THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EULALIO CORNEJO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

On the night of November 2, 1913, Zacarias Cabello was preparing a supper in
his house which was to be served outside in the yard (called in the record a
plazuela or small square). Some of the guests had already arrived in the yard by
7 o’clock, and about five of them were in the house upstairs. Among these latter
was Agaton Salazar, who had gone there to assist the host in preparing the meal.
Shortly afterwards Pedro Reyes and Eulalio Cornejo arrived. These two men
induced a boy 12 years of age to call upstairs to Agaton Salazar and have him
come down. The boy did so and Agaton Salazar descended, holding his shirt in his
hands and wearing a pair of wooden clogs. Pedro Reyes told Salazar that he
needed him and they, with the defendant, went aside to the south of the house.
Reyes led the way, Salazar followed him and behind the latter went Cornejo.
After they had gone a few yards, Reyes, without saying a single word, turned
halfway around and struck Salazar a blow on the head with a palma-brava
club he was, carrying and immediately followed it up with two more blows. When
Salazar stooped over, Cornejo struck him several blows in the face with a bolo,
and then the two assailants immediately took to flight. Such was the uniform
testimony given by the owner of the house, Cabello, the boy aforementioned,
named Eulalio Villamil, and Potenciano Lasala, all of whom were eyewitnesses to
the affair, which took place in the municipality of Taal, Province of
Batangas.

According to the medical examination, the blow was inflicted with a
palma-brava club with sharpened edges which fractured two bones in the
frontal parietal region and caused a very serious injury. The victim did not
regain consciousness from the time he was struck until he died, six days
afterwards, and the physician believed that this wound was the cause of his
death. The examination further showed that the deceased received another wound
in the cheek, not of a serious nature, caused by a cutting instrument, and still
another light one, likewise effected by means of a cutting instrument, which
split his lips and an incisor tooth on the left side; finally, there were
several bruises on the right wrist and the back of one of the forefingers, black
and blue spots on the eyelids and both lips, and bleeding at the nose.

Inocencio Aceron testified that on Sunday, November 2, 1913 (the day of the
occurrence), he had left his house and his barrio about 8 o’clock in the morning
in search of some cows and, while passing by the barrio of Halang of the same
municipality of Taal, he saw Reyes and Cornejo, old acquaintances of his, in a
shack. The former was engaged in putting an edge on the corners of a palma-brava
club, and the latter was sharpening a bolo. While witness was talking with them,
the idea occurred to him to ask why they were so busily engaged in that way, and
they replied that they were going to kill a bachelor of the barrio of Talon.

The defendant admitted having been at the house of Zacarias Cabello because
he had been invited by one Primitivo Magsino, who also went there to escort his
sister Maria back home. He heard, but did not see, the quarrel between Reyes and
Zalazar. He went home about 7 o’clock, but as his mother told him there was
nothing to eat, he went to his uncle’s house and there spent the night; the next
day he went to Lipa. However, in his same testimony, defendant said that after
the quarrel between Reyes and Salazar he remained for an hour on the bench where
he was seated, without moving. Primitivo Magsino testified that five minutes
after Salazar entered the house, witness, his sister, the defendant, and a man
named Vicente went away. Zacarias Cabello denied that either Primitivo or
Vicente had been at his house that night, though he asserted that Maria was
there and that he sent Potenciano Lasala to accompany her on her return home.
The defendant’s mother told the policeman who was looking for him that night,
that he had not returned home. Cabello himself went to the house of the
defendant that night in order that they might arrest him, but neither then nor
on the following days could he be found there, nor in the field where he was in
the habit of working before the crime was committed.

The Court of First Instance of Batangas tried and sentenced the defendant for
murder, and stated that he had not the least doubt of his guilt. He classified
the crime as murder “because the killing of Agaton Salazar was attended by the
two circumstances of treachery and deliberate premeditation, although one of
these is sufficient for the qualification of the said crime. The record
sufficiently proves that there was treachery, for the defendant Eulalio. Cornejo
and the fugitive Pedro Reyes attacked the deceased in a manner which he did not
expect and in such wise that he had no time to defend himself from their
assault. It is also proven that there was premeditation, because, as above
mentioned in the statement of facts, on the morning of the day of the
occurrence, the defendant Eulalio Cornejo and Pedro Reyes prepared the weapons
with which they attacked the deceased that night.”

Of the two qualifying circumstances mentioned, one was held to be a generic
aggravating circumstance which should increase the penalty; but it was offset by
the extenuating one of article 11 on account of the defendant’s lack of
education. Eulalio Cornejo was accordingly sentenced to seventeen years four
months and one day of cadena temporal, to the accessory penalties, to
pay an idemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, and the costs.

The defendant appealed. After a consideration of his appeal, we find that the
evidence was duly weighed in accordance with the merits of the case, and that
the finding of the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proper. There was
treachery if the attack was sudden and unexpected and not preceded by a dispute
and the deceased was unable to prepare himself for his defense, though he was
face to face with his assailant. (Decisions of November 16 and 23, 1900;
November 21, 1901; and May 20, 1903.)

We also find that the aggravating circumstance of deliberate premeditation
was also properly taken into account in accordance with the law. When, besides
treachery, there is premeditation, the latter constitutes an aggravating
circumstance. (Decision of May 9, 1877). This circumstance must be considered
when the crime was planned by the guilty party, when he prepared beforehand the
means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
had sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences.
(Decisions of Dec. 26, 1887, and Sep. 1, 1893.) There is premeditation when
there appears to have been a concerted plan to commit the crime (decision of
June 4, 1874), as, in the case at bar, where Reyes immediately preceded the
deceased and the defendant followed him, the victim being thus caught between
two well-aimed blows.

Finally, the opinion of the trial judge is in line with the principles of
penal sanction in finding that the defendant was guilty as a principal and
nothing else, although it was known that the death of the victim was due to
definite action by the co-defendant For only where there has been no agreement
to cause the harm produced can acts,, performed jointly, in common and
simultaneously, be separated and the respective parts be defined in a crime
where one attacks with a club and the other wounds the victim with a cutting
weapon; in such case there would clearly be two separate and distinct injuries.
(Decision of January 11, 1905.) But when there was an understanding, all who
participated in the preconcerted crime are liable for the means which each of
them employed to carry such crime into effect, and for the consequences thereof.
(Decisions of December 24,1901; March 26,1903; March 22 and 30, and May
31,1905.)

The only modification to be made in the sentence is the degree in which the
penalty should be applied. The penalty being cadena temporal in its
maximum degree to death, it should be raised to that of death, by reason of the
generic aggravating circumstance taken into account. Without this aggravating
circumstance the extenuating one of article 11 would reduce the penalty to the
minimum degree, as it was in the sentence imposed; but, compensating this
extenuating circumstance by that aggravating one, the penalty should be applied
in the medium degree, or cadena perpetua.

With the understanding that the defendant is sentenced to cadena
perpetua, the judgment appealed from is, in all other respects, affirmed,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant.

Torres, Johnson, Carson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo JJ.,
concur.