G.R. No. L-10164. February 28, 1958

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are not in dispute. Benigno Diaz, a widower residing in said city,
died on November 7, 1944, leaving a will and a codicil, which were admitted to
probate shortly after his death. The codicil contained, among other things, the
following provisions:

“9.o-En caso de muerte de alguno o de todos los legatarios nombrados por mi,
seran beneficiarios o sea pasaran los legados a favor solamente de los
descendientes y ascendientes legitimos, pero no a los viudos conyuges.

“10.o-Transcurridos diez o quince años despues de mi muerte todas mis
propiedades, muebles or inmuebles, derechos y acciones, cuando asi convenga a
los legatarios y los precios sean ventajosos, pueden proceder a la vent a de
todos dando preferemcia a los legatarios y de su importe total se deduciran mil
pesos (P1,000.00) para las cuatro hijos de mi difunto liermano Fabian, todos los
gastos y reservando una cantidad suficiente y bien calculada para sufragar los
gastos para otros dies ailos para las mandas y misas. El resto se distribuira a
las siguientes personas que aun viven, 0 a sus descendientes legitimos:

“A Isabel M. de Santiago-cincuenta por ciento (50&) Los hijos de Domingo
Legarda-treinta por ciento ( 30%) Filornena Diaz – dies por ciento (10%) Nestor
H. Santiago-diez por ciento (10%)”

The proceedings for the administration of the estate of Benigno Diaz were
closed in 1950 and the estate was there- after put under the administration of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands as trustee for the benefit of the legatees.
Early in 1955, the trustee bank, with the approval of the court, sold some
properties belonging to the estate as Authorized in paragraph 10th of the
codicil and thereafter sought court authority to distribute the net proceeds of
the sale among the various legatees named, among them Filomena Diaz. As the
latter was already dead – she died February 8, 1954, survived by her second
husband Iñigo Arguelles and two children by her first marriage named Onesima
Belen and Milagros Belen de Olaguera – the trustee proposed to pay to her
children the share that would have corresponded to her had she been living. That
share amounted to P14,836.57, being 10% of the sum to be distributed.

Notified of the proposed distribution, Filomena’s second husband Inigo
Arguelles, who had. been appointed by the court special administrator of her
estate, laid claim to the said sum of P14,836.57 and asked that it be paid to
the estate of the deceased Filomena instead of to her children. In view of this
claim, the court in its resolution of March 28, 1955 approved the distribution
proposed but ordered that “the 10% which corresponds to the deceased Filomena
Diaz x x x be retained pending resolution of the question of to whom it should
be delivered.”

On August 3, 1955, Iñigo Arguelles petitioned the court to have the said 10%
share delivered to him as special administrator of Filomena’s estate. The
petition was opposed by Filomena’s daughter Milagros Belen de Olaguera who, on
her part, prayed that the share be delivered to her and to her sister Onesima
Belen. Resolving the conflict, the court in its order of September 16, 1955,
declared:

“That the share of Filomena Diaz in the residue of the proceeds of the sale
of the properties covered by paragraph 10 of the codicil aforementioned does not
and should not form part of her estate; it pertains to her legitimate
descendants; and

“That the aforesaid share of Filomena Diaz should be distributed not only
between her children, Milagros Belen de Olaguera and Onesima D. Belan, but also
among her other legitimate descendants, if any, for ‘descendientes’ include not
only children but also grandchildren, great-grandchildren, etc.; and in this
connection, it is not amiss to observe that one may be a descendant.” and yet
not be an heir, and vice versa; one may be an heir and yet not be a
descendant.”

From the above resolution, Iñigo Arguelles appealed directly to this Court,
the questions involved being purely legal.

The main question for determination is whether the share in dispute should
belong to the estate of the deceased Filomena Diaz or to her descendants.

The terms of the codicil are clear enough. It provides for the sale of the
properties of the estate of the testator after the lapse of ten or fifteen years
after his death and for the distribution of the net proceeds of the sale, or rather what remained thereof after deducting certain amounts, among various
persons named or described “que aun viven, o a sus descendientes legitimos“.
Needless to say, the phrase “que aun viven” can only refer to persons still
living at the time of the distribution. Paragraph 10th of the codicil should be
construed in connection with its paragraph 9th, which provides that in case of
death of any legatee, the corresponding legacy should pass to the legatee’s
legitimate descendants and ascendants but not to their surviving spouses. To
adjudge to the estate of Filomena Diaz the share of the proceeds of the sale
which would have corresponded to her if she had lived would violate the wish of
the testator as expressed in said paragraph 9th because it would enable
Filomena’s surviving spouse, as a forced heir, to participate in said share
once it is incorporated in her estate.

Appellant claims that Filomena Diaz succeeded to the inheritance from the
moment of the testator’s death thereby acquiring a right to the legacy which she
could transmit to her heirs upon her death. The legacy, however, refers to the
balance of the proceeds of the sale of the testator’s estate after deducting
what might be required for certain purposes. That sale, as provided in the
codicil, was to take place only after ten or fifteen years from the testator’s
death. Needless to say, the balance of the proceeds of such sale can only be
determined and distributed after the sale, and as already stated It is evident
from the provision of the codicil that the testator intended to bequeath said
balance to the legatees named therein who may still be living at the time of the
distribution.

Appellant also claims that the share in dispute should be distributed only
among Filomena’s children and not among all her descendants, irrespective of
degree, as ordered by the lower court. We fail to see what possible interest
appellant could have in that matter. Objection thereto should come from the
children of Filomena. But it does not appear that they have questioned the order
appealed from.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,
concur.