#### ## Title:

\*\*Atienza, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections and Manuel A. Roxas II\*\*

#### ## Facts:

On July 5, 2005, Franklin M. Drilon, then president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced the party's withdrawal of support from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo without consulting party members. This action was denounced by Jose L. Atienza, Jr., LP Chairman, and other members. On March 2, 2006, Atienza convened a party conference that elected him as the LP president by declaring all positions vacant. Drilon promptly filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), challenging the legality of these elections. COMELEC resolved to annul the March 2, 2006 elections while acknowledging Drilon's tenure until November 30, 2007, pending new elections.

Subsequently, in 2007, a NECO assembly convened and elected Manuel A. Roxas II as the new LP president. Petitioners Atienza, Defensor, and other allies challenged Roxas' election before the COMELEC, claiming that the NECO meeting lacked proper quorum and excluded them unfairly. The COMELEC dismissed their petition on June 18, 2009. Atienza and company then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court without seeking COMELEC reconsideration.

### ## Issues:

- 1. \*\*Whether the Liberal Party (LP) was an indispensable party in the petition.\*\*
- 2. \*\*Whether Atienza, et al. had legal standing to question Roxas' election despite their expulsion from LP.\*\*
- 3. \*\*Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the NECO that elected Roxas.\*\*
- 4. \*\*Whether COMELEC abused its discretion by not resolving the expulsion issue prior to ruling on NECO's composition.\*\*
- 5. \*\*Whether the expulsion of Atienza, et al., violated due process rights.\*\*

## ## Court's Decision:

# \*\*1. Indispensable Party:\*\*

The Supreme Court held that the petitioners were not challenging the LP itself but rather specific actions by Roxas and his allies that allegedly disenfranchised them. Since the LP as an entity was not implicated in wrongdoing directly nor was affirmative relief sought from it, the LP was not deemed an indispensable party in this case.

# \*\*2. Legal Standing:\*\*

The Court recognized Atienza et al.'s standing based on allegations that they were unlawfully expelled and excluded from the NECO. The "real party-in-interest" principle allowed Atienza and associates to challenge the elections and their expulsion because they stood to benefit from possible nullification and reinstatement.

### \*\*3. COMELEC's Validation of NECO:\*\*

The Court upheld COMELEC's decision, stating that the changes in the NECO composition, including the admission of new members after the 2007 elections and the nomination of "persons of national stature" by Drilon, complied with the amended LP Constitution. The Souvenir Program's list was not static since NECO's makeup was naturally subject to change.

## \*\*4. Failure to Resolve Expulsion Issue:\*\*

The Court ruled that determination of the NECO and party leadership disputes did not require addressing the expulsion issue first. The NECO that elected Roxas was validly constituted, and the validity of petitioners' expulsion was seen as separate and purely internal, thus outside COMELEC's jurisdiction.

### \*\*5. Due Process:\*\*

The Court dismissed the due process claims, clarifying that political parties are private entities, and internal disciplinary actions are not bound by the state's due process clauses save where the issue interrupts state functions or elections. There was no governmental action concerned, nor was there a breach of state-imposed constitutional provisions in their expulsion.

#### ## Doctrine:

### \*\*1. Private Entities and Due Process:\*\*

The Bill of Rights, specifically due process, limits state action and is not enforceable against purely private conduct such as internal political party disputes.

## \*\*2. Internal Party Autonomy:\*\*

Political parties have autonomy in their internal affairs, including membership discipline unless state functions like elections are adversely affected.

## \*\*3. Jurisdiction over Intra-Party Disputes:\*\*

COMELEC may only involve itself in disputes within political parties to the extent necessary for discharge of its constitutional functions like election supervision and party registration.

#### ## Class Notes:

- \*\*Real Party-in-Interest (Sec. 2, Rule 3, Rules of Court):\*\* A stakeholder benefiting or suffering from the action's outcome.
- \*\*COMELEC's Limited Jurisdiction (Sec. 2, Article IX-C, Constitution):\*\* Over political parties only as needed to perform constitutional duties.
- \*\*Autonomy of Political Parties:\*\* Freedom in internal matters reaffirmed except where state action is essential.
- \*\*Due Process Limitation (Art. III, Constitution): \*\* Applies chiefly to governmental action, not private entity disputes.

# ## Historical Background:

This case arose in a period marked by political instability and diverging factions within major political parties in the Philippines, mirroring broader national disputes over the presidency of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The intricacies of this case exemplify the significant role political parties play in shaping democratic processes and the importance of internal cohesion to an effective political system. The Supreme Court's emphasis on internal party autonomy reinforces non-interference in party dynamics except where essential to public functions.