THE CITY OF MANILA, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. EVARISTO BATLLE ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

On the 12th of October, 1911, plaintiff filed a complaint for the
condemnation of certain lots of land situated in the city of Manila, among them
lands belonging to defendants, for the purpose of widening a public street
parallel to the Escolta in the district of Binondo.

Defendants answered the complaint, admitting the right of the city to condemn
and setting their damages at P196,000.

A commission of three persons was duly appointed which, after viewing the
premises and hearing the parties and their witnesses, made its report, whereby
said defendants and appellants were allowed P84,173.40 for the land condemned
and P35,000 for the improvements thereon, making a total of P119,173.40.

When the report came before the court the city attorney, by a written motion,
asked the court to confirm the same and render judgment in accordance with its
findings and conclusions. This motion was agreed to by the defendants Battle and
wife, and, in open court, counsel for both parties orally requested the court to
confirm the report in accordance with the motion of the city attorney.

On September 3, 1912, the court, disregarding the agreement of the parties,
and without notice to the parties and without evidence other than that found in
the report, rendered a judgment disapproving the report in so far as it related
to the damages allowed Batlle and wife and made other and different findings,
and, thereon, reduced the award made them from P119,173.40 to
P105,144.50.

The appellants excepted to the new findings and the judgment
based thereon and moved the court to set it aside and to grant a. new trial upon
several grounds, among them being that the action of the court was unjustified,
in violation of the agreement of the parties affected, and beyond the power of
the court to make. This motion was denied and the appellants duly excepting
thereto appealed to this court.

It is contended by the appellants that,
under the facts above related, it was the duty of the trial court to approve the
report of the commissioners and that the law did not justify it in setting it
aside and making findings of its own prejudicial to the interests of the
appellants. The appellants assert that both parties litigant having agreed to
the findings of the commissioners, having accepted the award made thereby, and
having manifested that conformity in proper form, and having agreed in open
court to the confirmation of the report as presented, the trial court had no
authority to do otherwise than to confirm.

The appellee, on the other hand, contends, as a matter of fact, that there
was no agreement between the attorneys for the parties relative to the
confirmation of the report of the commissioners, saying:

“The fatal defect in appellants’ position is that the agreement which they
rely on as the basis for their appeal is purely an invention of counsel, never
having had any existence in fact. The circumstances which counsel construe into
a binding stipulation were these: On the filing of the report of the
commissioners, counsel for the city, who in the proceedings before the
commission had vigorously contested the extravagant estimates of value placed
upon appellants’ land by alleged experts, filed on August 3, 1912, the following
motion:

” ‘The undersigned attorney for the plaintiff, the city of Manila, in the
above-entitled action, prays the court to approve and confirm the report of the
commissioners in said cause and render a decision in conformity therewith.’

“On presenting the above motion in open court, counsel for both sides
submitted ‘said report to the court without objection and with a verbal request
for its approval.'”

We cannot agree with the position of counsel for the city above set out, in
so far as it denies conformity on the part of counsel for the interested parties
for the approval by the court of the report of the commission. Counsel himself
admits, as expressly appears in the bill of exceptions, that the counsel for the
city moved the court for the confirmation of the report, that counsel for the
appellants joined in the motion, and that both together prayed in open court
that said report be confirmed.

Moreover, there appears in one of the bills of exception filed on this appeal
the following:

“On the 18th of September, 1912, the plaintiff, the city of Manila, and the
defendants, Evaristo Batlle y Hernandez and his wife Luisa Alvarez Estrada y
Arrieta, presented the following agreement:

” ‘It is hereby agreed
between the city of Manila, plaintiff, and Evaristo Batlle y Hernandez and his
wife, Luisa Estrada, defendants, that when the above-entitled cause was called
for hearing upon the report of the commissioners, the city attorney, Hon. I.
Adams, in representation of the city of Manila, and W. A. Kincaid, in
representation of the defendants Batlle and wife, submitted the said report to
the court without objection and with a verbal request for its
approval.'”

The bill of exceptions containing this agreement was expressly approved by
the attorney for the city on the 2d day of October, 1912, as well as by the
court on the 3d of October of the same year.

While, speaking technically, there was no express stipulation for judgment,
there was, nevertheless, such an agreement between the parties relating thereto
as to amount to the same thing in law. Although, as counsel says, the agreement
just quoted was not made until long after the events to which it refers and
which it incorporates occurred nevertheless, it embodies, and thereby concedes,
the existence of those events, and the existence of those events discloses a
perfect agreement between the parties interested relative to the approval and
confirmation of the commissioners’ report, in so far as it affected their
interests.

The question naturally arises then whether, under such circumstances, the
court was justified in law in disregarding the conformity of the parties
relative to the confirmation of the report and, upon its own motion, to proceed
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own and to render a
judgment thereupon materially different from that which it would have rendered
it if had followed the agreement of the parties interested.

We are of the opinion that the court erred and that its judgment must be
reversed to the extent to which it changed the report of the commission relative
to the award made to these appellants. Section 246 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides:

“Upon the filing of such report in court, the court shall, upon hearing,
accept the same and render judgment in accordance therewith; or for cause shown,
it may recommit the report to the commissioners for further report of facts; or
it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners ; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part, and may make such final order and judgment
as shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his
rights under the law, and to the defendant just compensation for the land so
taken; * * *.”

From this section it is clear that, on the presentation to the court of the
report of the commissioners, the court shall accept the same and render judgment
in accordance therewith. That is the first duty thrust upon the court when the
report is presented. Under certain conditions, however, the court may do other
things. It may recommit the report to the committee; it may set it aside and
appoint new commissioners; it may accept the report in part and reject it in
part and make such final order as may be just and proper. But it can do these
things only upon a condition named in the section and that is that cause be
shown.

The showing of cause is a condition precedent for doing anything except to
confirm the report. This means that cause must be shown by the parties
interested. The court itself has no interest in the matter except, perhaps, in
cases where it clearly appears that a fraud has been committed upon the court or
upon the public by the report or that the findings of the commission are such as
to show fraud, corruption, or bad faith. Its duty, in the absence of cause
shown, is to confirm the report. This is so even though there is objection made
to it. How much more is it its duty when the parties themselves affirmatively
agree upon the justice, equity, and legality of the report and jointly ask for
its confirmation.

The judgment appealed from is reversed and the cause remanded to the court
whence it came, with instructions to enter a judgment in favor of the appellants
and against the appellee for the sum found, by the report of the commissioners
to be due them. Of the judgment so entered only that part thereof will be
collectible which remains unpaid, with interest thereon. No costs in this
instance.

Arellano, C. J., and Araullo, J., concur.

Carson and Trent, JJ., concur in the result.

Judgment reversed; case remanded with instructions.