G. R. No. L-10215. April 30, 1958

This is  an appeal by  the plaintiff  from an  order of the Court  of First  Instance of Batangas, dismissing the complaint,  upon motion of the defendants, on  the ground that the cause  of action  was barred  by the statute of limitations.

The complaint was filed on December 6, 1954 and recited that Mariano Rodriguez Varela, appellant’s  brother, died intestate in Batangas, Batangas, on September 5,  1940 and left  an estate worth P45.000 which was  settled in  a written agreement  among the heirs dated February  14,  1941  and duly approved by the court on April 7, 1941.   Said agreement provided that Carmelo  Bautista, also known as Carmelo Varela (father of appellees) was the acknowledged natural child of the deceased Mariano E.  Varela; that the appellant, who had  long been absent and unheard  from, would be given a share equivalent to P12,000 which Carmelo Bautista would satisfy in money or property  upon  the appearance  of the appellant. The latter  seeks to recover said amount from  the appellees  who,  as successors  of Carmelo Bautista, allegedly refused and have still refused to pay the same.

The lower court  ruled that more  than ten years had elapsed since accrual  of  appellant’s  cause of action on April 7, 1941 when the agreement in question was  approved by the court and that, for purposes of prescription, appellant’s knowledge or lack  of  knowledge of his right was immaterial.   This  was a plain error consequent  upon the wrong supposition  that the  cause of  action  accrued on April 7, 1941.  The agreement  provided that  the  sum of P12,000  would be paid to the appellant upon his  appearance, and no period was fixed for said purpose.   It is not  denied that the appellant was unaware  of the  arrangement until he returned to the Philippines from  the United States in November,  1945, when upon his  appearance the obligor  had failed to comply  with his covenant. Hence appellant’s right to sue started  only from the moment he presented  himself and was not paid.  It would be absurd to  expect  the  appellant to  so present  himself without in the first  place knowing the  existence of  the obligation in his favor.  The situation may be likened to an indebtedness evidenced by a written document,  payable within  a stated  period, where the cause of action would accrue  only  upon the expiration of the stipulated period in case payment is  not  made,—certainly  not  from  the date of  the  agreement. It  would  make no  difference whether appellant’s right be based on the agreement  of February 14, 1941 or on the order of  the court on April 7, 1841, because  the  result would be  the same;  namely, that the obligation  would be deemed to mature upon  the appearance of the appellant.  Let it be noted that the order of April 7, did not change the terms of the agreement of  February  14.

Wherefore, the appealed order is reversed and the case remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.   So  ordered, with costs  against the appellees.

Bengzon,  Montemayor, Reyes, A.,  Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.