JOSE PEREZ PASTOR, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. PEDRO NOEL ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

After a careful review of all
the evidence of record, we find nothing which would justify us in disturbing the
findings of fact by the trial judge upon which is based his judgment in favor of
the plaintiff for P4,990.46, the value of certain property wrongfully and
forcibly taken by the defendants and appellants from plaintiff’s store in
Dumanhug, which property has long since been destroyed or consumed. The
contentions of counsel for defendants and appellants in this connection are
sufficiently and satisfactorily disposed of in the opinion of this court in the
case of Aldamis vs. Leuterio (8 Phil. Rep., 688, 691), and the cases
there cited, Williams vs. Bruffy (96 U. S., 176); Stevens vs.
Griffith (111 U. S., 48); Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388). The
principles announced in the former case are clearly applicable to the case at
bar and decisive of it, so that, adhering to the doctrine therein announced, the
judgment of the court below should be and is affirmed on this branch of the
case.

We cannot, however, agree with the trial judge, in his finding that it was
necessary for the plaintiff to pay the sum of P2,850 Mexican currency to the
Compañia General de Tabacos (referred to hereinafter as the company) in order to
recover possession of certain tobacco which was unlawfully and forcibly seized
by the defendants and which thereafter came into the possession of that company.
We have no doubt that plaintiff did in fact pay over that amount to the company
in order to secure possession of the tobacco, but we think it is very clear from
all the evidence of record, that there was no legal necessity therefor. In other
words, upon the evidence as developed by the record in this case, the plaintiff
was entitled to recover and by the institution of the proper action might have
recovered his tobacco from the company without the necessity for making payment
therefor. Upon the plaintiffs own showing he was wrongfully and forcibly
dispossessed of the tobacco which came into the possession ,of the company, and
in the light of the facts as disclosed by this record he had a perfect right to
recover possession of his property from the company, without the payment of any
indemnity whatever. It is not even suggested in the record that the payment of
this money was rendered necessary by the threatened or actual insolvency of the
company or for any other reason whatever which could have justified the payment
under protest, in order to avoid loss and damage to an amount still greater than
that paid to the company.

The trial judge rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff and against the defendants for the amount thus paid to the
company, and the judgment must therefore be reversed to that extent. It is
admitted that the plaintiff recovered Jill the tobacco which was unlawfully
seized by the defendants, and the measure of his damages arising out of the
transaction, for which they could properly be held responsible in a civil
action, is compensation for the wrongful detention, together with his necessary
and reasonable expenditures incurred in his efforts to recover possession. (38
Cyc, 2101, and cases there cited.) There is no evidence in the record as to loss
or damage of this nature, except the evidence touching the payment to the
company, and it appearing that there was no reasonable or legal necessity for
the payment of the amount in question in order to recover possession of the
tobacco, we are of opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to reimbursement
therefor from these defendants. To hold otherwise would put it in the power of
the injured party in cases such as that at bar, to augment the damages suffered
by him to any extent which malice or a willful disregard of the rights of the
offender might dictate, and would open the door to fraud in all such cases. To
allow the owner of property who has been wrongfully deprived of possession to
pile up expenses for the alleged purpose of recovering the property, which are
not reasonable and necessary to that end, and to recover as damages the amount
of such expenditures, would in many instances work a greater wrong than that
originally committed. Such expenditures can in no proper sense be held to have
been occasioned by the wrongful act of the trespasser, whose liability is
limited to the repair of the damage resulting from such wrongful act.

Let judgment be entered affirming the judgment in all respects, except as to
so much thereof as allows damages (daños y perjuicios) in the sum of
P2,850, and reversing so much thereof as allows the said damages, without
special condemnation of costs in this instance.

Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.

Arellano, C. J., concurs to the extent that the judgment should be
affirmed in full.