CHAPCHAP, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS CACAYAN, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The disposition of this case, which was commenced in the court below on
December 20, 1911, depends upon the authenticity of Exhibit 1, a notarial
document of purchase and sale executed in 1896, and duly registered on June 16,
1903, under the terms of which the defendant, Cacayan, purchased from Cayat, the
deceased husband of the plaintiff, the land in dispute for the sum of P300.

There is no question that the document is on its face regularly executed. It
is stated therein that Cayat could not sign his own name, while it was
satisfactorily proven at the trial that he could. It is admitted by the
plaintiff that a transaction occurred between Cacayan and Cayat with regard to
the land in question, but she insists that it was not one of purchase and sale
but one of pledge or mortgage for a loan of P100. Two witnesses testified that
this was the character of the transaction as stated to them by Cacayan about the
time it occurred.

If there was any fraud in the execution of this notarial document, it
consisted in someone impersonating the deceased Cayat as vendor. Under section
23 of the Notarial Law of Spain, extended to these islands by the royal decree
of February 15, 1889, the notary was obliged to satisfy himself of the identity
of the persons to the instrument. The presumption is that the notary who
executed this document complied with the Notarial Law in this respect. The mere
fact that the vendor told the notary that he could not sign his own name is not
sufficient to prove fraud in the execution of the instrument. Article 64 of the
Provisional Regulations for the’ organization and management of notarial offices
in the Philippine Islands, provides that the notary shall state this fact in his
certificate, which was done in the present case. The testimony as to the offer
of P100 to the defendant in the presence of the provincial governor is
unsatisfactory. Mr. Wagner, who was, at the time, private secretary of the
governor, was called as a witness, but his testimony is so vague because of his
indistinct recollection of the incident, that it is of no practical value. We do
not consider the testimony of the plaintiff and her other witnesses sufficient
to establish the fact that defendant was actually tendered the P100 in repayment
of a loan, and that he asked for time to consider the proposition. It is quite
possible that the governor sought to repurchase the land in order to gratify the
desire of the plaintiff to regain possession of it. In view of the importance of
the office of notary under the Spanish regime and the consequent solemnity and
strong presumption of accuracy of documents certified by him, we are not
inclined to adopt the theory of fraud in the very act of execution of
such documents unless it is the only possible construction which can be placed
upon the evidence of record. That this document was fraudulently executed is an
affirmative allegation of the plaintiff which should be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. We do not believe that this has been done. As the
document of purchase and sale must be held authentic, there is no basis for
plaintiff’s action.

The judgment of the lower court is therefore reversed and the defendant
absolved from the complaint, without costs in either instance.

Arellano, C. J., Carson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.