EUSEBIA BROCE Y APURADO ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLEES, VS. DAMASO APURADO ET AL., OPPONENTS AND APPELLANTS.

Eusebia Broce et al., the petitioners and appellees in the present case,
procured a registered title under Act No. 496 to a parcel of land situated in
the municipality of San Carlos, Occidental Negros. An appeal from the decision
of the Court of Land Registration ordering the inscription of the land in their
name was taken by Catalino Broce, and this Supreme Court on March 16, 1911,
affirmed the judgment (19 Phil. Rep., 599). On April 24, 1911, Damaso Apurado et
al., the present appellants, under the provisions of section 38 of the Land
Registration Act, filed a petition for the opening of the decree of registration
on the ground of fraud in its procurement. This was the first appearance of
these parties in opposition to the registration of the land in the names of the
petitioners.

Carlos Apurado was the maternal grandfather of Eusebia Broce et al. and the
ascendant of Damaso Apurado et al. It is conceded that Carlos Apurado at one
time owned the land in dispute. It is claimed by Eusebia Broce et al. that he
sold this land to their father, the son-in-law of Carlos Apurado. It is claimed
by Damaso Apurado et al. that he never sold this land to the father of the
petitioners, but that he owned it until his death, and that they therefore have
a right to participate in the division of it as heirs by force of law. The fraud
which they rely upon to secure an annulment of the registration in the names of
the petitioners is an alleged agreement whereby Damaso Apurado et al. agreed not
to interfere or take part in the registration of the land on the condition that
Eusebia Broce et al. should attend to the registration of the land in behalf of
all, securing to each the participation to which he was entitled as a legal heir
of the deceased Carlos Apurado.

Section 38 of Act No. 496 reads in part as follows:

“Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto,
subject only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and
all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice,
or citation, or included in the general description ‘To all whom it may
concern.’ Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or
other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any
court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest herein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration a
petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest.”

The decision of the Court of Land Registration is dated February 25, 1909.
This Supreme Court affirmed that decision on March 16, 1911 (supra). An
application to set it aside was made on April 24, 1911. Under these
circumstances the question arises whether the year within which the decree of
registration may be set aside for fraud dates from the decision of the Court of
Land Registration or from the time the decree may be entered by that court based
upon the decision of the Supreme Court, when the case is appealed.

Section 4 of Act No. 1108 repeals section 14 of the Land Registration Act and
provides that all of chapter 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to the
procedure of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
shall extend to appeals from the Court of Land Registration, with the exception
of appeals in special proceedings (sec. 498), and interest on money judgments
accrued during the pendency of actions on appeal (sec. 510), the last two being
clearly inapplicable to judgments of courts of land registration. By the same
section (sec. 4 of Act No. 1108), sections 514, 515, and 516, providing for the
exercise of original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition, and section 517, providing for the auxiliary writ of
preliminary injunction, as applicable to proceedings in the Courts of First
Instance, are also expressly extended to Courts of Land Registration.

A detailed examination of the various sections of the Code of Civil Procedure
and the adjudicated cases of this Court, wherein they have been applied,
establishes beyond question that judgments of the Court of Land Registration
must receive the same treatment on appeal as do judgments of the Court of First
Instance, with the limitations necessarily imposed by the special character and
attributes of the Court of Land Registration. Referring more particularly to the
finality of judgments of the Court of Land Registration: This Supreme Court has,
on various occasions declared that judgments of the Court of First Instance
become final for most purposes only when the prevailing party may have execution
thereon as of right; that is, after the time within which an appeal therefrom
may be taken. And in a recent case, De Fiesta vs. Llorente and Manila
Railroad Co. (25 Phil. Rep., 554), the same doctrine was applied to judgments
coming from the Court of Land Registration, as appears throughout the opinion in
that case, and more particularly from the following quotation:

“The use of the phrase ‘as of right’ in this connection does not mean merely
the time when, under the circumstances of the case, he has a right to have
execution; for it is to be presumed that when execution is issued by special
order of the court he had a right to have it issued. It means, rather, that he
has such a right to have execution issue, that he will not be liable to restore
in the event of a reversal on appeal; and this right can only exist when the
judgment, so far as it appears from the face of the record, is final as a result
of the lapse of the time allowed for appeal.”

Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to judgments of the
Court of Land Registration. Therefore, an appeal from a judgment of that court
of itself and ipso facto stays the execution of the judgment, i. e.,
the issuance of a title of registration to the petitioner.

There are, furthermore, certain specific provisions of Act No. 496 which
definitely provide that the certificate of registration which, of course,
concludes the whole matter and is the “execution” of the judgment of
registration, shall not be issued until the time for appeal has elapsed.

Section 4 of Act No. 1108 provides: “That no certificates of title shall be
issued * * * until after the expiration of the period for perfecting a bill of
exceptions for filing.”

Section 15 of Act No. 496 provides: “At the end of the proceedings on appeal,
the clerk of the appellate court in which final decision was made shall certify
to the Court of Land Registration the final decision on the appeal, and the
Court of Land Registration shall enter the final decree in the case, in
accordance with the certificate of the clerk of the appellate court in which
final decision was made.”

This furnishes a most convincing argument that
an appeal stays the issuance of a certificate of title, which is the sole
subject of the action. The quoted proviso of section 4 of Act No. 1108 and
section 14 of the original Act, which we have just quoted, taken together, show
exactly when the judgment of registration becomes final: when no appeal is
taken, it becomes final on the expiration of the time allowed for filing an
appeal; and when an appeal has been taken, the judgment of registration becomes
final when it is affirmed by a final judgment of this Supreme Court.

Reverting now to the quoted portion of section 38, it will be noted that the
year within which a decree of registration may be attacked on the ground of
fraud dates from the entry of the decree. The decree cannot be entered
until the judgment becomes final, and an appeal from the decision of the Court
of Land Registration prevents the judgment from becoming final until that decree
is affirmed by the judgment of this court. In such a case, only when the final
judgment of this court is returned to the Court of Land Registration, under the
procedure established by section 14, may the decree of registration be entered.
Therefore, it is clear that the year within which such a decree may be attacked
dates from the entry of the decree based upon the judgment of the Supreme Court.
In the present case, this court filed its decision on March 16, 1911. The
judgment was entered by the clerk of this court on April 6. As the petition of
Apurado et al. asking for a review of the same was presented less than twenty
days thereafter, it is clear that they are well within the year allowed for the
filing of such a petition.

In order to obtain the benefits of section 38 the applicant (1) must have an
estate or interest in the land, and (2) must show fraud in the procurement of
the decree of registration. A mere claim of ownership is not sufficient to avoid
a certificate or title obtained under the Land Registration Act. An important
feature of a certificate of title is its finality. The proceedings whereby such
a title is obtained are directed against all persons, known or unknown, whether
actually served with notice or not, and includes all who have an interest in the
land. If they do not appear and oppose the registration of their own estate or
interest in the property in the name of another, judgment is rendered against
them by default, and, in the absence of fraud such judgment is conclusive. If an
interest in the land will not by itself operate to vacate a decree of
registration, a fortiori, fraud is not alone sufficient to do so.

The claim of joint ownership through inheritance by Apurado et al. is met by
Broce et al. with Exhibit 5, which is a notarial document of purchase and sale
of the land in question, executed by Carlos Apurado in favor of his son-in-law,
Gregorio Broce. This document is dated April 3, 1886. According to the statement
therein it is signed by Filomeno Apurado at the request of Carlos Apurado
because he did not know how to write. There were also some sixteen witnesses.
The document was protocolized July 15, 1886. Several objections are made to the
acceptance of this instrument as a valid’ notarial document. The discussion of
this question by the trial court leaves nothing to be desired. The instrument in
question must be considered as a notarial document. And, as stated by the trial
court, even did it not possess the formalities of a notarial document, its
efficacy as a private document is unimpaired, and, as such, it is binding
between the parties and their privies.

There is nothing like adequate testimony in the record that any promise was
ever made by the registered, owners to the Apurados that they would have the
land registered as jointly owned by the two families. We can not overlook the
fact that these protestants remained silent for nearly five years during which
the registration proceedings were pending with the full knowledge, according to
their own statements, that the Broce children were seeking to have the land
registered. This acquiescence in the proceedings carried on with such publicity
and for so long a time by the registered owners in their own names, appears
incompatible with an agreement between them and the present petitioners to have
the land registered as their joint property. And furthermore it has been clearly
proved that Carlos Apurado sold the estate to Gregorio Broce, father of the
present registered owners.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from, denying the petition
seeking a review of the decree of registration, is affirmed; with costs of this
instance against the appellants.

Arellano, C. J., Carson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.