LA COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. THE SHERIFF OF OCCIDENTAL NEGROS, ARTURO CUADRA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The only ground upon which the defendants and appellants rest their claim of
error in the judgment of the court below is the alleged erroneous denial of
their plea of res adjudicata by the trial judge. We are of opinion
however that the trial judge properly disregarded their contentions in this
respect. Without examining the contentions of the plaintiff as to alleged
failure of defendants to plead the former adjudication in due form and as to the
lack of complete identity of the subject matter in the present and the former
action, it is a sufficient answer to the plea of res adjudicata to say
that the question of the right of the plaintiffs to the return of the money
prayed for in their complaint was not and could not have been put in issue in
the former action. The true force and effect of the former adjudication is not
to bar the claim of the plaintiff to recover the money paid out by them pending
the former proceedings, but rather to establish their right to recover upon
proof of their allegations as to the fact of payment, and the circumstances
under which they were compelled to make such payment, in order to avoid
unnecessary loss and injury flowing from the levy of execution which was held to
have been “null, for the reason that the court was without jurisdiction to issue
the same,” We conclude therefore that the trial judge correctly disposed of the
principal question at issue in the court below.

We think however that plaintiff’s appeal from his ruling denying interest on
the moneys paid out by them is well taken. As counsel well says, had the
appellant, whose land was actually sold under a, wrongful execution in this
case, been deprived of the use of the land by reason of said sale, there can be
no doubt of its right to recover, as damages for the wrong, compensation for the
loss of the use of the land. Instead of standing idly by and suffering the
unnecessary infliction of such damage, the appellant avoided the loss of the use
of its land, by depositing in its place, under due protest, its established
equivalent in money. In other words, the appellant, being threatened with the
wrongful deprivation of the use of its land, took the necessary steps to avoid
such deprivation, and underwent, instead, the deprivation of the use of an
equivalent sum of money. This was done in pursuance of the obligation which
rests upon every member of the community who is the victim of a tort, to do all
within his power to diminish the resultant damage. It was an act done for the
benefit of the tort feasor, who thereby became liable to compensate for the lost
use of the money, instead of the lost use of the land. It goes without saying,
of course, that no such act could be done to the prejudice of the tort feasor,
in increase of the resultant damages, and if it had been shown that the use of
the money was of greater value than the use of the land, the liability of the
tort feasor would be limited to compensation for the lesser sum. But no such
contention is here made, and no such question is involved. The appellant
substituted money, in place of land, and suffered the loss of use of the former
instead of loss of use of the latter. By the amount of the loss of said use the
appellant has been damaged and is entitled to compensation.

The judgment of the lower court should therefore be modified by allowing, in
addition to the amount awarded to the plaintiff therein, interest at the rate of
6 per cent per annum on the money turned over to the sheriff.

Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ.,
concur.