JULIAN ASIDO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. MACARIO GUZMAN, ROSALIA REYES AND JACINTO BATTUNG, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

Plaintiff in this action prays for a judgment of possession of a small parcel
of land, and in support of his allegation of ownership submitted a duly executed
deed of sale to himself from one Federico Comin, dated October 24, 1914, and a
duly executed deed of sale to Comin from the former owner of the land, Domingo
Mallillin, deceased, dated April 24, 1900, and registered at or about the same
time in the proper land registry.

The principal defendant, Rosalia Reyes, the widow of Domingo Mallillin,
deceased, the former owner of the land, alleges that the deed of sale from her
husband to Comin, although executed in due form, does not evidence a genuine
sale of the property. She claims that at the time of its execution it was
understood and agreed that the title to the land should not pass to Federico
Comin, the sole object of the execution of the deed being to make it appear that
Comin was the owner, in order that he might secure possession, on behalf of her
husband, from a tenant who refused to give up possession, and against whom her
husband was afraid to assert his rights on account of the unsettled conditions
existing in the community at that time. She further relies upon the admitted
fact that she and her husband continued in possession of the land from the date
of the execution of the deed in 1900 to the date of his death in 1911, under
claim of exclusive ownership, as she alleges, and that she herself has continued
in possession since the death of her husband.

In explanation of the continued possession of the land by the defendant and
her husband, plaintiff alleges that after the sale to Comin, the vendor and his
wife were left in possession as tenants under an agreement to turn over
one-third of the fruits of the land to Comin by way of rent for its use and
occupation, and that they did in fact continue to turn over the rent in kind
down to the date of the death of the husband.

The widow flatly denied the payment of any rental, in kind, by herself or her
husband, but the plaintiff’s allegations in this regard are supported by the
testimony of several reputable witnesses. The trial judge was evidently in doubt
as to the probative value of the testimony, and on this point said in his
opinion:

“The court confesses itself confronted by a problem which it is unable to
solve, but inclines to the belief that the evidence predominates in favor of the
defendants.”

There is no evidence in the record other than the testimony of the widow
herself, in support of her claim as to the fictitious character of the
transaction set forth in the instrument dated April 24, 1900, purporting to be a
deed of sale of the land in question. Her testimony in many important details is
flatly contradicted by the testimony of the witnesses for the plaintiff, and
from a review of all the testimony we can readily understand the manifest
hesitation with which the trial judge finally accepted the testimony of the
widow and rejected the conflicting testimony of the witnesses called by the
plaintiff. We think that the failure of the widow or her husband to demand the
return of the document and the cancellation of its registry in the land record,
during the years which elapsed before this plaintiff bought the land in question
from the vendee mentioned in the document, stamps her entire story with an air
of improbability which weakens very materially the probative value of the direct
evidence by which she seeks to establish its truth.

But admitting that the testimony slightly preponderates in favor of the
contention of the widow, we do not think that this testimony is sufficient to
sustain a judgment declaring void and of no effect a deed of sale executed in a
duly registered public instrument, which had been solemnly executed before a
notary public many years prior to the date of the judgment. Such a ruling would
tend to destroy all confidence in the efficacy of the execution and registration
of public document affecting the title to real estate. A mere doubtful
preponderance of the oral evidence is not sufficient to overcome the presumption
of validity and genuineness which attaches to a public document duly executed
and registered in the proper registry. For that purpose the oral evidence must
be clear and convincing, and should be sustained by proof of facts or
circumstances connected with the execution of the instrument which, in
themselves, tend to disclose a reasonable probability that the attack upon its
genuineness or its efficacy is well founded.

We conclude that the judgment entered in the court below should be reversed,
without costs in this instance, and that the record should be returned to the
court below wherein judgment will be entered in favor of the plaintiff in accord
with the prayer of the complaint, except as to the prayer for alleged damages
which must be denied, the evidence of record not being sufficient to sustain a
definite finding in this regard. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Araullo, Street, and Malcolm, JJ.,
concur.

Avanceña, and Fisher, JJ., did not take part.