ILDEFONSO TAMBUNTING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND AS JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF HIS DECEASED WIFE JULIANA UY CHICO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VIRGINIA DE VERA, IN HER O…

This appeal, by bill of exceptions, was raised by counsel for the defendants
from the judgment of April 28, 1913, whereby the Honorable A. S. Crossfield,
judge, found in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants by ordering
the latter to restore to the former possession of the land, the boundaries of
which were therein given, situated on Calle Benavides, Nos. 723 and 725, and
containing an area , in accordance with the plan, Exhibit B, of 599 square
meters and 61 square centimeters, and likewise the possession of the buildings
and other improvements made thereon, and to pay him the value of the rental of
the said property, at the rate of P3 per month, since the date of Andres de
Guzman’s death; without special finding as to costs.

Counsel for the plaintiff, in a written complaint filed in the Court of First
Instance of this city on September 6,1912, prayed that judgment be rendered
decreeing the ownership, possession and title of the following described urban
property to be in the plaintiff, by himself and in his capacity of judicial
administrator of the estate of the deceased Juliana Uy Chico, to wit, a parcel
of land situated on Calle Benavides of the district of San Jose, Trozo, and
bounded on the right of its entrance by the house No. 31 of Isabel Pantic; on
the left, by the lot of Flaviano Abreu; and on the rear, by a lot without
number, belonging to the plaintiff himself; which land, in the form of a
quadrilateral, has an area of 613 square meters and appears in the provisional
register of the municipality, Binondo section, as property No. 571, first
inscription. Said counsel further prayed that the defendants be sentenced to
restore the possession of the said property to the plaintiff and to pay him
P4,325, amount of the rentals therefor owed and unpaid and to pay him such other
rentals as might become due. He also alleged that the plaintiff and the estate
of the said Uy Chico were the owners of the property in question and that they
were entitled to possession and title thereof, to the exclusion of all others;
that Andres de Guzman and the defendants occupied it under lease in or about the
month of March, 1895, and had paid the plaintiff rental therefor from the said
year to January, 1899, though subsequently thereto and up to the date of the
complaint they had refused to pay him the said rental, wherefore they owed him
the sum mentioned, which, not-withstanding the judicial and extrajudicial
demands made upon them, he had not succeeded in collecting; and that the
defendants still continued unlawfully to occupy the said property under the
claim of ownership and possession, to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff’s rights and interests.

Counsel for the defendants in his written answer admitted the facts contained
in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of the complaint and made a general and specific
denial of those contained in the remaining paragraphs thereof; and, in special
defense, denied that the defendants had leased any property from the plaintiff,
and further stated that the property described in the complaint exclusively
belonged to the estate of the deceased Antonino de Guzman and Gregoria de la
Cruz, and that their heirs now held it quietly, peaceably, and without any
interruption whatever, as owners thereof jointly with the heirs of the deceased
Andres de Guzman; that the plaintiff perverted the facts when he testified that
the defendants had leased the property in 1895 and had paid him rental therefor
from 1896 to 1901, but had failed to do so for the succeeding years to date;
that on December 13, 1907, the plaintiff brought suit against Andres de Guzman,
as the lessee, for the restitution of the possession of the property, but that
the complaint was dismissed on account of lack of jurisdiction of the justice of
the peace; that about March 29, 1895, Andres de Guzman, a coheir of the
defendants, received from the plaintiff, as a loan, the sum of P300, to be
repaid within one year with interest at the rate of PS per month, although in
the instrument this latter amount was stipulated as rental under the security of
the said property, which the debtor Andres possessed pro indiviso and in common
with his coheirs, also defendants herein, and which the former so encumbered
without the knowledge or consent of the latter, but that the plaintiff knew of
the right and interest that Andres de Guzman had in the said property.

As a counterclaim he alleged that the administratrix, Virginia de Vera,
offered in the name of the defendants to pay the debt and the interest thereon
for the redemption of the share of the property belonging to the deceased Andres
de Guzman, inasmuch as the defendants, as the owners of the property held in
common, had a perfect right to redeem the said share by paying the price
therefor and the interest. He therefore prayed that the defendants be absolved
from the complaint; that the court hold that the house and land, the subject
matter of the possessory information proceedings instituted by Andres de Guzman,
belong exclusively to the surviving heirs of Antonino de Guzman and Gregoria, de
la Cruz, with the costs against the plaintiff.

After a hearing in the case and the introduction of evidence by both parties,
the court rendered the judgment aforementioned.

This action is for the recovery of a lot or parcel of land with the house
situated thereon, the possession of which its owner, Ildefonso Tambunting, lost
upon the death of his tenant, Andres de Guzman, which occurred about three years
before 1913, that is, in 1910, by reason of the said property having been
occupied by some of the latter’s relatives who claimed to have a right and share
therein.

The plaintiff bases his right of action on the fact that he acquired
ownership of the said property through the lapse of the conventional period of
one year within which the vendor, Andres de Guzman, should have redeemed the
property, which was sold under rifeht of repurchase in accordance with the
stipulations made in the public instrument executed before a notary on March
29,1895.

The vendor Guzman continued to occupy the property even after the vendee’s
ownership had been consolidated, by virtue of a contract of lease which forms
part of that purchase and sale of the said property under right of redemption,
and at a rental of ¥°3 per month; all of which facts are set forth in this
latter instrument, provisionally recorded in the property registry on December
17, 1901, and found on page 28 of record No. 880, exhibited at the trial of this
case.

Although the plaintiff acquired absolute ownership of the said property on
March 30, 1896, on account of the vendor’s failure to repurchase it, yet he
permitted the latter to continue to occupy it, as a lessee, until the month of
December, 1907, when the plaintiff brought suit in the justice of the peace
court for the recovery of possession of the said property and the rents owing
thereon for the months of August to November, inclusive. These proceedings,
however, were subsequently dismissed because the question as to the title of
real property was raised. The complaint that gave rise to the present case was
then filed.

In order to show that the vendor, Andres de Guzman, was the owner of the
property sold and could freely dispose of it, the plaintiff, Tambunting,
exhibited an authentic copy, attested by the registrar of the north district of
Manila, of the possessory information proceedings instituted by Guzman in the
Court of First Instance of this city. In this document it is set forth that the
said vendor inherited the lot described in the “information,” from his deceased
father Antonino de Guzman in September 1876, and that he constructed thereon a
strong-material house, at his own expense, in September, 1879. This possessory
information was approved by the court on condition that it should be without
prejudice to any third person having a better right and the court ordered it
entered in the property registry.

Against the allegation of the defendants that the said property had belonged
to their deceased ascendents, Antonino de Guzman and Gregoria de la Cruz, and
was now held by them jointly as its coowners and the successors of these latter,
and that they were entitled to redeem it by removing the incumbrance upon it by
payment to the plaintiff of the sum received from him by their coheir, Andres de
Guzman, now deceased, and of the interest thereon at the rate of TS per month,
considered as rent, we have the findings of the judgment of the lower court to
the effect that no evidence was presented as to what property Antonino de Guzman
left at his death, except the testimony of Virginia cle Vera, who claimed the
aforesaid house and land, though she did not explain why she did not commence to
pay the taxes thereon until the year 1911, for those pertaining to the previous
years up to 1910 were paid by the plaintiff, and that, furthermore, the
defendants presented no evidence of their alleged offer to pay the plaintiff the
repurchase price in accordance with the stipulations of the instrument of
sale.

The trial judge, therefore, accepted as true the statements made by Andres de
Guzman in the proceedings had for obtaining the said possessory information,
which was approved and recorded in the property registry in March, 1895, to the
effect that, the land concerned in that title had been inherited by him from his
deceased father, Antonino de Guzman, and that in the same month, two years
thereafter, he constructed on the land the house aforementioned. He accordingly
arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiff was the owner and entitled to
possession of the land and improvements described in the complaint and in the
instrument executed by Andres de Guzman in favor of the plaintiff, Ildefonso
Tambunting, said property being situated in Calle Benavides and designated in
Exhibit D as Nos. 723 to 725, lots 17 and 18, block 14.

It is impossible to review this finding of the trial judge or the facts from
which it is derived in view of the errors assigned by the appellants to the
judgment appealed from, inasmuch as the stenographic notes taken of the
testimony of the witnesses examined during the trial of the case and transmitted
with the record to this court were not transcribed into the official language.
These untranscribed notes cannot be read at all and the failure to transcribe
them is equivalent to a complete absence of oral evidence, for they were not
submitted in proper and available form for the interested parties and all other
participants in this suit.

It is a fixed principle, established by this court in accordance with
existing legal provisions governing civil procedure and now become a rule of
law, that the appellant who desires to obtain in second instance a review of the
evidence presented at the trial had in the Court of First Instance, must have
such evidence forwarded entire to this court. He cannot be permitted to forward
only a part of it and then ask that the judgment appealed from be reversed on
the ground that it is not supported by the evidence presented at the trial. In
such a case the appellate court is compelled to accept the findings of fact and
the conclusions in the decision of the lower court, as occurs in the present
case. It is to be observed that, by the mere fact of forwarding only the
untranscribed stenographic notes, intelligible only to the stenographer who
wrote them, such requirement is not fulfilled and the omission or failure to
transcribe the said notes amounts to failure to forward the evidence contained
in them for, though the said notes are included in the record, they are not
properly transcribed into Spanish or English.

Aside from this, the claim of prescription put forward by the appellee is
well founded, on account of the lapse of more than ten years counting from the
date when he purchased the property in question, the possession of which,
materially enjoyed in his name by the lessee, Andres de Guzman, was held by him
in good faith through a proper conveyance, though suspended during the course of
the period fixed for the redemption. However, for the reasons set forth in the
preceding paragraphs, this alleged prescription need not be considered and the
judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

The said judgment is, therefore, hereby affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant.

Arellano, C. J., Johnson, Carson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.