that the title
of a general law shall contain a statement of the subject matter of the law.
Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, provides:

“That no private or local bill which may be enacted into
law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill.”

We held in the case of United States vs. Concepcion, supra,
that said Act of Congress did not apply to general laws, and that said section 3
was a provision punishing the crime of perjury generally. (U. S. vs. De
Chaves, 14 Phil. Rep., 565; U. S. vs. Estraiia, 16 Phil. Rep., 520; U.
S. vs. Fonseca, 20 Phil. Rep., 191.)

In the case of United States vs. Dumlao (R. G., No. 8721, not
reported) this court held the defendant guilty of the crime of perjury, under
facts exactly analogous to those in this case, under the provisions of section 3
of Act No. 1697. We find no reason, either in law or in the argument of the
appellant in the present case, to modify or reverse our conclusions in that case
(No. 8721).

With reference to the second assignment of error, the appellant alleged that
the lower court committed an error in finding that he had committed the crime of
perjury voluntarily and corruptly. There is nothing in the record which shows
that he did not present to the proper authorities Exhibit A voluntarily. It is
difficult to understand, in view of the fact that the defendant had theretofore
been convicted of two different offenses and in one of them by two courts, how
he could, within a few months thereafter, make a sworn statement that he “did
not have a criminal record,” unless he answered said question No. 5 in the
manner indicated in said application for the express purpose of deceiving the
authority to which said application was presented.

With reference to the third assignment of error, it may be said that the
language of question No. 5 seems to be perfectly clear. The defendant admitted
that he could read and understand Spanish. It is to be noted also that at the
very beginning of said application there are three paragraphs devoted to
instructions to the applicant, which he should have read and no doubt did. Said
instructions were sufficient to indicate to the defendant that if there were any
questions which he did not fully understand, he should have acquired a full
understanding of the same before answering them. If there was any fault in
understanding said question No. 5, it was wholly due to his own negligence.

With reference to the fourth assignment of error, the appellant contends that
the lower court committed an error in holding that the phrase “which he does not
believe to be true,” found in section 3 of Act No. 1697, is equivalent to the
word “knowingly,” used in other laws. The lower court cited the case of U. S.
vs. Tin Masa (17 Phil. Rep., 463) in support of his conclusion. Said
section 3, in effect, provides that any person who takes an oath before a
competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which a law of the”
Philippine Islands authorizes an oath, that he will testify, etc., or that any
written testimony, declaration, etc., by him subscribed is true, and thereafter
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter,
“which he does not believe to be true,” is guilty of perjury. Under said
section, three things are necessary, in order to constitute the crime of
perjury:

1. The person must have taken an oath, in a case where the law authorizes an
oath, before a competent person, or a person authorized to administer an
oath;

2. That the person, who has taken the oath will testify, declare, depose, or
certify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition or
certificate by him subscribed is true;

3. That he willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any
material matter, “which he does not believe to be true.”

It is difficult to understand how a person can state, under oath, that a fact
is true or subscribe a document, asserting that the same is true, which he does
not believe to be true. If, under his oath, he declares that said facts are
true, we must conclude that he believed that they were true. If, as a matter of
fact, they were not true, and he had full knowledge of the fact that they were
not true, then his declaration that they were true would certainly be a sworn
statement that a certain fact was true which he did not believe to be true and,
therefore, he must have made a false statement knowingly. Without attempting to
show or assert that the phrase “which he does not believe to be true” is
equivalent to the word “knowingly,” as the lower court held, we are of the
opinion that whoever makes a statement or subscribes a document, under the
circumstances mentioned in said section 3, which is false and which he, at the
time he makes the same does not believe to be true, is guilty of the crime of
perjury. In other words, under the circumstances mentioned in said section, if
one swears positively that a fact is true, which he does not believe to be true,
and it turns out that it is false, he is guilty of the crime of perjury. No one
should swear positively that a fact is true or subscribe a document asserting
that the facts stated therein are true, unless he at least believes that they
are true at the time he takes such oath or subscribes such document. It can
scarcely be believed that the defendant in the present case believed that the
answer to said question No. 5 was true. He must have signed or answered said
question not only believing that it was not true, but, as a matter of fact,
signed the same knowing that the answer was false.

With reference to the fifth assignment of error, we are of the opinion that
the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause clearly shows that the
defendant is guilty of the crime charged and therefore the sentence of the lower
court should be and is hereby affirmed with costs.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.

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DISSENTING

MORELAND, J.

I dissent. The case of United States vs. George (228 U. S., 14), is
decisive of this, holding that an indictment for perjury can not be based on an
affidavit not authorized or required by any law of the United States. There is
no law of the Philippine Islands which authorizes or requires the affidavit
which is the basis of the charge of perjury in this case. (U. S. vs.
Panlilio, 28 Phil. Rep., 608.)