G. R. No. L-12662. August 18, 1958

Chua Lao, Cheng Kee Tek, Go Keng Bon, Hai Hing, Chua Kee, Chua Gui, Lim
Chuan, Lee Tiong, Chua Kee Kim and Teng Guan, all Chinese citizens, are the
holders of stalls, Nos. 69, 66, 67, 68, 59, 70, 71, 75, 80 and 83, respectively,
in the meat section of the public market of Pasig, Rizal, allegedly even before
the outbreak of the Second World War, and were duly licensed to engage in the
retail business. The meat section of the aforesaid public market has 54 stalls;
as of 1955, 33 of them were actually occupied—23 by Filipinos and 10 by
Chinese—and 21 were vacant.

On January 8, 1955, prompted by a letter sent by Filipino meat vendors
calling attention to the fact that there were alien stallholders in the public
market, the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, passed and approved Resolution
No. 5, series of 1955, declaring all the stalls in the meat section of the
public market of said municipality vacant starting February 1, 1955 (Exhibit A).
But 15 stallholders (Filipinos) in the same section took exception to the
measure for the reason that if the stalls that they were occupying would be
subjected to applications and be disposed of by lot, they may not be able to get
the same places. Being apprised of this situation, the Municipal Council,
pursuant to Republic Act 37 as implemented by Department Orders Nos. 32 and 42,
enacted Resolution No. 10 dated January 22, 1955, amending Resolution No. 5,
declaring as vacant the stalls in the meat section of the public market of
Pasig, Rizal held by aliens, effective February 10, 1955, for distribution among
Filipino applicants. It was also provided that only if there would be stalls
unapplied for by Filipinos or in the absence of any Filipino applicant would
aliens be allowed to lease any of them (Exhibit A—1).

As the Municipal Mayor and the Municipal Treasurer of Pasig, Rizal, were set
to enforce the said resolution, the Chinese stallholders filed a petition for
prohibition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branch, naming said
officials as respondents (Civil Case No. 3437), alleging that the aforesaid
resolution was unduly discriminatory, oppressive and prejudicial to their
interest, and prayed that respondents be definitely enjoined from enforcing
resolutions Nos. 5 and 10, series of 1955, on the ground that they were
unconstitutional. And upon petitioners’ filing of bond for P5,000, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the Court enjoining respondents from
enforcing the disputed resolutions.

On March 30, 1955, after the respondents had filed their answer, the parties
submitted a stipulation of facts providing, among others:

* * * * * * *

4. That the stalls occupied by the petitioners were declared vacant by the
   municipal council, pursuant to Resolution No. 5, as amended by No. 10, Series of
   1955, of the municipal council of Pasig, Rizal.

   And pursuant to that
   resolution, the Municipal Treasurer declared the said 10 stalls occupied by the
   petitioners, vacant, and set a date for the reception of applications for leases
   up to February 20,” 1955. As a consequence of that call of the Municipal
   Treasurer, twelve (12) applications were filed by Filipino citizens for the ten
   (10) stalls occupied by the petitioners.

5. That out of the 21 vacant stalls, five (5) are already leased to Filipino
   citizens permanently, who have paid the corresponding fees. The lease have been
   executed after the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.

   The
   remaining sixteen (16) vacant stalls in the meat section of the said public
   market of Pasig, Rizal, have been applied for by 16 Filipino applicants, in
   accordance with the standing rules and regulations or ordinances of the
   Municipal Council on March 4, 1955.

6. That the twelve (12) Filipino applicants for the stalls occupied by the
   petitioners are different persons from those who applied for the sixteen (16)
   vacant stalls, except one, Benjamin Alberto, who applied also for one of the
   sixteen (16) stalls.

7. That the twelve (12) applicants for the stalls occupied by the herein
   petitioners filed their applications for the said stalls prior to the
   institutions of this case. However, no leases for the same were awarded in view
   of the writ of preliminary injunction.

8. That the stalls occupied by the herein petitioners are equally as good as
   the other forty-four (44) market stalls in the same meat section of the said
   public market of Pasig, in the sense that they are made of the same materials,
   cement, and the same size and the same charges are collected by the Municipal
   Treasurer of the said municipality of Pasig, Rizal.

Based on the aforesaid agreement, the lower Court rendered judgment dated May
21,1955, holding that the enactment of the ordinances in question was a valid
exercise of the power of the Municipal Council pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 32 of the Department of Finance, as amended, after finding that the 10
stalls occupied by Chinese were applied for by Filipinos, and that of the 21
originally existing vacant stalls, 5 had already been leased to Filipinos and
the remaining 16 also duly applied for.

On June 15,1955, petitioners filed a motion for new trial on the strength of
a written statement by the respondent Municipal Treasurer dated June 14, 1955,
to the effect that of the 5 Filipinos’who were awarded lease of stalls after the
institution of that action, 1 paid the fee only up to March 31, 1955, and the
remaining 4, while paying the corresponding fees, did not regularly occupy or
utilize the same. It was further declared that as of March 31, 1955, 17 stalls
in the same section remained vacant. As said motion was denied, petitioners
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case, however, was certified to this Court
for the reason that the main question refers to the constitutionality of
Resolutions 5 and 10, series of 1955, of the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal,
and therefore falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (Section 17—1,
Republic Act 296).

The questions presented by the instant action are: (1) whether or not the
aforementioned Resolutions of the Municipal Council of Pasig are discriminatory
and oppressive to be violative of the Constitution; and (2) whether or not the
lower Court erred in denying petitioners’ motion for new trial.

It is clear that while it is true that there were 21 vacant stalls in the
meat section of the public market of Pasig, Rizal, equally as good as any other
stall in the same market, the 10 stalls occupied by aliens were applied for by
Filipinos, in view of which, the Municipal Council had to enact the disputed
Resolutions. In assailing the constitutionality of said measures,
petitioners-appellants contend that the purpose of the aforesaid enactments
apparently was to eject them from their place of business and deprive them of
their means of livelihood.

The Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, is under the law empowered “to
establish or authorize the establishment of * * * markets, and inspect and
regulate thfr use of the same” (Section 2442-[q], Revised Administrative
Code). Section 2238 of the same legal body, which prescribes the general powers
of municipal councils, also vests them with authority to “enact such ordinances
and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof.” But for a
municipal ordinance to be valid and have force and effect, it must not only be
within the powers of the council to enact but same must not be in conflict with
or repugnant to the general law. In the case at bar, the Council invoked the
provisions of Republic Act 37 as basis of the resolutions in question, and
considering that appellants did not contest, much less prove, that the said
resolutions were not in conformity with said law or that they were not within
the power of the council to enact, the question that necessarily comes up is
whether Republic Act 37, nationalizing the occupancy and use of stalls in public
markets by giving preference to citizens of this Republic in matters of lease
thereof (Section 1, Republic Act 37) is constitutional or not. This question has
already been settled and determined in a previous case when several Chinese
stallholders, claiming that the enforcement of Republic Act 37 would infringe
their right to due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution,
filed an action for prohibition against the Secretary of Finance seeking to
restrain and prohibit the latter from implementing said law. In upholding the
validity of the aforesaid Act and the administrative order of the Secretary of
Finance, this Court pronounced:

“Public markets are public services or utilities as much as the public supply
and sale of gas, gasoline, electricity, water and public transportation are.
Under the Constitution, the operation of all public service are reserved to
Filipino citizens and to corporations and associations sixty per centum
of the capital of which belongs to Filipino citizens.

In impugning the validity of Republic Act No. 37, appellees invoke general
guarantees in the Bill of Bights, such as the due process of law and the equal
protection of the laws. Even if their position could be supported under said
general guarantees, * * * said guarantees have to give way to the specific
provision above quoted, which reserves to Filipino citizens the operation of
public services or utilities.

Furthermore, the establishment, maintenance, and operation of public markets,
as much as public works, are part of the functions of government. The privilege
of participating in said functions, such as that of occupying public market
stalls, is not among the fundamental rights or even among the general civil
rights protected by the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The exercise or
enjoyment of public functions are reserved to a class of persons possessing the
specific qualifications required by law. Such is the case of the privilege to
vote, to occupy a government position, or to participate in public works. They
are reserved exclusively to citizens. Public functions are powers of national
sovereignty and it is elementary that such sovereignty be exercised exclusively
by nationals”. (Co Chiong vs. Cuaderno, 83 Phil., 242; 46 Off. Gaz.
4833).

Petitioners-appellants, however, maintain that this right to preference could
only be availed of where there are both Filipino and alien applicants to the
same stall or stalls, but in cases where there are other vacant stalls, equally
as good as those already occupied by aliens which could be applied for and
awarded to Filipino applicants, the latter cannot single out those held by
aliens and have them declared vacant on the theory that they are entitled to
preference under the law. To do so, appellants argue, would be highly
discriminatory and oppressive.

In enacting Republic Act No. 37, the Legislature, obviously prompted by a
desire to rid or relieve this country of the shackles of foreign economic
control and domination, intended to give to its citizenry monopoly of the retail
business in the public markets—an aspiration which this Court declared to be
within the limits of legislative authority (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil.,
1155). For this reason, said law specifically provides:

“SECTION 1.—All citizens of the Philippines shall have preference in the
lease of public market stalls”. Rep. Act No. 37).

It may be noted that the aforesaid Act does not specify when the privilege
allowed by Republic Act No. 37 accrues. The law, apparently, is applicable
whenever there is a conflict of interest between Filipino applicants and aliens
for lease of stalls in public markets, in which situation the right to
preference immediately arises. Accordingly where the law does not distinguish,
we should not make any distinction. In the case at bar, it does not appear how
the market fees for the stalls in question are collected, and considering that
the lease therefor terminates everyday, if the fee is paid daily, or every month
or every the state, through the municipal council, upon the expiration of such
lease, and considering further that the resolutions terminating the lease
granted to appellants herein, by declaring the stalls occupied by them as
vacant, are not repugnant or contradictory to any general law, there is no
plausible reason why the decision of the lower court and the order denying
appellants’ motion for new trial should not be affirmed.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants. It is so ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.
B. L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.