G.R. No. 7647. March 27, 1914
DOMINGO CALUYA, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT, VS. LUCIA DOMINGO, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.
MORELAND, J.:
The learned court below based its judgment upon three grounds. The
first one was that, although the testator had signed by mark, it
nowhere appeared in the will who had written the signature or that it
had been written at his request. The second, that the witness Antonino
Pandaraoan could not really have signed the attestation clause because,
at the time it was executed, he was attending a session of the
municipal council of Piddig as a member thereof. Third: That as to the
other witness, Segundino Asis, the will mentioned and confirmed a sale
of land to him by the testator, and he being thereby an interested
party his testimony could not be believed.
We do not believe that any of the objections are well founded and
the judgment refusing its probate must, therefore, be reversed.
Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part:
“No will, except as provided in the preceding
section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor
charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator’s name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of
each other. * * *”
It is nowhere required, that, where the testator is unable to write,
the fact that his signature was written by some other person, at his
request and express direction, should appear in the body of the will
itself. In the case of Barut vs. Cabacungan (21 Phil. Rep., 461, 463) we held the following:
“From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity
of the will, it is unimportant whether the person who writes the name
of the testatrix signs his own or not. The important thing is that it
clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her
express direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they
attested and subscribed it in her presence and in the presence of each
other. That is all the statute requires. It may be wise as a practical
matter that the one who signs the testator’s name signs also his own;
but that is not essential to the validity of the will.
Whether one person or another signed the name of the testatrix in this
case is absolutely unimportant so far as the validity of her will is
concerned. The plain wording of the statute shows that the requirement
laid down by the trial court, if it did lay it down, is absolutely
unnecessary under the law; and the reasons underlying the provisions of
the statute relating to the execution of wills do not in any sense
require such a provision. From the standpoint of language it is an
impossibility to draw from the words of the law the inference that the
person who signs the name of the testator must sign his own name also.
The law requires only three witnesses to a will, not four.“Nor is such requirement found in any other branch of the law. The name
of a person who is unable to write may be signed by another, by express
direction, to any instrument known to the law. There is no necessity
whatever, so far as the validity of the instrument is concerned, for
the person who writes the name of the principal in the document to sign
his own name also. As a matter of policy it may be wise that he do so
inasmuch as it would give such intimation as would enable a person
proving the document to demonstrate more readily the execution by the
principal. But as a matter of essential validity of the document, it is
unnecessary. The main thing to be established in the execution of the
will is the signature of the testator. If that signature is proved,
whether it be written by himself or by another at his request, it is
none the less valid, and the fact of such signature can be proved as
perfectly and as completely when the person signing for the principal
omits to sign his own name as it can when he actually signs. To hold a
will invalid for the lack of the signature of the person signing the
name of the principal is, in the particular case, a complete abrogation
of the law of wills, as it rejects and destroys a will which the
statute expressly declares is valid.”
The section above quoted also provides that “the attestation clause
shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to
be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it
in his presence and in the presence of each other. But the absence of
such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is
proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section
provided.”
Not only does the attestation clause comply with the requirements of
this section, but it appears clearly proved in evidence that the name
of the testator was signed by another person at his request and under
his direction and in his presence and in the presence of the witnesses
to the will. Moreover, as appears from the last clause of the section,
if the attestation clause is defective, or even absent, the will is
nevertheless valid provided it is satisfactorily proved that it was in
fact signed and executed as provided by law.
As to the second objection, namely, that Antonino Pandaraoan could
not have signed the will as a witness thereto, as stated in the
attestation clause, because he was attending a meeting of the municipal
council of Piddig at the time the will is alleged to have been
executed, we believe this also to be without merit. It does appear in
the evidence of the opposition that the witness Pandaraoan was
attending a meeting of the municipal council of Piddig from something
like 10 o’clock till 12.30 o’clock of the day on which the will was
executed and that the will was executed sometime between 10 and 12
o’clock. Too much weight, however, can not be given to the testimony
relative to the precise time of the execution of the will. The barrio
of Piddig is only a short distance from the house in which the will was
executed and it would have taken but a short time to cover the
distance. The witness Pandaraoan himself testified directly and
positively that, after having left the meeting,of the municipal
council, he went to the house of the testator by appointment and there
signed the will as stated in the attestation clause. He asserts that he
covered the distance on horseback. The other witnesses to the will
support this declaration. Not only this, but the notary public who drew
up the will and who translated it to the testator and who was present
at the time of its execution, declared and testified that the witnesses
whose names appear upon the will were present at the time it was
executed by the testator and that they signed the same at his request
and in his presence and in the presence of each other. All of the
witnesses to the will unite in declaring that they were there present
at the time the will was executed and that they signed as witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of each other. The mere fact that
there was a session of the municipal council of Piddig about the same
time that the will was executed is not necessarily conclusive against
the fact that ‘ Antonino Pandaraoan was present and signed as a
subscribing witness as he declares. Mistakes in time are easily made
among witnesses who measure time not so much by clocks or watches as by
the sun. Antonino Pandaraoan testified that the municipal council began
its session about 10 o’clock; that in order to attend the execution of
the will, as he had agreed with the notary public he would do, he was
obliged to leave the session before it terminated; that he so left the
session, mounted a horse and arrived at the house of the testator at
about 12 o’clock, in time to take part in the execution of the will as
stated in the attestation clause.
We do not believe that the clear and positive testimony of the
witnesses to the will and of the notary public is overcome by the
evidence offered in opposition to the probate.
As to the third ground upon which the court based its decision;
namely, that the will having mentioned and confirmed a sale of land, to
Segundino Asis, one of the witnesses to the will, while not rendering
the will entirely invalid, throws great doubt upon the legality of its
execution and especially the testimony of said witness relating thereto.
Section 622 provides:
“If a person attests the execution of a will, to
whom or to whose wife or husband, or parent, or child, a beneficial
devise, legacy, or interest, of or affecting real or personal estate,
is given by such will, such devise, legacy, or interest shall, so far
only as concerns such person, or the wife or husband, or parent or
child of such person, or anyone claiming under such person or such wife
or husband, or parent or child, be void, unless there are three other
competent witnesses to such will, and such person so attesting shall be
admitted as a witness as if such devise, legacy, or interest had not
been made or given. But a mere charge on the real or personal estate of
the testator, for the payment of debts, shall not prevent his creditors
from being competent witnesses to his will.”
As will readily be seen on reading this section, nothing in the will
before us relative to the sale of land to Segundino Asis creates such
an interest therein, as falls within the provisions thereof. Indeed, no
interest of any kind was created by the will in favor of Segundino
Asis, nor did it convey or transfer any interest to him. It simply
mentioned a fact already consummated, a sale already made. Even if,
however, the will had conveyed an interest to Segundino Asis, it would
not have been for that reason void. Only that clause of the will
conveying an interest to him would have been void; the remainder could
have stood and would have stood as a valid testament.
We are confident from a thorough examination of the record that a
fair preponderance of the evidence is in favor of the proponents, and
there being no legal impediment to the probate the court erred in
refusing it.
The judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and the cause remanded
to the court whence it came with instructions to legalize and probate
the will in accordance with the petition.
Arellano, C. J., Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
ARAULLO, J.
I do not concur in the result and in one of the grounds thereof.