G.R. No. 12354. March 17, 1917
GREGORIO REMATA, PETITIONER, VS. JUAN JAVIER, RESPONDENT.
TRENT, J.:
Javier for the purpose of ousting the latter from the office of municipal
president of Candelaria, Province of Tayabas, and placing the plaintiff in
possession of the same.
The grounds upon which the action is based, according to the complaint, are
that Juan Javier was duly elected president, qualified and assumed the office in
1912, and that his term expired by operation of law on October 15, 1916. As a
result of the general election held on June 6, 1916, Juan Javier was declared
reflected by the municipal board of canvassers. Subsequent thereto, Ricardo
Nadres, one of the candidates, contested Javier’s election. After due hearing,
the Court of First Instance found and decreed that no one was legally elected
president and so certified to the proper authorities. At the same general
election of 1916, Gregorio Remata, the plaintiff, was elected vice-president and
entered upon the duties of his office on October 16, 1916.
The defendant demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action because the failure to
elect a municipal president of Candelaria, did not create a vacancy which the
vice-president has a right to fill.
In the consideration of this question, it must be borne in mind that this is
not a case of a contest between parties as to the result of an election for an
office for which they were opposing candidates before the people. When an
election takes place and the will of the voters is expressed through the ballot
box, the candidate receiving the number of votes necessary to elect him, is
entitled to the possession of the office, its rights and emoluments. These are
his property; his right to them is a private right which the law protects and
the courts will enforce. A person who is entitled to fill a vacancy has the same
rights and remedies.
Section 2123 of Act No. 2657, effective July 1, 1916, provides that the term
of a municipal officer shall begin on the sixteenth day of October following the
election and shall end on the fifteenth of the same month four years thereafter.
The section further provides that if a successor be not inducted at the time
appointed by law, the incumbent shall hold over until a successor shall be duly
qualified.
Section 2126 of the same Code reads, in part, as follows:
“Vacancies in municipal office.—Vacancies occurring in elective
municipal offices shall be filled as follows:
“(a) In case of the president, by the vice-president, or if there be
no vice-president, by the council or who at the last general election received
the highest number of votes.* * * * *
* *“(d) In any case for which special provision is not made, by a
qualified elector of the municipality to be thereunto designated by the
provincial governor, with the approval of the provincial board, after
recommendation by the municipal council.“A person thus called to fill a vacancy shall hold for the unexpired term and
until the qualification of a successor.”
If our inquiry as to the meaning of the words “vacancy” and “vacancies” is to
be limited to section 2126, we would have to hold that the defendant’s
contention to the effect that no vacancy occurred, is well founded and supported
by the weight of authority in the United States. But, if the Legislature
intended that the word “vacancy” should be given a double meaning so as to
include the instant case, then the result will be different. That the
Legislature so intended, clearly appears from other provisions of the
Administrative Code.
Section 2000 of the Administrative Code provides in the first paragraph, that
when a vacancy occurs in an elective provincial office by reason of the death,
resignation or removal of the incumbent, the Governor-General shall appoint a
suitable person thereto. In paragraph two, provisions are made for the calling
of a special election in case the general election fails to take place or the
election fails. Under paragraph three, the Governor-General is authorized to
call a special election or fill the place by appointment where a provincial
officer elect dies prior to taking office, or for any other reason fails to
qualify. Paragraph 4 provides that in case a special election shall have been
called and held and shall have resulted in a failure legally to elect the
provincial officer, the Governor-General shall fill the place by appointment.
And the last paragraph reads: “A person appointed or elected to fill a vacancy
in an elective provincial office shall hold for the unexpired term and until the
qualification of a successor.”
Again, section 2412, which applies to the city of Manila, provides that—”if
any person so elected is ineligible to hold office, or if for any reason there
should be a failure to elect one or more members, no special election shall be
called, but the vacancy shall be filled for the term by the Governor-General
with the consent of the Upper House of the Philippine Legislature. Vacancies in
the office of member occurring after taking office shall be filled for the
unexpired term in like manner.”
It will thus be seen that the Legislature in sections 2000 and 2412 provided
for two kinds of vacancies. The first, where vacancies occur by the death,
resignation, or removal of the incumbent, and the second is where vacancies
occur by reason of the failure to elect. In both instances the office becomes
vacant.
In enacting the provisions with reference to elective provincial offices,
elective municipal offices for the city of Manila and elective municipal offices
in general, the Legislature was dealing with the same subject-matter. And, in
view of the fact that no provisions are made for the calling of special
elections in cases where the election fails or no one is legally elected to a
municipal office, we must conclude that it was intended that the words “vacancy”
and “vacancies” occurring in section 2126 should be given the same meaning as
those in sections 2000 and 2412, otherwise an incumbent of an elective municipal
office might continue indefinitely.
For the foregoing reasons, the demurrer is overruled and the defendant is
given five days after notice, within which to answer the complaint. If no answer
is filed within this time, judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff in
accordance with the prayer of the complaint, with costs against the defendant.
So ordered.
Torres, Carson, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., dissenting:
The decision in this case gives a new, and to me, very unusual definition to
the word “vacancy.” To hold that a municipal vice-president is entitled to
possession of the office of a municipal president who still occupies the office
and who does so under a statute not only authorizing but compelling him to do so
(Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, p. 401, ante), seems strange to me.
To hold that the office of municipal president, while still held by a person
entitled in law to hold it, is vacant in such sense as to permit it to be filled
by a municipal vice-president is, it seems to me, to disregard the meaning of
words.
I am convinced that the court has confused the case where the vacancy is
caused by the termination of the right or power of the incumbent to hold the
office, that is, an absolute vacancy, with that which might be
termed a qualified vacancy, where such right or power
to hold the office is not terminated, but is authorized and confirmed
by law, and continues by virtue of express provision of law until the happening
of a certain event, namely, the election or appointment and
qualification of his successor. There exists in such case only the
right to elect or appoint a successor, not the right
of a designated person to fill the office; and the incumbent
not only can but must continue in office until the
election or appointment occurs. There exists no right of
succession in favor of any given person such as comes into existence on the
death, resignation and removal of an official. There simply comes into existence
the power to elect or appoint, not the right to
succeed. It is in the first case only that a vice-president can
assume the office of the president; never in the second case.
The court seem also to have overlooked the fact that, in the first case, the
former incumbent is not succeeded by the new incumbent, but
the office is “filled” (sec. 2126, Administrative Code); and
that, in such case, until it is “filled” there is no one who actually holds the
office and no one who can hold it; whereas, in the second case, there is a
person who not only actually holds the office, but holds it legally
under a statute requiring him to hold it.
Section 2126 of Act No. 2657 (the Administrative Code), cited and quoted in
the opinion of the court, does not assume to provide for the appointment of a
successor but provides in what cases an office can be “filled” It would not seem
logical or even sensible that an office can be “filled” when it is already
full—when it is already occupied by a person who holds it strictly in pursuance
of law. There is a wide difference between a vacancy in office resulting from
the death of the incumbent, for example, and that condition which exists when a
person, by mandate of statute, holds over and continues in possession of the
office until his successor is elected or appointed and qualifies. Yet this is
precisely the difference which the court has failed to observe, the opinion
holding in effect, that no such difference exists. This is necessarily the
holding as the court declares that a vice-president has the right to assume the
office of president in both cases. The statute, however, provides that he can do
so only in the first case.
I believe that the court has also failed to observe that, in proving the
right of a vice-president to assume the office of a president in both the cases
named, it proves too much. If the decision of the court is correct then the
Legislature has overworked itself. There was no need to enact the statute (sec.
2123, Administrative Code) providing that municipal presidents shall,
notwithstanding the fixed term prescribed by other provisions of the statute,
hold over and continue in office until their successors are duly elected or
appointed and qualify. Under the ruling of the court, this provision is useless
as no such condition can possibly arise; for the instant the time is propitious
for it to arise, the vice-president, pursuant to the decision of the court,
leaps upon the scene, seizes and takes possession of the office, and—Lo and
behold!—the spectacle of a municipal president holding over and continuing in
office after the expiration of his term, is rendered impossible. Section 2126 of
the Administrative Code, as construed by the court, thus prevents the last
paragraph of section 2123 of the same Code from having any effect whatever, as
the situation to which it applies can never come into existence.
Thus, the court, by establishing one strange proposition, namely, that an
office can be “filled” which is already full, thereby necessarily establishes
another proposition equally strange from the standpoint of section 2123, and
that is that it is impossible for a municipal president to hold over and
continue in possession of his office after the expiration of his term, although
the statute expressly says that he may do so.
The court has also failed to note the significance of the last sentence of
section 2126 which it quotes. This sentence reads: “A person thus
called to fill a vacancy shall hold for the unexpired term * * *.” Now,
according to the construction given the statute by the court, there can never be
an “unexpired” term under section 2123, The instant the president’s
term as fixed by law expires the vice-president assumes the office, and there
can be no holding over on the part of the president and, therefore, there can be
no “unexpired” term. The words “unexpired term” indicate, of course, either that
an officer dies, etc., during his term or he holds over and serves a part of the
term succeeding that for which he was elected; and that the person who is
elected or appointed to succeed him will, therefore, be unable to hold for the
full term but only for the unexpired term, that is, that part
not already served by the hold-over. This is the clearest kind of evidence of
the correctness of my contention and, therefore, of the error of the court. The
court holds that there can be no holding over, as the vice-president succeeds
and takes possession of the office the instant the president’s term expires. As
a consequence, the last sentence of section 2126 is given no meaning when
applied to a situation intended to be covered by section 2123 as there can be no
such thing as an “unexpired” term in such case; and the flood of light which
comes from it to aid in defining the word “vacancy” as used in section 2126 has
served no purpose in the decision of this case. From these observations it
appears that while, under section 2126, the word “vacancy” is used
exclusively in connection with an unexpired term, the court
uses the word to cover cases where there can be no unexpired term.
Thus, by construction, the court has not only created a situation in which
the words “unexpired term” found in section 2126 can have no meaning or effect
but also has prevented the possibility of an official holding over after the
expiration of his term, something which section 2123 expressly says he may
do.
The court, in my judgment, has overlooked another thing which is highly
important. As nature abhors a vacuum, so the law abhors a vacancy in public
office; and the first care of the legislator is to prevent the occurrence of
such a vacancy. This duty the Legislature had in mind when it placed in the
staute the provision that all elective officers, in spite of the fact that they
are elected for a definite term, shall hold over and continue in possession of
their offices until their successors are elected or appointed and qualify. The
sole purpose of this provision is to prevent vacancies in
public office. The purpose thus manifested is defeated by the decision of the
court, not only for the reasons already stated, but also for the further reason
that it results from the construction given to the statute that the court fills
one vacancy by creating another. It fills the office of president
by creating a vacancy in the office of vice-president This is a strange
way of satisfying a provision of statute the sole purpose of which is to prevent
vacancies in office. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is a new principle of statutory
construction.
The court has also failed to look upon the question in a broad way. The
question is a very simple one. We have two sections of the Administrative Code
dealing with the question of the occupation of a municipal office. One of them
has to do exclusively with the occupation of the office after the
term of the incumbent has expired, and no one has been elected or appointed
to succeed him. The other deals exclusively with cases where the term
of office has not expired but, during the term, it has been put beyond
the power of the incumbent to occupy the office further; that is, the right
and the power to occupy have ceased to exist although the term for which
the incumbent was elected has not expired. Such an occasion arises on the death,
resignation, or removal of the official. In such case the term for which he was
elected has not expired but the elected has not expired. Such an
occasion arises on the right or power to hold the office has ceased.
Now, section 2123 deals exclusively with a case where the term of office
has expired and no one has been elected or appointed to succeed the
incumbent; while section 2126 deals exclusively with a case where the term of
office has not expired but the incumbent, by his own act or by
an act of nature or of superior authority or by operation of law has lost
the power or right to hold the office until the expiration of his term.
This simple situation has been seized upon by the court and handled in such
manner that the two sections of the law referred to are put in conflict, the
court holding that section 2126 covers the same ground as a part of section
2123. This has caused the error of the court. The decision has confused a
statute which deals with the term of office with one dealing
not with the term of office but with the occupant of
the office—with a situation produced, not by the expiration of or anything
affecting the term of office but, by something occurring to the
incumbent of the office. This confusion naturally vitiates any conclusion
to which the court may arrive.
It is clear, then, that the court has obliterated the distinction between an
absolute and a qualified vacancy—between a case where there is no one who is
holding or can by any possibility hold the office, and that where there is a
person who not only holds and can hold the office but who is compelled by
law to hold it.
It is also clear that the court has refused to permit provisions 6f statute
to have their natural and intended effect—indeed, any effect at all. Not only
this; it has interpreted and construed section 2126 of the Administrative Code
so that it is in conflict with a part of section 2123 of the same Code, the
result being that a portion of the last named section is applied where, by
virtue of its express provisions, it cannot apply. Furthermore, and this is more
interesting still, the court has so interpreted that section that the first part
thereof is in conflict with the last part; and such is the nature of the
conflict that the last part ceases to have meaning or application and, as a
consequence, is virtually stricken from the section. This is done by
obliterating the words “unexpired term,” that is, by making the first part of
the action applicable to cases where there can be no unexpired
term.
Of course the Legislature itself labored under no such confusion of terms and
ideas. To establish its thesis the court does not resort to the wording or the
very section of the law it is construing. Nor does it even resort to the law
which deals with the same subject-matter. Instead of considering the law of
municipal officials, which is the only law under consideration as it is
the only law applicable, it takes up and considers instead the law relating to
provincial officials and officials of the city of Manila,
which is not governed by the Municipal Law. It cites and quotes from section
2000 of the Administrative Code, which deals exclusively with provincial
officials, and studies and considers it in detail, referring to the paragraphs
in succession. It cites and quotes also from section 2412, which applies only to
the city of Manila, and considers its provisions in the same manner. From a
detailed study of these two sections, that is of the provincial and city law,
the court draws a conclusion as to what the Municipal Law ought to be. The law
of municipal officials is left almost untouched and unconsidered.
For these reasons I dissent.