THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. SERVANDO BAY, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The information in this case charges the appellant, Servando Bay, with the
crime of rape, committed as follows:

“On the night of June 7 of the present year, 1913, in the barrio of San
Teodoro of the township of Calapan, Mindoro, in the jurisdiction of this Court
of First Instance, the above-named accused accidentally met Florentina Alcones
walking along the beach, and, on finding that she was alone, did maliciously and
criminally drag her toward a place covered with underbrush, and there by means
of force and intimidation did lie with her against her will.”

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution is substantially as
follows: That the complaining witness and the accused are neighbors: that about
7 o’clock in the evening of June 7, 1913, when returning from her rice field she
was joined by the accused, and that a short distance from the mouth of the
Subaan River he caught hold of her, picked her up, and carried her to the edge
of some thickets, where he threw her on the ground and attempted to have carnal
intercourse with her; that angered by her resistance he drew his dagger, and
forced her under threat of her life to accede to his desires; that, a party who
were passing near the place where the crime was committed heard her cries, and
put into shore; that one of the party stepped ashore, and seeing the accused get
up from the place where the woman claims the crime was committed, asked “What’s
this?;” that the accused made no explanation of his conduct or his presence
there, and left the place forthwith; that immediately thereafter the woman,
accompanied by some of the party from the boat, went to the councilman of the
barrio and made complaint; that the accused, having been brought before the
councilman and asked had he committed the crime of which he was charged,
admitted that he had; that thereafter the accused was sent to the justice of the
peace, who held him for trial.

Upon this evidence the accused was convicted in the court below of the crime
with which he is charged in the information and sentenced to seventeen years
four months and one day of reclusion temporal, together with the
accessory penalties.

Counsel for appellant lays great stress upon certain apparent contradictions
and inconsistencies in the testimony of some of the witnesses for the
prosecution, and vigorously contends that the trial court erred in accepting as
true the testimony of the complaining witness and of the witnesses called by the
prosecution to corroborate her. He emphasizes what he calls the inherent
improbability of the story told by the offended woman, and points to the fact
that she appears to be much more than twice the age of the accused, and anything
but attractive in her personal appearance. His contention is that the charge of
rape is a pure fabrication, and that it was brought by the woman for the sole
purpose of wreaking her vengeance and spite upon the accused, with whom she had
had a quarrel over the trespass of one of his carabaos on her land.

It is true that there are some apparent contradictions and inconsistencies in
the testimony of some of the ignorant witnesses called for the prosecution, and
that it is somewhat difficult to understand how the accused, a young married
man, could have been so lost to all sense of right and decency as to assault a
woman so much older than himself, a neighbor, and an old friend of his family.
But her evidence, supported by that of the other witnesses for the prosecution,
is so convincing arid conclusive that we are forced to believe that he did in
fact commit the atrocious crime with which he is charged.

We are not forgetful of the fact that convictions for this crime should not
be sustained without clear and convincing proof of the guilt of the accused; or
that experience has shown that unfounded charges of rape or attempted rape have
not infrequently been preferred by women, actuated by some sinister or ulterior
and undisclosed motive. We recognize that in cases of this nature it is the duty
of the courts to scrutinize with the utmost care the story told by the
complaining witness and the witnesses called to corroborate her, especially when
it appears either that the offended party did not make immediate outcry or that
there was any unexplained delay in instituting criminal proceedings. But in the
case at bar it conclusively appears that the offended woman sought assistance
and made formal and official complaint immediately after the commission of the
crime under such conditions as practically to preclude the possibility of a
conspiracy between herself and the other prosecuting witnesses to press a false
charge against the accused.

There can be no possible doubt that the party passing in a boat the deserted
place where the crime was committed was attracted by her cries and complaints,
and that the arrival of those aboard was a fortunate coincidence which she could
not well have anticipated, had she planned the filing of false charges against
the accused. There can be no question also that she went immediately to the
councilman, of her barrio to make complaint against the accused, accompanied by
some of the passengers on the boat. And there can be no question also that as a
result, these proceedings were instituted forthwith in the court of the justice
of the peace.

There is a direct conflict in the testimony as to whether the accused, when
the complaint was made to the councilman of the barrio, did or did not admit his
guilt, and this evidence is so contradictory that it would be difficult if not
impossible to make an express finding on this point. But whatever be the truth
as to these alleged admissions of his guilt, the evidence leaves no room for
doubt that neither at the moment when the party in the boat came upon him in
company with his victim nor when he appeared before the councilman upon her
complaint did he claim, as he does now, that her charge that he had assaulted
her was a pure fabrication, invented for the purpose of wreaking vengeance upon
him.

There can be no possible doubt that he was present when the party on board
the boat were attracted to the place where she raised her outcry charging him
with the assault, and that he was present later on when she presented her
complaint to the councilman of the barrio. Under such circumstances, we are
convinced that an innocent man would instantly, and indignantly repudiate such a
charge, and attempt there and then to establish his innocence, explaining how he
came to be there present with the woman, and the conditions under which she had
made the false charge.

The witnesses called both for the prosecution and the defense go into
considerable detail as to all that occurred at the time when the party on board
the boat responded to the calls of the woman and immediately thereafter, and yet
there is not the slightest indication in the evidence that there was on the part
of the accused any such indignant denials and protests as would be expected from
an innocent man suddenly confronted with such a charge under such circumstances.
Indeed, his conduct at that time was, to our minds, wholly at variance with that
which might fairly be expected from him, granting the truth of his testimony and
that of the other witnesses for the defense.

Having in mind the fact that the trial judge saw and heard the witnesses
testify, and upon a full review of all the evidence, we are of opinion that
there is nothing in the record which would justify us in disturbing the findings
of the court below as to the degree of credit which should be accorded the
various witnesses, or as to the guilt of the accused of the crime of which he
was convicted.

We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantial rights of
the accused, and the judgment entered in the court below convicting and
sentencing him should, therefore, be affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo,
JJ., concur.