G.R. No. L-11219. May 07, 1958

On December 20, 1955, Pacita Salabaria Vda. de Suataron, in her behalf and as
mother of her minor children Eva and Romeo, filed a petition before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental praying that a writ of execution be issued
to enforce the award made by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in their
favor which was affirmed by the Supreme Court on May 25, 1955 and became final
and executory on June 16, 1955. It is claimed that of the total award of
P2,171.52, plus the sum of P100.00 as burial expenses, the Hawaiian-Philippine
Company, herein referred to as respondent, only paid the sum of P765.19, leaving
an unpaid balance of P1,506.33, plus 6 per cent interest thereon from January
29, 1952.

Respondent, in its amended answer, stated that, while the claim of petitioner
was pending before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and the Supreme Court,
petitioner had been drawing various amounts of money from respondent totalling
the sum of P1,519.45 which were withdrawn as payments on account of the
compensation to be awarded to petitioner. Consequently, after the award as
affirmed by the Supreme Court became final, respondent remitted, to the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission a check covering the balance in the amount of
P792.19. Respondent prayed that the petition be dismissed.

On March 28, 1956, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts and,
thereafter, the court issued an order denying the petition to dismiss and
ordering the issuance of the writ of execution prayed for to enforce in full the
award made by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission as affirmed by the Supreme
Court. The court held that under Section 51 of Act No. 3428, as amended by
Republic Act No. 772, its function is merely ministerial, or to order the
execution of the final award of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, which was denied,
whereupon respondent filed its notice of appeal and the record on appeal within
the reglementary period. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and
disapproved the appeal because under the law the decree of the court in the case
is unappealable. However, pleading that respondent is not appealing from the
judgment of the court to enforce the award but merely from the order denying its
motion for reconsideration wherein it asserted that it had already made full
payment of the award under section 43, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, which is
final in nature, the court allowed the appeal and suspended the effectivity of
the writ of execution.

The case is before us on appeal because it
involves purely a question of law.

Among the facts stipulated by the parties before the court a quo are:

“3. That, even while the case was pending determination by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission and by the proper courts of justice and on various dates
beginning on February 7, 1952, until May 17, 1955, plaintiff had been drawing
from the company various sums covered by appropriate vouchers which in the final
count totalled P1,750.00. On the said vouchers, all duly signed by Pacita S.
Suataron, appear the following notations made by the company and written on the
said vouchers when herein plaintiff signed them, acknowledging receipt of the
amounts covered by said vouchers:

‘(The amount covered by this voucher is a voluntary donation to the family of
the deceased policeman, Romeo Suataron; not as admission of legal liability on
the part of the company).’

“4. That the parties submit this case upon the question of whether or not the
total amount of P1,750.00, received by plaintiff under vouchers with notation
thereon as in the preceding paragraph provided, shall be construed as payments
made in settlement of defendant’s compensation liability under the law, the
herein plaintiff contending that being ‘voluntary donations’ they should not be
so counted and the defendant should be adjudged still liable for the balance of
the P2,271.52 awarded, after deducting the sum only of P860.64, representing the
amount paid by the company through the Workmen’s Compensation Commission with
interest at the legal rate from June 17, 1955 until fully paid. On the other
hand, defendant’s stand is that it has more than fully paid such compensation to
herein plaintiff.”

Section 51 of Act No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772, provides:

“SEC. 51. Enforcement of award.-Any party in interest may file in any court
of record! in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred a certified copy
of a decision of any referee or the Commissioner, from which no petition for
review or appeal has been taken within the time allowed therefor, as the case
may be, or a certified copy of a memorandum of agreement duly approved by the
Commissioner, whereupon the Court shall render a decree or judgment in
accordance therewith and notify the parties thereof.

“The decree or
judgment shall have the same effect, and all proceedings in relation thereto
shall thereafter be the same as though the decree or judgment had been rendered
in a suit duly heard and tried by the Court, except that there shall be no
appeal therefrom.

“The Commissioner shall, upon application by the proper party or the Court
before which,such action is instituted, issue a certification that no petition
for review or appeal within the time prescribed by section forty-nine hereof has
been taken by the respondent.”

It appears from the provision of law above-quoted that when a party in
interest files in the proper court a certified copy of the decision of a referee
or commissioner which has become final, “the court shall render a decree or
judgment in accordance therewith and notify the parties, thereof.” The decree or
judgment shall have the same effect as though it had been rendered in a suit
duly heard or tried by the court, “except that there shall be no appeal
therefrom.” In other words, the function of the court in such a case is merely
to render judgment in accoradance with the award of the referee or commissioner,
and not to modify or alter it as a party may desire, for if the same is allowed
over the objection of the opposing party, it may become controversial which
would be a proper subject of appeal. Yet the law expressly provides that from
such judgment or decree no appeal may be taken, which shows that the function of
the court is to enforce the award as certified by the commissioner. The lower
court therefore interpreted properly the law when it declined to entertain the
claim of deduction invoked by respondent in view of alleged payments made by it
during the pendency of the proceedings.

Respondent claims that, even while this case was pending determination by the
Workmen’s Compensation Commission and by the proper courts of justice, plaintiff
had withdrawn from respondent various sums of money covered by appropriate
vouchers which amount to Pl,750.00, which partial payments should be considered
as payments in advance of the compensation that may be awarded in favor of
petitioner. Petitioner on the other hand contends that those payments were made
as “voluntary donations” given by respondent to the family of the deceased and
as such cannot be deducted from the award. Since these partial payments were
made before the finality of the award, or while the same was still pending
review by the Supreme Court, this matter should have been taken up by respondent
when the award was affirmed by the Supreme Court and the case was returned to
the Workmen’s Compensation Commission for its enforcement. It was then the
proper time for respondent to raise the question whether the payments so made
were payments in advance, as it now contends, or mere voluntary donations as
contended by petitioner. The Commission would then have the opportunity to
determine the issue and make the corresponding adjustment in the award as may be
proper. At any rate, this step could have been taken by respondent before
petitioner filed her petition before the proper court under section 51 of Act
No. 3428, as amended by Republic Act No. 772. As the case now stands, the award
has become final and executory, and the function of the court is merely to
enforce it. This is the mandate of the law.

Wherefore, the appeal is dismissed. The order of the trial court dated June
29, 1956 is affirmed. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.