THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EUGENIO GACUTAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Cagayan convicting the accused of the crime of
prevaricacion, and sentencing him to imprisonment for two months, to
pay the costs of the proceeding, and to suffer temporary special
disqualification in its maximum degree for the period of ten years and one
day.

This case arises out of the facts on which is formed the case of United
States vs. Gacutan, ante, p. 100.

The evidence shows that on July 20,1912, Elias Pagulayan was charged before
the accused, a justice of the peace in and for the pueblo of Solana, Cagayan
Province, with the theft of a horse belonging to one Pascua; that on or about
July 31, 1912, the accused promised Pascua that, in consideration of the
delivery to him of a female carabao worth P80 he would decide the case against
Pagulayan regardless of the evidence; that said carabao was delivered in
pursuance of that agreement; that Gacutan, fulfilling his promise, did on August
12,1912, convict the said Pagulayan of the crime of larceny and sentence him to
six months’ imprisonment, to pay the costs, and to indemnify Pascua in the sum
of P50, the value of the horse alleged to have been stolen; that the sentence
imposed was not executed for the reason that on August 23, 1912, the accused
transferred the cause to the Court of First Instance, the same, under Act No.
2030 of the Philippine Legislature, not being within his jurisdiction.

Gacutan, the accused, was, on the 2d of October, 1913, convicted of bribery
in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan, it having been found that he accepted
from Pascua a carabao as a bribe in consideration of which he agreed to and
subsequently did decide a criminal case then pending before him against
Pagulayan and in favor of the people without regard to the evidence upon which
the same was founded.

The appellant assigns in this court as errors:

“1. That the court allowed the motion of the fiscal asking for additional
time to present further evidence and in permitting the prosecuting attorney in
pursuance of said permission to produce evidence, of facts which had not
theretofore been presented in the case.

“2. For having disallowed the plea of double jeopardy.

“3. For having convicted the accused and sentencing him as he was
sentenced.”

We do not believe that the conviction can stand. The information is based on
article 347 of the Penal Code which provides that “any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust decision against the defendant, etc.,” shall be punished as
provided therein.

As we said in the bribery case against the same accused, (ante, p.
100), we do not know whether the decision rendered by the accused was an unjust
or a just decision. Neither do we know whether it has been executed or not. In
fact, the decision seems subsequently to have been set aside and the cause sent
to the Court of First Instance for original action in the premises. ‘What has
become of the case, we do not know.

Moreover, it does not appear that the accused knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment even if we concede that the judgment was unjust. The mere fact that the
court may not have had jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action does not
necessarily establish the fact that his judgment was unjust. He may have been
honestly mistaken with respect to his jurisdiction. In fact, this seems to have
been precisely the case, for, on being informed of the existence of the law
depriving his court of jurisdiction in such cases, he immediately set aside his
judgment of conviction and sent the case to the Court of First Instance for
trial.

Without, therefore, referring to the effect, if any, which the decision of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Alzua vs. Johnson (231
U. S., 106) has upon Chapter I, Title VII of the Penal Code, we may say upon the
record that there is no evidence warranting the conviction of the accused, and
the judgment of conviction is accordingly reversed and the sentence imposed
thereunder set aside; costs de officio.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.