G.R. No. L-27120.

Petition for certiorari against the order of the Court of First Instance
of Manila dated 13 May 1966 (in Criminal Case No. 82116) granting the petition
for bail of therein accused Jose Simborio y Salonga on a P20,000.00 bond.

In an information filed on 19 April 1966, Jose Simborio y Salonga was charged with the crime of murder for the fatal
shooting of Avelino Concepcion,
Jr. in the evening of 11 March 1966.  It was there alleged that the accused, in
conspiracy with Marmolito Catelo
y Rivera (alias Sonny Catelo) and others whose
identity and whereabouts were unknown, shot Avelino Concepcion, Jr. with a gun, wounding the latter in the
abdomen which directly and immediately caused his death (on 14 March
1966).  The offense was said to have been
attended by the circumstances of premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength,
and the use of motor vehicle.

On 22 April 1966,
the accused filed a motion for his provisional release on bail, claiming that
the evidence of his guilt was not strong and, considering his personal
circumstances and social standing, there is no probability that he would
flee.  Thereupon, the motion was heard on
29 April 1966, during which hearing the prosecution presented its evidence,
consisting of the ante mortem statement of the victim, Avelino Concepcion, Jr., given to
Patrolman J. Sta. Maria at the Philippine General Hospital to the effect that
accused Simborio was in the company of gunwielder Sonny Catelo when he (Concepcion) was shot; the statement of alleged eyewitness
Ruben Sumalde y Olisco that
when Sonny Catelo shot Concepcion,
Jr. the accused was holding the victim’s left arm; and the statement of Manolito Gascon, the driver of
the car used by Catelo and company, to the effect
that the accused was with them at least before the incident happened.  Upon the other hand, the accused contended that
at the time of the incident he was taking an examination at the Mapua Institute of Techno­logy.  To support this allegation, he presented the
examination paper and the testimonies of his instructor and the latter’s
assistant that the said examination paper could not have been submitted if movant did not take the test on the date in question.

After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the
court, considering the fact that –

“The prosecution admits that it was not.  Simborio who fired
the gun and shot Concepcion
but another suspect still at-large by the name of Sonny Catelo.  But the prosecution insists that Simborio was present, was the one who identified the
victim, and was in fact holding the victim’s arm when the latter was fired
upon.

“In view of the claim of the accused that he was not present
at the scene of the crime, but was in fact taking a final examination in the Mapua Institute of Technology at the time the alleged crime
was committed, the fact of his examination paper having been produced, and the
testimony of the professor that it can not happen that a student can submit an
examination paper without attending the test, or that an examination paper can
be submitted without the student having taken part in the examination, added to
the fact that the killer and the trigger man was not Simborio
but another suspect named Sonny Catelo, who is still
at-large, which the prosecu­tion admits, as in fact it states in its memorandum
that the principal suspects are still at-large’, which is an indirect admission
that the herein accused is not as guilty as the said real principal suspects;
the counter statement of the assistant to the professor, Gumangan,
to the contrary notwithstanding, which in effect does not substantially alter
his first affidavit because he did not have to personally know the student, but
the fact remains that ‘an examination paper submitted after the examination
bearing the name of Jose Simborio‘ make out a very
contro­versial issue as to whether or not Simborio
was present at the scene of the crime at the time”,

reached the conclusion that the
prosecution evidence as such does not meet the required standard of
“strong evidence” to justify the denial of the accused’s
right to bail.  Consequently, the
petition was granted and the provisional release of the accused allowed on a
bond for P20,000.00.  The Assistant City
Fiscal filed the present petition, claiming that the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion and with bias in issuing the aforementioned order.

Petitioner’s charge of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondent judge is premised on the allegation that the motion for bail was
granted in disregard of the manifestation of the trial fiscal that he was
introducing witnesses to amplify the exhibits already presented.  In short, it is here contended that in
granting the petition for bail before the trial fiscal could introduce his wit­nesses,
the prosecution had been deprived of its right to present complete evi­dence
that would justify the disapproval of the petition, or that the order allowing
the temporary liberty of the accused on bail was based on incomplete evidence.

It can not be denied that, under our regime of laws, and
concomitant with the legal presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused
is entitled to provisional liberty on bail,^[1]
the only exception being when he is charged with a capital offense and the
evidence of his guilt is strong.^[2]
But even in the latter instance, the high regard reserved by the law for
personal freedom is un­derscored by the provision placing upon the prosecution,
not on the defense, the burden of proving that the accused is not entitled to
bail.^[3]
This protective attitude towards the sanctity of the liberty of a person
notwithstanding, due process also demands that in the matter of bail the
prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to present proof of the guilt
of the accused.^[4]
Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of the
right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order
granting such petition was issued upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance
of the order would really constitute grave abuse of discretion that would call
for the remedy of certiorari.^[5]

There is record, however, that while the trial fiscal manifested
his intention to introduce witnesses to amplify the exhibits already
adduced by the prosecution, such manifestation was in effect withdrawn when he
offered to submit the matter for resolution of the court on the evidence
already presented, provided the accused would admit said exhibits — which
condition the accused accepted.  The
transcript of the notes of the proceedings in the court below reads as follows:

“FISCAL

If the accused will admit the affidavits, the exhibits that we have presented,
then we will submit and rest our case on this motion for bail.

“COURT

What do you say about that?

“ATTY.
CONCEPCION (for the accused)

As far as Exhibit A^[6]
is concerned, your Honor, we have no objection that if this witness will tes­tify,
he will reiterate the contents of that statement.

x x
x x x                     x x
x x x                       x x
x x x

“ATTY.
CONCEPCION

For the purpose of this petition for bail, your Honor, we have no
objection to the admission of Exhibit B.

“COURT

That is?

“ATTY.
CONCEPCION

Manolito Gascon, with the
reservation that it is without prejudice to cross examine during the hearing.

x x
x x x                     x x
x x x                       x x
x x x

“COURT

How about the other affidavits?

“ATTY.
CONCEPCION

As far as Exhibit C,^[7]
we have no objection, inas­much as anyway the statement is obviously contrary
to the statement of the witness Gascon.

x x
x x x                     x x
x x x                       x x
x x x

“COURT

How about the ante-mortem statement?

“ATTY.
CONCEPCION

The ante-mortem statement, we have no objection also.  And we would like to invite attention of the
Court that the deceased only stated that Simborio was
present.

x x
x x x                     x x
x x x                       x x
x x x

“COURT

All right.  With the manifestation
and reservation, defense admits the several exhibits.

“FISCAL

Yes, your Honor.

“COURT

That was your challenge.

“FISCAL

Yes, your Honor, we will submit memorandum.  Ten (10) days, or, two weeks, your
Honor.  (t.s.n.,
pages 15-20, session of 6 May 1966).”  (Under­scoring supplied; pages 3-6, Answer.)

And there is nothing unlawful or
irregular about the above procedure.  The
declara­tions constitute judicial admissions, which are allowed by the rules^[8]
and are binding on the parties, by virtue of which the prosecution dispensed
with the in­troduction of additional evidence and the defense waived the right
to contest or dispute the veracity of the statements contained in the
exhibits.  Clearly, it can not be claimed
that there had been deprivation of the prosecution’s right to present all its
evidence.  If the evidence already
adduced turned out to be inade­quate for purposes of denying the petition for
bail, the prosecution can not lay the blame at anyone else’s door; it took the
risk in resting its case on the exhibits already presented, which, in the lower
court’s opinion, did not suffice.

Neither is it correct to say that the respondent judge gave more
credence to the alibi of the accused rather than to the statements made
by the victim and an eye­witness to the incident, thereby showing bias in favor
of the accused.  It must be remembered
that the question raised for the determination of the lower court was not the
guilt or innocence of the accused of the crime charged, but whether or not the
evidence of his guilt is strong.  In
taking cognizance of the fact that the state­ments of the victim and witness Sumalde, that the accused was present at the scene of the
incident and even held the arm of the victim when the latter was shot at, is
contradicted by the examination paper and the testimonies of the instructor and
his assistant tending to establish the presence of the accused in school at the
time when the shooting occurred, the respondent judge did not rule on the ad­missibility
and probative value of said evidence.  It
was merely held that with the issue of the whereabouts of the accused when the
crime was committed having thus become contentious, the evidence of guilt of
the accused (so far presented) can not be considered strong.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the
order here in question, the petition is hereby dismissed, without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon,
Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Ruiz Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Marcos vs. Judge Cruz, 67 Phil. 82.

^[2]
Sec. 1 (16), Article III, Philippine Constitution.

^[3]
Sec. 7, Revised Rule 114.

^[4]
See Angeles vs. Abaya, 90 Phil. 172, 218.

^[5] Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75
Phil. 634.

^[6]
Statement of the assistant to the MIT instructor who watched the examination.

^[7]
Statement of eyewitness Ruben Sumalde y Olisco.

^[8]
Section 2, Revised Rule 129.