THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. JOSE PATOTO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Jose Patoto, the appellant in this case, was convicted in the court below of
the crime of homicidio (felonious homicide), and sentenced to twelve years and
one day of reclusion temporal, together with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1l,000, and to pay
the costs of the trial. The prescribed penalty was imposed in its minimum degree
because the trial judge was of opinion that the crime was committed in
vindication of a grave offense against the daughter of the accused.

Giving the accused the benefit of any reasonable doubts raised by the
conflicting testimony of record, it appears that the deceased, Catibog, struck
and reprimanded the daughter of the accused for trespassing on his land; that
not long afterwards the accused approached Catibog and asked him what he meant
by maltreating his daughter; that a quarrel ensued in the course of which
Catibog struck the accused several times with a club; that after receiving one
or two blows on the head the accused took out his pocketknife and slashed
Catibog across the abdomen; that soon after being stabbed Catibog fell
helplessly to the ground and died four or five hours later; that immediately
after the quarrel the accused gave himself up to the municipal authorities; that
Catibog was a decidedly larger and stronger man than the accused, and had a
reputation as a dangerous man in the community in which he lived.

The most serious conflict in the testimony arose in relation to the question
as to which of the two struck the first blow. We are of opinion, however, that
the disinterested testimony of the medical officer is conclusive on this point.
He testified that it would have been a physical impossibility for Catibog to
have struck the accused with the club after receiving the knife thrust in the
abdomen, which disemboweled him. This evidence raises a reasonable doubt as to
the exact truth of the story told by a niece of the deceased who was the only
eyewitness of the fight—a doubt which is not dispelled by the vague, uncertain,
and indefinite ante mortem statement of the deceased.

On the whole record, and giving the accused the benefit of the doubt, we
incline to the belief that before the accused took out his knife Catibog had
struck him at least twice with his club, and that the accused made use of his
knife in repelling the attack upon him by the deceased.

Upon these findings of fact we are of opinion that the accused is exempt from
criminal responsibility for the striking of the fatal blow. The victim of an
unlawful and unprovoked assault with a heavy club in the hands of a strong and
powerful man, whose reputation as a dangerous man was well-known in the
community in which he lived, the accused had a perfect right to defend himself,
provided the means adopted to repel the attack were reasonably necessary to
relieve him from the danger to which he was exposed. Unarmed, as he was, ;we are
not prepared to say that in taking a knife from his pocket and stabbing his
powerful assailant, who had already struck him twice on the head, he did any
more than was reasonably necessary to protect himself from an assault which
might well have resulted in the loss of his life, and could hardly fail to
result in the infliction of grave personal injuries. When the fatal blow was
struck he ad already received two severe blows on the head. There was no one
present upon whom he could call for help. His assailant was a larger and more
powerful man than himself, armed with a club and still pressing the unlawful and
unprovoked assault. Under such circumstances, and there not appearing to have
been any other means by which the accused could reasonably hope to avoid the
threatened danger, we believe that he was entirely justified in the use of his
knife, the only available weapon of self-defense.

We conclude, therefore, that the judgment entered in the court below
convicting the accused of the crime of homicidio (felonious.homicide) and
imposing the penalty prescribed by law for that offense should be reversed; that
he should be acquitted of the drime with which he is charged in the information;
that if in detention, he should be set at liberty forthwith, and if at liberty
under bail that his bondsmen should be exonerated; and that the costs in both
instances should be noted de offlcio. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.